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The platoon leader flops down next to his rucksack after checking the perimeter one last time before getting some well-deserved sleep. He asks his radio/telephone operator (RTO) if the company has sent any new orders for tomorrow morning. The expected negative response tells him it's going to be another long night. He puts his head down on the backrest of his ruck and tells the RTO to wake him when they finally call. It is just after midnight and the platoon leader is asleep in minutes. Thirty minutes later, the RTO shakes him awake, and as the platoon leader takes the radio handset, he is jolted back into the battle rhythm at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).

One of the most common problems encountered by units conducting operations at the JRTC is their inability to manage the limited amount of time available for mission preparation, especially during the low- intensity conflict (LIC) phase. Clearly, the JRTC LIC phase is a unique training opportunity for our Army. No other CTC presents a Task Force brigade/battalion (bde/bn) the opportunity to conduct true continuous operations. Three separate missions (movement-to-contact (MTC)/approach march, defend, deliberate attack) loosely tied together with stay-behind forces, division or brigade reconnaissance forces, hardly captures the challenges and demands of continuous planning, preparation, and execution. To effectively command and control units during continuous operations, units must develop efficiency in their mission planning and preparation process. To this end, units attempt to synchronize the actions of the commander and staff at brigade and battalion levels with the troop-leading procedures (TLPs) required at the company and platoon levels. They refer to the resulting schedule of daily events as their battle rhythm. Unfortunately, all too often it appears that the foundation of their battle rhythm is daily briefings and meetings such as the following: commander's update briefs, commander's conference calls, battlefield update briefs, tactical operations center (TOC) update briefs, shift change briefs, battlefield circulation and targeting meetings. It is the authors' contention that the true foundation of battle rhythm should be the timely dissemination of orders to subordinates down to the platoon level. The various meetings and briefings exist only to make the daily orders process possible. Battle rhythm must also undoubtedly strike a delicate balance between responsiveness to the changing enemy situation and consideration for the TLPs of subordinate units. However, lack of adequate planning, rehearsals, and preparation at the platoon and company levels almost always leads to disastrous results in contacts with the opposing forces (OPFOR).

An effective battle rhythm will help the commander and staff synchronize the information management process (briefs, battlefield circulation, and conference calls) and planning sessions (targeting meetings, sync meetings) with the timely dissemination of daily or reoccurring orders to subordinates. This article will ultimately create and explain a suggested brigade and battalion battle rhythm that should prove efficient and provide the required balance between responsiveness to the enemy and the needs of subordinates.

Experience at the JRTC shows that units habitually try to force four levels of planning (brigade through platoon) into a 24-hour period. Using the standard "1/3, 2/3" rule, they assume that this will provide adequate preparation time for their subordinates. However, a timeline of the resulting orders process does not support this assumption. In fact the old 1/3, 2/3 rule does not work. Although it sounds good, it lacks the detail required to establish an effective battle rhythm. (See Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Note that in this example (the norm for most rotations), the platoon leader starts his planning and preparation at approximately 2200 or later. The significance of the timing is important. The platoon leader will conduct 100 percent of his TLPs during the hours of darkness! With no light-tight facilities, he will work out his plan under a poncho with a red lens flashlight held between his teeth. We've all been there. Less security-minded individuals would simply violate all standards of light discipline. Issuing the resulting platoon order in similar conditions further degrades the overall product, not to mention the desired rehearsals following the order. Figure 1 also shows that the final hour of the company commander's time, probably coinciding with his operations order (OPORD), is after dark; a true noise and light discipline nightmare. To really be effective, battle rhythm must be focused on providing subordinate leaders down to platoon level sufficient time to conduct TLPs prior to execution of combat operations. While this sounds fundamental, the vast majority of companies and platoons at the JRTC are given missions to execute on an immediate or nearly immediate timeline. When orders are given for immediate execution, the unit's performance is severely degraded, and results are often disastrous. Immediate execution orders virtually eliminate the opportunity for rehearsals or pre-combat inspections (PCIs). This causes platoons and squads to arrive at the battle without essential equipment, with only limited understanding of what is expected of them, and it forces them to execute with little or no situational awareness. At the soldier level, it causes confusion and demoralization when soldiers believe their leaders are not willing to keep them informed.

