CTC Quarterly Bulletin, 3d Qtr, FY 99, No. 99-14, Oct 99; Battle

BATTLE COMMAND INSIGHTS

by LTC James Zanol, Cdr, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR (NTC OPFOR)

Battle Command means action. It means accomplishing the mission at least cost to your troops in land operations - the tough, unforgiving arena that is land combat. It requires of battle commanders a lifetime of practice and study to ready for those minutes, hours, days or years of execution in actual operations. Actual battle is the great auditor of how well prepared the battle commander really is. That arena is no place for amateurs.
--GEN Frederick M. Franks, Battle Command1

This paper shares some techniques and procedures that the National Training Center's opposing force (OPFOR) has developed and perfected during the past two years of force-on-force battles at the National Training Center (NTC). These techniques are relevant to effective battle command and the orchestration of the battlefield operating systems. Prior to my experience in the 11th Armored Cavalry, I more readily discerned potential difficulties associated with courses of action than identifying the advantages gained through bold maneuver. Repetitive training, standard procedures, battle drills, and a clear, universally understood concept of the operation are what permits the NTC OPFOR to take advantage of fleeting, unpredictable battlefield opportunities. Identifying an opportunity, deciding to act on it, then leading, is the essence of battle command at the tactical level.

At brigade and battalion levels, battle command is inextricably linked to the effective integration of battlefield operating systems. To see himself, the enemy and terrain; identify possibilities; and issue orders to defeat the enemy, the commander must understand the systems at his disposal. This is done while always being mindful of his tactical purpose. Although this paper is organized by battlefield operating systems, the emphasis must be on integrating those systems into a coherent concept of operation.

THE OPFOR REGIMENT

The leadership and responsibility of the small unit leaders at the squad and platoon, the perfection of the training of these units, must be given greater emphasis, and less emphasis placed on the operation of the larger units such as battalion, regiment, and division. The division will succeed only as the platoon succeeds.2
--MG E. N. Harmon

The OPFOR Regiment has a distinct way of fighting. When a new soldier, NCO, or officer joins the OPFOR Regiment, they learn the SOPs, battledrills, TTPs, field craft, and, most importantly, the warrior ethos of the Regiment (see CALL Quarterly Bulletin No. 97-20, Dec 97, Training to Achieve an OPFOR Level of Proficiency). The battlefield skills that allow the OPFOR soldiers to close with and destroy the enemy are paramount. Excellence, aggressiveness and success are expected, and their effect is extremely powerful. Every soldier in the regiment shares a common understanding on how the unit fights, what actions must take place, and what is possible given the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available. That common understanding comes from repeated tough and challenging training on the NTC battlefield. The result is trained, confident, aggressive soldiers, crews, platoons, and companies. Trained soldiers and leaders, a solid SOP, commonly understood doctrine and tactics, and tough, challenging, repetitive training are the foundations for effective maneuver. The endstate is a unit capable of responding immediately to orders or acting appropriately in their absence on a fluid battlefield. The OPFOR level of training permits leaders to focus on execution rather than the development of detailed plans and orders.

BATTLE COMMAND

Battle command is the art of battle decision-making, leading, and motivating soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplish missions. It includes visualizing the current state and future states, formulating concepts of operations to get from one to the other, and doing so at least cost. It also includes assigning missions, prioritizing and allocating resources, selecting the critical time and place to act, and knowing how and when to make adjustments during the fight.3--FM 100-5

Leave it to Army doctrine writers to make such a passionless definition of the art of command, an otherwise extremely personal, cognitive, emotional, and professional act. Battle command is best described by terms such as coup d'oeil or fingerspitzengefuhl; insight into the right action to take immediately and in the near future is based upon the commander's personal estimate of the situation. The estimate is based on the lifetime of practice and study described by GEN Franks in the introduction. Extensive maneuver experience is the essential element of battle command, and commanders must be able to envision the development of the fight in time and space.

The commander's leadership style must create an environment conducive to effective battle command. The commander must remain calm and confident under pressure. A cool head leads to an accurate commander's estimate and coherent battle orders that are relevant to the situation. A calm demeanor is contagious and permits subordinates to focus on the mission.

Effective communications are equally important. The radio net must stay clear and efficient, not cluttered with inaccurate, incomplete reports or overly detailed and specific instructions. Because subordinates understand the commander's concept of the operation, they can separate important information from potential distracters. When the commander sets and sustains sharp, succinct communications within his unit, command and control becomes a combat multiplier and is a key factor in allowing the unit to act faster than the enemy can respond.

