COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS (cont)
TREND
12
SUBJECT:
Casualty Reporting and Tracking Within the Engineer Battalion Administrative
and Logistics Command Post (ALOC)
OBSERVATION (Engr): Engineer units do not use tracking methods that maintain detailed and accurate accountability of casualties on the battlefield.
DISCUSSION:
1. Units use a variety of methods for tracking casualties at the ALOC, but generally rely solely on FM casualty reports that lack the detail necessary for PAC personnel to generate required feeder reports and awards. Reports usually include little more than battle roster numbers.
2. Engineer units, which usually rely on supported unit assets to evacuate casualties, often send formal feeder reports only through those supported unit channels, b-passing engineer channels altogether.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Units must be able to accurately track casualties by event and type as well as by individual, and must receive formal casualty feeder reports/witness reports as well as the initial FM report.
2. Sub-units should send an initial report via FM with sufficient information for ALOC personnel to anticipate the movement of casualties on the battlefield and to begin planning for replacement operations. This information should enable the ALOC to assess combat losses not only in terms of individual personnel but also in terms of personnel as they relate to combat systems. In addition, this information enables the ALOC to identify early those soldiers which will be pushed back through the replacement system, generate reports and awards in a timely manner, and provide immediate analysis and feedback to the commander. At a minimum, the initial report should include:
3. Formal casualty feeder reports/witness reports, action summaries, and personnel status reports sent through battalion FM channels or through the LOGPAC should follow initial reports. These follow-up reports provide verification of initial reports and the information necessary to generate awards, letters, and action summary reports as necessary.
(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
13
SUBJECT:
Mission Analysis: Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA)
OBSERVATION (Armor): The greatest challenge to engineer XOs during recent rotations is the production of a solid EBA during mission analysis.
DISCUSSION:
1. A detailed EBA is the foundation for successful mobility/counter-mobility/survivability planning at any level. Engineer company executive officers (XOs) are generally able to provide a good estimate of friendly engineer capabilities and extract specified and implied tasks from the brigade order. However, analysis of the terrain and how the OPFOR fights his engineers to shape the battlefield remain areas of weakness.
2. Engineer XOs do not arrive at the National Training Center with a formal process developed to use as an EBA framework for mission analysis or terrain analysis for each battle.
3. Typically, engineer XOs do not fully elaborate enemy engineer breach or situational obstacle capability.
4. Engineer XOs provide only limited assistance to the task force/squadron S2 in terrain analysis. While engineer officers in tactical command (OTC) generally have Terrabase II, the engineer XO and task force/squadron staff do not take full advantage of this valuable terrain analysis tool.
5. Engineer XOs start COA development without a solid understanding of the mission, terrain, enemy, and what their mobility/counter-mobility/survivability BOS could bring to the fight.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Engineer XOs should develop and brief a formal EBA during mission analysis so that the staff understands the impact of OPFOR engineers and terrain on the fight. The key is that the engineer and S2 must go beyond simply quoting enemy capabilities and actually provide some analysis. In short, they must be able to tell the commander the "so what" in terms of how the enemy will use the terrain and employ his battlefield shapers. This will help focus the squadron's planning to task organize its own M/CM/S assets and incorporate them into the scheme of maneuver.
2. Terrain analysis must begin at the earliest possible time, in conjunction with receipt of a WARNO.
3. The engineer and S2 must work together to develop and disseminate terrain analysis products to company/team commanders to allow them to visualize the fight early in the planning process.
(TA.4.2 Assess Situation)
TREND
14
SUBJECT:
Mission Analysis: Participation by CSS Leadership
OBSERVATION (Mech): The task force (TF) S4 often completes the combat service support (CSS) planning process with little or no participation by other CSS leadership.
DISCUSSION:
1. Maintenance, medical, and personnel representatives are rarely present for the TF mission analysis process or briefing.
2. The S4 is usually not prepared to properly brief for the battalion maintenance officer (BMO), medical platoon leader, or the S1. As a result, the TF commander does not receive a clear and concise picture of the TF maintenance posture, medical capability, and personnel status, or how they may affect the upcoming mission.
