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Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Targeting Process

OBSERVATION (Avn): The S2, S3, and fire support officer (FSO) do not integrate and coordinate the targeting process.

DISCUSSION:

1. Fires planning is often conducted after the staff has completed COA analysis. Fires are consequently planned in a vacuum, and the FSO is not aware of developments and changes to the scheme of maneuver.

2. No complete synchronization and decision support (DS) matrix is developed during the course of action (COA) analysis.

3. The targeting process is fragmented and incomplete.

4. Units typically falter during execution; fires are not supportive or synchronized with the scheme of maneuver and do not meet the commander's guidance.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The targeting team should continuously refine the targeting plan based on enemy information as it becomes available. This process continues after the initial plan and is completed during the staff planning process.

2. The S2, S3, and FSO should be familiar with FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process. This publication explains the targeting process during the staff planning process.

3. The use of the synchronization and DS matrices will assist in identifying when and where various targets should be attacked to influence and support the operation.

4. The S3, S2, and FSO should conduct an informal targeting meeting to review the targeting process and focus fires to support the operation by phase.

5. Staff planning exercises at Home Station will assist in reversing this trend.

(TA.2.1 Process Ground Targets)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Task Force Observation Post (OP) Planning

OBSERVATION (Armor): Task force observer and observation post plans are usually developed after wargaming.

DISCUSSION: The observer plans lack the detail and synchronization required to ensure observers are in position and prepared to execute the scheme of fires.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Observation planning should begin during course of action (COA) development and then refined during the wargaming process. The fire support officer (FSO) should develop a checklist of observation post (OP) selection tasks for inclusion in the unit SOP. An example listing of tasks follows:

(TA.2.1.1 Select Target to Attack)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Fire Support Observation Plan

OBSERVATION (FS): Observation plans often lack sufficient detail to provide the company fire support team (FIST) a focus for planning, preparing, or executing their mission.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The observation plan, as an integral part of the fire support plan, should provide the task and purpose for each observer by phase of the operation. As part of the scheme of fires worksheet, the following format may be useful:

FIRE SUPPORT OBSERVATION PLAN

This focus enables the company FIST to plan, conduct appropriate pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs), and execute their mission according to the task force (TF) commander's intent.

(TA.2.1.1 Select Target to Attack)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Fire Support Observation Plan and Target Location

OBSERVATION (FS): Task forces experience difficulty developing and executing an observation plan to support essential fire support tasks (EFSTs), the scheme of fires, and the scheme of maneuver.

DISCUSSION:

1. Observers frequently commit errors in observed fire procedures resulting in inaccurate target locations.

2. The fire support officer (FSO) frequently does not synchronize the observer plan with the scheme of maneuver during the wargaming process.

3. Company/team level refinement of the observer plan does not always happen.

4. Rehearsals are frequently inadequate.

5. Fire support teams (FISTs) have difficulty getting into position at the right time and place to acquire the enemy before the task force is decisively engaged in the enemy's battle space.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Maneuver commanders must maintain the tactical patience necessary to allow observers to get into position and execute their assigned task and purpose to set conditions for maneuver. FM 6-71, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander, states that company/team commanders are the executors of the plan. FISTs are the maneuver commander's precision target acquisition assets. Success can be achieved with top-down planning, bottom-up refinement, and decentralized execution.

2. Construct an observer plan in concert with the S2 and S3, and use Terrabase computer programs to assist in position selection. Proper position selection will enable the unit to complete the detect functions of the targeting process IAW FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process.

3. The task force FSO must plan to have observers in position to support the maneuver commander's decisive point and each essential fire support task (EFST). Address where the observers need to be, security, communications, and how they will get there.

4. Synchronize the observation plan with the scheme of maneuver during the wargame. To do so, the commander must have a thorough terrain analysis coupled with a complete understanding of the enemy's capabilities that define the enemy commander's battle space. The task force FSO provides the top-down plan that is refined by company FSOs in conjunction with company/team commanders.

