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Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Brigade Maintenance Meetings

OBSERVATION (CSS): Attendance at the daily brigade maintenance meeting is inconsistent, and unit representatives are seldom prepared to provide specific requirements.

DISCUSSION:

1. Forward support battalion (FSB) support operations officers rarely synchronize the efforts of transportation and maintenance officers and representatives prior to the meeting with the brigade units.

2. Shop officers are routinely unable to brief the current status of direct support (DS) jobs with maintenance support teams (MSTs) at the unit maintenance collection points (UMCPs).

3. Units do not focus on combat critical systems for the next mission. Generally, no firm commitments are made to expedite parts identified as available within the theater of operations to the UMCPs.

4. Brigade leadership and maintenance managers do not receive a clear picture of the brigade's current and projected maintenance posture (combat power).

5. Brigade Class IX and maintenance managers do not receive requirements in time to allow the supply system to respond to a unit's needs.

6. DS maintenance and Class IX managers provide conflicting information and inaccurate statuses, and drag out the meeting time trying to synchronize their efforts. The supported units lose faith in the FSB's ability to support the customer.

7. DS repairs by MSTs are delayed due to lack of management oversight and emphasis. Shop officers are unaware of potential requirements to dispatch mobile maintenance teams (MMTs) from the base shop to assist an MST.

8. Unit representatives depart the meeting without a clear picture of who, how, where, and when critical parts will arrive to build combat power prior to the next fight.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Use butcher paper or a dry erase board to record all commitments for critical combat systems and who is responsible for completing the action. Review commitments at the end of the meeting to ensure everyone clearly understands their roles. At the next maintenance meeting, review all previous commitments and their current status.

2. The brigade XO must ensure that all units have representation at the daily maintenance meeting and must ensure that the established meeting agenda is followed. This is when all organizational and DS maintenance managers coordinate and synchronize their efforts to enable the brigade commander to accomplish his next mission.

3. During battle days, use an abbreviated meeting format that solely focuses all assets and efforts on the brigade commander's maintenance priority for the next fight.

4. Prior to the maintenance meeting the support operations officer should conduct a coordination meeting with the transportation supply officer (TSO), shop officer, MMC representative, logistics assistance representatives, and the FSB materiel officer (MATO). The focus of the coordination meeting is to review critical combat systems (parts status, shop status, technical assistance requirements, disk turn-in status, Class IX issues). The goal is to have all maintenance information ready for the customers and ensure that the DS effort is focused and synchronized to sustain combat power.

(TA.7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Direct Support (DS) Maintenance and Class IX Management

OBSERVATION (CSS): Maintenance and Class IX management above the company level is reactive and significantly hampers the development of a maintenance battle rhythm to sustain the brigade.

DISCUSSION:

1. Maintenance managers routinely do not know:

2. Class IX managers routinely do not know:

3. Although the SAMS-2 AHO-026 printout is consistently used, brigade maintenance managers routinely take no action on the feedback it provides them regarding the effectiveness of their unit level logistics system-ground (ULLS-G), SAMS, and SARSS automation systems.

4. Repair times for combat systems are significantly increased because there is no focused and synchronized effort between organizational and DS maintenance assets during the execution of brigade missions. Task forces and separate companies rely only on their organic assets, while DS assets sit idle until the conclusion of a brigade mission. Generally, requests for backup support are not surfaced until the brigade maintenance meeting, two to three hours after continuing the mission.

5. Shop office officers, transportation supply officers (TSOs), mobile maintenance team (MMT) chiefs, and security, plans and operations (SPO) maintenance officers routinely do not know:

6. Brigade units are confused by conflicting guidance/directives on maintenance procedures, meeting times and unit level logistics system (ULLS) disk synchronization plans.

7. During brigade CSS rehearsals, units rarely cover any aspects of maintenance and Class IX operations to support the fight and provide backup support to organizational maintenance sections.

