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TA.7 Needs Emphasis Trend 1: Supply/Resupply Operations

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 1-1: Medical supplies often reach critical stockage levels because clinical staff and medical supply personnel fail to coordinate efforts.

RESULT: Medical supplies are used and a several day lag time results for operational input which is often impossible to make up.

PROBLEM 1-2: Units are still experiencing difficulties with LOGPAC operations.

RESULT: Infantry battalion logistical planners are not planning 24, 48, and 72 hours out. For success, they must synchronize their LOGPACs with the battalion's tactical operations.

Techniques

1. Medical staff personnel need to circulate through wards to check on supply levels, and clinical personnel need to gain a better understanding of the time necessary to obtain supplies through the normal requisitioning system.

2. Commanders need to educate both clinical and administrative personnel regarding the impact of their operations on the entire hospital system.

3. Battle-track in the field and combat trains to stay abreast of friendly and enemy unit locations and ongoing operations being conducted by their battalions.

4. Support platoon leaders must utilize the forward support battalion S-2 and their own battalion S-2 to track the enemy threat, specifically minefield locations.

TA.7 Needs Emphasis Trend 2: CSS Integration

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 2-1: Brigade and FSB logisticians experience significant difficulty coordinating Army aviation for logistics from the brigade support area (BSA) to forward units.

1. Aviation is rarely used to move material from the BSA to the forward units. Often, neither the brigade nor the aviation battalion allocate aircraft for aerial resupply.

2. When aircraft are allocated, units fail to prioritize loads, establish PZ/LZ controls, and maximize backhaul capabilities.

RESULT: The effect of aerial resupply operation as a combat multiplier is degraded.

PROBLEM 2-2: There are frequent failures to effectively use the Standard Army Maintenance System version (SAMS-2) to manage maintenance and track readiness. Failure to transmit outgoing maintenance data real-time to the Division Material Maintenance Center (DMMC) using the material support element (MSE), the tactical terminal adapter (TTA), the digital network voice telephone (DNVT), and/or other electronic means.

1. Reference publications are often not available.

2. The SAMS-2 system operator does not perform prevention maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on the SAMS-2 system.

PROBLEM 2-3: Maintenance units have difficulty understanding the concept of maintenance in operations other than war. One aviation unit maintenance (AVUM) is assigned responsibility for maintenance of all the attached assets, normally three or four different types of airframes.

RESULTS:

1. Difficulties in unifying the maintenance effort.

2. Poor status reporting to the task force commander.

3. Higher not-mission-capable maintenance (NMCM) and nonmission-capable supply (NMCS) rates.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 2-4: Units are still experiencing difficulties with LOGPAC operations.

RESULT: Infantry battalion logistical planners are not planning 24, 48, and 72 hours out. For success, they must synchronize their LOGPACs with the battalion's tactical operations.

Techniques

1. The brigade must develop and implement a system for requesting and allocating aviation for logistics.

2. Allocations should be prioritized and listed in the tasks to subordinate units of the brigade order to clearly delineate responsibilities.

3. Transportation support must be integrated into the overall CSS plan to ensure support and supplies arrive where needed, when needed.

4. The transportation support plan must consider and integrate Air Force airlift, Army aviation, and ground transportation assets into the concept of support for the ground tactical plan.

5. Synchronize the transportation plan with subordinate and supported units' plans.

6. References:

• MTP 63-216, Forward Support Battalion.

• FM 100-13, Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone.

• FM 90-4, Air Assault Operations.

7. Battle-track in the field and combat trains to stay abreast of friendly and enemy unit locations and ongoing operations being conducted by their battalions.

8. Support platoon leaders must utilize the forward support battalion S-2 and their own battalion S-2 to track the enemy threat, specifically minefield locations.

TA.7 Needs Emphasis Trend 3: Ammunition (AMMO) Management

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 3-1: Units are not adequately managing and controlling ammunition.

1. Units do not plan ammunition in volleys.

2. Ammunition tracking is deficient. Ammunition counts at batteries, battalion TOC, and battalion ALOC often widely differ.

3. Ammunition resupply is often prepackaged prior to D-Day. Little planning for follow-on missions.

4. Resupply plans frequently rely on only one means of delivery. If weather or the enemy eliminate that means, units are slow to develop alternatives.

