• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 1: Battle Tracking and Predictive Analysis

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 1-1: Aviation task forces fail to systematically pass intelligence to the companies. Companies seldom develop a system to pull the intelligence from the task force S-2.

RESULTS: Failing to have current enemy troop and AD locations.

PROBLEM 1-2: Air defense fire units continue to suffer substantial casualties which are primarily caused by a lack of battle tracking and situational awareness.

1. Inaccurate information concerning air defense team locations.

2. Actual team locations differ from those posted on the ADO's maps despite clearance of fires battle drills conducted at brigade and battalion level.

3. Current minefield tracking charts, usually available at brigade and battalion TOCs, are not considered when planning Stinger and Avenger moves.

RESULTS:

1. Fratricides caused by friendly indirect fire systems.

2. Stinger and Avenger teams suffer an inordinate amount of casualties from known friendly and enemy minefields.

PROBLEM 1-3: Signal operations planning and battle tracking are not timely or accurate.

1. Too many signal units do not maintain the status of communications.

2. Failure to routinely report status to higher headquarters.

3. Too many signal leaders do not track the status of expendable supplies (batteries) or Class IX repair parts.

RESULTS: Battalion signal sections too often do not know the locations of their supporting signal assets to include RAUs and retrans teams.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 1-4: (Repeat of Problem 1-2).

PROBLEM 1-5: Air mission commanders and aircrews are not aware of the assets available in the light/airborne infantry companies and battalions.

PROBLEM 1-6: Battalion command posts have difficulty receiving, analyzing, and disseminating information.

RESULT: Battle staffs are unable to provide the information which the commander needs to see the battlefield (both the enemy and his own unit).

Techniques

1. The commander can keep his staff focused by carefully developing and updating all three components of the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR): priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs), and friendly forces information requirements (FFIRs).

2. Develop a method to ensure that the three command posts (main CP, combat trains CP, and field trains CP) receive and share critical battlefield information. Include this information in the unit SOP for command post operations.

3. S-2 provides companies an intelligence update twice daily.

4. S-2 briefs aircrews prior to each mission.

5. ADOs at brigade and battalion levels must ensure that their battle tracking is current and accurate.

6. Use communications procedures, status charts, and tracking tools effectively to keep the ADO situationally aware of the entire battlefield.

7. Track, disseminate, and update locations of supporting signal assets.

8. Develop a standard battle tracking report that includes all equipment and expendables.

9. Aviation companies need to develop a better situational awareness of the units they are supporting. At Home Station, units should attempt to conduct cross-training OPDs with their maneuver counterparts.

TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 2: Communication and Signal Operations

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 2-1: Many commanders and battle staff cannot perform such basic tasks as install, operate, and maintain tactical FAXs, SINCGARS FM, SINCGARS remotes and MSRTs/DNVTs. These tasks and the rerouting of information over alternative means of communications are often delegated to the brigade signal officer and communications section.

RESULT: Disruption of priority of work, planning, and crew tasks the signal officer and his personnel.

PROBLEM 2-2: Signal operations within the brigade task force often become desynchronized with little or no cross-talk between signalers.

RESULT: After insertion into the brigade AO, the task force signalers often completely lose track of each other.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 2-3: Brigades have experienced difficulty in using tactical local area network during operations at JRTC.

RESULT: Laptop computers have not had the required software and device drivers to access TACLAN.

Techniques

1. Conduct Home-Station user/operator training and certification to improve and sustain individual skills consistent with current doctrine.

2. Make sure that TOC/TAC communications battle drills include at least the installation of Combat Net Radio (CNR) assets, MSE user equipment, and how to use redundant/backup communications means (i.e., "what to do when primary communications fails").

3. The command and staff must "familiarize, zero, and qualify" with their assigned individual communications equipment in order to effectively master the art of staff coordination, information management, and overall brigade task force command and control.

4. Doctrinal references:

• FM 7-30, The Infantry Brigade.

• FM 24-1, Signal Support in the AirLand Battle.

5. Develop and implement a system for subordinate signalers to pass information.

6. Conduct daily meetings while still at the ISB and a method to communicate in the field (MSE conference calls, separate communication net, tactical LAN/WAN, meeting at TOCs, etc.) that implements a daily report to higher headquarters (FAX or data) and a voice connection to discuss areas of concern (conference call or FM net).

7. Brigades need to acquire the appropriate software and supporting equipment in order to effectively utilize this system.

TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 3: Battle Staff Planning and Mission Analysis

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 3-1: Battalion staffs are having difficulty planning for future operations while executing current operations. FA battalion staffs are not routinely integrated into a disciplined, structured planning process.

