NTC
TRENDS AND TTPs
3rd
and 4th Quarters, FY 98
Organized by BOS, these are the trends submitted by NTC O/Cs for 3rd and 4th quarters, FY98. As appropriate and/or available, they provide doctrinal references and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for the needed training emphasis. Each trend is annotated with Blueprint of the Battlefield codes for use in long-term trend analysis.
INTELLIGENCE BOS
(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)
Positive Performance
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
S2 Understanding of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Process
OBSERVATION (Lt/Abn): Task force S2s consistently demonstrate thorough knowledge of the IPB process and the products needed during various steps of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).
DISCUSSION:
1. S2s understand terrain analysis, how the enemy fights, and enemy capabilities and weaknesses.
2. S2s are familiar with templates required during the MDMP.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Task force commanders and staffs should conduct IPB exercises at Home Station to give the S2 and staff experience in the process and products needed.
2. Continue training these skills at the MIOBC and MIAOBC, and place the best and brightest intelligence officers in S2 positions.
(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
TF S2 use and understanding of Terrabase
OBSERVATION (Lt/Abn): Terrabase is proving to be a valuable tool in assisting S2s in terrain analysis.
DISCUSSION: Terrabase products are being distributed to company and platoon level to assist company leadership in their application of the IPB process.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. S2s should continue using Terrabase as a terrain analysis tool.
2. The S2 can manually input key terrain and operational graphics into Terrabase to put it all into perspective (to scale in a picture).
(TA.5.3.2 Evaluate Physical Environment Information)
Needs Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
S2 Section Organization and Operations
OBSERVATION (Mech): S2 sections do not work efficiently or as a team and are not task organized according to METT-T.
DISCUSSION:
1. S2 sections often operate on a 12-hours-on, 12-hours-off shift schedule without regard to mission requirements. This leads to mass turnover of personnel twice a day and offers little continuity in planning and execution.
2. The S2 and perhaps one assistant generally do all the work, which does not take advantage of the capabilities of all members of the S2 section.
3. Most S2 sections set up a plan team (which is a good idea) but do not fully brief the plan to the rest of the section for execution.
4. The most underutilized member in most S2 sections is the NCOIC. S2 section NCOICs are usually senior NCOs with maneuver backgrounds and years of experience who could offer great assistance to the S2.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Phase soldiers into work schedules; work and sleep plans should be based on METT-T.
2. Avoid having a massive turnover of personnel twice a day.
3. Utilize the S2 NCOIC. Regardless of his MOS, he can offer valuable insight gained through his years of experience. Do not let the NCOIC become bogged down with all the details involved with running the entire TOC.
(TA.5 Intelligence)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Planning
OBSERVATION (Armor): The S2 is often left to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning without input from the other members of the staff.
DISCUSSION:
1. Although priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) are usually based on the commander's guidance, the R&S plan seldom ties together named areas of interest (NAIs) and specific information/operation requirements (SIRs/SORs) that would answer PIRs throughout the depth of the battlefield. As a result, NAIs are not prioritized or focused and do not support the unit's scheme of maneuver.
2. Early R&S guidance is seldom issued. The R&S plan is often not disseminated until the OPORD is published. As a result, R&S plans do not support decision points or incorporate fires.
3. R&S planning does not incorporate all collection assets available to the unit or synchronize them to gain timely intelligence. As a result, some unit assets are either overtasked or underutilized.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Doctrinal references:
2. Although there is no standard format for the R&S plan, the above references provide an excellent common framework for what should be included.
3. R&S planning is an entire battle staff effort. Most importantly, R&S plans should be developed in conjunction with the S3.
4. The S2 should develop and use the event template to assist in synchronizing the abilities of all collection assets.
5. Conduct R&S rehearsals whenever time permits.
6. Issue guidance early and refine the plan during the execution phase.
(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S)
OBSERVATION (Mech): Task force (TF) R&S operations are often unsuccessful.
DISCUSSION:
1. There is a lack of emphasis on R&S operations by commanders. Commanders are not giving guidance or developing good priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) to guide the R&S effort.
2. There is a lack of integration of all staff elements during planning and execution.
3. R&S operations are treated as a part of the current operation and not seen as important and independent.
4. No one is put in charge of the R&S effort or identified as the one responsible for tracking, adjusting and updating the R&S effort.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Make R&S planning and execution the initial main effort of the TF. Do not consider R&S planning as the S2's business.
2. The TF commander must give clear and concise guidance on what he needs to know in the form of PIRs and a commander's intent for what he wants R&S to accomplish.
3. The S2 must understand the capabilities and limitations of all assets in the TF.
4. R&S plans must be developed by the entire staff and integrated by all BOS.
5. Treat R&S as an operation of its own and not as an annex to the current TF OPORD.
6. Distribute R&S guidance and orders as early as possible to allow the TF scouts and other assets time to conduct their own mission analysis and prepare their own orders.