RESULTS:

1. Units have insufficient ammunition to meet commander's guidance for fire support.

2. Infantry companies initiate attacks with insufficient ammunition to meet the desired attack criteria.

Techniques

l. The brigade FSO:

• Identifies ammunition requirements for the brigade and battalion fights.

• Allocates volleys to meet the commander's desired effects on enemy forces.

• Estimates requirements for future operations.

2. The FA battalion S3:

• Refines the FSO's requirements.

• Identifies the amount of ammunition for gunnery needs (registration and calibration) and counterfire efforts.

• Tracks and controls the expenditure of the ammunition.

3. The FA battalion XO:

• Identifies ammunition resources.

• Plans and coordinates all resupply operations (consider use of multiple means).

• Monitors consumption.

• Anticipates future requirements.

4. The brigade FSCOORD: Monitors the process and identifies shortfall to the brigade commander.

5. For mortar ammunition:

• The battalion FSOs must work closely with the infantry battalion commander and S-3 to assign priorities for mortar fire.

• FSOs must work closely with the infantry battalion XO and S-4 to ensure both the battalion and company mortars are resupplied with sufficient ammunition to accomplish the commander's intent.

6. Develop an ammunition transfer point (ATP) layout plan based on quantity/distance tables.

• Set up the ATP according to the layout plan to ensure safety and security.

• Include a generic plan in the unit's TACSOP.

7. Cache fuel assets throughout the assembly area to reduce the likelihood of all assets being destroyed.

8. Establish silent and/or jump FARPs prior to offensive or defensive operations.

9. Plan ammunition in volleys:

• Calculate the number of volleys required to accomplish the mission.

• Allocate ammunition by volleys.

10. Doctrinal reference: FM 9-13, Munitions Support in Theater of Operations; FM 9-6, Ammunition Handbook: A Guide for Ammunition Specialists, Chapter 2; and quantity/distance tables.

TA.7 Needs Emphasis Trend 4: Maintenance

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 4-1: Units are not coordinating maintenance and Class IX support well.

PROBLEM 4-2: Units do not establish and implement SOP for preventative maintenance in the field. This is highlighted by the failure to properly complete and submit DA Form 2404 and DA Form 5988.

RESULTS:

1. Parts are not ordered.

2. Increased downtime for weapons systems.

3. Low materiel readiness status.

Techniques

1. Use the SAMS-2 system as the primary tool for maintenance and supply management.

2. Conduct supervisor and operator training on the various methods for transferring SAMS-2 data.

3. Coordinate with the DMMC prior to deployment to prevent communications difficulties.

4. References:

• FM 63-20, Forward Support Battalion.

• FM 100-10, Combat Service Support.

• AR 750-1, Army Materiel Maintenance Policies.

• SAMS-2 Users Guide, ADSM 18-L26-AHO-BUR-UM.

5. Establish SOP for preventative maintenance in the field that includes completion of DA Form 2404 and DA Form 5988, submission and collection process/method, and action and return of parts to equipment operator.

6. Review Maintenance Management, Update 14, and Unit Supply, Update 14.

TA.7 Needs Emphasis Trend 5: Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 5-1: The task organization for the forward support MEDEVAC team (FSMT) is often unclear. Significant confusion between the forward support medical company, the combat support hospital, and the aviation task force.

RESULT: Creates C2problems that hinder the effectiveness of the forward support MEDEVAC team.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 5-2: Many CSS units do not have a plan to evacuate casualties.

1. The large majority view casualty evacuation as a simple process that can be developed and executed while casualties are happening.

2. Even when units do have a plan, it has not been rehearsed and during execution proves to be ineffective. When the plan works, it usually cannot accommodate the continuous influx of casualties.

3. This is attributed to the dangerously low number of combat lifesavers and medics available to help.

4. What units need to understand is that casualty evacuation is an event that will use resources normally used for other purposes.

RESULTS:

1. There are a high number of died of wounds (DOWs) in these units.

2. Most units do not analyze and fail to realize what it takes to properly render assistance and effectively remove their casualties from the battlefield.

