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TREND 25
SUBJECT: CSS Integration Into the Battalion Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

OBSERVATION (FS): CSS operations are seldom integrated into the battalion's battle rhythm and do not facilitate the battalion's tactical posture.

DISCUSSION:

1. Most battalions demonstrate the ability to plan, prepare, execute, and reconstitute logistics; however, the S4, S1, and XO are not primary players during the orders process. CSS is often an afterthought and seldom addressed.

2. The S4 often leaves the wargame to gather information or solve problems that should be handled by the ALOC.

3. CSS is briefed but rarely rehearsed during battalion rehearsals. Who, what, when, where, and how should be briefed during the battalion rock drill for R3SP, LRPs, medical support plan, MSRs, resupply triggers, and reconstitution of battalion assets.

4. The S4s are not using a CSS execution matrix and their CSS plan is rarely rehearsed.

5. The S4s are not using a checklist during the battalion orders process, hindering their ability to both validate and synchronize the plan and ensure it supports the Essential Field Artillery Tasks (EFATs).

6. The S3 does not provide timely ammunition guidance or establish future requirements, thus hindering the S4's ability to develop an adequate resupply plan.

7. Battlefield calculus is rarely conducted, and ammunition requirements/triggers are not clearly identified (155mm).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. A battalion logistician (S4/S1 or battalion XO) should be present at all battalion orders drills, aggressively representing the CSS arena and ensuring integration and synchronization of CSS operations. Better integration of CSS operations provides necessary time to reconstitute Class III (B) and V and reconfigure ammunition, thus posturing the battalion's CSS for the future battle.

2. The battalion XO orchestrates the orders process by acting as the chief of staff, ensuring all of the necessary players are present and participating.

3. The S4 must know the battalion's current logistical status before conducting mission analysis.

4. Develop a battalion OPORD CSS checklist that lists critical CSS functions which must occur before, during, and post battle, including grid locations of CSS entities. The list should be completed by phases of the battle and should include:

5. At a minimum, answer the essential field artillery tasks (EFATs) before leaving the battalion wargaming process and include them in any rehearsals.

6. Clear, timely ammunition guidance from the S3, better battlefield calculus, and ammunition positioning improves ammunition operations.

7. Focus on integrating resupply operations with the battalion operation, whether it be centralized or decentralized. This facilitates resupply operations in a more stable environment with less distraction and economizes the use of battalion logistical assets.

8. The S4 should maintain situational awareness and status of logistical assets and provide the S3 advice on execution of the logistics operations.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 26
SUBJECT: Engineer Battalion Integration Into the Brigade Planning Process

OBSERVATION (Engr): Engineer battalion staffs do not complete the planning process and products to standard.

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineer staffs are prepared to conduct horizontal planning to a certain degree. The vertical planning process, however, remains unstructured, leading to engineer orders that lack sufficient detail and specificity to conduct successful operations.

2. Although the battalion S3, S2, and the assistant battalion engineer (ABE) participate together in brigade mission analysis and the brigade wargaming process, critical steps in the development of the engineer estimate are missing, as the engineer battalion is not planning concurrently.

3. The battalion commander and staff are not developing a detailed scheme of engineer operations (SOEO) to support each maneuver course of action (COA) and then integrating the SOEO for the selected COA into brigade wargaming. Key engineer tasks are left out of both the brigade's SOEO and the engineer battalion's plan as each works through his respective processes.

4. The engineer battalion XO does not closely coordinate with the battalion S3 and is seldom able to establish any type of battalion planning timeline.

5. The engineer battalion conducts its own separate wargame and identifies critical vertical tasks after the brigade plan is completed, so the tasks are not integrated or coordinated.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. When an engineer battalion's assets are task organized under maneuver battalion control, the engineer battalion must conduct parallel planning with the supported maneuver brigade. Engineer parallel planning requires a focus on both vertical planning (identification, integration, synchronization of tasks to support the engineer mission) and horizontal planning (integration, synchronization of tasks to support the maneuver brigade).

2. The engineer battalion, with the assistant battalion engineer (ABE), should study and know the planning process as outlined in FM 5-71-3, Brigade Engineer Combat Operations (Armored). The battalion XO should take ownership of the planning structure within the engineer battalion.

