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TA.3 Needs Emphasis Trend 1: Early Warning

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 1-1: Brigade air defense artillery (ADA) units have experienced difficulty maintaining consistent early warning. Light and Special Divisions Interim Sensor (LSDIS) early warning radars have been improperly placed, resulting in the system not being maximized to its fullest capability. Battery command posts have had difficulty maintaining communications on the division early warning net.

RESULT: Both problems have led to ADA elements assigned to the brigade being unsuccessful in interdicting enemy aircraft.

Techniques

1. The brigade air defense artillery officer (ADAO) must ensure that he conducts a thorough IPB to identify enemy air avenues of approach and then conduct the necessary terrain analysis to determine the best position to place the LSDIS radar.

2. Communications must be maintained on the division early warning net to receive timely information specific to enemy air activity.

TA. 6 MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY

TA.6 Needs Emphasis Trend 1: Force Protection

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 1-1: Most signal units lack the training and equipment to adequately defend themselves from OPFOR attacks.

1. Individual and group tactical movement/patrolling.

2. Preparation of individual and crew-served fighting positions.

3. Proper emplacement and operation of an LP/OP and construction.

4. Planning and maintenance of tactical and protective obstacles.

PROBLEM 1-2: Aviation units fail to effectively defend their assembly areas with organic manpower.

1. Manpower shortages.

2. Training and command emphasis should be placed on the officers' and NCOs' lack of basic soldiering skills.

PROBLEM 1-3: Leaders and soldiers are not taking the proper steps to protect the force.

1. Improper movement techniques.

2. Inadequate preparation of individual fighting positions; i.e., use of sector stakes, preparation of range cards, fighting position construction.

3. Poor dispersion during halts or in patrol bases.

4. Poor noise, light, and litter discipline.

5. Inadequate use of observation posts.

6. Inadequate local security patrolling.

7. Failure to understand the rules of engagement.

8. Poor passive/active air defense measures.

9. Inadequate leader supervision of field hygiene.

RESULT: Preventable loss of life and combat power.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 1-4: Individual and crew-served weapon positions are not completed to standard, often lacking overhead cover. The use of obstacles is nonexistent. Camouflage of personnel, tents, vehicles, and equipment are seldom to standard.

RESULT: The continual improvement of assembly areas fails to occur after initial occupation.

Techniques

1. All leaders and soldiers should review FM 7-8, The Infantry Platoon and Squad (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger), and FM 5 -103, Survivability, for Techniques and standards for defensive measures.

2. FM 20-3, Camouflage, gives company-level leaders an understanding of camouflage principles.

3. An assembly area plan must be developed and continually improved upon.

4. Constructing survivability positions for all soldiers enhances combat survivability.

5. Leaders must ensure force protection is a priority, and the aviation task force is included in the brigade task force defensive plan.

6. FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data, discusses construction of tactical and protective obstacles.

7. GTA 7-6-1, Fighting Position Construction Infantry Leader's Reference Card, covers the construction of the common types of individual and crew-served fighting positions.

8. Aviation leaders must maximize the use of engineer assets to compensate for manpower shortages.

9. Use aviation warrant officers to augment the overall protect-the-force effort.

10. Construct individual fighting positions to standard, with particular emphasis on sector stakes, clearing fields of fire, range cards, and sector sketches.

11. Practice squad and platoon movement techniques consistent with desired speed, security, cover and concealment, fields of fire, dispersion, command and control, and enemy threat.

12. Treat every halt as a hasty defense. Begin preparing hasty fighting positions when halts last more than 15 minutes.

13. Practice a disciplined response to hostile air, both fixed and rotary wing.

14. Use vignettes to train soldiers on situational application of the rules of engagement. Refer to CALL Newsletter No. 95-2, Mar 95, Peace Operations Training Vignettes.

15. Proactive patrolling techniques designed to find the enemy, determine his strength and dispositions, and provide early warning and security.

16. Enforce, at all levels, strict adherence to noise, light, and litter discipline.

17. Enforce field hygiene. (Note: In heavily forested and vegetated areas, soldiers are susceptible to poison ivy and poison oak, particularly in the summer and fall.)

TA.6 Needs Emphasis Trend 2: NBC Operations Proficiency

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 2-1: The main causes for chemical casualties is a lack of early warning and noncompliance with directed force protection measures (not following established battle drills).

1. Units within affected chemical attack areas fail to properly employ their M8A1 chemical agent alarms.

2. Alarms are normally emplaced but not checked to ensure proper operation.

3. The improper emplacement of the M8A1s also results in no early warning for units and the loss of soldiers.

4. The brigade-directed MOPP level is frequently ignored or misunderstood.

5. During chemical attacks, some units do not have masks and MOPP gear readily available.

6. When units react to a chemical hazard, they normally mask and give the alarm, but stop short of increasing the level of MOPP.

7. The unit sustains a high amount of casualties due to lack of protection and reaction throughout the area.

RESULT: Units sustain significant casualties from chemical attacks.

2-3 QFY97

PROBLEM 2-2: Recent observations tend to support a lack of emphasis on NBC operations at the brigade task force level. Subordinate units consistently have performed poorly during the execution of both collective and individual level NBC-related tasks.