5. The plan must be rehearsed during both task force and company/team rehearsals.

6. Initiative, cross talk, and coordination between FISTs are imperative during execution.

7. Observers must employ their precision target acquisition equipment IAW the appropriate TMs and follow the observed fire procedures in FM 6-30, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire, for manual target location.

(TA.2.1.1 Select Target to Attack)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Engagement Area (EA) Development

OBSERVATION (FS): Task force (TF) fire support officers (FSOs) and fire support teams (FISTs) do not adequately complete engagement area development during defense in sector missions.

DISCUSSION:

1. Not all triggers are emplaced.

2. Time/distance factors for some triggers are miscalculated.

3. Targets are not tied into obstacles.

4. All primary and alternate observers cannot see triggers.

5. The target area survey is usually inadequate.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The task force FSO should develop a scheme of fires to support the task force commander's decisive point. This includes:

2. Tasks must be prioritized with an established timeline and the status of preparation reported. This must be a coordinated effort between the task force FSO/FSE and company/teams. Execution can be centralized or decentralized.

3. The task force fire support sergeant is the subject matter expert (SME) and should supervise and coordinate the overall effort.

4. Trigger kits must be standardized and resourced.

(TA.2.1.1 Select Target o Attack)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Clearance of Fires

OBSERVATION (Armor): Task forces often experience "close to friendly" incidents, defined as fires within 500 meters with no danger-close identified or announced, and fratricide incidents.

DISCUSSION: These incidents usually occur when any of the following situations exist:

1. The brigade and task force plans do not provide clear graphical control measures to facilitate clearance.

2. Established control measures are not disseminated throughout the task force.

3. Positive control/situational awareness within the main command post is lost (i.e., no log of current scout positions is maintained).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The maneuver commander has the final authority to approve and clear fires within his area of operations (AO). Often, the fire support officer (FSO) becomes the person to help coordinate and conduct this task, but it is ultimately the commander's responsibility. To assist the FSO, he must approve both permissive and restrictive control measures.

2. The first step in effective clearance of fires is to have maneuver control measures built into the maneuver plan. A clear understanding of land ownership delineated by zones, boundaries, or sectors is essential; coordination with the next higher headquarters is required for all fires short of the coordinated fire line (CFL). Controlling the CFL is even more critical for a division cavalry task force when working in front of the division. Using boundaries allows the "owner" of that terrain to clear fires in his zone/sector, facilitates responsive fires, and clearly identifies where additional coordination will be required.

3. The next step involves the use of fire support coordinating measures (FSCM). Use a CFL as close to the forward edge of battle area (FEBA)/forward line of own troops (FLOT) as the task force can accurately track. Combine this with no-fire areas (NFA) to protect company/teams beyond the FEBA/FLOT. These two techniques can facilitate responsive fires while providing controls to help clear fires. Management of NFAs becomes critical and requires dissemination procedures to lower, higher, and adjacent headquarters. A rehearsed drill is also required in the fire support element (FSE) to update control measures every time one changes.

4. A final step can be to pre-clear areas. For example, fires into a planned call-for-fire zone (CFFZ) can be pre-cleared to ensure rapid counter-fire while meeting the requirements to protect the forces. Similarly, fires on a preplanned target with a defined trigger and specific conditions can be pre-cleared. If the location or timing of those fires changes, then positive clearance is again required. Pre-clearance requires a risk assessment by the commander to weigh the requirements of responsive fires against the requirements to protect the force. It is necessary to remember that commanders, not fire supporters, clear fires.

5. Even when the above steps are taken, there will be times when fires must be cleared. Examples: Fires across boundaries, fires called by brigade assets in a task force area, or fires short of the CFL in "undesignated" or brigade areas.

(TA.2.1.3 Develop Order to Fire)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Fire Support Planning

OBSERVATION (FS): Fire support officers (FSOs) have difficulty transforming essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) into a synchronized concept of fire support.

