• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

OBSERVATION (Engr): The majority of engineer companies do not have or use a TACSOP.

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineer company TACSOPs, if they exist, seldom contain the task force SOPs or the engineer battalion SOPs.

2. TACSOPs do not include procedures on how the company internally conducts tactical missions.

3. Most companies say they use their engineer battalion TACSOP, but the soldiers in the company are usually not familiar with it and do not follow it during the planning, preparation, and execution of tactical missions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The engineer company leaders must conduct bottom-up research on how they will conduct tactical missions and must produce a company-level TACSOP.

2. Once the TACSOP is produced, it must be disseminated to all soldiers, and the company leadership must enforce the use of the TACSOP.

3. The TACSOP is a living document that is reviewed and updated after each major field training exercise (FTX).

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 39
SUBJECT: Engineer HHC Commander Troop-Leading Procedures (TLPs)

OBSERVATION (Engr): Engineer HHC commanders are not effectively utilizing TLPs as a tool to plan, prepare, execute, and supervise CSS operations.

DISCUSSION:

1. Because many of their tasks and missions are ongoing and/or repetitive, many HHC commanders find it difficult, or unnecessary, to conduct TLPs and issue HHC OPORDs. Without an OPORD, subordinates are not focused and do not possess the situational awareness necessary to fight, win, and survive on the battlefield.

2. Many engineer HHC commanders plan "on the fly" and do not establish timelines, leaving subordinate leaders (support platoon leader, CSE platoon leader, etc.) without the necessary information or time to conduct their own TLPs for successful execution.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Regardless of time available, the engineer HHC commander must use TLPs to develop a systematic approach to formulating tactical plans.

2. An HHC OPORD must be issued to standard (written or oral) to include force protection (Force XXI risk sssessment). Without effective TLPs, the commander will seldom deliver an adequate OPORD on time or at all.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 40
SUBJECT: Development and Use of Tactical SOPs: Task Force TOC Displacement

OBSERVATION (Armor): Task forces seldom have an established standard operating procedure (SOP) for the echelonment of tactical operations center (TOC) equipment and personnel to provide an interim capability.

DISCUSSION:

1. Task force TOC jump plans are not synchronized into the task force scheme of maneuver.

2. The TOC loses situational awareness and the ability to conduct predictive analysis and timely recommendations to the commander.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The task force TOC should establish an SOP that addresses the organization of each echelon of the TOC as it displaces. The SOP should address:

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 41
SUBJECT: Direct Fire Planning

OBSERVATION (Mech): Direct fire plans are often not developed.

DISCUSSION:

1. Development of direct fire plans is often omitted during the planning process to save time. This is a result of poor time management and a lack of parallel planning.

2. When a direct fire plan is developed, it is a basic sketch that lacks real in-depth analysis and development.

3. Based on a belief that he will not receive indirect fires, the company commander seldom integrates indirect fires into his plan. As a result, fires are poor or are not properly concentrated or dispersed.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Direct fire plans must be developed to mass fires and kill the enemy with maximum effectiveness.

2. Maneuver commanders must have some confidence that higher headquarters will support their plan. Indirect fires and engagement area development must be stressed during Home Station training.

3. When developing the direct fire plan, commanders should understand how to effectively integrate TOW fires and other weapons systems.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 42
SUBJECT: Operations Order (OPORD) Preparation Process

OBSERVATION (Mech): The orders process in the field trains command post (FTCP) is not standardized or followed.

DISCUSSION:

1. FTCPs normally have a good OPORD format in their SOPs, but the SOPs are not followed or used.

2. The HHC commander often attempts to write the entire OPORD himself, and most of the time he does not begin mission analysis until he receives the task force (TF) OPORD.

3. The FTCP chain of command often surfaces valid concerns about the upcoming mission that as a result of late or improper mission analysis are not elevated up to the TF level.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The FTCP command group should be consistently involved in the TF orders process and all maneuver and CSS rehearsals.

2. The HHC commander should use his XO, 1SG, and subordinate element leaders to give him input to the FTCP OPORD. This will make the order clearer to all involved and allow the commander to accomplish his other duties.

3. The FTCP staff should establish a timeline when the WARNO is received and follow it.

4. The HHC commander should coordinate closely with available assets in the brigade support area (brigade rear and forward support battalion CP) to allow him to conduct a timely and adequate mission analysis.