3. The S4 does not receive input or recommendations from the other CSS leadership prior to COA development, and often forms the TF CSS plan based on his best guess given the minimal information and guidance available to him.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Ensure the BMO, medical platoon leader, and S1 attend the TF planning process if at all possible. This will promote integration of all the CSS assets into a team effort, allowing each leader's specific expertise to add to and build a viable plan and preparing any of these staff officers to fill the role of TF logistics planner if required.
2. If the BMO, medical platoon leader, or S1 cannot attend mission analysis, they must provide the S4 with an accurate, current, and projected status of their assets and the TF status in each of the six essential functions of CSS. They must prepare the S4 to brief the information to the commander.
(TA.4.2 Assess Situation)
TREND
15
SUBJECT:
Engineer Company Risk Management
OBSERVATION (Engr): Engineer companies are typically conducting a form of risk management on a mission-by-mission basis, generally following the Force XXI model.
DISCUSSION:
1. The process is not organic to the military decision-making process (MDMP) but often an afterthought.
2. Critical operational risks, such as conducting night tactical road marches and mitigating controls, are not identified.
3. Sub-units are not forced to continue the process at their level.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Risk management is applicable to everything an organization does. All units should conduct a Force XXI-type risk management process for every mission.
2. Make the risk management process organic to the MDMP, with the risk management product issued not later than the higher echelon's OPORD.
3. Higher echelon commanders should add risk management to their pre-combat check/pre-combat inspection (PCC/PCI) checklist and actually check it.
(TA.4.2 Assess Situation)
TREND
16
SUBJECT:
Battle Staff Mission Analysis
OBSERVATION (Mech): Mission analysis is not conducted as an integrated battle staff function.
DISCUSSION:
1. The staff is seldom briefed on the mission analysis prior to the initial brief to the commander.
2. The battle staff does not:
3. Frequently, the air defense officer (ADO), logisticians, and other attached staff officers are not informed that the main CP has received the order and that mission analysis is going to be conducted.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The battle staff should conduct mission analysis, integrating all the key players as outlined in ST 100-9. This initial step in the decision-making process focuses the staff on the upcoming operation and provides information on tasks that they must accomplish according to the brigade OPORD.
2. Refer to CALL Newsletter No. 95-12 Update, Military Decision-Making: "Abbreviated Planning." A coherent and synchronized plan cannot be developed unless the battle staff presents a fully integrated mission analysis brief to the commander with all specified tasks, implied tasks, mission essential tasks, facts, assumptions, assets available, and requests for information (RFIs) identified.
(TA.4.2.1.1 Analyze Mission)
TREND
17
SUBJECT:
Mission Analysis: Signal Officer (SIGO)
OBSERVATION (Mech): SIGOs seldom conduct a thorough mission analysis prior to the execution phase.
DISCUSSION: SIGOs do an adequate job fixing problems that develop, but many of those problems can be avoided if the SIGOs anticipate them and build contingencies into their plans.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The SIGO must analyze the task force mission, determine the elements critical for success, and assign resources to ensure achievement of the commander's intent. Resource assignments resulting from mission analysis could include, for example, planning for a back-up retransmission, ensuring mobile subscriber radio terminal (MSRT) coverage in the tactical operations center (TOC), and relocating personnel to best support the mission.
(TA.4.2.1.1 Analyze Mission)
TREND
18
SUBJECT:
Predictive Analysis
OBSERVATION (Mech): The main command post (CP) staff does not provide the task force (TF) commander adequate predictive analysis during operations.
DISCUSSION:
1. The event matrix, situation template (SITEMP), and decision matrix are usually not available or posted during the fight.
2. The battle staff is seldom able to analyze information it receives to provide the commander with a picture of future enemy actions or events. As a result, the staff cannot make recommendations to the commander on needed actions or change.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The function of the battle staff is to assist the commander by providing him a clear picture of current and future events and courses of action (COAs) to assist him in the fight.
