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TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 8: Staff Synchronization

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 8-1: Battalion commanders frequently fail to use the XO as the principle agent for integrating coordinating and special staffs into a battle staff capable of operating as a team during the military decision-making process (MDMP) and mission execution. Units that have not developed and trained as a combined staff often ignore several staff officers (such as civil affairs, psychological operations, S-1, S-4, EN, ADO, BALO and SALTO) in staff estimates and orders development.

PROBLEM 8-2: Aviation and ground commanders fail to coordinate and integrate their assets to maximize the effectiveness of the combined arms team.

1. Frequently, aviation units operate over the ground commander's sectors without understanding the ground commander's intent or scheme of maneuver.

2. Ground commanders do not have a clear understanding of how to employ aviation assets.

3. Aviation commanders fail to give ground commanders an accurate depiction of aviation capabilities and limitations and fail to suggest the best method to utilize their assets.

PROBLEM 8-3: Synchronization of breaching fundamentals.

1. Insufficient coordination and integration between task organized units.

2. Combined arms rock drill rehearsals at brigade and battalion level often exclude key BOS representation.

3. Failure to achieve full-scale rehearsals at company team and below.

RESULTS:

1. Extended amount of time on target.

2. Unsynchronized execution.

3. Execution shortcomings such as timid and untimely deployment of forces, exposed flanks, no obscuration, and no attempt to secure the far side of unopposed point obstacles are common.

2-3QY97

PROBLEM 8-4: Aviation and ground commanders fail to coordinate and integrate their assets to maximize the effectiveness of the combined arms team.

1. Frequently, aviation units operate over the ground commander's sectors without an understanding of the ground commander's intent or scheme of maneuver.

2. Ground commanders do not have a clear understanding of how to employ aviation assets.

3. Aviation commanders fail to give ground commanders an accurate depiction of aviation capabilities and limitations and fail to suggest the best method to utilize their assets.

PROBLEM 8-5: As the brigade's subject matter experts for combat health support operations, the forward support medical company commander and the brigade surgeon are not properly integrated into the brigade staff.

RESULT: A CHS plan that lacks proper and timely coordination, synchronization, and dissemination. Overall, the CHS plan becomes reactive instead of proactive.

PROBLEM 8-6: Brigade task forces have experienced difficulty in employing heavy teams during MOUT. Heavy units do not understand the complexity of MOUT, and brigade staffs do not understand how to effectively utilize heavy units during MOUT. Fire control measures needed to prevent fratricide have not been planned in detail.

PROBLEM 8-7: Synchronization of attacks in built-up areas.

1. Although units typically do well inside buildings, they are much less successful at coordinating the efforts of units outside and between buildings.

2. Units generally disregard the synchronization of direct fires, indirect fires, and obscuration, often in the belief that "MOUT is a squad leader's fight."

3. Units lack a detailed direct fire plan.

4. Units fail to weight the main effort through restricting responsibility or adding combat power.

5. Lack of a plan by units to suppress and obscure enemy positions to allow movement.

6. Units exhibit tactical impatience, resulting in movement to a new building before the conditions have been set.

RESULT:

1. The result is a large number of friendly casualties and the loss of tactical momentum.

2. On average, units suffer twice as many casualties moving between buildings as they do in the close fight within buildings.

Techniques

1. XO must integrate the entire battle staff into the MDMP and information management.

2. Battalion SOPs must establish clear and separate task lists for each TOC member or BOS and be formatted as checklists or battle drills.

3. Initiate commander/S-3 interface early in the planning cycle.

4. Commanders or S-3s should conduct direct coordination with aviation companies placed under the operational control of an infantry battalion.

5. During Home-Station training, conduct classes on the air tasking order (ATO), airspace control order (ACO), special instructions (SPINS), and A2C2operations IAW FM 100-103.

6. Integrate the medical company commander and brigade surgeon into the brigade staff planning process for CHS operations.

7. Ensure that the combat health support officer (CHSO), the brigade signal officer, and a representative from the forward MEDEVAC support team become involved in the CHS planning process.

8. The brigade S-1 should schedule CHS wargaming, coordination meetings, and rehearsals as critical events on the brigade timeline.

9. The CHS planner must provide the command with a CHS estimate to be used as a basis for the CHS plan, which is developed by the brigade S-1 and the other CHS planners in the brigade.

10. The CHS planners should develop a single CHS graphic (cartoon) showing the position of the brigade's medical assets, all air and ground evacuation routes and planning, and alternate methods for requesting MEDEVAC.

11. The brigade should include the CHS graphic with the brigade operations order to ensure maximum distribution and dissemination of the CHS plan.

12. Brigade staffs must conduct leader professional development training with heavy team leaders to completely understand how to employ heavy forces during MOUT.