Several considerations go into the development of a viable unit battle rhythm to include required planning time, the availability of required information, conditions under which subordinates must prepare and issue orders, and, most importantly, the demands and pace of current operations. A backward planning sequence with established minimum-planning times for each successive level of command creates our framework. (See Figure 2).

Commanders at higher levels must enforce timelines that ensure subordinate commanders and staffs have sufficient time to complete their orders process and TLPs. The most sacred planning time should be that of the platoon leaders!

Looking at the basic time requirement for platoon and company TLPs, experience at JRTC shows us that four hours should be sufficient in most cases. If, however, the unit needs resupply or special equipment for an operation, it may take longer. To prevent the poncho and flashlight fiasco mentioned above, the platoon leader must receive his order and start TLPs at approximately 1600. To make this a reality, companies must receive their orders and start their TLP by 1200. The obvious and anticipated argument of doubtful readers is that any battle rhythm that has a company commander conducting mission analysis, planning, and orders preparation starting at noon is unacceptable because it takes him out of the fight during the middle of the day. Our counter argument is based on a number of observations.

Doctrinally, the search and attack (S&A) technique incorporates a balanced concept of enemy destruction, area denial, force protection, and information collection activities. Company missions are normally intended to accomplish one of these four purposes. The latter three activities, which consistently account for greater than 80 percent of the available S&A time, are typically characterized by a decentralized scheme of maneuver. Typically, this would include multiple, coordinated squad/platoon reconnaissance, ambush, and combat patrols, or the establishment of platoon-level defensive positions. The company headquarters element is almost always static, positioned in a central location to command and control the platoon efforts. In this configuration, a company commander should be able to plan for future operations by either turning current operations over to the executive officer (XO) or personally conducting current operations and future planning simultaneously (less preferred).

Enemy destruction operations, on the other hand, usually involve a scheme of maneuver with multiple, mutually supporting platoon movements or activities. The company headquarters typically moves with the assault element and is obviously in no position or configuration to even think about future planning. However, our observations also tell us that the most effective company-level, enemy destruction operations observed at JRTC are conducted between two hours before daylight and three to four hours after daylight. Encirclement of known or suspected enemy positions postured prior to beginning morning nautical time (BMNT) and then systematically reduced during the first hours of daylight have the greatest likelihood of success. In contrast, continuous company-level movements from BMNT to early evening nautical twilight (EENT) using an approach march technique are the least effective. By noon, therefore, a typical company will have or probably should have reverted to one of the other S&A activities and started looking toward future operations. Are these observations of company-level operations the approved solution for conducting S&A? Absolutely not, but they reflect a consistent trend on which to build a foundation for a reasonable, long-term, sustainable battle rhythm.

For a battalion to get hard-copy orders to the companies by 1200, it has to start early and not waste any time. Figure 3 shows the typical timeline of early morning battalion commander and staff activities to include staff update, BN and BDE conference calls, and battlefield circulation. It also depicts this timeline with a recommended application of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and the targeting/synchronization methodology - detect, decide, deliver, and assess (D3A) - superimposed. The resulting battalion-level battle rhythm should make orders dissemination by noon a reality.

Figure 3.

The first activity of the day initiates the MDMP and targeting/synchronization process. Most units conduct some type of morning update brief for the commander. Many combine their shift change brief with this update, which is an excellent timesaving technique. The current format is an information briefing during which the battle staff presents their current understanding of battle command information routinely required by the commander. A critical look at the normal content of these briefings reveals an obvious parallel with the doctrinal mission analysis brief and, for our specific purposes, the decide function of the targeting/synchronization process. With some preparation by the staff prior to this briefing and a small change in format, it can easily be turned into a decision briefing for the commander resulting in commander's planning guidance for future operations. During this decision brief, the staff will provide their current staff estimates, an analysis of the next day's mission based on orders from higher headquarters, a future enemy situation/event template, and an updated high-value target list (HVTL). They would also recommend changes to the high-payoff target list (HPTL) and commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).