2. The task force XO, S2, assistant S3/S3 air, engineer XO, chemical officer, and fire support officer (FSO) should track the battle at the map board or table and think one step ahead of friendly/enemy forces. They need to be able to articulate to the commander their predictive analysis and provide him with a recommended COA.
(TA.4.2.2 Project Future Requirements)
TREND
19
SUBJECT:
Forecasting Supply Requirements
OBSERVATION (CSS): Brigade combat team (BCT) S4s do not adequately coordinate logistics status (LOGSTAT) requirements with forward support battalion (FSB) security, plans and operations (SPO) officers.
DISCUSSION:
1. BCT S4s do not routinely scrub daily LOGSTATs with FSB SPOs. Due to this lack of coordination, the FSBSPO is not able to accurately forecast supply requirements for the BCT.
2. FSB SPOs usually determine future supply requirements based on what they "think" the BCT requires, rather than using LOGSTAT requirements balanced with an analysis of historical supply usage.
3. Poor analysis of unit LOGSTATS results in the inability to cross-level supplies between maneuver task forces (TFs) because both the BCT S4 and the FSB SPO are not situationally aware regarding the status of TF stocks.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. To develop an accurate BCT logistic forecast, enforce the timely submission of unit LOGSTAT reports to the BCT S4.
2. The BCT S4 must fix responsibility for an individual in the brigade S4 section to manage unit LOGSTATs.
3. A method to provide both the BCT S4 and FSB SPO visibility of unit on-hand balances/forecasts by class of supply is through the use of spreadsheets, with one class of supply per page. Using this method, the BCT S4 and the FSB SPO can view each TF and the BCT roll-up at one glance, rather than sorting through each LOGSTAT.
4. The FSB SPO must also look at historical usage, expecially early in the campaign. By day five of the rotation, the SPO will be able to analyze what units are requesting, compare this to what they actually are receiving, and adjust daily forecasts accordingly.
(TA.4.2.2 Project Future Requirements)
TREND
20
SUBJECT:
Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP): Integration of the Signal Officer
(SIGO)
OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces seldom integrate the SIGO into the planning process.
DISCUSSION: The SIGO is not involved in task force planning early enough to develop a plan and present recommendations for command and control (C2) assets.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Integrate the SIGO into the planning process at the early stages of planning.
2. Once they have a general idea of the enemy situation, friendly situation, and the commander's intent, the SIGO and NCOs can make a tentative C2 plan.
(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND
21
SUBJECT:
Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP): Application of the S2's Products
OBSERVATION (Lt/Abn): Task force (TF) commanders and staffs continue to be weak in applying the S2's products during the MDMP.
DISCUSSION: Often the S2 will prepare an adequate situational template (SITEMP) or threat course of action (COA), but then the TF staff and commander will not fight that SITEMP/COA during staff wargaming or at the TF rehearsal. This leads to an inability to identify critical events/branches and an unsynchronized TF plan.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Doctrinal references:
2. The TF battle staff must understand that the S2's SITEMP and enemy COAs are the most important products for determining critical events and developing a synchronized TF plan. Staffs must integrate the S2's products into mission analysis, COA development, and wargaming.
3. Refer to CALL Newsletter No. 95-12 Update, Military Decision-Making: "Abbreviated Planning," May 97.
(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND
22
SUBJECT:
Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP): Integration of the Aviation LNO
OBSERVATION (Avn): The aviation task forces, specifically the aviation liaison officers (LNOs), are not integrated into the brigade's decision-making process.
DISCUSSION:
1. Too often, the aviation LNO is a junior officer or warrant officer without the requisite experience to effectively integrate aviation into the brigade's scheme of fires.
2. Aviation LNOs do not aggressively seek out mission information.
3. Planning for aviation assets to support the brigade's mission is often an afterthought. The aviation LNOs are relegated only for last-minute planning efforts for missions that require timely and accurate information flow for execution.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The aviation LNO should form a working relationship with the brigade staff before it deploys.