Effective communication will not remove the inherent uncertainty of battle. Commanders must accept risk and take decisive action. Bold action taken when you are uncertain will most often succeed because the enemy probably does not know what is happening either. Often, the commander must act when information is incomplete, the situation confused and uncertain. He must develop a personal tolerance to friction in order to maintain the mental energy and imagination to see tactical opportunities. Let the TAC and S3 fight while you think, make decisions, and issue orders. If you are controlling the movement of individual vehicles, you are not commanding your unit.

KNOW YOURSELF

Every unit, leader and soldier has strengths and weaknesses. Know your strengths. Every unit fights most effectively in a particular way, so use them in that way.

Build a common understanding of how you fight throughout your force. Initiative, aggressiveness, and tenacity are possible when every soldier in your unit knows how their actions contribute to the operation as a whole. Further, they must understand that the success of the operation hinges on their own personal or small unit actions.

Know how to get every asset into the fight. Make a mental inventory of the assets available to you -- special munitions, sorties, attack helicopters, as well as maneuver units. As you are thinking ahead in time, review this list for assets you still have available. Often one type of munition or asset is still available that you can use to drive home your attack, isolate enemy forces or create new opportunities for action.

Do not become predictable. When your actions are predictable, your opponent will learn your operating style and battle rhythm and find ways to minimize your strength and attack your vulnerabilities.

KNOW YOUR ENEMY

Consider the capabilities of your opponent's most effective systems and minimize their impact on your forces to protect your combat power. For example, to reduce the effectiveness of attack helicopters with standoff weapons, use broken terrain that provides cover and concealment for your force. This will prevent the attack helicopters from getting sufficient time to track you, and, instead, will cause them to close within range of your air defense and direct fire systems.

Consider the impact of weather and terrain upon friendly and enemy weapons and systems. High winds can prevent helicopters (or UAVs) from taking off (as well as rendering your obscuration plan ineffective). If these conditions exist, select a scheme of maneuver that otherwise might have been risky against attack helicopters.

Seek a maneuver option. Isolate strength and attack weakness. If you can envelop your opponent, a deeper envelopment is always better and more effective. Remain flexible in your offensive and defensive plans so that you can maneuver with your force to a position of advantage.

Take risk. Most often the action that looks risky at first glance is really less than you think. Fix the enemy with a small part of your force, and maneuver the mass of your combat power to a position of advantage. Know what actions to take to turn a potential course of action from that of a gamble to one of acceptable risk.

Most of the battles fought at the NTC without decisive results occur when the commander chooses a more conventional, less risky maneuver option rather than one that is bold and unexpected.

Do not tip your hand. Retain the most flexible position possible with your force until you absolutely have to make a decision (See CALL CTC Quarterly Bulletin No. 97-4, Jan 97, Decision Point Tactics). Allow more intelligence and combat information to come in and more situation development by the units in contact. This information is acquired by aggressive combat reconnaissance. Assume the enemy can see what you are doing unless you are absolutely sure he is blind. If you reposition in a manner to execute one or two schemes of maneuver while eliminating others, look for indicators that the enemy saw your move, such as whether or not the enemy repositioned forces to react to your deception measures. Do not, however, wait for "perfect information," because the course of events will depend, in part, on enemy intentions. The commander, once he has considered the possibilities, must act boldly.

Deception works. Keep deception plans simple and believable. Reinforce what the enemy is most likely to believe at the outset. In most cases at the tactical level, your deception efforts will get you only a few minutes of opportunity to exploit. Aim the majority of your deception efforts primarily at the individual, squad, and tank crew levels. These men are the first to make contact with the enemy and the last to get the intelligence update or the satellite imagery. Fool them long enough to execute your plan and gain an advantage. Deceive in depth; compliment your efforts at the level of contact with false radio traffic, smoke or special munitions.

Above all, give credit for success to the fighting man. I have learned that the commander's battle command skill and expertise comes from the men who are in the fight. Their success, aggressiveness, and tactical skill create the opportunity for decisive action at the commander's level. They, therefore, deserve to be led from the front by a leader who shares the pain of battle as well as the exhilaration of success.