7. Rehearse, rehearse, rehearse!
(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Planning
OBSERVATION (Lt/Abn): Task force (TF) commanders, S3s, and S2s routinely have problems developing reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plans that answer the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
DISCUSSION:
1. Often the situational template (SITEMP) is not complete prior to course of action (COA) development, and an event template is not used.
2. R&S plans are not developed throughout the width and depth of the zone/sector, resulting in the commander not being able to see the enemy.
3. Often the S2 develops an R&S plan in a vacuum, with no integration or synchronization with other combat multipliers such as indirect fires, engineer, NBC reconnaissance, retransmission, and CSS. There is seldom any coordination or parallel planning with the brigade. Although the S2 generally identifies the intelligence requirements, the remainder of the staff is unable to identify and manage the resources necessary to answer the PIRs. Poorly coordinated, synchronized, and integrated plans lead to destruction of TF R&S assets and poorly executed plans that do not answer the TF commander's PIR.
4. Units lack an understanding of the technical abilities of unit and external assets such as combat observation lasing teams (COLTs), enlisted terminal attack controllers (ETACs), dismounted infantry, air defense artillery (ADA), and so forth. They also do not understand the sustainment and force protection requirements for all R&S assets. The results are over-tasked assets due to repetitive and redundant collection requirements and poor management of assets by the TF staff.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. TF commanders and S3s must recognize their role in R&S planning and supervision. Designate an S3 officer (Battle Captain, assistant S3) as the chief of reconnaissance. This does not relieve the TF commander, S3, or other staff members of responsibility. Rather, it provides one point of contact with the authority to begin early planning and coordination of the R&S effort and allows the S2 to analyze the information requirements and plan collection efforts.
2. TF staffs must plan R&S efforts as a team. If the S2 plans the R&S effort alone, the collection efforts will receive little or no protection or sustainment support.
(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Engineer Task Force (TF) Employment of Reconnaissance.
OBSERVATION (Engr): Too often, the TF engineer and TF S2/S3 do not incorporate engineer reconnaissance into the overall battalion reconnaissance & surveillance (R&S) plan.
DISCUSSION: Engineer reconnaissance teams are often sent out as an afterthought, without a clear task and purpose.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The employment of engineer reconnaissance should be a critical task of the engineer battalion S2/S3.
2. Engineer companies must issue clear and complete orders (IAW the TF R&S plan and scout platoon plan applicable) to the engineer reconnaissance teams, and must ensure they deploy with graphics, maps, reporting matrixes, and a communication plan.
3. Establish a system for tracking the location and activity of the teams, and for receiving, analyzing, and disseminating this critical information. This should be done regardless of the task organization.
4. Use the TF O&I net or the engineer company net for communications.
(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Engineer Battalion Use of the Engineer Reconnaissance Team (ERT)
OBSERVATION (Engr): Engineer battalions have difficulty incorporating ERTs into reconnaissance operations.
DISCUSSION:
1. Engineer battalion staffs do not adequately coordinate with the brigade staff to integrate ERTs within the brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan.
2. Engineer battalions have developed numerous TTPs for employing ERTs (such as incorporating ERTs with brigade COLTS or conducting independent engineer reconnaissance missions). Most enginer battalions, however, are not using the full potential of the ERT.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The engineer battalion staff must participate in the brigade R&S planning process to ensure that effective engineer reconnaissance is integrated into the brigade R&S plan.
2. The engineer battalion staff should conduct detailed mission planning and provide clear guidance and priority intelligence requirements (PIR) to the ERTs.
3. The battalion must ensure that redundant communications systems are in place.
4. The ERT leader must participate in rehearsals or backbriefs to ensure synchronization with the maneuver R&S plan.
(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
OBSERVATION (Mech): The scout platoon leader seldom meets with the S2 early enough in mission preparation to assist in developing the templates for a successful mission.
DISCUSSION:
1. The scout platoon leader does not conduct an IPB at his level.
2. Observation posts (OPs) cover vast observation areas, but with no specific focus.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The scout platoon leader and platoon sergeant should attend the Scout Platoon Leaders' Course (SPLC) for a thorough understanding of the IPB process.
2. The scout platoon leader and platoon sergeant should develop a good working relationship with their S2 and determine how they can assist each other in the IPB process.
3. The scout platoon leader or platoon sergeant should gather as much information as possible to start planning during mission analysis.
(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Aerial Reconnaissance Operations
OBSERVATION (Avn): The two analysis control teams (ACTs) of a divisional cavalry squadron do not facilitate continuous operations for more than a 24-hour period before starting to experience resource problems.
DISCUSSION:
1. Units attempt to maintain continuous aerial reconnaissance, particularly during security operations.
2. Many units, in an effort to maintain continuous operations, are conducting "single ship" reconnaissance missions rather than scout/weapon team operations. A single aircraft without a wingman or overwatch element is at exceptional risk on the battlefield. Not only is the aircraft much more likely to be engaged, but if it is shot down, there is no one to assist in its security or recovery.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Regardless of how the aerial scout is armed, do not expect him to function on the battlefield as a single aircraft and survive. We do not train that way with any other maneuver system or squad. Scout/weapon teams provide mutual security for one another, additional firepower, and enhanced target acquisition capability.