2. The aviation LNO should be familiar with the standard operating procedures of all battlefield operating system (BOS) elements working within the brigade headquarters.
3. The aviation LNO should continuously seek out mission information and "sell" aviation to the brigade staff.
(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND
23
SUBJECT:
Brigade Fire Support Planning
OBSERVATION (FS): Although brigade fire support elements normally adequately prepare the fire support officers/elements (FSOs/FSEs) for participation in the planning process, they often struggle with providing timely and essential information to the battalion/task force (TF) FSOs to permit concurrent planning.
DISCUSSION:
1. The FSEs are hesitant to:
2. The resulting fire support plans lack sufficient detail, flexibility, and synchronization necessary to enable the brigade to attack the enemy throughout the depth of the battlefield. The brigade does not appear to the enemy as fighting one continuous fight.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Upon receipt of the new mission, the FSE begins a battle drill to confirm the current status of the fire support system and to gather the other needed elements for the first step in fire support planning. These are:
2. The FSO must:
3. The FSO should brief the results of his mission analysis to the commander and conclude his brief with recommended essential fire support tasks (EFSTs). Prior to COA development, the FSO should receive the commander's approved EFSTs and issue a WARNO to his subordinate FSOs and to the FA battalion.
4. As COA development begins, the FSO should conceptualize how to integrate fires into the developing COA. The commander's guidance becomes the start point for where and how the FSO allocates assets to each COA.
5. The results of the mission analysis become the foundation for fire support COA development. The FSO uses these results to plan the method for accomplishing the EFSTs. At a minimum, the fire support portion of a COA allocates acquisition assets (collection plan), attack assets, planned attack locations (target/TAI/EA), and the sequence (concept of fires) of these attacks required to achieve the effects specified in the EFSTs.
6. The desired output of COA development is a draft fire support plan. The draft fire support plan provides the sequence of EFSTs and outlines the task, purpose, method, and endstate for each EFST of the operation. The plan should include:
7. The more complete the fire support plan is before COA analysis and comparison, the more efficient and effective the wargame. The wargame provides final detail and refinement, validates capabilities, and synchronizes the fire support plan. Based on issues identified by the wargame, the FSO can modify the draft fire support plan and products to improve the plan. The wargame also provides a means to test the strength of the plan and build in flexibility by identifying decisions and branches for the fire support plan. At the conclusion of the wargame, the FSO should have:
8. Use a cartoon sketch, map overlay, or terrain model to help convey the details of the fire support plan more clearly. Once approved, the consolidated products become the fire support annex and are added to the maneuver order.
(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND
24
SUBJECT:
Fire Direction Officer (FDO) Integration into the Military Decision-Making
Process (MDMP)
OBSERVATION (FS): The FDO's responsibilities during the staff planning process are not well defined.
DISCUSSION: The staff does not analyze the Essential Fire Support Tasks (EFSTs) further than broad statements such as suppress lead MRBs, attrit the lead MRB, and provide smoke, FASCAM, Copperhead, and so forth.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. All members of the battalion staff must have a good understanding of the staff planning process and all members must contribute to varying degrees. The information and tools each member should bring to the planning table must be defined.
2. The FDO can contribute significantly to the planning process by reviewing the following information from the maneuver order:
- Attack guidance matrix: identifies desired effects and when to
attack a target type.
- HPTs: identifies the priority to attack a target type by FS means.
3. By front loading the planning process with an understanding of these areas, the FDO can determine:
4. After COA analysis, comparison, and the decision brief, the staff begins a deliberate wargame of the selected COA. During this phase, the FDO focuses on the entire scheme of fires, to include the specifics of the EFST (i.e., FASCAM aimpoints and number and type of rounds per aimpoint; Copperhead EAs and artillery positions; smoke aimpoints and number of rounds; mass missions; and munitions and volume required to fire).
(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)
TA.4
Command and Control BOS, Part 1
TA.4
Command and Control BOS, Part 3
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