LESSONS ON MANEUVER

.adopting a scheme of maneuver that allows you the widest range of options, then keeping your forces balanced so any of those options are available to you.4

All operations must include decisive, bold maneuver. We achieve greater success when the maneuver is more aggressive, deeper into the enemy flank, and violently executed. The unit must have the flexibility and agility to execute a scheme of maneuver that hits an enemy's weakness. Always look for the weakness in the enemy, and then concentrate combat power at that point. Units must maneuver to gain a position of advantage to place effective direct fire on the enemy. Use the terrain that provides the best opportunity to hit the enemy from an unexpected angle. Maneuver along unlikely axes of advance and avoid expected approaches. "Restricted" terrain becomes "unrestricted" when the enemy is not there. Force the enemy to fight in an area not of his choosing.

Always have an operational concept that includes multiple schemes of maneuver. The option selected depends on the initial disposition of the enemy and your assessment of his intentions. This "course of action" decision is often not made until contact with the enemy is achieved and the enemy commits to his own course of action. Multiple courses of action allow your unit to exploit the enemy's weakness. Rehearse all courses of action and clearly understand the criteria that will help you decide which one to execute. Keep all maneuver options available until you absolutely must commit, then commit with all assets available. If no weakness is seen, then maneuver to the ground that offers the best advantage to your force. The best example of this last point is the North Wall (NK 4018 to NK 5816) of the central corridor or the Washboard (vic. NK 2512) area at the NTC. The OPFOR Regiment can fight more effectively in this terrain than the units that it faces because of the soldiers' skillful use of the ground and the superior mobility of its smaller, lighter vehicles.

Effective defensive concepts include a fully developed scheme of maneuver. A defending unit must maneuver to mass its combat power against the enemy's main effort. An attacking force must mass, reveal its scheme of maneuver, main effort, point of penetration and economy of force sector. When that happens, the defender likewise can use a small force on the non-threatened flank and concentrate its combat power against the enemy.

The repositioning defending forces do not go directly to the point of penetration, but build depth in the engagement area to extend the depth and mass of concentrated direct fire and force the attacker to fight in two or more directions simultaneously. Repositioning forces must take up positions that, in addition to building depth, build mutually supporting crossing, direct fires. Units with stabilized weapons systems should be prepared to attack boldly into the enemy flank to exploit the shock effect of their initial volleys of fire. Force the enemy to fight in at least two directions. The NTC's OPFOR engagement area ("kill sack") is built around repositioning T80s, BMPs, AT5s, 2A45Ms, AT3s, and small arms fire. The combined effect of massed and distributed fires is devastating. Remember that depth extends toward the enemy. A counterattack launched forward of the defense into the enemy's flank builds depth.

Light infantry units most often prepare defensive positions on the flanks of the battle positions to tie into terrain. Again, like the combat vehicles, if the infantry position is out of the fight, they must be prepared to remount and move to a position to contribute to the defense. The maneuver plan must dedicate the assets to keep the infantry mobile. A single 5-ton truck working a shuttle can reposition a company of infantry up to several kilometers in an hour. Most defensive battles last long enough for this repositioning to occur in time for light infantry to rejoin the fight or reset the conditions on the battlefield. Maneuver of dismounted infantry must always be a part of any plan and its branches or sequels.

All systems in the unit must maneuver. Tanks and IFVs attack to seek a flank or advantageous position. However, artillery, air defense, engineers, IEW, reconnaissance, and logistics must also move to concentrate their effects on the enemy. Everything masses. The standing order for every element in any maneuver-oriented formation is to find and attack the enemy. All combat and combat support leaders must understand the concept of operation and take action to support the main effort.

Do not sit on your objective or support-by-fire position if the enemy is not there and you are not contributing to the fight.

LESSONS ON FIRES

The concept of fires and the scheme of maneuver must be explained together to have a fully integrated concept. In addition, fires seem more effective when very top-driven. In the OPFOR, the concept of fires is developed to specifically support the scheme of maneuver of the regiment. The MRB commander gives little input into the scheme of fires; however, when the concept of fires is integrated into and strongly supports the regimental scheme of maneuver, the MRB commander will get the fires he needs when he needs them. The fires concept begins with the commander's guidance to ensure that fires and maneuver are mutually supporting. The OPFOR commander's guidance for fires is:

1) They must support the regimental scheme of maneuver.

2) They must support the main effort.

3) The target must be massed, stationary, and in targetable terrain.