DISCUSSION: FSOs are usually able to take the commander's guidance and develop the EFSTs and subsequent scheme of fires necessary to execute and successfully complete those tasks. However, FSOs seldom adequately allocate available resources or identify the required volume or duration of fires necessary to shape the battlefield and mass fires at the decisive point.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: EFSTs are refined from the commander's intent and guidance for fires. They form the foundation for the concept of fire support and the course of action (COA )for fire support, and for COA analysis, validation, and synchronization with maneuver (wargaming). EFSTs are identified in terms of task, purpose, method, and endstate:

1. TASK. Describes the targeting effect (a.k.a. targeting objective) fires must achieve against a specific enemy formation's function or capability. These formations are high-payoff targets (HPTs) or contain one or more HPT. Memory Aid: Task = Effect, Formation, Function. FM 6-20-10 (p.1-2) outlines several terms to describe targeting effects or objectives that can be used; however, disrupt, delay, or limit are most commonly used.

2. PURPOSE. Describes the maneuver or operational purpose for the task. Memory Aid: Purpose = maneuver purpose. This should identify as specifically as possible the maneuver formation that will benefit from the targeting effect and describe in space and time what the effect will accomplish. (Example: "Purpose is to allow our advanced guard company to destroy the FSE with direct fires before the AGMB arrives.")

3. METHOD. Describes how the task and purpose will be achieved. It ties the detect function or "observer" (COLT/scout/FIST/TA/IEW sensor) with the deliver function or "shooters" (lethal and non-lethal assets) in time and space and describes how to achieve the task.

4. ENDSTATE. Attempts to quantify the successful accomplishment of the task. If multiple shooters are involved, it helps delineate what each must accomplish. Endstate provides a measure of the point of task completion. It also provides a basis for assessing the situation and making the decision to re-attack or not.

(TA.2.2.1 Conduct Lethal Engagement)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Development of Essential Field Artillery Tasks (EFATs)

OBSERVATION (FS): Many field artillery battalions do not understand how to properly develop EFATs after receiving the brigade operations order.

DISCUSSION:

1. EFATs generally lack the detail required to support the brigade essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) because units do not wargame each task in sufficient detail down to fire unit selection.

2. Staffs do not adequately develop detailed support requirements, decision points, and triggers for their synchronization matrix, do not tailor each EFAT to the specified mission, and do not publish this in full detail in the field artillery support plan (FASP).

3. Battery commanders often leave the orders briefing and rock drills knowing little more than the sequencing of movement and the primary/alternate shooters for special munitions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. At FA battalion level, during the battalion-level wargaming process, translate brigade- level EFST into EFATs for battery commanders.

EXAMPLE:

2. After developing the EFATs to this level of detail as a product of the wargaming process, provide them to the battery commanders so they can focus on preparation and execution. Include this level of detail on the EFATs to subordinate units in the FASP. Most tasks of a repetitive nature may evolve in the unit SOP as FASCAM, CPHD ,and smoke drills, but the EFAT will require tailoring to meet current mission requirements and MUST be published completely in the FASP.

(TA.2.2.1 Conduct Lethal Engagement)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Task Force Fire Support Planning

OBSERVATION (Armor): Task force fire support officers (FSOs) have difficulty translating the commander's essential fire support tasks (EFST) into a scheme of fires.

DISCUSSION: FSOs are able to develop an execution matrix for each battle that outlines a concept of fires; however, the matrix is often unsynchronized with other fire support documents (i.e., target list), which causes confusion among the company/team FSOs.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. To help focus the planning, execution, and synchronization of the delivery assets, the next step in the planning process after developing the EFST is translating the EFST into a scheme of fires. The EFST defines a task, purpose, method (i.e., CAS, artillery, mortars, and IEW), and desired endstate required to accomplish the commander's guidance. A scheme of fires is the detailed, logical sequence of fire support events to acquire and attack the enemy in the time and space necessary to accomplish the commander's EFST.

2. The task force FSO should develop two key products during the planning process:

3. Conduct an effective wargame to refine the target locations, and synchronize the means of delivery, target triggers, observer locations, movement and positioning of the task force mortars, critical friendly zones (CFZ), and fire support coordinating measures (FSCM). The specific method (i.e., artillery battalion 6 dual-purpose improved conventional munition [DPICM]) necessary for achieving the desired effects, combined with identification of primary and alternate observers and triggers, becomes the scheme of fires.