5. The format of a field train's OPORD is no different from that of a maneuver element; what is different is the information it contains. The commander must give a task and purpose to each subordinate element in the field trains to allow each platoon or section to conduct proper mission analysis IAW their given tasks.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 43
SUBJECT: Operations Order (OPORD) Preparation: Integrating the Medical Platoon Leader

OBSERVATION (Mech): Medical platoon leaders are usually not integrated in the task force (TF) OPORD preparation process.

DISCUSSION:

1. The S4 operates independently without input from the medical platoon leader.

2. The TF commander's intent and concept of support are often not clearly understood by those who will conduct casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) operations.

3. Current graphics that template obstacles, engagement areas, and enemy avenues of approach are seldom distributed throughout the medical platoon. As a result, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) assets are often destroyed by friendly and enemy obstacles and by enemy direct and indirect fires.

4. Company MEDEVAC teams maintain poor situational awareness because of inadequate FM communication with the TF command group. Often, only the administration and logistics (A/L) radio net is monitored. As a result, battalion aid station (BAS) locations, casualty collection points (CCP), and ambulance exchange points (AXP) are unknown throughout the medical platoon and TF.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. For a medical plan to be successful, it must be controlled as with any other operation.

2. Rehearse FM communications at every level. Use multiple radio frequencies to allow real-time communication with the TF command group, subordinates, and the supporting medical company (C/FSB).

3. Once incorporated into the TF planning process, the medical platoon leader must execute troop-leading procedures (TLP) and develop a timeline for issuing the OPORD and conducting rehearsals.

4. The platoon leader responsible for appropriate allocation of medical assets and responsive support must track continuos SITREPS from the S2 and line company medics. Intelligence reports, active AXPs, and FRAGOs must be disseminated to evacuation teams immediately for adequate situational awareness.

5. Friendly and enemy graphics and overlays must be understood by crews and posted in each evacuation vehicle.

6. The medical platoon leader should participate in the TF's Home Station JANUS exercises for additional battle-tracking experience.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 44
SUBJECT: Direct Fire Planning: Battalion Engagement Area (EA) Development

OBSERVATION (Avn): Company commanders often do not understand where direct fire planning should occur within the battalion engagement area (EA) development process.

DISCUSSION: Company commanders do not understand the importance of synchronizing the direct fire plans from the attack companies within a battalion EA. With large target arrays and multiple attack companies involved in the fight, synchronizing fire plans becomes even more critical due to potential multiple missiles on the same target.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The battalion S3 or battalion commander should conduct a training exercise without troops (TEWT), for the purpose of working through the battalion engagement area development process. Participants should include the entire battalion staff and company commanders. The objectives of the training exercise should be to ensure company commanders know:

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 45
SUBJECT: Preparing and Completing Orders: FA Battery Defensive Operations

OBSERVATION (FS): FA batteries generally do not prepare for defensive operations to standard.

DISCUSSION:

1. Commanders do not ensure that units understand the desired defensive endstate and do not prioritize their work efforts.

2. Leaders do not supervise and enforce standard occupation defensive preparations.

3. Batteries seldom do the following in preparation for defensive operations:

4. Positioning of the field artillery ammunition support vehicle (FAASV) is often an afterthought in defensive preparations.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Conduct a battery defensive preparation battle drill. Develop a drill that clearly outlines:

2. Preparation begins when the battery commander receives the mission. He must begin his own analysis based on information received during the field artillery support plan (FASP) briefing.

3. The gunnery sergeants then begin their reconnaissance with a specific defensive concept in mind.

4. The battery commander issues specific defensive PCCs/PCIs for the platoon leaders, platoon sergeants (PSGs), and section chiefs to accomplish before any movement takes place. For example:

" The S2 believes rotary wing aircraft are the greatest threats during Phases 1 and 2. After Phase 2 the greatest threat comes from counter-fire and possible leakers from the 1st Echelon MRBs. As a result, I want the air threat and counter-fire threat PCCs completed prior to 1900 hours. We will depart start point (SP) to PA 62 at 1930 hours. Once in position, conduct mounted and dismounted ground threat PCCs IAW with the FA TACSOP."

In these four short sentences the commander has told his junior leaders their likely threats and control measures to counter those threats, and has established a priority of work and a completion time. The commander can then address any changes during his battery OPORD.

5. The greater challenge of defensive preparation begins after the occupation, but it need not be a new concept at each position. A defensive battle drill, focused by the commander as illustrated above, will give the section chiefs sufficient time to prepare their sections.