RESULT: The S-3 fails to maximize specific functional area expertise, and the plan is rarely synchronized.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 3-2: Brigade fire support elements need to ensure that they are integrated into signal specific issues within the TOC. Specifically, FSEs at brigade level do not receive updates referencing frequency changes, TEK changeover, and SOI changes implemented by the BSO.

RESULT: The FSE experiences difficulty in executing their assigned mission.

Techniques

1. Develop and practice using SOPs for the planning process. Address the roles and responsibilities for each individual involved in the process.

2. Facilitate a more coordinated and synchronized parallel-planning process. Prepare a list of FA questions for a member of the battalion staff who participates in the brigade planning process.

3. Post timelines and adhere to them.

4. The BSO must assume ownership of the FSE and ensure the FSE is aware of any changes inherent to signal operations in the brigade.

TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 4: Rehearsals

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 4-1: Backbriefs and rehearsals are not routinely conducted.

1. Too many units simply talk through the concept of operations in lieu of a viable rehearsal.

2. Commanders and S-3s do not:

• Deliberately plan for rehearsals and, therefore, do not prepare for rehearsals.

• Focus on key events.

• Address branches and sequels.

• Involve all key leaders and BOS representatives.

• Use a synchronization matrix or execution checklist.

• Adequately note changes to the concept resulting from mission preparation.

• Publish a FRAGO to update subordinate units.

PROBLEM 4-2: Fire support element rehearsals are poorly conducted and seldom provide benefit to the operation.

1. The rehearsals do not practice or test the plan.

2. Fire supporters are not integrated into the "maneuver" rehearsal.

3. Most fire support rehearsals result in only a confirmation of the planned target list.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 4-3: The forward support battalion often fails to properly plan and execute the occupation/relocation of the BSA.

1. The military decision-making process (MDMP) is usually not used.

2. Operation is not synchronized with the brigade's current operations.

3. Rehearsals are seldom conducted. When they are, key personnel often fail to attend.

4. Normally the unit has an SOP for BSA occupation:

• Personnel not familiar with the SOP do not follow the SOP.

• Never execute the procedure to verify whether the written SOP works or not.

5. FSB S-3s often consolidate the responsibilities of the security and quartering parties.

• OIC of the quartering party often inexperienced at placing units in the BSA.

• Lack the knowledge and experience of the area needed to properly disperse and defend the BSA.

6. Tenant elements in the BSA fail to submit sector sketches of their unit area and perimeter IAW unit SOPs.

RESULTS:

1. The FSB S-3 normally plans the move in a vacuum with little or no input from the rest of the FSB staff and the tenant elements of the BSA.

2. Area improperly quartered when the main body arrives.

3. BSA TOC takes 48-72 hours after closure to establish a good sector sketch of the area.

PROBLEM 4-4: Once units depart the intermediate staging base, rehearsals are poorly conducted and seldom provide benefit to the operation. Fire supporters are not integrated into the "maneuver" rehearsal as recommended in FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, and most fire support rehearsals result in only a confirmation of the planned target list. Rehearsal Techniques listed in FM 6-20-1, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battalion, are not being used.

Techniques

1. Conduct confirmation briefs immediately after the OPORD.

• Standard format.

• The battalion staff must attend.

2. Do not use backbriefs as sole means of rehearsal because backbriefs are inadequate in trying to visualize the entire task force plan.

3. Rehearsals must be properly planned and prepared.

• Ensure the entire staff is present.

• Do not sacrifice rehearsals because of time.

4. Use a synchronization matrix or execution checklist to guide the rehearsal to ensure that all BOS are covered.

5. When sufficient time is available, there is no substitute for a full-force rehearsal from battalion down to platoon leader level.

6. Develop a sound SOP to cover the essential elements of a rehearsal.

• Concentrate on key events.

• Ensure that the SOP tests and practices the plan against enemy actions and reactions.

• Ensure contingencies are addressed and branches and sequels rehearsed.

7. Integrate fire support into the "maneuver" rehearsal.

• Each commander and FSO should succinctly describe the actions as each unit fights with maneuver and fires.

• The FSO must be able to describe what enemy or maneuver action will trigger a specific fire support task/event. A walk-on terrain model is usually worth the required time to construct it.

8. A thorough SOP, checklist, or agenda, reinforced by Home-Station training, would greatly improve rehearsals and should include the essential elements of a rehearsal.

9. The FSB should ensure compliance with unit SOP for BSA occupation.

10. Rely on the MDMP to:

• Develop the plan.