8. Tactical situation and friendly unit dispositions are not routinely tracked and updated.

9. Forward support battalion (FSB) SPO and brigade S4 maintenance managers routinely do not coordinate and synchronize their efforts in the brigade administrative/logistics operations center (ALOC)/FSB tactical operations center (TOC).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Refer to Chapters 1, 3, and 4 of FM 4-30.3, Maintenance Operations and Procedures. Conduct a daily review of the SAMS-1 006 printout and the SARSS-1 AJT-017 daily performance report. The security, plans and operations (SPO) maintenance section should visit the shop office and TSO at least twice per day (preferably during scheduled unit level logistics system [ULLS] disk drop times).

2. Conduct a daily analysis of the SAMS-2 026 printout. Look for trend indicators such as status of requisitions, number of write-ins by unit during the maintenance meeting, and the date equipment became non-mission capable (NMC) with the corresponding date parts were ordered.

3. The forward support battalion (FSB) SPO or representative and the brigade S4 must coordinate before and during the brigade planning process to produce:

4. The brigade S4 should brief these areas by phase so that all units clearly understand how and where to request backup support. Endstate is a brigade operation in which maintenance actions are immediate, rather than backlogged. This information must be annotated on the brigade CSS overlay, disseminated in brigade OPORDs/FRAGOs, and posted on a map in the brigade and battalion ALOCs, the SPO van, and shop office.

(TA.7.3.2 Fix/Maintain equipment)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Materiel Readiness: Maintenance and PMCS

OBSERVATION (Mech and Engr): A majority of engineer units deploy to NTC with non-mission capable (NMC) VOLCANO and MICLIC systems.

DISCUSSION:

1. Units too often arrive at the NTC with the wrong PMCS -10 manual and no change updates. Common excuses are that they are unable to get the manual or did not know a change was published.

2. Units do not know what seemingly minor mechanical faults will deadline their key weapons systems. Units arrive at the NTC thinking their systems are fully mission capable (FMC) and are surprised when the system is deadlined because of improper conduct of -10 PMCS.

3. Most leaders do not take the time to understand the specific mechanical requirements of the VOLCANO and MICLIC warfighting systems, and PMCS is not enforced to standard during Home Station training.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The majority of these problems would be solved if leaders would enforce "by the book" PMCS for their weapons systems.

2. In preparation for their NTC rotation, units should establish maintenance "hot pits" that focus on the proper analysis of -10-level maintenance for the VOLCANO system, to include the prime mover (HEMTT/M548) and the MICLIC system. Ensure the operator conducts the proper PMCS and then verify it through company/battalion hot pit programs.

3. The battalion must have an aggressive publications program that keeps up with the latest publications and their changes. Revitalize the technical manuals with all the latest changes.

4. Establish a graphic training aid (GTA) card that focuses on specific VOLCANO/MICLIC maintenance checks.

(TA.7.3.2.1 Perform Preventive Maintenance)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Field Sanitation

OBSERVATION (Mech): Implementation of basic field sanitation procedures at company level is less than adequate.

DISCUSSION:

1. The company supply sergeant, who must spend the majority of his time at the field trains, is often placed in charge of the field sanitation team (FST).

2. Too often leaders are observed telling soldiers to "go dig a cat hole." Cat holes are acceptable under certain conditions; however, major problems can develop if sanitation procedures are not managed closely by a trained FST.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Field sanitation encompasses the following basic responsibilities:

2. The role of field sanitation is to aid the unit in protecting the health of troops. With the integration of female soldiers into combat engineer companies, personal hygiene becomes increasingly important. The following field sanitation techniques are recommended:

3. AR 40-5, Preventive Medicine, requires companies to appoint FSTs on official orders and mandates their training and certification. The FST must stock and maintain a basic load of preventive medicine (PM) materials, stored in three footlockers. These PM materials, listed on the chart below, are to be used in support of training exercises as well as real-world missions.

4. Implement the FST in Home Station training exercises in accordance with chapter 1-IV of FM 4-25.12, Unit Field Sanitation. Company commanders must appoint FST membership and battalions should track to ensure the training is being conducted.

(TA.7.4.2 Provide Field Services)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Medical Company Operations

OBSERVATION (CSS): Forward support battalion (FSB) medical companies are often not prepared to provide a fully functional Level 2 health care facility.