4. To help ensure execution of a task force scheme of fires when working for a brigade, it becomes critical for the task force's plan to be "nested" into the brigade scheme of fires.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 10
SUBJECT: Integrating Fire Support with the Task Force Scheme of Maneuver

OBSERVATION (Armor): The fire support plan and scheme of fires developed by the brigade fire support element (FSE) often do not support the task force's scheme of maneuver or task force commander's guidance for fires.

DISCUSSION: The result is that fires are not synchronized with task force maneuver during the battle.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. During mission analysis, it is important that the fire support officer (FSO) help the task force commander visualize the brigade's scheme of fires and what the fires will do for him.

2. Current doctrine outlines a top-down fire planning process with bottom-up refinement.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 11
SUBJECT: Integrating Fire Support with Maneuver Operations

OBSERVATION (Armor): Task forces often do not identify the critical fire support tasks needed to effectively integrate fires and maneuver for defensive operations.

DISCUSSION:

1. Fire support elements (FSEs) usually conduct some limited engagement area proofing; however, ineffective time management, limited cooperation from fire support teams (FISTs), and lack of defensive planning checklists hamper fire support preparations.

2. Integration and coordination with the key S2, S3, and engineer representatives are not tracked on task force timelines.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Task forces should develop a checklist or SOP that details the fire support tasks to be accomplished for defensive operations, and determine which tasks are essential for success. A sample checklist is provided below.

2. Once the critical tasks are defined, they should be placed on the task force timeline to ensure visibility by the entire staff.

3. The fire support officer (FSO) should determine which tasks he will supervise and then delegate the remaining tasks to the fire support NCO (FSNCO) with a priority of work and effort.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 12
SUBJECT: Integrating Fire Support with Maneuver Operations

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces seldom receive indirect fire support from the mortar platoon during offensive operations.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. References: Use FM 7-90 and ARTEP 7-90 mission training plans (MTP) to ensure proper procedures are being followed.

2. Conduct situational training exercise (STX) lane training with mortar platoon participation at Home Station. For the immediate suppression mission to have the desired effect on the battlefield, each soldier must thoroughly understand the specific job he must accomplish. Every soldier must know proper procedures and total team work to minimize friendly casualties.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 13
SUBJECT: Integrating Fire Support with Maneuver Operations

OBSERVATION (Mech): The fire support team (FIST) officer is seldom involved with the maneuver company commander in the planning process.

DISCUSSION:

1. After completing the maneuver plan, the commander often hands a copy to the fire support officer (FSO) with instructions to do fire support.

2. The FIST cannot support the commander's plan, and it is too late to make revisions because the order is about to be, or has already been, published.

3. The FSO simply takes the targets from battalion and passes them along to platoons with no refinement based on the company mission.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Maneuver company commanders should have a close working relationship with the FIST, and they need to understand the importance of integrating indirect fires into the maneuver plan. Habitual relationships will help this process; practice at Home Station.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 14
SUBJECT: Integrating Fire Support with Maneuver: Observation Plan

OBSERVATION (Mech): Observation plans are seldom synchronized with the task force (TF) scheme of maneuver.

DISCUSSION:

1. TF and squadrons experience difficulty developing and executing an observation plan to support essential fire support tasks (EFSTs), the scheme of fires, and the scheme of maneuver.

2. Fire support officers (FSOs) seldom synchronize the observer plan with the scheme of maneuver during the wargaming process.

3. Plans are not refined at the company/team level.

4. Rehearsals are inadequate.

5. Fire support teams (FISTs) have difficulty getting into position at the right time and place to acquire the enemy before maneuver finds itself decisively engaged in the enemy commander's battle space.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Per FM 6-71, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander, company/team commanders are the executors of the plan and FISTs are the maneuver commander's precision target acquisition assets. Success can be achieved with top-down planning, bottom-up refinement, and decentralized execution.