If the call for fire does not meet these criteria, it probably will not be shot. The commander and FSO must totally understand each other in the use of the criteria. The commander must clearly state where he wants the effects of fires. For example, when the best massed, stationary target is not at the point of main effort, the commander may still want the suppressive effects of fire at that point to isolate enemy strength while maneuver forces attack his weakness.

The concept of fires must be extremely simple and flexible. Having a small number of essential fire support tasks helps focus all the fires available to the unit on the most important part of the battlefield at the required time. Too many fire support tasks causes a smattering of fires all over the battlefield, rather than concentrated, massed effects at the decisive point. The commander's guidance must provide this focus. The OPFOR commander's guidance to his fire support officer ((FSO) an armor lieutenant5) includes task and purpose for field artillery, CAS, and special munitions, generally by phase of fires or operation. This allows him flexibility to maneuver field artillery assets as needed to support each phase and task to achieve the desired purpose. The commander's guidance and intent for fires should be very simple: fires are massed on large enemy formations on targetable terrain to support the maneuver of the regiment.

Like the maneuver plan, fires must be flexible. Detailed targeting matrices based on an assumed, scripted-out enemy course of action are guaranteed not to survive contact with the enemy and often preclude effective integration of fire support into the overall concept. Techniques of fire, however, add effectiveness, flexibility, and survivability of indirect fire assets. Understand the capabilities of the indirect fire weapons systems and use techniques of fire to increase their effectiveness. These techniques will also increase the effects of fires in support of the scheme of maneuver.

The multiple aimpoint technique of fire makes missions more effective. This technique uses three grid aimpoints to surround the target with fire, increasing the effects on the target. No matter how sophisticated targeting, ballistic computing, delivery systems, and smart munitions get, target location error will always be present. Using multiple aimpoints reduces the effect of target location error and maximizes the fire effects on the target. The technique is very simple: each firing battery fires at a grid 50 meters from the target; the effects of all three batteries overlap at the target grid. This technique of fire exists in the AFTADS and the Battle Command System (BCS) as a BCS special. The figure below shows how this looks.

Volume of fire is another technique of fire that is critically important. Fires must be massed; battalions must fire at targets. Very often at the NTC, we see units fire inadequate volumes of fire, failing to achieve the effects desired by the commander. Massed fires used with multiple aimpoints are very effective. Most often, units will fire a target with multiple aimpoints with only one platoon of the firing battery. Use a battalion, as a minimum, to fire this mission -- one battery firing at one aimpoint. This ensures that killing effects are placed on the target. Using battalions instead of platoons may seem an inefficient use of assets; however, if the commander's guidance and targeting criteria are being strictly followed, battalions must be fired.

Volley firing is another very powerful technique of fire. It uses all assets available to your unit and puts massive effects on the enemy simultaneously. Volley firing is especially effective against high payoff targets. The integration of reconnaissance, intelligence, and electronic warfare is vital in this connection. These assets can find and report the location of command posts, attack helicopter assembly areas, UAV ground-based control nodes, artillery observers, or any other high payoff target. The FSO builds this target list and simultaneously strikes these targets at the right time for greatest effect on the enemy. Volley firing also protects the artillery systems by overloading the target acquisition system with too many targets, slowing or completely shutting down the counter-fire system.

Offensive fires incorporate the principles described above: massed fires, at a massed target, on known, targetable terrain. Fire employed any other way diffuses their effect for the unit. The key for the battle commander is to monitor the current execution of fires while anticipating where fires must focus for the next action. Anticipation is key. For effective fire to be available at the right place and in time, the commander must give the order, explain his intent and effects desired in time so that the staff can get to work. Also, with this lead time before execution, the XO and battle staff can orchestrate other combat power resources (CAS, EW, and air defense) to further reinforce the maneuver action. Again, envisioning the development of the operation in time and space is vital.

Defensive fires are employed in much the same way with commander's guidance and target criteria. The subordinate units must provide the 10-digit GPS grids to the target reference points in their defense. Additional target reference points (TRPs) in deadspace, on avenues of approach, or at breach points are also valuable for observers to call for fires when shifting from this known point. The enemy will often stop right next to a TRP. The TRP grids must be widely disseminated; the FSO must have them, and all leaders down to TC level must post them on their maps. The MRB commander must ensure that he has an observation plan within his unit that covers all the TRPs. These known points dramatically increase the effectiveness of fires employed using the criteria described above.