DISCUSSION:

1. Medical companies seldom validate critical Level 2 functions during reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I).

2. Medical equipment sets (MES) are packed in MILVANS and are not given priority on the train.

3. Chemicals required for the x-ray processor are expired, not present in sufficient quantity, or have exceeded required temperatures. Film is often exposed prior to arrival.

4. X-ray technicians have difficulty setting up equipment in a field environment.

5. Power requirements for the medical and dental x-ray machines are unclear.

6. Critical repair parts are not on hand.

7. Laboratory reagents and test strips are expired or damaged.

8. Quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) programs are left at Home Station.

9. Combat lifesaver bags and medics' personal aid bags are packed in MILVANs and not carried.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop a plan at Home Station for set-up and validation of dental, lab, and x-ray operations during RSO&I.

2. Place critical Level 2 equipment on a priority train which will arrive early enough to ensure all equipment is fully mission capable (FMC) prior to roll out.

3. Develop a list of medical equipment sets (MES) critical repair parts, which the operator can replace.

4. Deploy with and maintain an ongoing QA/QC program with a valid document register maintained by the treatment platoon.

5. Develop standard load plans.

6. Aid bags and combat lifesaver bags should be carried as to-accompany-troops (TAT) baggage.

7. Use a refrigerated van to maintain temperature-sensitive Class VIII supplies.

(TA.7.4.4 Provide Health Services)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) of Scout Platoons

OBSERVATION (Mech): Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) of scouts from the battlefield is an ongoing problem.

DISCUSSION:

1. Coordination between the scout platoon sergeant and the company 1SG seldom takes place.

2. The respective roles of the platoon sergeant and the company 1SG in the mission are often not understood.

3. Scout platoon sergeants try to evacuate their casualties to the battalion aid station (BAS) themselves, which takes them out of the battle for a considerable amount of time.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. During the combat service support (CSS) rehearsal, the scout platoon sergeant should get a commitment for support from the company 1SG and help him develop a plan for scout evacuation.

2. Rehearse the plan on the actual terrain where the battle will take place by talking to the supporting company via FM as the platoon moves into its position.

3. Verify routes and collection points. The scout platoon is responsible for getting its casualties from the OPs to a collection point.

4. Discuss the plan in detail when conducting the platoon rehearsal.

(TA.7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC): Battalion Aid Station (BAS) Locations

OBSERVATION (Mech): The task force (TF) order is often issued with no pre-planned (BAS) locations or "triggers" for movement to subsequent CASEVAC positions.

DISCUSSION:

1. Normally, the battalion's forward aid station (FAS) follows the main-assault company while the main aid station (MAS) remains in the vicinity of the combat trains command post (CTCP). This is satisfactory until one of the aid stations stops and sets for casualty treatment or the main assault shifts to another unit; the TF continues to progress while the FAS or MAS quickly falls behind and out of range for effective CASEVAC.

2. Scout and mortar platoons are typically not accounted for in the combat health support (CHS) plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Incorporate pre-positioned FAS and MAS locations into the maneuver plan concept of support during all phases, to include the reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance fight.

2. Have the medical platoon leader brief the entire combat health support (CHS) plan during maneuver and CSS rehearsals. The briefing should include FAS/MAS movement triggers based on phase lines, events, number of wounded, and so forth. Also show where the medical assets will most likely be during each phase of the battle.

3. Include company 1SGs in the CSS rehearsal when possible.

4. Effective use of nonstandard CASEVAC assets proves to be a combat multiplier.

(TA.7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC): Unit Casualty Reporting

OBSERVATION (Mech): Unit casualty reporting is not to standard.

DISCUSSION:

1. Casualty types/categories, method of transportation, and estimated time of arrival are often not reported before evacuation to the battalion aid station (BAS). Consequently, the BAS may jump to a subsequent location without realizing casualties are en route. This markedly increases the task force's died-of-wounds (DOW) rate due to excessive evacuation time.

2. Casualties often arrive without DA Forms 1155 and 1156, which hinders unit patient tracking and replacement capabilities.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Incorporate casualty reporting procedures into the unit tactical SOP (TACSOP).