• Publish a good operations order.

• Conduct a rehearsal of the operation.

• Properly designate the responsibilities of the security party, quartering party, main body, and trail parties.

11. Doctrinal references:

• FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion.

• FM 6-20-1, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, for the Field Artillery Cannon Battalion.

• FM 63-20, Forward Support Battalion.

• MTP 63-216, Forward Support Battalion.

• CGSC ST 101-5, Command and Staff Decision Processes.

12. Other references: CALL Newsletter No. 91-1, Apr 91, Rehearsals; FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, Chapter 2; FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, Chapters 2, 4, 5-7.

TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 5: Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Operations

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 5-1: Forward support battalions frequently establish forward command posts (CPs) either as part of a forward logistic element (FLE) or when moving a brigade support area (BSA).

1. Roles and responsibilities between the forward CP and the main CP are frequently undefined.

2. The forward CPs do not have or use SOPs for organization, assembly, security, and command, control, and communications (C3).

3. Forward CP personnel are often unaware or unsure of their duties and are unable to control the logistics battle or battle-track brigade operations.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 5-2: Brigades do not have the procedures incorporated into the tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOPs) that address the specifics inherent to TOC vs TAC operations. They have failed to develop any criteria that determines when the TAC has control of the battle.

Techniques

1. The FSB should develop an SOP for the forward CP to ensure continuous, responsive combat service support when moving the brigade support area (BSA) or employing a forward logistic element (FLE).

• Define the relationship between the forward CP and the main CP.

• Include standards for the forward command post's capabilities and its employment.

• Describe the roles and responsibilities for organization, assembly, security, C3, and personnel.

2. Rehearse the newly developed SOP during Home-Station training to gain and maintain proficiency.

3. Doctrinal references:

• FM 63-20, Forward Support Battalion.

• MTP 63-216, Forward Support Battalion.

• CGSC ST 101-5, Command and Staff Decision Processes.

4. Brigades must determine what conditions must exist for this to occur. Examples are: all nets inherent to the TAC are operational and the TAC is in position to monitor and track the battle.

5. During wargaming and synchronization, brigade staffs must determine the necessity to employ a TAC. Considerations include, but are not limited to, the need to place C2at a specific point to influence the battle, the need to have redundant communications, and the current threat.

TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 6: Course-of-Action Development and Wargaming

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 6-1: The greatest shortfall in the planning process is the inability to synchronize the task force because of inadequate wargaming.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 6-2: Brigades have not thoroughly developed approved courses of action to the level of detail needed to execute wargaming and synchronization. The brigades begin the MDMP already having an OPLAN developed to address their initial entry and mission. While this can serve as an advantage in the interest of time, staffs have not developed courses of action in detail.

RESULTS:

1. Movement tables, convoy density, and ACLs specific to airland and air assault operations are not developed until the actual wargaming and synchronization begin.

2. This confuses the wargaming process and does not allow the staff to totally focus on synchronizing the plan.

Techniques

1. Array the unit's combat power (two levels down) and array the enemy (event template two levels down).

2. Wargame thoroughly using the action-reaction-counteraction methodology.

3. Conduct detailed analysis of each BOS element.

4. Conduct a formal wargame brief for the commander (critical if he did not participate in the process).

5. Brigade staffs must develop approved courses of action prior to initiating the wargaming and synchronization process to maximize synchronization.

TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 7: Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 7-1: The forward support battalion often fails to properly plan and execute the occupation/relocation of the BSA.

1. The military decision-making process (MDMP) is usually not used.

2. Operation is not synchronized with the brigade's current operations.

3. Rehearsals are seldom conducted. When they are, key personnel often fail to attend.

4. Normally the unit has an SOP for BSA occupation:

• Personnel not familiar with the SOP do not follow the SOP.

• Never use the procedures in the SOP to verify whether they work or not.

5. FSB S-3s often consolidate the responsibilities of the security and quartering parties.

• OIC of the quartering party often inexperienced at placing units in the BSA.

• Lack the knowledge and experience of the area needed to properly disperse and defend the BSA.

6. Tenant elements in the BSA fail to submit sector sketches of their unit area and perimeter IAW unit SOPs.

RESULTS:

1. The FSB S-3 normally plans the move in a vacuum with little or no input from the rest of the FSB staff and the tenant elements of the BSA.

2. Area improperly quartered when the main body arrives.

3. BSA TOC takes 48-72 hours after closure to establish a good sector sketch of the area.

PROBLEM 7-2: Battalions generally plan well during the initial planning process at Home Station or the ISB. However, as battalion commanders and staffs begin to experience battlefield friction and stress, proficiency in executing the MDMP diminishes.

