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Positive Performance

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Tactical Communications

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task force signal and communications teams consistently and adequately install tactical communications in the frequency hopping and single channel modes.

DISCUSSION: Task force retransmission teams are usually technically and tactically proficient at VHF-FM communications.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUE: Continue the training methods used to achieve the current level of proficiency.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Parallel Planning

OBSERVATION (Lt/Abn): Parallel planning between the company, task force (TF), and brigade is improving.

DISCUSSION:

1. TF staffs are attempting to conduct parallel planning with the brigade, especially in the areas of reconnaissance and intelligence (R&S) planning and producing and issuing warning orders (WARNOs) and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).

2. Companies are doing a better job of parallel planning with TF staffs. This is most evident in that companies are beginning their company WARNOs, direction of platoon-level generic rehearsals, and pre-command checks/pre-command inspections (PCCs/PCIs) before formal receipt of the TF order. As a result, platoons and companies are having more time to conduct detailed troop-leading procedures once the formal order is received.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUE: Continue to focus on the benefits of parallel planning at company/TF, TF/brigade levels. Parallel planning has been shown to give units more time to prepare for their mission.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Battle Tracking in the Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP)

OBSERVATION (Mech): During tactical operations, most CTCPs maintain clear situational awareness of the battlefield.

DISCUSSION: The key factor in the CTCP's capability to maintain situational awareness is the previous experience of the S4 and S1 functioning as "battle captains." Most of the other personnel in the CTCP do not have the knowledge and experience to properly track the battle.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Ensure CTCP personnel participate in all command post exercises (CPXs), JANUS exercises, and field training exercises (FTXs) to maintain a pool of S1 and S4 personnel trained to function in a CP.

2. Attach CTCP NCOs and radio/telephone operators (RTOs) to the TOC for training exercises. This will provide these soldiers an experience in and understanding of battle tracking.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Risk Assessments

OBSERVATION (Lt/Abn): Task forces (TFs) are integrating risk management into the military decision-making process (MDMP).

DISCUSSION:

1. TFs are doing a more seamless integration of risk management into the MDMP, specifically in Paragraph 3 of the operation order (OPORD).

2. Units are identifying risk early in the MDMP. They are including tactical and accident risk-reduction measures in their schemes of maneuver and using surface danger zones (SDZs).

3. Company/teams are conducting effective risk management and enforcing TF control measures.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUE: Continue to focus on the importance of risk assessments at all levels at Home Station. Units that identify risks and incorporate risk-reduction measures are more likely to survive in battle.

(TA.4.2 Assess Situation)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Field Artillery Battalion S2 Coordination

OBSERVATION (FS): Battalion S2s do not effectively coordinate and work together during mission planning and execution.

DISCUSSION:

1. Direct support and reinforcing battalion S2s and staffs tend to work independently of each other. The two S2s rarely have a standard to determine what information they should exchange or how to pass this information. As a result, there is very little sharing of intelligence between the two sections.

2. The battalion staffs normally conduct their orders processes simultaneously but separately, causing duplication of effort. As execution draws closer, even less exchange of information occurs.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The battalion S2s need to develop a list of essential items that must be shared between the direct support and reinforcing battalion intelligence sections. The two S2s must discuss how they will exchange this information.

2. Rehearse the information exchange process prior to conducting combat operations.

3. At a minimum, the following information exchange processes should occur:

(TA.4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Automation of Combat Service Support (CSS) Operations

OBSERVATION (CSS): CSS operations are degraded by inadequate connectivity among and limited use of automated system capabilities.

DISCUSSION:

1. The brigade signal coverage plan inadequately supports the automated data transfer requirements of CSS systems. Communications equipment is not prioritized with CSS automation hardware in the deployment flow. Units in the brigade support area (BSA) must execute manual disk synchronization plans throughout most of the reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I) phase, rather than maximizing the automated data transfer features of the automation systems.

2. The mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) network is not established or tested until late in RSO&I. Occasionally, the MSE network is not operational for the BSA until halfway through the campaign due to hardware problems and technical proficiency of supply support activity (SSA) personnel.

3. Units generally do not adhere to ULLS-G disk turn-in and synchronization plans, and timely disk submission is not consistently enforced by unit leaders.

4. When the SARSS-1 blast is not operational, most units do not have an alternate and rehearsed courier delivery plan to the SARSS-2A.

5. Standard Army Retail Supply System-1 (SARSS-1) trans-out batches from the transportation supply officer (TSO) are delayed for long periods before departing the BSA. Batches are sent out of sequence to SARSS-2A, which causes old status to overwrite current status at the unit level logistics system-ground (ULLS-G). As a result, operators and crews do not receive timely status on their DA Form 5988E, and the AHO-026 printout becomes an ineffective management tool.

6. Manual write-ins on the AHO-26 printout increase, degrading the 026 printout into an ineffective management tool. Class IX volume does not set the conditions for sustaining combat power, maintenance managers are unable to monitor workloads, and the unit's manual high-priority call-in system becomes inundated.