2. Exercise the procedures during platoon and company lane training.

3. Standardize MILES cards, DA Form 1155, and DA Form 1156 throughout the task force (e.g., complete name data and cards placed in the first aid dressing pouch).

4. Line company medics and designated non-standard ambulance crews must report pertinent casualty information to the BAS prior to evacuation.

(TA.7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Integrating Non-Standard Aircraft for CASEVAC into the Brigade Combat Health Support (CHS) Plan

OBSERVATION (CSS): Aircraft are rarely dedicated for non-standard CASEVAC in the Brigade CHS plan.

Discussion:

1. If aircraft are dedicated for evacuation, they are not effective because an aviation representative is not involved in the development of the CHS plan.

2. Brigade ground and air evacuation plans are not mutually supporting.

3. Brigades have difficulty developing an efficient missioning and launch process for non-standard CASEVAC. The missioning and launch process is unclear and, when executed, is either too late or shuts down artillery fires due to insufficient coordination. Location of the aircraft is also a major concern.

4. Typically brigades arrive at the National Training Center having trained with a Forward Support MEDEVAC Team (FSMT) at Home Station, but the FSMT does not deploy to the NTC.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Use the flow-chart below as a guide:

2. Dedicate aircraft based on the casualty estimate and when these casualties are expected. Position the aircraft at a location that facilitates the crew's situational awareness as well as launch and missioning.

3. Rehearse the entire process in detail at the brigade combat team (BCT) CSS rehearsal.

4. Post CHS graphics, both air and ground, on consolidated brigade graphics.

(TA.7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 10
SUBJECT: Night Convoy Operations

OBSERVATION (CSS): Drivers departing the division support area (DSA) on ressupply convoys to the brigade support area (BSA) are not properly equipped or trained to conduct safe convoys at night or during hours of limited visibility.

DISCUSSION:

1. Night convoys are experiencing the following challenges:

2. Standards are not being enforced concerning proper techniques for wearing and operating night vision devices.

3. Convoys are relying on the use of chemical lights rather than blackout markers and blackout drive.

4. Leadership is placing soldiers at undue risk as a result of improper supervision during night operations.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Night vision training must be incorporated into field training exercises (FTXs) and lane training plans at Home Station, and must be implemented prior to deploying to the National Training Center.

2. Training lanes should incorporate the proper use of such navigational devices as ground positioning systems (GPSs), maps, and compasses.

3. Resupply convoys must be executed predominately during hours of darkness or limited visibility to increase the training level and confidence of soldiers and leaders.

4. Main and corps support battalions (MSBs/CSBs) deploying to the National Training Center must deploy with ample amounts of qualified night drivers and equipment in order to support night operations.

(TA.7.5.1.2.1 Move by Surface)

TREND 11
SUBJECT: Supply Management: Logistics Status (LOGSTAT) Reporting

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces often do not complete logistics status (LOGSTAT) reports IAW their SOP.

DISCUSSION:

1. Reporting of on-hand quantities for classes of supply is poor.

2. The logistics package (LOGPAC) composition in the field trains is affected, preventing the field trains command post (FTCP) from tracking the exact quantities of supply on hand in the task force.

3. The FTCP is not able to anticipate needs and request supplies IAW unit requirements.

4. The lack of proper accountability of on-hand quantities prevents the supply system from distributing the on-hand supplies IAW unit priorities.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Task forces need to improve LOGSTAT reporting to reflect the on-hand quantity of the unit's classes of supply.

2. Place chain of command emphasis on proper reporting from subordinate elements.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 12
SUBJECT: Development of Unit Basic Loads (UBLs)

OBSERVATION (FS): Too often field artillery units are deploying with no developed or published UBLs.

DISCUSSION:

1. The battalion leaders are not aware of what they need and have not divided the required classes of supply into battery amounts.

2. The requirements are not part of the battalion SOP; batteries cannot properly develop their load plans.

3. Distribution plans are not developed; units have not identified what host nation support they may need.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Refer to FM 101-10-1/2, Staff Officers' Field Manual Organization, Technical, and Logistical Data Planning Factors; historical data; supply usage requirements; operations logistics planner software; FM 8-10-5, Brigade and Division Surgeon's Handbook Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures; FORSCOM Reg 700-3; and SB 8-75 for guidance on UBLs.