13. Detailed planning to address fire control measures and issues must be incorporated into plans developed for MOUT.

14. Doctrinal reference: FM 8-55, Planning for Health Services Support.

15. Other references:

• CALL CTC Bulletin No. 90-3, May 90, The Stone Forest (A Heavy/Light Combat Narrative).

• CALL Newsletter No. 93-8, Dec, 93, Peace Operations, Vol IV, Operations other than War, Chapter II.

TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 9: Troop Leading

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 9-1: Battle captains and battle NCOs are not proficient in orchestrating staff battle drills. Staffs rarely train at Home Station on how to execute staff battle drills.

RESULTS:

1. Unnecessarily large amount of reaction time required for the staff to deal with certain foreseeable situations.

2. Too many brigades lose their ability to stay within the enemy's decision cycle.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 9-2: (Same as Problem 5-2).

PROBLEM 9-3: The MI company leadership does not rigidly enforce the basic tenets of troop-leading procedures (TLPs) during operations. Rehearsals are not stressed by the company leadership, and little planning time is dedicated to contingency planning for C2, reporting criteria, and actions on contact.

RESULT:

1. The result is poorly planned missions which lack integration into the tactical scheme of maneuver.

2. The factors of METT-T are rarely considered, particularly in preparation for ground surveillance (GS) and human intelligence (HUMINT) team missions.

3. Teams often deploy without basic mission-essential equipment items such as radios, maps, etc.

4. Coordination with attached and/or supported units is poorly executed.

Techniques

1. Use every possible Home-Station training opportunity to develop and refine battle staff procedures and drills.

2. Train the principal staff on the "how to" of concurrently planning for future operations while still executing current operations.

3. Units must revise company SOPs to include TLP checklists for all MI company assets. Ensure checklists are tailored to address missions such as initial deployment, planning and coordination, and movement (mounted/dismounted and air assault). Such checklists should include coordination as well as mission-essential equipment items required for particular missions.

TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 10: Information Management

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 10-1: Aviation task forces fail to systematically pass intelligence to the companies. Companies seldom develop a system to pull the intelligence from the task force S-2.

RESULTS: Failing to have current enemy troop and AD locations.

PROBLEM 10-2: Brigade task force compromise plans are generally not well-thought-out, comprehensive, or rehearsed.

1. Most units plan to jump their Julian dates up or down on the FH FM nets because alternate net IDs have not been established and/or published.

2. A SINCGARS time change from Julian date GPS Zulu or alternate net ID is only a temporary fix (long enough to correct the reason for change) to deny enemy access to compromised nets. Once all nets are on the adjusted time, a COMSEC and/or SOI changeover must be initiated.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 10-3: Battalion command posts have difficulty receiving, analyzing, and disseminating information.

RESULT: Battle staffs are unable to provide the information which the commander needs to see the battlefield (both the enemy and his own unit).

Techniques

1. S-2 provides companies an intelligence update twice daily.

2. S-2 briefs aircrews prior to each mission.

3. Although manually distributing COMSEC/SOI changes is an acceptable method, a more preferred method is to implement all COMSEC/SOI management and compromise procedures using electronic key transfer, i.e., FM over-the-air-rekey (OTAR) and/or MSE bulk/individual variable transfer. Incorporate the OTAR method of distribution into the brigade's SINCGARS CNR sustainment training program.

4. To further protect codes during periods of suspected compromise:

• Request authentication and encryption tables and ensure that operators are trained on their use.

• If changing Julian dates, move all nets to the new Julian date to ensure communications on the combined arms battlefield.

5. Initiate a COMSEC and/or SOI changeover after all nets are on an alternate Net ID or adjusted time.

6. Doctrinal reference: See FM 11-32, Combat Net Radio (CNR) Operations, for building SINCGARS SOPs.

7. The commander can keep his staff focused by carefully developing and updating all three components of the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs): priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs), and friendly forces information requirements (FFIRs).

8. Develop a method to ensure that the three command posts (main CP, combat trains CP, and field trains CP) receive and share critical battlefield information.

TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 11: Air Liaison Officer Operations

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 11-1: Aviation and ground commanders fail to coordinate and integrate their assets to maximize the effectiveness of the combined arms team.

1. Frequently, aviation units operate over the ground commander's sectors without understanding the ground commander's intent or scheme of maneuver.

2. Ground commanders do not have a clear understanding of how to employ aviation assets.

3. Aviation commanders fail to give ground commanders an accurate depiction of aviation capabilities and limitations and fail to suggest the best method to utilize their assets.

PROBLEM 11-2: Integration between assault and attack aviation rarely exists during operations. A very minimum of interface occurs between aircrews of different companies.

PROBLEM 11-3: The aviation liaison officer often does not understand his role within the brigade A2C2element. He often fails to provide the information needed to ensure airspace deconfliction. Frequently, the air liaison neglects to provide information which promotes the development of situational awareness, especially within the AD arena (both ground-to-air and air-to-ground engagements).