2. A proper IPB, along with a good reconnaissance and security (R&S) plan that uses redundant collectors arrayed in depth, will provide a good read on the enemy's timeline and scheme of maneuver. The intelligence read should be good enough to allow a surge of aerial reconnaissance assets to meet the threat as needed. This would conserve the limited availability of aerial reconnaissance assets based on crews and maintenance.
3. Units should focus OH-58Ds for use at night (when they are the most effective and least vulnerable) for critical events such as security operations and movement of the enemy's main body.
(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
S2 Evaluation of Threat Information
OBSERVATION (FS): Battalion S2s seldom adequately analyze the effects of weather and terrain or identify probable enemy courses of action (COAs).
DISCUSSION:
1. Most battalion S2s do not provide the intelligence information needed for battalion mission analysis.
2. S2s seldom evaluate the effects of weather and terrain on friendly forces or consider multiple enemy COAs. They have difficulty describing an aggressive, uncooperative enemy to the battalion staff.
3. The staff seldom produces a decision support template (DST) or develops specific commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) for the course of the wargame.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. S2s should follow the IPB process as described in FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.
2. Since the IPB process involves all staff members, not merely the S2, the battalion should train IPB and the orders process as a staff at Home Station.
3. For every mission, SITEMPs should be produced for at least two enemy COAs. These SITEMPs and corresponding event templates drive wargaming and provide the means to facilitate analysis of combat information during the fight.
4. A decision support template (DST) should be developed as a result of the wargame. The DST greatly assists the staff in refining priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and friendly forces information requirements (FFIRs), in synchronizing combat power, and in developing triggers for movement and resupply operations. By identifying decisions that must be made, the DST serves to focus the battle staff during the course of an operation.
(TA.5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)
TREND
10
SUBJECT:
Event Templates and Matrices
OBSERVATION (Mech): Task force S2s rarely produce event templates or event matrices that focus on critical enemy events.
DISCUSSION:
1. Event templates or matrices, when developed correctly, identify critical enemy events and help distinguish between enemy courses of action (COAs). Without the template or matrix, the focus of reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plans is reduced.
2. S2s generally develop two or three enemy COAs for each plan. These COAs are usually developed graphically through a sketch, but are rarely developed in sufficient detail. This causes a unit to misunderstand critical enemy events and time/distance relationships.
3. S2s often enter wargaming sessions with nothing more than a sketch of enemy COAs.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. S2s must understand the importance of the event template. The event template facilitates development of an enemy COA. At a minimum, the following things should be found on the event template:
2. Other items that can be included ,but are not required, are probable locations of high-value targets and enemy decision points.
3. The event matrix is another helpful tool in developing detailed enemy courses of action. It should be used as a companion to the template. An event matrix can help identify key decisions that the enemy commander has to make (such as when to commit the reserve), and can help the S2 determine what the enemy can actually do based on time, distance, task organization, capabilities,and limitations.
4. Event templates and event matrices help the S2 contribute positively to the wargame and significantly improve the task force's understanding of the enemy COAs.
(TA.5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)
TREND
11
SUBJECT:
Intelligence Reporting
OBSERVATION (FS): Battalion S2s often do not pass important intelligence and combat information to higher levels or subordinate units.
DISCUSSION:
1. S2s send occasional periodic intelligence reports (PERINTREPs), but these reports are sporadic at best. There is also no system to track the times at which PERINTREPs are sent.
2. S2s often have information which would be of tremendous value to batteries, the brigade, DIVARTY, or the DS and/or reinforcing battalion, but do not always relay this information in a timely manner.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Battalion S2s should develop a standard PERINTREP format and a tool to track the times that the reports are sent.
2. Battalion S2s should develop a system to track the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and information requirements (IRs), as well as those of his higher headquarters and subordinate units. When information is received that answers a PIR or IR, this information should be sent immediately, and the time and contents of this report should be entered in the S2's log.
(TA.5.4 Prepare and Disseminate Intelligence Reports)
TREND
12
SUBJECT:
Enemy Course of Action (ECOA) Development
OBSERVATION (FS): Battalion S2s seldom develop several enemy courses of action (COAs).
DISCUSSION: The inability to develop more than one enemy COA is not normally due to a lack of competence on the part of the S2s, but rather a result of a restricted planning timeline. S2s are only allowed sufficient time to develop one threat COA, and the staff has no appreciation for the various avenues of approach or forms of contact available to the enemy. If the enemy executes a different COA than what is planned for by the staff, the unit does not have the systems in place to defeat the threat and is unable to react in a timely manner.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The battalion S2 should coordinate with the brigade combat team (BCT) S2 for early receipt of the situation template (SITEMP) to allow for more time to develop multiple threat COAs.
2. S2s and staffs should practice staff drills at Home Station. S2s must be able to produce SITEMPs in a timely manner to address at least the most likely and most dangerous threat COAs.
(TA.5.4.2 Prepare Reports on Enemy Intentions)
User's
Guide
TA.1
Maneuver BOS
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