2. Units need to have a clear understanding of all classes of supply.

3. Include classes of supply in the unit tactical SOP (TACSOP).

4. Appoint an OIC/NCOIC for each class of supply.

5. Deploy a robust advance party that can open all accounts and begin drawing supplies.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 13
SUBJECT: Field Artillery Battalion Rearm, Refuel, Resupply, and Survey Point (R3SP) Operations

OBSERVATION (FS): Field artillery battalion staffs usually identify R3SP requirements but often do not integrate or synchronize the operation with the tactical plan.

DISCUSSION:

1. A lack of discussion of R3SPs during the planning process causes poor site selection and unsynchronized execution within the battalion movement plan and logistics plan.

2. The S3s give poor or untimely ammunition guidance, which impedes the S4's effort to consolidate the necessary R3SP assets (CL III [B], V, survey, and LOGPAC if available) at the correct time and location.

3. There is often no effective timeline and/or trigger. The R3SP site often turns into a refuel operation or unit distribution effort because of inadequate triggers.

4. The required equipment and assets, although available, are not postured forward to execute an R3SP.

5. A typical R3SP location is along the brigade MSR in an open field with no concealment and poor dispersion.

6. There is poor coordination between unit advance parties and the R3SP site OIC. This causes delays and confusion during the operation.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The R3SP's principle mission is to rearm and refuel the battalion with secondary missions of providing survey update for the M109A6 and linking up LOGPAC vehicles (if possible) or required unit supplies. The R3SP is not the only resupply technique. It is, however, the most efficient method to rearm, refuel, and resupply a battalion conducting a deliberate movement. A properly planned, prepared, and executed R3SP is the combat multiplier necessary to allow the battalion to continue the fight uninterrupted.

2. The S4 integrates and synchronizes the execution of the R3SP with the battalion's tactical plan.

3. The S4 should position the R3SP site central to the Paladin position areas to facilitate rapid execution. It must be tactically positioned with good concealment, as survivability is a primary consideration for site selection. Maximize terrain for cover and concealment and ensure good dispersion of assets.

4. The S3 provides guidance (ammunition types and powders) to the S4 with sufficient time for the battalion logisticians to execute the plan.

5. The S4, considering battery ammunition status, remaining mission requirements (estimate), and the battalion's on-hand ammunition, gives guidance to the Battalion Ammunition Officer (BAO) who, in turn, begins configuring ammunition.

6. The ammunition PSG configures the R3SP in the field trains and possibly stages it in a forward location.

7. Combat trains assets are for emergency resupply during the battle and should not be used; if they are used, they must be resupplied, reconfigured, or replaced immediately.

8. Ensure all assets are assembled early enough to conduct a rehearsal.

9. The R3SP site layout should facilitate rapid execution.

10. The S4, CAT CDR, or BAO should be the R3SP site OIC and be responsible for site reconnaissance, conduct communications checks, and establish the R3SP prior to units arriving.

11. The R3SP site OIC positions the refuel point after the rearm point allowing simultaneous operations, e.g., refueling howitzers while rearming ammunition vehicles.

12. The recon survey officer establishes the survey control points at the refuel sites to facilitate simultaneous operations.

13. The S4 should position LOGPAC vehicles (if available) near the R3SP exit to link up with their unit as they depart the R3SP site.

14. Inclusion of the R3SP in the battalion TACSOP is the key to success. The TACSOP must establish responsibilities, timelines, a pre-R3SP advance party link-up checklist, security responsibilities, and a site layout diagram.

15. The R3SP is not the only resupply technique. It is, however, the most efficient method to rearm, refuel, and resupply a battalion conducting a deliberate movement. A properly planned, prepared, and executed R3SP is the combat multiplier necessary to allow the battalion to continue the fight uninterrupted. By determining possible conflicts early, a commander can find solutions or work with the battalion to modify the plan.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TA.6 Mobility/Survivability BOS & NBC

TA.4 Command and Control BOS