Anticipating enemy action is slightly easier when you are defending. Once the enemy is fully committed and has revealed his concept, the commander again issues orders and intent for fire effects to mass effects in support of the defensive maneuver.

LESSONS ON INTELLIGENCE

The higher echelons are primarily concerned with the larger view; to them the problems that confront the battalion and the company are microscopic. But even when they do receive information of vital interest to the smaller front-line units, it seldom reaches those units in time to be of value.6

Intelligence, of course, plays an essential role in battle command. The commander must be able to see and understand the enemy. Only when you can see the enemy and understand how he intends to fight can a proper decision be made on your on scheme of maneuver. Anticipating and planning for multiple enemy courses of action and layered reconnaissance are the key components of battlefield intelligence. The OPFOR fights the enemy as we see him; we do not rigidly expect a single enemy course of action. Developing multiple enemy COAs builds flexibility in our plans. Reconnaissance is vital.

Layered reconnaissance is a powerful part of OPFOR tactics and it makes a lot of sense (see "OPFOR Recon TTPs" in CALL's News from the Front!, May-June 98). Every level of command in the OPFOR has reconnaissance. Division and regimental reconnaissance see the entire enemy force, providing the Regimental commander the information he needs for the COA decision. The MRBs employ combat reconnaissance patrols usually 45 minutes ahead of their main body that answer their combat information requirements. Forward patrols are often used at the MRC level to see the enemy before making physical contact, allowing the MRC commander to develop the situation and maneuver to a position of advantage. Each level of command sees the enemy in time to make maneuver decisions rather than blindly executing a specific plan. Each reconnaissance unit is a "connecting file" with the unit forward of it and is capable of developing the situation forward to effect battle handover. The OPFOR desert lore says, "Don't go anywhere for the first time."

Scouting is the key to effective reconnaissance. Scouts and all other reconnaissance and intelligence collecting assets must position themselves on the battlefield and survive to give real-time information on the enemy. Scouts, GSR team, engineer reconnaissance, and ADA scouts must all be expert in infiltration techniques to get into sector and to their assigned observation posts (OPs). Scouts must be expert in reconnaissance techniques: single vehicle infiltration, use of terrain, low illumination, waiting until late at night when vigilance is low, modifying routes based on intelligence already gathered. Basic tactical procedures, such as inspecting for no light sources, radio listening silence, reporting on a time schedule secure communications, alternating patterns of operations and reporting, truly are important to reconnaissance success.

The OPFOR regiment commander forbids his S2 from briefing named areas of interest (NAIs) and target areas of interest (TAIs). The OPFOR does not use a single situation template (SITEMP) per se, but does develop multiple enemy courses of action. The OPFOR commander concentrates on what enemy actions he needs to see rather than focusing reconnaissance assets on seemingly arbitrary pieces of terrain. The commander needs to see the number and composition, location, and direction of movement of every enemy company team. The OPFOR commander limits his S2 to a very small number of reconnaissance objectives that answer his needs to make the scheme of maneuver and fires decision. The danger is that a commander will assume an enemy course of action and try to see too many things. For successful battle command, the commander must learn to sharply focus all intelligence assets on the specific information he needs to make decisions.

Radio electronic combat or intelligence electronic warfare (IEW) is an extremely powerful tool and is also integrated into the fight in accordance with the commander's concept of the operation (see "OPFOR Electronic Warfare: More than Just Jamming" in CALL CTC 1QFY99 Bulletin, No. 99-3, Jan 99). The work of collectors and jammers can contribute to the effectiveness of all operating systems. Maneuver is facilitated through deception traffic passed over both friendly and enemy radio nets that supports the actual course of action. Fires are enhanced through imitative communication deception (ICD) measures that expose enemy forces to fire and jamming that disrupts voice and digital fire support transmissions and air defense warning nets. Command and control is aided by collecting on the enemy jammers hitting friendly nets and providing targetable data to our artillery to kill those jammers. Use ICD to prevent enemy jamming of friendly nets by sustaining traffic on the net being jammed while the MRB jumps to its next clear frequency.

Again, deception works. Integrate the deception effort with the scheme of maneuver -- a story for each scheme. The commander must dedicate resources to make the deception realistic. Expect that the deception effect will be brief and must be effective against crews, platoons, and companies.