3. The XO and S3 must coordinate critical junctures when the engineer staff is required to supplement S3/ABE efforts in the brigade planning process. This will drive development of the battalion planning timeline.

4. Once the timeline is set, the S3/XO must determine what products will result from each part of the process and whether the products come from the battalion staff or the S3/S2/ABE. There should be a continuous exchange of products/information between these two cells to facilitate effective engineer planning for both the maneuver brigade and the engineer battalion.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 27
SUBJECT: Combat Support Equipment (CSE) Platoon Augmentation and Integration

OBSERVATION (Engr): CSE platoons attached to engineer battalions seldom deploy with their full compliment of equipment and are often poorly integrated into the engineer planning process.

DISCUSSION:

1. A lack of equipment often reduces a CSE platoon to a survivability asset with virtually no capability to conduct even limited horizontal construction operations (main supply route [MSR] upgrades, etc.).

2. A lack of integration into engineer operations normally results in the platoon having unnecessary idle blade hours.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Always deploy the CSE platoon with their full compliment of equipment. Both the platoon and the brigade are deprived of a valuable training opportunity if the CSE is not fully equipped.

2. As the rear area engineer, the HHC commander must take ownership of the CSE platoon and provide leadership and guidance.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 28
SUBJECT: Integrating the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) Security, Plans, and Operations Officer (SPO) into the Brigade Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

OBSERVATION (CSS): FSB SPOs are not involved in the brigade combat team (BCT) logistic planning process.

DISCUSSION:

1. The FSB SPO does not routinely attend the BCT planning sessions. The SPO becomes a receiver of the BCT logistic support plan rather than being an active participant in its development.

2. SPOs tend to leave the planning of BCT logistics to the brigade S4 or a logistic planner on the brigade staff.

3. SPOs rarely provide the brigade S4 sufficient guidance regarding the involvement of direct support (DS) logistics in future operational planning. BCT logistic support plans are not synchronized to adequately support the BCT scheme of maneuver.

4. SPOs lack situational awareness regarding the BCT's tactical and logistic plan and are unable to provide the FSB executive officer (XO) timely information concerning the BCT concept of operations. As a result, the FSB XO is not able to publish a timely order for the FSB companies to execute troop-leading procedures (TLP) and company-level rehearsals.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. FSB SPOs must attend at least a portion of the BCT planning process, specifically mission analysis and course of action (COA) development, to provide the status of direct support (DS) logistics assets and guidance on how the maneuver plan can best be supported from a logistic standpoint.

2. The primary BCT logistics planner, be it the brigade S4 or a subordinate logistics planner, must keep the SPO informed throughout the planning process. The SPO can then begin parallel planning and keep the FSB XO abreast of the developing BCT plan. This will allow the FSB XO to set a viable timeline and publish an order that will enable FSB company commanders to execute TLP and conduct rehearsals.

3. The brigade S4 and the FSB SPO must ensure that the logistic support plan is synchronized with both the BCT maneuver plan and with the logistic support plans of each task force.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 29
SUBJECT: Course of Action (COA) Development

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task force (TF) S3s do not understand how to develop a COA.

DISCUSSION:

1. In most cases TF commanders do not understand how to determine a decisive point as it relates to developing the COA and do not develop COAs based on the decisive point.

2. TF S3s are not able to define in doctrinal terms what they want the company/teams to do or to task organize assets available to achieve the endstate. Task organization is often generic with little thought of weighting a main effort and adjusting supporting efforts to support the main effort.

3. COAs are frequently not developed with the S2's situational template (SITEMP) or on a map where the terrain can be visualized.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Doctrinal references for commanders and staffs are FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, and FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion. FM 101-5-1 provides the correct doctrinal definitions that should be used when assigning company/team tasks and purposes. Chapter 2 of FM 7-20 provides procedures for development of COAs.

(TA.4.3.2 Develop Courses of Action)

TREND 30
SUBJECT: Wargaming

OBSERVATION (Armor): Wargaming is weak within too many maneuver task forces.