6. Based on the WARNO, the gunnery sergeant should have begun establishing TRPs. The TRPs serve several purposes:

7. Units should then establish range cards for each crew-served weapon and howitzer. The combination of range cards and TRPs will allow a section chief to easily reestablish his sectors of fire and defensive orientation after conducting a survivability move. Sections should be battle- drill trained to ensure that they re-mark their sectors of fire after each move.

8. Listening posts and observation posts (LPs/OPs), either mounted or dismounted, can be set up based on the threat.

9. PCCs and PCIs will ensure chiefs cover the specifics of each task.

10. The battery commander (BC) or a battery leader should conduct coordination with adjacent units. This coordination ensures each unit knows the other's location, the established call signs and frequencies, and recognition signals. Coordination also allows them to tie into defensive positions, and prevents confusion and misidentification of friendly vehicles.

11. The commander must consider survivability moves versus hardening of positions.

13. The defensive preparation battle drill is vital. The battery commander, having determined what measures his battery must take, focuses his battery leadership through the WARNO and OPORD using PCCs, PCIs, rehearsals, priorities of work, and planning guidance. Defensive preparation is then a directed effort of priorities of work based on a logical analysis within the whole timeline, not guesswork as time permits.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 46
SUBJECT: Movement and Commitment of Combat Health Support (CHS) Assets

OBSERVATION (CSS): CHS planners seldom establish clearly defined triggers for movement and commitment of CHS assets based on scheme of maneuver, decision points, or casualty loads.

DISCUSSION:

1. Maneuver forces typically outrun their CHS assets during offensive operations.

2. The medical company commander loses communications with his forward elements at the battalion aid station (BAS) and ambulance exchange points (AXPs).

3. Medical company treatment teams are rarely used in a reinforcing role to allow BAS treatment teams to remain mobile. Treatment teams which are pushed forward seldom have a clear task and purpose.

4. Non-standard evacuation platforms are seldom massed in sufficient quantity and are not forward prior to crossing of the line of departure (LD).

5. In an offensive mission, CHS elements are either left behind, or stop and set up for operation with minimal casualties as the maneuver task force continues to fight far forward.

6. Situational awareness and command and control are poor due to inadequate communications planning.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Position an ambulance exchange point (AXP) with the trail battalion aid station (BAS) treatment team. Move the AXP with the BAS and drop it off when the battalion sustains its first casualties to allow the BAS to remain mobile.

2. Position non-standard ground evacuation platforms far forward in sufficient quantity to support the casualty estimate.

3. The ambulance platoon leader and platoon sergeant attend the battalion/task force rehearsals.

4. Establish a CSS C2 cell composed of the medical company commander, brigade S4, FSB security, plans, and operations officer (SPO), and brigade chaplain. This cell can see the battle, communicate through the depth of the battle space, make timely decisions regarding reallocation of resources, and maintain good situational awareness. All graphics are posted and maintained on a common map.

5. Develop CHS decision points based on maneuver decision points.

6. Use air evacuation early to allow ground platforms to remain.

7. Translate equipment losses into casualty reports.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 47
SUBJECT: Supply Company Orders and Mission Preparation

OBSERVATION (CSS): Supply companies do not prepare with sufficient detail to ensure mission success.

DISCUSSION:

1. Companies usually wait for the battalion order to begin internal planning. As a result, supply companies rarely issue an operations order (OPORD) and when they do, it is never complete.

2. Company commanders do not use or are unaware of the eight troop -eading procedures.

3. Units do not plan to conduct rehearsals. Unit actions prior to movements are uncoordinated, and soldiers are usually unaware of the unit mission or key events or times for the next 24 hours.

4. Start point (SP) times are usually not met because units are not prepared.

5. Soldiers become disgruntled because of conflicting guidance.

6. Occupation of operating sites is frequently haphazard.

7. Low leader/soldier situational awareness inhibits initiative, and unit personnel waste large amounts of time.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Use the troop-leading procedures.

2. Do not wait for a complete order from the battalion to issue the company warning order (WARNO). The commander's intent and a no-later-than (NLT) time is enough to get the unit moving. Concentrate on what can be done do to prepare, inspect, rehearse, and spot check.

3. Conduct rehearsals. The more personnel involved the better. At a minimum, use a backbrief rehearsal to ensure that key leaders have the information needed to accomplish the mission.

4. Allow enough time for subordinate leaders to issue an OPORD to their soldiers and conduct internal backbrief, inspections, and rehearsals.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TA.4 Command and Control BOS, Part 3

TA.4 Command and Control BOS, Part 5