After he provides the planning staff with his guidance, the commander takes part in the brigade conference call. The brigade conference call serves multiple purposes, the most important of which is the backbrief of the following day's plan. The TOC battle staff monitors this call while the XO leads the primary staff into course of action (COA) development, completing the detect, deliver, and assess methodology, and creating a proposed COA. Following the conference call, the planning staff conducts a quick COA decision brief. Adjustments may be necessary based on feedback from the bde conference call. The commander directs an approved COA that allows the planning staff to transition into course-of-action analysis wargaming as the commander initiates a conference call with the company commanders. The conference call should serve at least two purposes. First, the company commanders provide up-to-the-minute feedback on the current operations and the projected status when they complete their mission. Second, the battalion commander and the battle staff would provide the companies with an initial warning order (WARNO) for the next day's operations.

After wargaming, the staff should brief the commander on the plan for final approval. Once the plan is approved, the staff quickly produces the appropriate operation order products: fragmentary order (FRAGO), situation/event template (SIT/EVENT TEMP), reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) matrix, and target list/overlay. The commander prepares to depart on battlefield circulation. When the commander departs, he should have a hard-copy product to issue to his subordinate commanders. Since the resulting dissemination by the commander will be sequential, the staff should also publish a detailed WARNO via FM radio to the companies. In some situations, dissemination of the hard-copy order may also occur by having one or more of the company commanders come to the TOC. Regardless of the method used, this sequence should provide company commanders sufficient time to employ all of the TLP steps. An evening conference call allows company commanders to back-brief their plans for the following morning and allows the commander/battle staff to provide additional information and fine-tune synchronization requirements.

It was previously suggested that four command levels could not effectively plan and execute within a 24-hour period. The authors have provided a battalion-level battle rhythm example starting approximately 24 hours prior to execution that meets the needs of company and platoon TLPs. What remains is identifying an effective and complementary brigade battle rhythm. Doctrinally, brigades are told to plan 24 to 48 hours out. To meet the demands of fighting a guerrilla force that specializes in quick-hitting, ever-changing operations to attack friendly high-value targets, the planning window should tend more toward 24 hours than 48. A workable solution appears below. Once again, it depicts a "standard" evening brigade timeline with a recommended application of the targeting/synchronization methodology D3A superimposed. The shaded portion portrays a complete 36-hour mission planning cycle.

The commander's update brief can initiate the targeting/synchronization process just as it did in the battalion example, or the process can begin following the evening conference call. Regardless, the brigade starts its planning no more than 36 hours prior to execution. The planning process could actually begin later in the evening to draw closer to the 24-hour window; however, leader/staff rest plans during the "relative" quiet hours after midnight would obviously conflict. This schedule limits the potential changes to the brigade-level situation to significant events and enemy activities during an additional 12 hours of darkness. While the enemy will plan many of his attacks to coincide with the late night and early morning hours, the response to these actions will hopefully be addressed by a planned dedicated reserve or by a branch of plans and not significantly affect the planned concept of operations. Once the process starts, the brigade staff should be able to conduct the MDMP using the targeting/synchronization methodology and produce a FRAGO with required products in about six hours. TAC FAX or courier can disseminate the resulting products to subordinate battalions at about midnight. The schedule of brigade activities clearly fits well with battalion efforts noted above. This completes the proposed task force battle rhythm.

To be effective during search-and-attack operations, the brigade task force must "find, fix, and finish" an elusive enemy that often operates in small, decentralized organizations. During these operations, platoons and companies will be the primary fighters. To be successful in these efforts, commanders in the field must allow these same subordinates to adequately plan and prepare prior to execution of combat operations. Rotation after rotation, brigade task forces struggle to find a battle rhythm that provides the right balance between responsiveness to the changing enemy situation and consideration for the TLPs of subordinate units. The solution presented in this article is a combination of some valiant efforts by a number of superb commanders and their organizations. The components of this battle rhythm have been successfully executed at various levels, but never as a coordinated and synchronized process from brigade down to platoon. A task force that collectively "buys in" to the proposed battle rhythm will find that elusive balance and establish a sound foundation for successful sustained operations.

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