DISCUSSION:

1. Units have limited time training as a complete staff on the military decision-making process (MDMP).

2. During a rotation, most units improve their performance with the various phases of the MDMP, with wargaming being the one exception.

3. Units attempt to wargame before fully developing a complete COA. Units develop a COA based on a vague concept directed by the task force commander.

4. Units seldom wargame against several enemy COAs.

5. Wargaming methods detailed in FM 101-5-1 are seldom incorporated into the process because the incomplete COA will not allow the unit to select a method outlined in the FM.

6. Units have difficulty with recording wargame results. Units have not trained adequately on the methods outlined in FM 101-5-1 or developed SOPs to record and display the results.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units must train on the MDMP with emphasis on wargaming. The wargame is a disciplined process with rules and steps that attempt to visualize the flow of the battle.

2. Units must become familiar with the wargaming techniques and recording methods outlined in FM 101-5-1. A unit SOP can be developed to enhance the process.

3. A complete COA must be developed prior to wargaming. If one friendly COA is developed in an effort to save time, the unit should wargame against several enemy COAs in order to develop branches to the base plan.

4. Adhering to the established timeline allows the staff to remain focused during the process and forces the staff to prioritize the amount of detail given to the effort.

5. The wargame should result in refining or modifying the COA, to include identifying branches and sequels that become on-order or be-prepared missions. It should refine location and timing of the decision point.

6. A synchronization matrix and decision support template (DST) should also be a result of the process. It should project the percentage of total enemy forces defeated in each critical event.

(TA.4.3.3 Analyze Courses of Action)

TREND 31
SUBJECT: Wargaming

OBSERVATION (Mech): Wargaming is not focused and rarely synchronizes the task force (TF) plan.

DISCUSSION:

1. The TF XO does not facilitate the process, and the battle staff loses its focus on the critical events that need to be wargamed and the relationship between events and the decisive point.

2. The timeline is not managed effectively, and the wargame ends up taking well over half of the available planning time.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The TF XO must adhere to the timeline he establishes and keep the battle staff focused.

2. Integrate into the wargame all of the key players as outlined in ST 100-9.

3. The battle staff should identify critical events, prioritize them, and allocate time for each.

4. At the end of the wargame, the battle staff should have a synchronized plan in the form of a synchronization matrix, with operational graphics, so each BOS representative can finalize their portion of the OPORD.

(TA.4.3.3 Analyze Courses of Action)

TREND 32
SUBJECT: Wargaming

OBSERVATION (FS): Not all battlefield operating systems (BOS) and staff elements are included in the battalion wargaming process.

DISCUSSION:

1. Battalion staffs are attempting to integrate and synchronize all resources without the participation of all the BOS representatives.

2. Essential field artillery tasks (EFATs), critical events, critical tasks, movement triggers, and shortfalls are not determined or developed in the detail necessary for the batteries to execute.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. FM 101-5-1, Staff Organization and Operations, outlines a very deliberate course of action (COA) analysis and wargaming process. The wargame should focus the staff's attention on each phase of the operation in a logical sequence. It is an iterative process of action, reaction, and counteraction.

2. The wargaming process, adapted to the FA battalion, is described below.

(TA.4.3.3 Analyze Courses of Action)

TREND 33
SUBJECT: Development and Use of Tactical SOPs: Scout Platoon

OBSERVATION (Mech): The majority of platoon SOPs are insufficient.

DISCUSSION:

1. Many scout platoon SOPs are simply a reprint of FM 17-98 with the unit's cover on it.

2. Specific information that the platoon needs is not discussed in the SOP, and what is in the SOP is often not understood.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Developing a good platoon SOP requires time and the involvement of the entire platoon. FM 17-98 is a good guide to use when developing an SOP, but each subject area must be tailored to the platoon.

2. Ask soldiers for input on different subject areas to get them involved and help them understand the information presented. If the lowest-ranking soldier can read it and understand exactly what to do, the SOP is a good product.

