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(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Use of Dismounted Infantry in the Offense

OBSERVATION (Lt/Abn): Task forces (TFs) seldom plan for employment of infantry during offensive operations.

DISCUSSION:

1. When infantry is employed, the initiative is normally at the platoon and company level.

2. Soldiers often dismount from Bradleys unprepared for the task and purpose they have been given.

3. Infantry squads are untrained and unfamiliar with infantry drills such as:

4. TF staffs do not take ownership during the planning process to set the conditions for success on the battlefield.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Commanders and staffs must understand the capabilities and limitations of mechanized infantry. FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, pages 1-7 and 1-8, outlines capabilities and limitations for dismounted infantry. Each element with a mechanized infantry unit can employ that infantry if they have a clear and attainable task and purpose. Tasks that infantry squads can best support include: <P>

2. During the military decision-making process (MDMP) commanders must determine what the most vulnerable target is for the infantry. In fact, early in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process, look for targets that will be vulnerable to infantry and plan to support their employment against those targets.

3. TFs must take ownership to assist the infantry and ensure their success. TFs are best suited for planning and coordinating force protection measures such as:

4. The trend of infantry squads being unfamiliar with infantry drills indicates a lack of training at Home Station. Commanders need to include training exercises for infantry squads on the battle drills described in FM 7-7, The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad, and 7-7J, Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley).

(TA.1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces [Units and Equipment])

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Paladin Battery Movement and Maneuver

OBSERVATION (FS): Movement of Paladin batteries is seldom adequately planned or executed.

DISCUSSION:

1. Artillery movement is not adequately planned for, resulting in a lack of synchronization with the maneuver plan.

2. The battalion staff does not correlate the movement plan with the execution of the brigade's essential fire support tasks (EFSTs). P>

3. The capabilities of the Paladin system present some unique movement challenges for the direct support (DS) FA battalion.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The staff must properly plan and execute a maneuver scheme for Paladins to maximize the ability of the battalion to provide responsive fires while remaining survivable on the battlefield.

2. To provide the fire support that maneuver forces require, the FA battalion staff must plan for repositioning during the military decision-making process (MDMP).

3. Some factors that must be considered as part of the FA battalion's planning process are:

4. Paladin battalions must understand and use maneuver graphical control measures. Using operational terms and symbols that are common to maneuver units will aid in an understanding of how Paladins maneuver.

5. The staff must provide firing batteries with clear guidance and triggers to conduct survivability moves and tactical moves. Tactical moves should be established using clear event triggers and Paladin axis (offensive operations) or zones (defensive operations) into which the batteries will move.

6. Because the Paladin can occupy places unsuitable for conventional artillery and has no requirement for sole use of terrain, the maneuver commander's land management concerns are simplified. Terrain management and coordination will be simplified once maneuver commanders understand Paladin movement techniques.

(TA.1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces [Units and Equipment])

TREND 3
SUBJECT: FA Battery Paladin Movement Planning and Execution

OBSERVATION (FS): FA commanders often do not conduct proper preparation and planning for their tactical moves.

DISCUSSION:

1. Commanders typically give little thought to control measures for ensuring timely, controlled tactical moves.

2. Most moves consist only of sending a move order to the guns with no thought of land deconfliction, boundaries, terrain, movement aids for limited visibility, reconnaissance, survey points, or movement control measures.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Paladin movement requires great detail in planning and flexibility in execution. Commanders should look early for potential problems, define specific control measures for the movement, and then position key leaders where they can see and influence the movement.

2. Movement planning must begin during the commander's mission analysis. Even if the battalion does not provide sufficient guidance for movement, this does not absolve the battery commander from planning movement in-depth to support his battery mission.

3. An initial examination of the scheme of maneuver, coupled with the Paladin zones provided from battalion, will give the commander a starting point for his maneuver plan.

4. The commander should look for obvious conflicts in the movement plan. By determining possible conflicts early, a commander can find solutions or work with the battalion staff to modify the plan.

5. The commander must then make specific decisions concerning his planned movement.

6. It is here that the gunnery sergeants can best assist the commander. The gunnery sergeants can easily place survey control points along the route if they know to do so in advance. By conducting a route reconnaissance within limits of the tactical situation, the gunnery sergeants can advise the commander on the terrain, routes, and possible conflicts. If ground recon is not possible, then the commander must conduct a detailed map recon.