2. To set conditions for maneuver, maneuver commanders must possess the tactical patience necessary to allow observers to get into position and execute their assigned task and purpose. If an observer must be in position to see the commander's decisive point or EFST, the maneuver commander must be willing to commit the assets necessary to get the observer into position.

3. The observer plan must be constructed in concert with the S2 and S3 using Terrabase computer programs to assist in position selection. Position selection is critical for providing the detect function of the targeting process IAW FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process.

4. The observation plan must be synchronized during the wargame with the scheme of maneuver. There must be a thorough terrain analysis, coupled with a complete understanding of the enemy's capabilities that define the enemy commander's battle space. The TF FSO provides the top-down plan; company FSOs refine the plan in conjunction with company team commanders.

5. The TF FSO must plan to have observers in position to support the maneuver commander's decisive point and each EFST.

6. Rehearse the plan during both TF and company/team rehearsals.

7. Initiative, cross-talk, and coordination between FISTs are imperative during execution.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 15
SUBJECT: Fire Support Team (FIST) Degraded Operations

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces (TFs) do not employ FIST personnel and equipment to maximize target acquisition and location capabilities when their vehicle (FIST-V) is non-mission capable (NMC).

DISCUSSION:

1. When the FIST-V is down for maintenance, the company fire support officer (FSO) frequently moves to the commander's Bradley or HMMWV equipped with a manpack SINCGARS, binoculars, compass, and map. The entire remainder of the team's personnel and equipment go with the FIST-V to the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) and wait.

2. The ground/vehicle laser locator designator (G/VLLD) is not employed in the dismounted mode.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: TFs should develop a plan that provides several options for FIST degraded operations based on personnel and equipment availability and METT-T (see example options below). The plan should be approved by the TF commander, incorporated into the TF tactical SOP (TACSOP), and followed by all commanders and FSOs. These initiatives can ensure that FISTs are employed with the maximum capability possible. Example options:

(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 16
SUBJECT: Integrating Fires and Maneuver

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces (TFs) and squadrons typically experience difficulty developing a logical and executable concept of fires with clearly defined essential fire support tasks (EFSTs).

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The commander must state his desired task and purpose (what and why) for each fire support asset (FA, mortars, CAS), and the desired endstate.

2. FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process, describes the relationship between EFSTs and the targeting process.

3. FM 6-71, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander, provides further discussion of commander's guidance for fire support.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 17
SUBJECT: Integrating Fire Support: Critical Friendly Zones (CFZs)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces (TFs) are experiencing difficulty planning, refining, and activating CFZs.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. During the wargame, the fire support officer (FSO) must plan CFZs to cover movement, attack-by-fires, support-by-fires, breach sites, tactical assembly areas (TAAs), battle positions, and hide positions through the depth of the zone or sector, then establish activation triggers.

2. During execution, the fire support sergeant or targeting officer must refine and activate the zones using reports from fire support teams (FISTs) and company/teams via cross-talk with the TOC battle captain to ensure zone coverage where the force is located on the battlefield. Use EPLRs and Applique situational awareness to complement the refinement and activation battle drill.

3. The number of zones allocated to a task force is limited. It is therefore essential that the task force commander states his force protection priorities for CFZs to ensure a critical unit or main effort, such as a breach force, is covered.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 18
SUBJECT: Fire Support Integration into Engagement Area Development

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces are experiencing difficulty integrating fire support into engagement area (EA) development during defensive missions.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The task force fire support officer (FSO) should develop a scheme of fires to support the commander's decisive point. This includes:

2. Tasks should be prioritized with an established timeline and the status of preparation reported and tracked in the TOC. This must be a coordinated effort between the task force FSO/FSE and company/teams.

3. Execution can be centralized or decentralized. The task force fire support sergeant is the subject matter expert and should supervise and coordinate the overall effort.