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 11-4: Air mission commanders and aircrews are not aware of the assets available in the light/airborne infantry companies and battalions.

Techniques

1. Initiate commander/S-3 interface early in the planning cycle.

2. Commanders or S-3s should conduct direct coordination with aviation companies placed under the operational control of an infantry battalion.

3. Train at Home Station with attached units.

4. Conduct rehearsals to identify problems and ensure synchronization.

5. Aviation companies need to develop a better situational awareness of the units they are supporting. At Home Station, units should attempt to conduct cross-training OPDs with their maneuver counterparts.

6. Doctrinal references:

• FM 100-103, Oct 87, Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone.

• CALL Handbook No. 92-3, Apr 92, Fratricide Risk Assessment for Company Leadership.

• CALL Newsletter No. 92-4, Apr 92, Fratricide: Reducing Self-Inflicted Losses.

TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 12: Time Management

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 12-1: During the deliberate planning process, there is generally an absence of parallel planning between the battery commander and his platoon leaders. There is a shortage of planning time at platoon level.

RESULTS:

1. Platoon leaders often fail to develop and issue effective OPORDs to their teams.

2. Impedes the platoon leader's ability to integrate and synchronize his planning with that of the supported unit.

PROBLEM 12-2: Backbriefs and rehearsals are not routinely conducted. Too many units simply talk through the concept of operations in lieu of a viable rehearsal. Commanders and S-3s do not:

• Deliberately plan for rehearsals and therefore do not prepare for rehearsals.

• Focus on key events.

• Address branches and sequels.

• Involve all key leaders and BOS representatives.

• Use a synchronization matrix or execution checklist.

• Adequately note changes to the concept resulting from mission preparation.

• Publish a FRAGO to update subordinate units.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 12-3: Company/team commanders and platoon leaders make little or no effort to complete their own mission analysis with resultant products, including a timeline.

1. Lack of standardized operations order formats and presentation.

2. Inability to know when to use the deliberate, combat, or quick techniques when applying the military decision-making process (MDMP).

3. Poor time management.

4. Inadequate preparation to conduct MDMP planning in a field environment.

Techniques

1. Issuing a warning order after each of the brigade's key planning events (mission analysis brief, COA decision brief, wargaming, etc.) will ensure that subordinate leaders will have adequate time and information to conduct their troop-leading procedures.

2. Conduct confirmation briefs immediately after the OPORD.

• Standard format.

• The battalion staff must attend.

3. Do not use backbriefs as sole means of rehearsal because backbriefs are inadequate in trying to visualize the entire task force plan.

4. Rehearsals must be properly planned and prepared.

• Ensure the entire staff is present.

• Do not sacrifice rehearsals because of time.

5. Use a synchronization matrix or execution checklist to guide the rehearsal to ensure that all BOS are covered.

6. Concentrate on key events.

7. Establish and adhere to a battle rhythm and incorporate it into the unit SOP.

8. Practice either the combat decision-making process or the quick decision-making process. Leaders must first understand how the entire formal process works before they can abbreviate the process; otherwise, steps in the process will be skipped and the plan will be poorly synchronized.

9. Strive for the execution of all events at the prescribed time.

10. Ensure all tasks that lead to the generation of FRAGOs that focus future operations are accomplished.

11. Set agendas for all events.

12. Focus on updating estimates.

13. Provide visibility on significant acts.

14. Integrate the battle staff and TOC shift.

15. References:

• FM 7-8, Apr 92, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, Chapter 2.

• FM 7-10, Dec 90, The Infantry Rifle Company, Chapters 2, 4, 5, 6, 7.

• CALL Newsletter No. 91-1, Apr 91, Rehearsals.

• CALL Newsletter No. 95-12, May 97, Update, Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning."

TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 13: Incomplete/Inaccurate Estimates

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 13-1: (Same as Problem 1-6).

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 31-2: There is poor utilization of the analysis control element (ACE). SALUTE reports are being passed to the commander with little or no analysis.

RESULTS: Where analysis is attempted, it is usually of poor quality and lacks the necessary details to be useful to the commander. In essence, this information is only of general benefit to the commander.

Techniques

1. Maintain a set battle rhythm for the staff.

2. Conduct staff updates/staff huddles.

3. Conduct commander's conference calls with staff in attendance.

4. Standardize staff journals.

5. Conduct weekly training with the ACE to increase soldier knowledge and future use of ASAS.

6. Use ASAS to assist with radio line-of-sight (RLOS) planning, threat database upkeep, and graphic intelligence summaries, only a few of its capabilities.