LESSONS ON AIR DEFENSE

An aggressive posture ensures more effective air defense. When conducting an attack mission, move to positions that offer air defense protection. This expands and enhances the unit's protection more than simply orienting on the friendly main body.

Air IPB is critical in air attack tactics. Understanding the capabilities of the air platform, the method of employment and terrain that supports their employment helps planners to identifiy the positions for the SHORAD systems. As the main body advances, these teams must bound ahead to maintain their coverage.

All arms air defense means every direct fire system can kill aircraft. Because of the devastating effect attack helicopters can have, every weapon must engage when it encounters aircraft within their range. Very often attack helicopters will come too close to their target due to terrain, making them vulnerable. The NTC OPFOR has repeatedly destroyed AH-64s with small arms, VIPER, and Dragon fire. The ADA commander must understand the commander's concept of operations, track the battle, and take the initiative to shift assets based on the situation.

Passive measures are critically important to any force, particularly when stationary. Dispersion and the use of terrain to enhance camouflage are mandatory when facing a sophisticated air threat. These hides, in addition to passive air defense, can also sell the deception story. Moving to several hide sites over time increases protection and again will support the deception story. Maneuver can increase air attack effectiveness by using terrain that provides protection while drawing enemy aircraft, particularly attack helicopters, into the range of friendly air defense systems. Unit commanders and the ADA commander must conduct a joint air IPB to coordinate hides with ADA protection and positioning. This ensures mutual support using the capabilities from both units, establishing proper air attack coverage. This coordination can also assist the air attack commander in developing his air defense engagement areas. Battle drills are vital -- units must be capable of moving in dispersed formations, then rapidly concentrating in time for the close fight.

LESSONS ON MOBILITY/COUNTER-MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY (M/CM/S)

Use of all time available is the most important battle command factor of this operating system. Unit commanders must never allow engineer assets to sit idle. The engineer effort must support the commander's concept of operations so it is integrated into the scheme of fire and maneuver. The engineer commander must have peer status with the maneuver unit commanders. His input on routes of march, situational obstacle emplacement, engagement area development, obstacle composition, and siting is critical to every operation. This input is best achieved through early integration in the planning process, in a team-player environment. Like the infantry, the OPFOR keeps its M/CM/S assets mobile. For each asset, such as a VOLCANO or an MOPMS, there is a prime mover; a HMMWV loaded with a pair of MOPMS with sappers and a GPS and radio on board is a powerful combat multiplier. In the OPFOR, all flank or enveloping detachments are accompanied by two or more ACEs to rapidly entrench this force. In the defense, bulldozers dig until the last moment before being whisked away by their ever-present lowboys, and are then positioned to support the combined arms reserve.

LESSONS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL

The commander's intent is only effective when the unit is trained, has effective SOPs and uses them, and has a common understanding of how the unit fights as a whole. Common understanding is really the key. This understanding of commander's intent comes with repetitive training experience. When facing a developing situation on the battlefield, a junior leader can only act within the commander's intent when he knows what his decision and actions mean to the regiment. He has an understanding of what is possible and can answer the "if-then" question; if I do this, then I can accomplish my task and purpose and meet the commander's intent. Only then can he confidently act within the commander's intent and retain or seize the initiative.

The Army's doctrine for commander's intent is really very good. The intent statement in the order must be a very concise statement of purpose, method, and endstate. It cannot include specific information by BOS because BOS information is more applicable to commander's planning guidance. Again, the foundation for making intent effective is a fully trained unit with a common understanding of how the unit fights. Then purpose, method, and endstate become a useful expression of the commander's vision of the battle, how he sees it unfolding and the effects he is trying to achieve.

Commander's intent must operate during the battle, not just in the planning stage. As the situation develops, the commander's estimate of the situation and actions required will change. The commander must inform his subordinates of changes to his intent during the fight in time for them to execute. Warning orders (WARNOs) and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) are a good way to do this. This requires commanders to focus on their responsibilities: see the enemy, see yourself, and see the terrain. Clausewitz observed that war is a "continuous interaction of opposites."7The commander must think about what is happening to the enemy (its action or inaction), what his own force is doing, its combat power, and look ahead in time for actions to impose his will on the enemy. The commander must think at this level to see opportunities, issue FRAGOs that begin to set conditions for the next major action of his force, and then execute the FRAGO.