4. Trigger kits should be standardized and resourced. Time/distance factors are different for an enemy moving during day and night, and response and shift times for mortars and artillery are different.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 19
SUBJECT: Critical Friendly Zone (CFZ) Refinement and Activation

OBSERVATION (FS): The FSE does not fully develop an effective battle drill for planning, refining, and activating CFZs during the campaign.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. During the wargame, the fire support officer (FSO) should plan CFZs to cover movement, attack-by-fires, support-by-fires, breach sites, tactical assembly areas (TAAs), battle positions (BPs), and hide positions through the depth of the zone or sector, then establish triggers for their activation.

2. During execution, the fire support sergeant or targeting officer should refine and activate the zones using reports from fire support teams (FISTs) and company/teams via their cross-talk with the TOC battle captain.

3. Enhanced position location reporting system (EPLRS) situational awareness can be utilized to complement the refinement and activation battle drill.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 20
SUBJECT: FA Battalion Radar Zone Management

OBSERVATION (FA): Planning and executing radar zones (critical friendly zones [CFZs]) to facilitate the maneuver commander's force protection priorities is a problem area for the direct support (DS) field artillery (FA) battalion.

DISCUSSION:

1. The DS FA battalion seldom provides responsive counterfires that support the maneuver commander's priorities for force protection. Planning, rehearsing, and triggering the radar employment plan is rarely synchronized with the reinforcing artillery or DIVARTY assets available and the rest of the brigade's plan. The crucial missing piece is the linkage of the DS FA battalion TOC to the radar during the execution of the zone plan.

2. Synchronizing and coordinating with DIVARTY for redundant AN/TPQ-37 coverage and the deconfliction of zone coverage within the brigade's sector/zone is a problem area. This consistently leads to ineffective radar cueing and zone activation.

3. Digital transmission of radar zones and orientation data are seldom used. This greatly slows down the zone activation and creates unnecessary work.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Properly planned, rehearsed, refined, verified, and digitally executed radar zones can initiate responsive, prioritized counterfire during key times or events in the battle. Effective radar employment begins with the interpretation of the maneuver commander's planning guidance for his priorities for force protection.

2. During the brigade's wargame of the selected COA, the brigade FSE/FSCOORD should identify the probable locations of the events or units, obstacles, breach points, or routes critical to success.

3. A FSCOORD's/FSO's priority to ensure success must be to integrate zone management for planning, allocation, approval, dissemination, and rehearsals into the overall FS planning cycle. Develop a top-down radar zone plan so bottom-up refinement can occur.

4. Establish counterfire priorities and make certain they are understood to ensure responsive fires to support the force protection priority reflected by the planned zone.

5. Once the zones are consolidated and approved at the brigade FSE, the plan must be incorporated into maneuver and Fire Support Execution Matrices (FSEMs) or any other locally used products, such as scheme of fires worksheet.

6. The DS FA battalion S2/S3 and FA targeting technician must use the higher headquarter's order/matrices as the planning guidance required to perform the bottom-up refinement necessary to develop the radar deployment order (RDO), position areas, and cueing plan for the radar.

7. The DS battalion S3, S2, brigade FSE, TF FSEs, and the FA targeting technician must understand their roles in the triggering, refinement, and verification of the zones to match the scheme of maneuver. Verification of the unit or event location covered by the planned zone is critical to the success of the plan. Accordingly, the zones planned for maneuver elements must be planned, verified, and triggered by the supported FSEs. To ensure success, the zone, cueing, and radar movement plans must be integrated into the fire support rehearsal, FA technical rehearsal, FA rehearsal (rock drill), and combined arms rehearsal (CAR) (see CALL Newsletter No. 98-5, Rehearsals).

8. Once the radar acquisitions are received, the DS battalion TOC's counterfire battle drill must process, clear, and initiate responsive counterfires. There are many moving parts and coordination requirements to make an effective counterfire plan work. Effective coordination with DIVARTY for zone deconfliction and radar orientation is curtailed to ensure the targeting system is not overloaded with acquisitions. FA battalions must develop a TTP that incorporates the digital link and works for their unit similar to the process described above. Once they develop a TTP, incorporate it into the local SOP.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TA.1 Maneuver BOS

TA.3 Air Defense BOS