7. Maintenance management center (MMC) personnel in the division support area (DSA) routinely do not have the most current AHO-026 printout at their disposal to work Class IX status acquisition. The maintenance managers in the DSA receive only one AHO-026 printout daily from the maintenance meeting. At best, this printout reflects automated data as of the morning disk drop, marked up with write-ins from the maintenance meeting that must be worked through the night (reactive manual maintenance management). What they should receive is fully automated data on an 026 printout from the evening disk drop (responsive automated maintenance management).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The forward support brigade (FSB) security, plans and operations officer (SPO) must ensure that the brigade signal officer (SIGO) clearly understands the requirements to support CSS automation systems and that the brigade signal plan adequately supports those requirements. Place key signal equipment early in the deployment flow to establish a functioning CSS automation infrastructure prior to arrival of the unit's main body in the theater.

2. Develop a backup disk courier plan to go into effect when the SARSS-1 blast is not operational. The plan must include the specific point in time that triggers the initiation of the courier. Coordinate with the MMC and log batch numbers at both ends to ensure the disks remain sequenced. Rehearse this plan, make sure it works, and take the time to accomplish a full cycle (SARSS-1 trans-out disk to SARSS-2A and a status disk back to SARSS-1). Consider the impact of the courier plan on customer ULLS-G disk drop times.

3. The brigade XO and unit commanders must enforce compliance with brigade directed disk synchronization plans and disk submission times. Track the turn-in rates and review at each maintenance meeting.

4. The MMC section in the DSA must have a SAMS-2 system available in order to receive the most current SAMS-2 026 printout from the FSB Support Operations SAMS-2 system.

(TA.4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Communicating Information: Operation of the CTCP Net Control Station

OBSERVATION (Mech): NCOs and radio/telephone operators (RTOs) in the combat trains command posts (CTCPs) are usually unprepared to operate the net control station.

DISCUSSION:

1. The net control station is the task force's most critical CSS node. Upon arrival at the NTC, the NCOs and RTOs are unsure of their role in the CTCP and are unfamiliar with the techniques and procedures used by a CTCP to collect and disseminate information via the net control station.

2. Management of detailed information, such as combat vehicle not-mission-capable (NMC) information, on-hand quantities of Class III and V (companies, combat trains and field trains), and casualty accounting is habitually a major weakness.

3. During the course of the NTC rotation, the CTCP NCOs and RTOs begin to understand their task force support role, but they do not have the experience or time available to focus on developing workable systems and techniques to most effectively operate the CTCP.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Upon completion of each Home Station training event, CTCP personnel should conduct an extensive internal AAR to capture and record all the lessons learned.

2. Capture and document the techniques that worked and eliminate those that did not. Take these results and immediately adjust the CTCP TACSOP accordingly.

3. Train using the new TACSOP until all personnel are proficient in collecting and disseminating pertinent information.

(TA.4.1.1 Communicate Informaiton)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Use of the Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Warning and Reporting System

OBSERVATION (Engr): Engineer units do not use the NBC warning and reporting system to warn other units of an actual or predicted chemical hazard.

DISCUSSION:

1. Units often neglect to make initial reports, resulting in unnecessary casualties due to chemical agent exposure.

2. Unit personnel do not understand the capabilities of the NBC warning and reporting system and do not use it to determine required protective measures or to plan operations.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Refer to page 2-1 of FM 3-3, Chemical and Biological Contamination Aviodance, for information on the use of the NBC warning and reporting system.

2. Include procedures for the use of the NBC warning and reporting system in the engineer battalion tactical SOP (TACSOP).

3. Standardize all reporting formats for NBC. If a SPOT or SALUTE report is used, ensure it has all required information.

4. Ensure that all unit personnel understand the flow process of reports.

(TA.4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Fire Support Team (FIST) Reporting Standards

OBSERVATION (FS): Fire support teams frequently do not report information in accordance with doctrinal report formats.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. FISTs should report information and call for fire IAW the formats in FM 6-20-20 and FM 6-30.

2. The FIST forward observer's (FO's) primary mission is to call for fires for the maneuver element. When fires are unavailable, the FO's next responsibility is to report. The task force (TF) needs to enforce reporting standards (i.e., call for fire, SALUTE reports, and SALT reports).

(TA.4.1.1.4 Receive and Transmit Friendly Troop Information)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Communicating Information: Battalion/Brigade Signal Officer (SIGO) Duties

OBSERVATION (Mech): Battalion/brigade signal officers (SIGOs) are often used only to place retransmission systems.

DISCUSSION: The battalion/brigade SIGO's responsibility in the unit is to ensure the commander has command and control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) for his troops. The SIGO should plan and synchronize the communication nodes with the flow of the battle throughout the depth of the battle.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Authorize the SIGO to plan and synchronize an approved command and control plan that goes beyond simply placing retransmission systems.

2. Require the SIGO to plan the locations for the tactical operations center (TOC) (to include forward and rearward displacement), the combat trains command post (CTCP), retransmission systems, mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) assets, and so forth.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Task Force TOC Battle Tracking and Information Management

OBSERVATION (Armor): Task force TOCs too often do not have established procedures for information display, message handling, and battle tracking.