7. Incorporate communications and dissemination to the ACE as part of the ACT battle rhythm.

8. Utilize ACE-generated reports to update the brigade S-2 on developments outside the AO but within the area of interest (AI). The analysts working the ACE are the best source of analytical assistance for SIGINT and HUMINT databases.

9. Develop a tracking system for managing incoming message traffic:

• CCIR

• Combat power

• Planning guidance

• Significant activities

10. Analyze all information received from subordinate and higher units for completeness.

11. Track follow-up RFIs to complete outstanding actions.

12. Enforce existing unit tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOPs).

TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 14: Orders Development and Processing

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 14-1: (Same as Problem 12-1).

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 14-2: Task-organizing military police (MP) units is usually not done well in the order development.

1. Brigade staffs have habitually assigned MP platoons with missions that are executed in another unit's sector.

2. At times the platoons have been given TCPs and checkpoints to man that are in close proximity to maneuver units in the same sector.

RESULT: Clearance of fires and direct fire control measures are difficult to manage, which has led to problems with fratricide.

PROBLEM 14-3: Units are not getting the right personnel involved in the CHS planning and are not developing a plan to support sustained operations.

Techniques

1. Issuing a warning order after each of the brigade's key planning events (mission analysis brief, COA decision brief, wargaming, etc.) will ensure that subordinate leaders will have adequate time and information to conduct their troop-leading procedures.

2. To develop a successful combat health support plan, the medical company commander, combat health support officer, brigade S-1, and brigade surgeon must all be involved in developing the plan.

3. During the brigade's course-of-action development, the combat health support (CHS) plan must be incorporated.

4. Units must use effective CHS rehearsals, matrices, and CHS cartoons on the concept of support.

5. Units can improve their evacuation process by using C-130s for the backhaul of routine and priority patients.

6.Task-organize MP units conducting operations under maneuver battalions.

TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 15: Commander's Guidance

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 15-1: The commander's guidance for fire support is frequently vague.

1. It does not focus fire support assets and is unsupportable with available fire support assets.

2. Commanders are using nonstandard terminology.

3. Improper use of standard terminology.

RESULT: Although FSOs are using the correct formats, many FSOs are poorly conveying the commander's guidance for fire support.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 15-2: (Same as Problem 15-1).

PROBLEM 15-3: Most commanders are using the format of FM 6-71 when writing their guidance for fire support using Purpose, Priority, Allocation and Restriction (PPAR). Recently, some commanders have started using Task, Purpose, Method, and End State.

1. Although FSOs are using the correct formats, many FSOs are poorly conveying the commander's guidance for fire support.

2. Some FSOs use the terms destroy, neutralize, suppress, and harass incorrectly.

RESULT: The commander's guidance for fire support is usually vague, does not focus fire support assets, and is not supportable with the fire support assets available.

Techniques

1. FM 6-71, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander, p. 3-5, lists the information commanders should provide their fire support officers (FSOs). FSOs must clearly understand the commander's intentions and guidance for the use of fires.

2. FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process, states that the effects of fire can be to harass, suppress, neutralize, or destroy the target. The subjective nature of these terms means the FSO must ensure his commander's interpretations of this terminology are correct, and that fire support assets are available to achieve his attack guidance.

3. FSOs must fully understand the concept of operations and the commander's intentions for the use of fires. FSOs must translate this into clear, concise, and understandable terms.

TA.4 Needs Emphasis Trend 16: Precombat Checks

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 16-1: Preoperational combat checks and COMMEXs are normally not conducted to standard.

1. Units frequently have difficulty understanding the differences in and purposes for precombat checks, COMMEXs, and signal operation rehearsals.

2. Communications are not normally integrated into the brigade task force rehearsal.

3. During deployment, COMMEXs are normally ignored. If they occur, they exclude all SINCGARS FM and IHRF Radio NCSs controlling their nets.

4. Task force briefings and rehearsals do not include a complete review of the signal operations concepts or plans.

PROBLEM 16-2: Aviation company leaders too often do not conduct precombat checks and precombat inspections. Units suffer from noncompliance with unit SOPs.

RESULT: Units are often unable to perform their mission to standard because do not have the needed equipment or information.

Techniques

1. Revise brigade task force SOPs to include essential preoperational and precombat checks of communications equipment.

2. Familiarize leaders with the purpose, application, and conduct of precombat checks, COMMEXs, and signal operation rehearsals.

3. Review the unit's timeline of events to synchronize the signal COMMEXs, rehearsals, and execution with the maneuver commander's tactical plan.

4. Units should review their precombat check and precombat inspection SOPs to ensure they are adequate and used.

5. Doctrinal references:

• FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad.

• FM 11-32, Combat Net Radio (CNR) Operations.

• FM 11-37, MSE Primer for Small-Unit Leaders.

• FM 11-38, MSE System Management and Control.

Section N - Needs Emphasis, Part VI

Acknowledgements