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DISCUSSION:

1. The breach plan rarely addresses the brigade's responsibilities for a task force breach or specifies how the brigade intends to synchronize suppression, obscuration, security, and reduction (SOSR) missions.

2. While the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) understands how to use reverse breach planning, the brigade staff does not use the reverse planning process to develop the brigade scheme of maneuver.

3. Often the brigade's main effort is not weighted with additional mobility assets to provide the required redundancy at the breach.

4. There is seldom a plan included in the brigade's fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) to shift or reallocate mobility assets should a task force (TF) become combat ineffective.

5. During the fight, the brigade struggles with isolating the point of penetration and massing sufficient combat power at the decisive point on the battlefield. As a result, the brigade is unable to set the conditions prior to committing to the breach and is rapidly destroyed by the defending enemy.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Breach planning at the brigade level should focus on five areas:

• Engineer Integration in the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).
• Breach Organization and Mass.
• Reverse Planning Process.
• Actions at the Breach.
• Brigade Responsibilities at the Breach.

2. Engineer Integration in the IPB.

3. Breach Organization and Mass.

4. Reverse Planning Process. The reverse planning process is an essential tool in building an effective plan. The endstate is not the breach; rather it is getting the assault force onto the objective to destroy the enemy. By starting at actions on the objective and working back to the LD, the staff can allocate combat power, mobility assets, and indirect fires (suppression/smoke). FM 3-34.2, Combined Arms Breaching Operations, outlines the technique:

• Actions on the objective drive the size/composition of the assault force, assault force objective, and the point of penetration (POP).
• Size of the assault force and location of the POP determines the quantity/location of lanes.
• Lane requirements, type of obstacles, and type of terrain/soil drives the amount/type of mobility assets (size/composition of the reduction element) task organized to the breach force.
• The size/composition of the security element in the breach force is based on the enemy's ability to interfere with the reduction of the obstacle.
• The amount of suppression and size / composition / location of the support force is driven by the enemy's ability to mass fires and interfere with the breach at the reduction site.

5. Actions at the Breach.

(1) Obscuration Plan: Timeline critical actions at the breach for both support force and breach force as constrained by available smoke. Specify task and purpose of both projected and generated smoke. Allocate or task organize smoke assets to the support force and the breach force based on those requirements. Develop solid triggers to employ obscuration and specify who controls obscuration. Ensure that the support force commander controls/shifts artillery projected smoke needed to obscure his movement into the support by fire as well as set conditions for the breach.

(2) Fire Control Plan: Identify fire control measures in the brigade graphics such as support-by-fire positions, Coordinated Fire Lines (CFL) or Restricted Fire Lines (RFL) and No- Fire Areas (NFA). All elements of the breach organization must specify and discuss direct fire control measures such as TRPs, phase lines, and signals to initiate, lift, shift, and cease fires.

6. Brigade Responsibilities at the Breach. Engineers must ensure that the brigade's breach plan defines the brigade responsibilites during a brigade or TF breach:

(TA.6.1.1 Overcome Obstacles)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Breaching Operations: Lane Marking Materials

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units are having difficulty identifying lane and bypass markers at the breached site.

DISCUSSION:

1. Many training units at the NTC use VS-17 panels to mark breached lanes. This is an approved marking method per Chapter 3 of FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations. However, the VS-17 panel is also used to mark CASEVAC routes and as a fratricide marking system on all combat vehicles. Because of the many VS-17 panels in the area, soldiers become confused as to what the markers are indicating. When the soldiers are buttoned up in their vehicles, they have a difficult time identifying and visualizing the lane entrance and exit markers. They often miss the lane altogether.

2. The majority of lane marking done at the NTC is in accordance with Figure 3-6, page 3-17, FM 90-13-1. Very little attention, however, is being paid to the visibility guidelines listed in Table 3-2, page 3-16. Most VS-17 panels do not include directional arrows indicating the entrance or bypass lane boundaries.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Unit leaders must ensure that steps are taken to rectify the inconsistency in the utilization of the VS-17 panel on the battlefield. Utilizing the VS-17 panel to mark everything is not productive and should be managed rigorously by all leaders. Several units have developed their own nonstandard marking devices to eliminate any confusion with the VS-17 panel.

2. Problems observed during recent rotations indicate a need to reevaluate Chapter 3, Lane and Bypass Marking Procedures, of FM 90-13-1-specifically entrance, exit, final approach, and far-recognition markers. Recommend that references made to the VS-17 panel in figure 3-6, page 3-17, be removed and replaced with the following:

3. When marking a lane through a complex obstacle, units should have a well-defined marking system to eliminate any confusion approaching and passing through the obstacle. The VS-17 panel has historically been the solution for all marking needs on the battlefield. Combat engineer units should reevaluate their TACSOPs and ensure there is no inconsistency with lane and bypass marking systems.

(TA.6.1.1.1 Breach Obstacles)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Employment of the Modular Pack Mine System (MOPMS)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Engineer units are not proficient in performing the basic employment techniques and procedures of the modular pack mine system (MOPMS).