7. The commander then determines how best to pass his movement plan to his platoons. One successful method is to develop battery graphics and disseminate them while issuing the WARNO or OPORD.

8. Control during the execution of the movement is no less critical than the planning phase. Commanders generally are good about using the gunnery sergeants to link in with the rear elements of the maneuver forces. This gives the commanders eyes forward while positioning themselves forward to make their own assessment of the movement.

9. Commanders should plan for contingencies in their scheme of maneuver. By planning alternate Paladin zones and alternate routes of march, the commander can easily shift his unit when the situation changes.

(TA.1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces [Units and Equipment])

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Engineer Company Maneuver in Offensive Missions

OBSERVATION (Engr): Engineer companies do not adequately control their maneuvers from crossing the line of departure (LD) to the breach site.

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineer company commanders do not adequately address in Paragraph 3 (Execution) of the company OPORD how the company will maneuver from the LD to the breach site.

2. Engineer companies rarely rehearse maneuver while preparing for a mission or moving to a new tactical assembly area (TAA) after a mission.

3. Engineer company leaders do not give clear and concise fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) or use decision point tactics effectively.

4. Engineer companies are normally slow in reacting to contact and do not adequately report, which allows the enemy to kill critical breaching equipment before it reaches the point of breach.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The company commander must address in Paragraph 3 of the company OPORD how the company will maneuver from the LD to the breach site, based on the operational risks he has determined from the enemy situational template (SITEMP).

2. The company leadership must take every opportunity to practice maneuvering the company. For example, instead of just convoying to the next TAA for the next mission, the company should practice maneuvering to the next TAA as if it was the next breach site.

(TA.1.1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces [Units and Equipment])

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Actions on Contact

OBSERVATION (Lt/Abn): Units often quickly become combat ineffective after initial contact with the enemy.

DISCUSSION: Companies and platoons are unable to execute maneuver in direct fire contact with the enemy. Units lose command and control, lose momentum, are rapidly attrited, and are unable to accomplish their mission. Contributing problems include:

1. Poor use of terrain or not using terrain to their advantage.

2. No integration or use of enemy combat multipliers such as smoke, indirect fires, and breach assets.

3. No preparation for contact. Units often do not plan for transitioning to maneuver; they use column formations and traveling techniques that do not facilitate rapid transition. When units are in the proper formation and technique, they are having problems rapidly transitioning from movement to maneuver.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. During the planning process, the commander should identify a probable line of deployment based upon the enemy situation. At the line of deployment, the unit will conform to a movement formation and technique that will facilitate rapid transition to maneuver.

2. Units must train at Home Station on battle drills and unit SOPs that address actions on contact.

(TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Actions on the Objective

OBSERVATION (Avn): Battalions and companies frequently occupy their initial assault-by-fire positions at their primary engagement area (EA) and do not maneuver to engage the enemy.

DISCUSSION:

1. When the enemy is not exactly where predicted, or if the timing is off, the attack units probably cannot see the enemy from their initial positions.

2. When the enemy is encountered where predicted, units typically do not maneuver to maintain contact and complete the destruction of the enemy.

3. Helicopters remain in their assault-by-fire position far too long, resulting in enemy indirect and/or direct fires on their position.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. When the enemy is not where predicted.

2. When the attack unit begins the engagement but does not maneuver to destroy the enemy.

(TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Offensive Direct Fires

OBSERVATION (Lt/Abn): Task force (TF) staffs seldom apply direct fire control measures in the offense.

DISCUSSION:

1. TF staffs and company commanders generally demonstrate a basic knowledge and understanding of how to apply direct fire control in the defense. However, terrain-based fire control measures such as target reference points (TRPs) and quadrants (well suited for defensive operations) are difficult to apply and utilize in the offense.

2. During offensive operations, direct fire control is rarely established at any level, and if done, is solely terrain-based. This is due to a lack of understanding of threat-based fire control measures such as quadrant on the enemy, target array, and so forth, which are best suited for offensive operations.