3. Incorporate any attachments that the unit normally has, and include specific tasks for each subject area. For example, if a mechanic is normally attached to the platoon, he is not only responsible for maintenance within the platoon, but also assists in construction of the terrain model or is assistant gunner on a certain vehicle.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 34
SUBJECT: Troop Leading and Discipline: LOGPAC Operations SOPs

OBSERVATION (Mech): Unit SOPs on logistics package (LOGPAC) operations are seldom followed or enforced.

DISCUSSION:

1. LOGPAC turnaround times, as set by unit SOPs, are rarely met. Most task forces (TFs) meet their turnaround standard 25% of the time.

2. The excessive time consumed on unit LOGPACs affects the entire TF logistical arena, including mission preparation, draw times from the forward support battalion (FSB), and preparation for the next scheduled LOGPAC.

3. The support platoon suffers in many areas, with the biggest area being its rest plan.

4. Mission essential tasks for the platoon, such as pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs), inspection of vehicle load plans, equipment maintenance, personal maintenance, rehearsals, and the orders process at platoon level are inadequately conducted or not conducted at all.

5. The support platoon leader or HHC 1SG often closes the logistics release point (LRP) before all assets return.

6. Many drivers are not aware of the current mission when they depart the LRP and simply follow the truck in front of them. This is a cause of accidents.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Most TF and field train SOPs adequately cover all aspects of the LOGPAC, but the SOPs need to be followed by each element within the TF.

2. The TF chain of command, beginning with the TF XO and CSM, must adhere to, enforce, and be actively involved to ensure this important mission requirement is accomplished in a timely manner.

3. Company teams and specialty platoons/sections can aid in LOGPAC turnaround time by:

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 35
SUBJECT: Troop-Leading Procedures in Medical Platoons

OBSERVATION (Mech): Troop-leading procedures are seldom followed in medical platoons.

DISCUSSION:

1. The medical platoon OPORD is often issued only a few hours before crossing the LD, with little time for rehearsal or further preparation.

2. Delegation of responsibilities to junior NCOs is rarely applied.

3. Pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs) are inadequate, resulting in faulty communications and equipment shortcomings.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The medical platoon leader and/or platoon sergeant (PSG) must establish a timeline with priorities of work, follow the established timeline, and publish an OPORD for each mission.

2. PCCIs/PCIs must be incorporated into the unit SOP and conducted before every mission.

3. NCOs must be held accountable for supervising tasks, following up for proper completion, and reporting to the PSG when tasks are complete.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 36
SUBJECT: Troop-Leading Procedures (TLPs): Engineer Units

OBSERVATION (Mech and Engr): Engineer TLPs at both company and platoon level remain inadequate and lack the required substance to properly allow the unit to succeed.

DISCUSSION:

1. TLPs are often overlooked and/or rushed to a point where they have no effect on the mission.

2. Engineer units often develop timelines (from past-due maneuver timelines) that do not identify key engineer essential planning and execution tasks.

3. Development of a tentative plan usually falls short because of incomplete application or a misunderstanding by the company XO during the tactical planning process.

4. Engineer company XOs do not identify essential, specified, and implied tasks that are critically important to mission accomplishment.

5. Unit orders lack clarity regarding the unit commander's intent, scheme of engineer operations, and sub-unit tasks.

6. Unit commanders misunderstand the importance of time management.

7. Rehearsals and backbriefs are executed poorly.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 37
SUBJECT: Troop-Leading Procedures (TLP): Task Force Signal Officer (SIGO) and NCOICs

OBSERVATION (Mech): The task force SIGO's and NCOIC's troop-leading procedures (TLPs) are usually inadequate.

DISCUSSION:

1. Many times subordinate soldiers do not fully understand their mission, reporting procedures, or routes. This creates confusion during mission execution phases.

2. There is poor situational awareness without TLP at every level. Placing the retransmission system on the wrong slope of a hill will not only cost the lives of the retransmission team, but also puts at great risk the lives of ground troops that the commander can no longer reach.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The SIGO, communications chief, and all the NCOs must exercise the TLP steps at Home Station. They must be clear and concise when conducting platoon or section OPORD briefings.

2. Signal soldiers must fully understand the scheme of maneuver and commander's intent to provide needed support to the mission.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TA.4 Command and Control BOS, Part 2

TA.4 Command and Control BOS, Part 4