3. Even the best evacuation plans cannot account for massive number of casualties.

4. Qualified medical help can maintain soldiers alive while the evacuation plan gets to them.

5. Transportation is one of the most critical commodities for CSS units and, as such, has to be managed. The use of those assets has to be factored into the overall plan so when the time comes those resources will be available.

PROBLEM 5-3: Expeditious loading and evacuation of casualties is the single most important element in reducing the number of DOW on the battlefield today.

1. Units fail to recognize that medical personnel alone cannot accomplish this mission.

2. Units are failing to augment teams with nonmedical personnel and/or failing to adequately train team members so that evacuation platforms can be rapidly loaded and/or unloaded.

RESULT: Use of nonstandard means of evacuation is increasingly being employed; litter teams are still slowing the process of evacuation.

Techniques

1. Commanders need to emphasize that patient evacuation is not a medical mission but rather a unit mission.

2. Casualty evacuation has to be part of the plan and rehearsed in order to be successful.

3. Proper resource allocation and enough first aid qualified personnel translates into higher readiness level.

4. Medical personnel should be used to supervise litter teams, but their expertise is better put to use in treatment of casualties than in the actual carrying of litters.

5. All unit personnel should be trained in litter team techniques, and rotating rosters should be established to have personnel on call for litter team duty.

6. Establish a clear command relationship for the FSMT prior to deployment.

7. Train with that established relationship prior to deployment.

TA.7 Needs Emphasis Trend 6: Combat Health Services

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 6-1: Poor site selection prevents medical companies from conducting smooth and efficient patient treatment and evacuation.

RESULTS:

1. The lack of space inhibits proper dispersion of equipment.

2. Does not facilitate establishing patient bunkers or fighting positions.

PROBLEM 6-2: Medical equipment sets are not being properly packed.

1. Some medications are still in bulk packaging and are not placed in medical chests.

2. Most of the medical equipment chests lacked the appropriate Class VIII.

3. Chest drawers are not labeled.

4. Units are storing expired medications.

5. Units are not using quality control and surveillance records for TOE Medical Assemblies, DA Form 9998.

Techniques

1. Conduct a training exercise without troops (TEWT) on site selection with key leaders from the medical company and battalion staff.

2. Reference: FM 8-10-1, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Medical Company, Paragraph 3-3, and FM 63-20, Forward Support Battalion, Chapter 2.

3. Develop an internal Class VIII SOP that outlines accountability, setup, and maintenance procedures for both garrison and field operations.

4. References:

• AR 40-61.

• ARTEP 8-263-30-MTP.

• DA PAM 710-2-1.

• FM 8-10-1, para 1-12.

• FM 8-10-4, Medical Platoon Leaders Handbook Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, para 5-24.

• FM 8-10-9, Combat Health Logistics in a Theater of Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.

• FM 8-55, Planning for Health Services Support, Chapter 6, Sections III and IV.

TA.7 Needs Emphasis Trend 7: Civil Affairs Operations

4QFY96
1QFY97
2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 7-1: Most units are unfamiliar/untrained in dealing with civilians on the battlefield.

1. Too often units allow civilians free access to the position area.

2. Subordinate elements frequently call battalion for guidance whenever civilians show up at the perimeter. Battalions usually take an inordinate amount of time to decide what it wants the unit to do with the civilians.

RESULTS:

1. Disruption of unit activities.

2. Friendly or neutral civilians are too often unnecessarily angered by procedures and the treatment they receive as a result of units trying to figure out the proper disposition.

3. Too free an access, however, allows neutral or anti-U.S. civilians a significant opportunity to collect valuable intelligence (where the C2nodes are, possible targets for terrorist activities, etc.).

4. Frequently, terrorists will gain unobstructed access to a battery and will destroy the BOC/FDC or howitzer section through the detonation of a ruck sack or car bomb.

Techniques

1. Develop and disseminate to the lowest level a "white/gray/black" list of all pro/neutral/anti-civilians.

2. Develop clear, concise guidance of what actions are to be taken with each type of civilian, as well as those civilians who do not appear on any list.

3. Establish clear procedures on what soldiers are to do upon contact with civilians -- train and rehearse all soldiers on how to deal with civilians on the battlefield at Home Station.

Section N - Needs Emphasis, Part IV

Section N - Needs Emphasis, Part VI