How the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) is organized and functions will determine how effective synchronization of all BOS will be. Based on two years of observations at the NTC, I have concluded that the Army's doctrinal TOC/TAC CP organization really does not help synchronization. The following organization has worked well for the OPFOR:

1) Tactical command post (TAC CP):

The brigade/battalion executive officer (XO) should be in charge of the TAC CP. The XO monitors the whole zone and orchestrating all of the units' combat systems, integrating them under the commander's concept. Do not leave the XO in the TOC to battle-track and conduct the "deep battle." He and the battle staff must coordinate battlefield activities to support the integrated close and deep battle. The best place to do that is forward where they can see and talk.

With the XO are the FSCOORD, S2, S3 Air, Air Liaison Officer (ALO), MI Co/Tm commander, and assistant battalion engineer (ABE).

They move to a position that provides effective communications and a view of the battlefield.

The Executive Officer controls the actions of all these players to synchronize and mass battlefield effects.

They are all face to face, using a common map to track friendly and enemy forces.

This TAC CP organization forces synchronization.

2) Tactical operations center (TOC):

The battle captains in all sections man the TOC.

They battle-track, work coordination issues identified by the TAC, maintain communications with higher headquarters, continue planning future operations, and prepare to pick up the battle if the TAC is destroyed or moving.

3)The brigade/battalion commander and S3:

The commander and S3 are forward on the battlefield where they can see the critical points.

The commander is located where he can make a revelant decision and execute with the help of the S3.

Crosstalk among subordinate commanders is an extremely powerful battlefield action. To encourage subordinate commanders to crosstalk on the command net, the brigade/battalion commander must discipline himself to be quiet. He should issue his orders, convey his intent, then monitor and talk only when necessary. That way the men in contact with the enemy, who know what is possible, can talk to each other to the benefit of the whole unit. The leader in contact with the enemy must be encouraged to make a recommendation on the course of action. Commanders who direct the movements of individual vehicles crush initiative and the willingness of subordinate commanders to crosstalk.

The commander's role is to command a lot and control just enough. He should be forward where he can see the action for himself and make a judgment as to what is possible. He must monitor the current execution while thinking ahead in time for the next action to take. A commander cannot do this if he is directing B22 into a firing position. Therefore, commanders must learn how to position themselves forward to see, survive, and command. The old maxims here are generally true:

1) Move with a unit so they can provide security.

2) When moving to a position, know where the closest tank or IFV is that offers protection.

3) Stay away from prominent, targetable terrain; get just high enough. A single vehicle in a good position in the flats is more survivable than sitting on top of a hill.

4) Reposition often to stay with the action and to avoid being targeted.

5) Above all, the commander must be forward, far forward, where the main effort is fighting so he can make immediate assessments and issue orders to take advantage of fleeting windows of opportunity.

SUMMARY

We have identified danger, physical exertion, intelligence, and friction as the elements that coalesce to form the atmosphere of war, and turn it into a medium that impedes activity. In their restrictive effects they can be grouped into a single concept of general friction. Is there any lubricant that will reduce this abrasion? Only one, and a commander and his army will not always have it readily available: combat experience.8

As noted by Clausewitz, experience is the best teacher and the most efficient lubricant to overcome the friction of war. The NTC is a simulation, and one can question the value of the OPFOR commander's experience on those grounds. However, the Army is training more and more through simulation with computer-generated graphics and "combat" results.9If experience gained at the NTC is questionable, then the value, credibility, and relevance of virtual simulation is probably more suspect. Repetitive, tough, realistic training is the best way to build into commanders the skills of battle command.

ENDNOTES

1. Franks, Frederick M., GEN, Battle Command, Military Review, United States Command and General Staff College, May-June 1996, pg. 14.
2. Harmon, E.N., MG, Notes on Combat Experience during the Tunisian and African Campaigns, undated memorandum, pg 1.
3. FM 100-5, Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1993, pg. G-1.
4. Ibid, pg. 21.
5. MTO&E, 11th ACR. There is only one artilleryman in the OPFOR, the Regimental FSO who serves as "White Cell" from the Training Analysis and Feedback (TAF or "Star Wars") building. All forward observers, planners, etc., are of MOS and branches other than artillery.
6. Infantry in Battle, The Infantry Journal Incorporated, Washington, D.C., 1939, pg. 343.
7. Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1976, p. 122.
8. Ibid.
9. Swann, Guy, COL, Blah-Blah, letter to the editor, Armor, 1998.

Foreword

Battle Rhythm

NEWSLETTER

Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list