Military

Flashy units do some things exceptionally well but are weak in most areas. Exceptional units are consistent across the board. They place as much emphasis and importance on little things as they do on big things. It is called attention to detail.

One area in particular stands out as the benchmark of a successful unit -- Battletracking.

Successful units are extremely competent in reporting, battletracking, and situational awareness. Often units disregard this area as "the small stuff" that works itself out in the end. Such assumptions are disastrous and are often the root of failure.

Battletracking and situational awareness go hand in hand. Proper reporting procedures lead directly to accurate battletracking and ultimately to a thorough understanding of the tactical situation -- up and down the chain of command. Although many scoff at the notion of addressing this seemingly elementary procedure, units frequently struggle at CMTC because of poor reporting procedures, faulty information dissemination, and confusion in figuring out what to do with information once they receive it.

Accurate reporting is a critical ingredient. It enables a commander to see the battlefield. Yet few units have battle drills for -- or aggressively train for -- this important function.

The simplest approach is often the best approach. Reporting is no exception. Soldiers will know the significance of battlefield observations if they understand the commander's intent, the concept of the operation, and the commander's information requirements. The orders process frequently violates the 1/3 - 2/3 rule and the information that gets to the soldier on the ground is either vague or hard to understand. If the commander's intent lacks clarity, is poorly written, or not properly disseminated, then soldiers cannot equate battlefield observations with how the commander wants to fight. The same holds true for information requirements. If the commander is not clear on what he must know to press the fight and if he leaves this requirement to the staff, then the fog of war will definitely prevail.

Reporting battle drills are not complex. Obviously the SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time and equipment) format is the basis for reporting. But don't ignore proficiency in other soldier skills.

EXAMPLES:

• Land navigation and map reading are critical, they are often the cause of improper reporting (a bad grid).
• Threat vehicle identification.
• Composition of threat units/elements.
• Attack criteria.

For reporting, the bottom line is discipline -- pure and simple.

Regardless of how a unit refines its reporting procedures, soldiers must report: (1) crossing the start point (SP); (2) their location, and (3) what they observe. Reports must be timely, accurate, and concise. Disciplined units train hard in reporting procedures and are subsequently successful in winning battles.

The tactical operations center (TOC) must have an equally refined battle drill. The S-3 must establish procedures to effectively receive information and disseminate it not only within the TOC, but also to subordinate units and higher headquarters. Information overload is common; therefore, the S-3 must train his TOC team how to recognize what is significant and, more importantly, how to analyze the data. This is a great undertaking and one that a TOC will not master if it waits until it arrives at a Combat Training Center (CTC) to develop.

Often the TOC operations revert to a glorified switchboard with high-paid radio telephone operators (RTOs). Information is passed, receipt is acknowledged, and nothing else happens. Frequently, there are also multiple logs to deal with. The S-3 or the commander must read the operations log, the intelligence log, and the fire direction center's log, to piece the current situation together.

The TOC information flow battle drill must include procedures to inform everyone in the TOC of pertinent information.

Use routing slips, hourly huddles to update the TOC team, or some criteria for announcing immediate critical information. The S-3 should assign responsibility for maintaining charts, the log (DA Form 1594) entry standards, and managing the TOC "inbox." This is not a complex procedure, but we routinely observe problems in this area.

EXAMPLE: During a recent rotation, the battalion fire direction center (Bn FDC) lost communications with the firing units. The counterfire cell received an acquisition, and the S-2 received a spot report on enemy activity near a named area of interest (NAI). No one told the S-3, who was monitoring a situation on the Brigade Command net. The S-3 believed that he had indirect fire capability and the only situation he was tracking was the situation on the brigade net.

Technique: The S-3 must develop a practical system of information management. The S-3 cannot do it alone. He must use his battle captains and operation sergeants to assist him. Information management within the TOC is a team effort and all personnel must keep focused on the current situation and the magnitude of information coming into the TOC.

All too often we observe units moving into contaminated areas, minefields, or improperly recognizing battlefield belligerents. These shortcomings result in needless casualties and a loss of combat power which could have been prevented if soldiers had been aware of the situation. Situational awareness is the result of proper reporting and battletracking procedures. An informed soldier is a combat multiplier. He understands his role in the battle, how his actions will affect the outcome, and what dangers around him could impede him from accomplishing his mission.

Battle Rhythm

Let's Fix Company-Level Fire Support