DISCUSSION: Upon arrival at the NTC, units are often so unfamiliar with MOPMS employment that they require (and request) training. Classes are taught by NTC observers/controllers (O/Cs) which, in most cases, bring the training units to a level of proficiency that allows them to utilize the MOPMS at the NTC.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Because MOPMS is a mine dispensing system, combat engineers should be the experts. MOPMS utilization training should be conducted at Home Station. Soldiers should train on the remote control unit (RCU), MOPMS, and alternate means of firing to specified standards as stated in the -10 manual. Ensure that soldiers are utilizing the actual MOPMS trainers during Home Station training. (Use of MOPMS trainers alleviates questions in reference to the standard and/or required times.)

2. Engineer company commanders are the task force engineers. They must ensure that MOPMS training is included in the training plan in compliance with FM 25-101, Battle-Focused Training, and that the system is properly employed during the combined arms training exercise.

3. Because MOPMS is a very lethal weapon system when used correctly, engineer squads must constantly train, conduct pre-combat checks (PCCs), and ensure that MOPMS is included in the commander's pre-combat inspection (PCI) prior to each mission.

(TA.6.2.2.1 Emplace Mines)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: CSS Unit Protection

OBSERVATION (CSS): CSS companies rarely set up and build defenses adequately.

DISCUSSION:

1. Leaders and soldiers do not know how to construct hasty and deliberate fighting positions to standard.

2. Units never have at least one position (hasty, deliberate, or survivability) for each soldier assigned or attached. Units incur a high number of casualties from indirect fire.

3. Leaders do not know how to lay in crew-served fighting positions and properly assign individual sectors of fire. Soldiers and junior leaders do not ever see what "right" should look like, which institutionalizes the problem.

4. Sector sketches are rarely constructed properly and often lack the detail needed to be effective.

5. Soldiers and the unit leadership frequently neglect weapons maintenance. Weapons frequently will not operate upon enemy contact.

6. Obstacle plans, if ever planned for, are usually not employed or emplaced in an efficient manner.

7. Defense rehearsals are never conducted from company down to the soldier level. Soldiers are confused on what to do and where to go during different types of enemy contact.

8. The perimeter security plan is rarely enforced. Opposing forces (OPFOR) usually penetrate and exit the perimeter with ease.

9. Actions-on-enemy-contact drills are not practiced enough and are executed in haphazard fashion. Units lose high numbers of direct support (DS) assets, supplies, and personnel when engaged by the OPFOR.

10. Fratricide control measures are frequently non-existent. Incidents of possible fratricide occur nearly every rotation in the brigade support area (BSA).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Train at Home Station. Focus the long-range training plan toward basic defense skills.

2. Train leaders on what "right" looks like.

3. Ensure leaders enforce standards and spot check frequently.

4. Use simple SOPs and drill them frequently in garrison.

5. In the field use stand-to or stand-down times as training opportunities.

6. Conduct a defense set up and execution in detail with key leadres prior to any field exercise.

7. Rehearse, rehearse, rehearse.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Use of the M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm (ACAA)

OBSERVATION (Engr): Engineer unit use of the M8A1 ACAA is not to standard.

DISCUSSION:

1. Units frequently do not emplace the M8A1 alarm into operation upon arrival in an area they plan to occupy.

2. Units that do set up the M8A1 alarm do not emplace it correctly and do not have trained operators.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. At Home Station and during reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I), conduct some training on tactical assembly area (TAA) procedures, with one task focusing on the emplacement of the M8A1 ACAA. As a minimum, unit personnel should know that:

2. Annotate the M8A1 alarm locations on the sector sketch.

3. Ensure operational maintenance is performed.

4. Have a trained operator.

(TA.6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Use of M9 Chemical Agent Detector Paper

OBSERVATION (Engr): Engineer units do not use M9 chemical detector paper to standard.

DISCUSSION:

1. The procedures for using M9 chemical detector paper are not often addressed in unit SOPs.

2. Unit personnel frequently do not know the full capability of the M9 paper or how to attach it to equipment and personnel.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Standardize procedures for attaching M9 paper to like items of equipment so that all personnel know where it goes.

2. Ensure personnel are aware that M9 paper must be removed during decontamination operations.

3. Ensure soldiers perform buddy-buddy checks on MOPP gear after donning, ensuring M9 paper is attached correctly.

4. Include the procedures for using, attaching and removing M9 paper in unit SOPs.

(TA.6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Physical Security: Cargo Tie-Down Procedures

OBSERVATION (Mech and Engr): Soldiers and NCOs are not meeting cargo security standards.

DISCUSSION: Units do not properly secure cargo and equipment or use approved cargo tie-down straps and tie-down points. This is an indication of improper training and lack of supervision, and results in injured soldiers and lost or damaged equipment.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Commanders and leaders must ensure that approved procedures for cargo tie-down are followed, particularly when working with live ammunition items. The safety of soldiers and accountability of live munitions must be paramount concerns.

2. Units should become educated in the approved methods of securing cargo and ensure that soldiers are properly following standards.

(TA.6.3.2.1.1.1 Employ Physical Security Measures)

TA.3 Air Defense BOS

TA.7 Combat Service Support BOS