1. Mission analysis:

• Seldom develop comprehensive estimates for the CS and CSS staff elements.

• Poor time management.

2. Commander's guidance: Often inconsistent, incomprehensive, and lacking detail.

3. Course-of-action analysis and wargaming:

• Battalion staffs consistently fail to follow the eight steps of the wargaming process.

• Staffs seldom develop force ratios needed to assess the results of the action-reaction-counteraction methodology.

4. Decision-making in a time-constrained environment:

• Battalion staffs tend to be less integrated in a time-constrained environment.

• Battle staffs skip steps in the MDMP rather than modifying each step based upon time available.

RESULTS:

1. Staff planning quality generally degrades as battlefield friction increases.

2. This results in poorly synchronized plans.

PROBLEMS 7-3: Aviation staffs do not effectively execute the decision-making process.

1. The staffs do not have a clear understanding of the process and the linkage between the steps.

2. The few senior officers who understand the process generally focus on other issues.

3. Often the executive officer focuses on logistical issues, not ST 101-5 staff "leadership" requirements, while the S-3 is fighting the current fight. Units should train as a staff at Home Station to become proficient in all areas of the decision-making process prior to their training rotation.

PROBLEM 7-4: Company-level estimate of the situation is not done well.

1. Company/team commanders and platoon leaders make little or no effort to complete their own mission analysis with resultant products, including a timeline.

2. Lack of standardized operations order formats and presentation.

3. Inability to know when to use the deliberate, combat, or quick Techniques when applying the military decision-making process (MDMP).

4. Poor time management.

5. Inadequate preparation to conduct MDMP planning in a field environment.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 7-5: (Same as 4-3).

PROBLEM 7-6: (Same as 7-3).

PROBLEM 7-7: Brigades have not effectively integrated heavy LNOs into the military decision-making process (MDMP). As a result, the capabilities and limitations of heavy assets inherent to the brigade task force are not thoroughly understood.

RESULT: Normally, heavy units deploy to JRTC separate from light organizations and are not present during the initial planning process. Due to this fact, heavy integration becomes an afterthought.

Techniques

1. The FSB should ensure compliance with unit SOP for BSA occupation.

2. Rely on the MDMP to:

• Develop the plan.

• Publish a good operations order.

• Conduct a rehearsal of the operation.

• Properly designate the responsibilities of the security party, quartering party, main body, and trail parties.

3. Battalion commanders must see the requirement to conduct Home-Station training on MDMP with full staff.

4. Battalion XOs must ensure all members of the battle staff are incorporated in the mission analysis.

5. Consider available time from the receipt of the initial warning order to mission execution.

6. Identify critical events that must occur in staff planning and within each battle operating system.

7. Commander's guidance should be given for each battle operating system.

8. Remember: Clear, concise commander's guidance is most important when the tempo of tactical operations increases to minimize the degradation of staff planning quality associated with battlefield friction and stress.

9. The battalion XO must ensure the process remains objective as the S-2 and S-3 fight the enemy and friendly course(s) of action.

10. Use every available Home-Station training opportunity to train as a staff in order to enhance proficiency in all areas of the decision-making process.

11. Ensure that the unit TACSOP incorporates the procedures for battle staff drills.

12. Develop preprinted, acetate sheets for conducting the estimate of the situation in the field:

• Mission analysis worksheet

• COA sketch sheets

• Blank timeline

• Warning order format

• FRAGO format

13. Company commanders can use their platoon leaders as a mini-staff with each responsible for completing a portion of the mission analysis:

• Developing a COA.

• Wargaming the COA.

• Writing an annex to the FRAGO.

14. Brigade staffs must ensure that heavy LNOs are incorporated into the MDMP and must aggressively seek to integrate them into the process.

15. Heavy unit LNOs link up with supported units at the unit's Home Station and deploy with the brigade staff to JRTC.

16. Doctrinal references:

• FM 101-5, Aug 96, Staff Organization and Operation, Final Draft.

• FM 63-20, Forward Support Battalion.

• MTP 63-216, Forward Support Battalion.

• CGSC ST 101-5, Command and Staff Decision Processes.

17. Other references:

• CALL Newsletter 95-12, Dec 95, Tactical Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning."

• CALL Newsletter 95-7, May 95, Tactical Operations Center, for additional detail about Techniques and procedure on how to successfully employ the military decision-making process (MDMP).

Section N - Needs Emphasis, Part V

Section N - Needs Emphasis, Part VII