DISCUSSION:

1. There is a lack of training on information management.

2. Most units do not know what information to track. They often track information that is not critical, are unable to identify information that is critical, or attempt to track an overabundance of information that makes it unmanageable.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Decide what standard information the TOC expects from subordinate units.

2. Ensure subordinates understand what information is expected and when it should be provided. Units must ensure that a satisfactory number of individuals other than and including the battle captain understand the system for information management. Information is lost when only a few individuals understand the system.

3. When a task force commander decides additional tracking information is required for a specific mission, these new requirements must be disseminated to subordinate units.

4. The task force XO must monitor his staff sections to ensure that the information management system is to standard.

5. The task force commander and staff should be able to quickly visualize the accurate status of the task force from one source in the TOC.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Battle Tracking and Situational Awareness in the Field Trains Command Post (FTCP)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Insufficient battle tracking and situational awareness in the field trains command post (FTCP) result in its inability to assume command and control of the battle when called.

DISCUSSION:

1. The FTCP is not able to maintain positive communication with the task force (TF) TOC and is not receiving adequate battlefield reports from the combat trains CP (CTCP) to maintain situational awareness. The communication plans are sufficient while a TF is static in the defense, but become a problem when the TF conducts offensive operations.

2. FTCP personnel rely too heavily on either the commander, XO, or 1SG to be at the CP at all times. When situations arise that require these three personnel to be absent, the second team does not keep the map board/tracking charts updated to allow the commander to receive an updated battlefield update brief when he arrives back at the CP. This is also true with tracking FTCP assets throughout the battlefield and the maintenance status of all HHC elements (i.e., turn-in of DA Forms 2404/5988E).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The HHC commander establishes a CP SOP that clearly explains each soldier's duty while on shift at the FTCP. Establish a shift changeover and commander update brief format and include it in the SOP.

2. Ensure the TF SIGO constructs a communications plan that covers all CPs within the TF.

3. Ensure the FTCP has the proper tracking charts and CP set up to function as a viable TOC if needed.

4. Refer to CALL Newsletter No. 95-07, Tactical Operations Center.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Battle Tracking in the FA Battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC)

OBSERVATION (FS): The FA battalion TOC is seldom able to track the battle and maintain situational awareness.

DISCUSSION:

1. The battalion often has limited means of displaying information within the TOC. Few, if any tracking or status charts are developed. The product used most often is the situation map (SITMAP).

2. The unit is generally not able to consistently track the location and status of the maneuver units on the battlefield. Critical information such as ammunition status, commander's critical information requirements (CCIR), and mission status are not tracked adequately throughout each battle. Typically, the staff begins the battle with a clear status of their units, but are not able to sustain it throughout the fight.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The unit should identify the critical information that must be tracked. Prioritize this information and develop status boards and charts to track and manage it. At a minimum, display and monitor the following information:

2. Identify specific messages that must be processed in the TOC, and use pre-printed message forms that automatically provide multiple copies.

3. Charts are very useful tools for handling some types of information. Consider the following when developing charts:

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 10
SUBJECT: S2 Battle Tracking and Predictive Analysis

OBSERVATION (FS): Battalion S2s commonly lack an ability to track the enemy and predict future actions during the battle.

DISCUSSION:

1. The battalion battle staff is often unable to maintain a clear picture of the enemy situation as it relates to ongoing friendly activities.

2. The S2s of the direct support (DS) field artillery battalion, reinforcing field artillery battalion and brigade combat team (BCT) do not consistently share timely, accurate intelligence.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Staff sections must "cross-talk" continuously to retain situational awareness within the TOC. Knowledge of the enemy situation as it relates to the friendly situation allows the S2 to confirm or deny enemy COA and enables him to make predictions that commanders or members of the staff can then use to make informed decisions during the course of the battle.

2. Many units conduct periodic "battle updates" which facilitate the exchange of information across staff sections during a battle. The S2s must exchange intelligence information in the same manner, regardless whether by voice or digital. Staffs, specifically S2s, should develop a system to keep one another informed during the course of an operation and incorporate this system into their SOP.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 11
SUBJECT: Engineer Company Battle Tracking

OBSERVATION (Engr): Task force engineer representatives in the task force tactical operations center (TOC) (engineer company HQ section) have difficulty with clearly and accurately tracking mobility, countermobility, and survivability data.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. A clear, visible tracking system that combines map and wingboard data is the most effective tracking method.

2. Keep the information being tracked to the minimum required. If you do not use it, you do not need it (see CALL Newsletter No. 95-07, Tactical Operations Center).

3. The information must be organized, accurate and easy to read. Key graphics and charts required in the engineer cell of the task force TOC to sustain combat operations include:

3. In the defense, an enlarged version of the "commander's status card" cartoon sketch should be posted for ease of tracking battlefield preparation and engineer operations.

4. Subordinate unit locations should be tracked two levels down.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TA.7 Combat Service Support BOS

TA.4 Command and Control BOS, Part 2