3. TF staffs seldom develop fire control measures during course of action (COA) development and wargaming. This results in an inability to distribute fires across the width and depth of enemy formations.

4. Weapons' effects for direct fire weapons (surface danger zones) are not taken into consideration during COA development or wargaming, and no force protection/risk reduction measures are put in place. These shortcomings increase the potential for fratricide.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The focus of offensive fires is to control and distribute fires while on the move against either a static or moving enemy.

1. If the enemy is static, terrain-based fire control measures can be utilized; however, they must be flexible to shift to where the enemy is located. Chapters 2 and 3 of FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, outline the principles, techniques and procedures for applying fire control measures in the offense.

2. If the threat is a moving enemy, threat-based fire control measures will be more effective. Specific examples include:

(TA.1.2.1 Employ Direct Fire)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Boresighting and Gunnery Skills

OBSERVATION (Avn): Attack helicopter battalions and cavalry squadrons (Air Cavalry Troops [ACTs]) continue to display eroding helicopter gunnery skills during both force-on-force (MILES/AGES) and live-fire operations.

DISCUSSION:

1. During recent rotations, crews employing the Hellfire point target weapon system have probability of hit (PH) statistics of less than 60 percent. This PH is based on actual gun camera footage of the missile engagements. Some causes are:

2. Area weapons systems (30mm/50cal and 2.75" rockets) are less accurate because adjustments when firing more than one volley are made improperly or not at all.

3. Crews seldom have standard cockpit procedures for employment of the chosen weapon system. This results in poor switchboard dexterity, slow engagement times, and poor crew coordination.

4. Unit difficulties with the following tasks indicate a lack of Home Station gunnery training.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. FM 1-140 prescribes a "continual" gunnery training program. To attain and sustain good gunnery skills, attack and cavalry units need to train continuously, not once per year.

2. To make gunnery training a priority, the battalion leadership, from platoon leaders to battalion commander, must become directly involved.

3. Use combat mission simulator (CMS) periods to train tactical gunnery with close attention to standardized procedures and phraseology.

4. All units should incorporate gunnery training into each flight that launches.

5. Standardize gunnery evaluations per FM 1-140. Tables V through VIII must receive objective evaluation.

6. Conduct Home Station gunnery training. One method, per FM 1-140, is provided below.

(TA.1.2.1 Employ Direct Fire)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Mortar Target Line Orientation

OBSERVATION (Mech): Leaders are not familiar with the technique "laying by orienting angle," which utilizes a target orienting station and orienting line.

DISCUSSION: Because of their unfamiliarity, mortar platoons are not using this useful technique.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Seek assistance from the task force fire support officer (FSO) for the procedures listed in FM 6-50, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery.

2. Coordinate with the survey team from the artillery battalion to establish directional control using "laying by orienting angle". This will help leaders become familiar with this technique and gain confidence from its use.

(TA.1.2.1.2 Engage Direct Fire Targets)

TREND 10
SUBJECT: Integrating Direct Fire with Maneuver

OBSERVATION (Mech): Mortar platoon split-section operations are not incorporated into the task force maneuver plan.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. References: FM 7-90, FM 23-91, and ARTEP 7-90 mission training plans (MTP).

2. Units should be aware of the advantages of employing mortars by section:

3. Conduct situational training exercise (STX) lane training at Home Station.

(TA.1.4 Integrate Direct Fire with Maneuver)

TREND 11
SUBJECT: Integrating Direct Fire with Maneuver

OBSERVATION (Mech): Combat multipliers are not adequately integrated into the scheme of maneuver.

DISCUSSION:

1. Task forces (TFs) tend to focus on maneuver only and do not understand how to integrate other combat multipliers.

2. A lack of integrated fires, engineers, air defense artillery (ADA), dismounted infantry and smoke results in a desynchronized plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Consider all potential combat multipliers during wargaming to determine their most effective application.

2. Determine when each of the combat multipliers can be used during the next mission to bring about the desired effect. Timing the effects of combined arms and mass in the scheme of maneuver brings about the desired synchronization.

3. Refine the scheme of maneuver as needed during the TF rehearsal.

(TA.1.4 Integrate Direct Fire with Maneuver)

TA.5 Intelligence BOS

TA.2 Fire Support BOS