RESULT: Brigade staffs generally do not pay particular attention to NBC input until forced to go into mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear.

Techniques

1. Conduct individual training to standard using the tasks outlined in STP 21-1, SCMT, using a collective or STX format (see TC 3-8, Chemical Training for Guidance).

2. Generate battle drills for the TOC and leader's actions that coincide with ARTEP 7-8/7-10, MTP, and make them part of the TACSOP.

3. Integrate NBC battle drills into TOCEXs, STAFFEXs, TEWTs, and other training vehicles.

4. Leaders must supervise and become effective in the unit's response to a chemical attack and not just wait for it to go away or be told what to do.

5. Brigades must place more emphasis on NBC operations and better incorporate the BOS into mission planning.

6. Attention needs to be paid to collective and individual level NBC training at Home Station.

TA.6 Needs Emphasis Trend 3: Mine Detection/Clearance

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 3-1: Maneuver commanders at all levels have demonstrated a lack of tactical patience and have pressured engineers into quickly conducting route sweep operations. Task force commanders do not conduct deliberate risk analysis and do not determine the appropriate clearance method.

RESULT: This frequently results in minefields being discovered by the destruction of lead vehicles in the route clearance team.

Procedures

1. Modify the SALUTE report to include more detailed information on enemy obstacles.

2. Develop and implement an enemy obstacle marking SOP.

Techniques

Commanders must exercise tactical patience during route clearance operations and allow engineer leaders to analyze the situation to determine the proper method to facilitate route clearance.

l. Train soldiers to gain and maintain mine awareness.

2. Use Home-Station training opportunities to train route clearance as a combined arms operation.

3. Establish a mine dump for each obstacle group.

4. Train mine detector operators IAW the applicable TM. Develop squad level SOPs.

5. The assistant brigade engineer and the engineer company commander must synchronize and develop an enemy obstacle template to assist in the IPB analysis and in the development of a combined arms route clearance plan.

6. Integrate deployable intelligence support element capabilities into the analysis.

7. The brigade engineer must work with the S-2 and S-3 to develop an R&S plan to confirm or deny the enemy obstacle template.

8. TF engineers must properly conceal and protect their primary means of obstacle supply (Class V, mines).

9. Task forces must develop a Class IV/V supply point and mine dump SOP for defensive operations.

10. Use brigade or higher level haul assets to transport mines to the mine dump and nodes.

11. Maneuver units must provide support personnel to uncrate, inspect, configure, and transport the mines for emplacement by the engineers.

12. Doctrinal reference: FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, Chapter 2, pp. 2-33 thru 2-41.

TA.6 Needs Emphasis Trend 4: Combined Arms Obstacle Integration

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 4-1: Greater unit employment of nonstandard complex obstacles in restrictive and very restrictive terrain.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 4-2: Maneuver staffs and their engineers lack understanding of the integration of natural and reinforcing obstacles with fires to shape the enemy maneuver.

1. Brigades designate belts and intents but do not resource belts with appropriate quantities of Class IV/V.

2. Brigades do not designate directed obstacle groups to support either the brigade deep fight or the brigade decisive point.

3. The brigade does not refine the obstacle plan by preparing consolidated obstacle graphics from task force obstacle plans and by resolving any conflicts in intents (similar to the artillery fire support planning process).

4. Direct and indirect fires are seldom integrated with the obstacle plan at any level.

RESULT: Most of the defensive obstacle emplacement time is consumed by staffs conducting planning.

Techniques

1. Plan and execute obstacle integration principles in accordance with FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration.

2. Obstacle belts and groups are planned and designated in order to synchronize the brigade and battalion defensive fight and researched to allow timely acquisition, allocation, and distribution of Class IV/V.

3. A combination of wire, mines, tank ditches, and berms has proven most effective.

TA.6 Needs Emphasis Trend 5: Mine Reporting and Lane Marking

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 5-1: Units do not take the time to properly mark and report minefields.

1. Actual markings emplaced on enemy minefields are not consistent with unit SOPs.

2. Initial markings are not upgraded with more durable material such as pickets and barbed wire.

3. Minefields that have lanes reduced are not overwatched or subsequently cleared.

4. Units do not routinely mark friendly emplaced minefields, especially FASCAM minefields.

5. Failure to follow procedures for filling out and submitting DA Form 1355 to units responsible for overwatching obstacles containing mines.

RESULT:

1. Friendly forces continue to experience incidents in enemy minefields believed to have lanes reduced.

2. Lack of continual observation creates difficulty in determining whether a minefield has been reseeded by enemy forces or merely improperly swept by friendly forces.

3. Leads to an unclear intelligence picture.

4. Hampers the S-2's attempt to develop enemy patterns.

5. Incidents of fratricide continue to occur as a result of inadequate documentation and improper marking of friendly minefields.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 5-1: Brigades have placed little emphasis on route status and obstacle tracking by maneuver commanders. Enemy obstacle reporting is poorly managed at all levels.

RESULT: Information pertaining to route and obstacle locations is not disseminated down to subordinate units throughout the brigade.

Techniques

1. Brigades must ensure that reporting procedures, specific to route and obstacle locations, are developed and incorporated into existing SOPs.

2. Information received, referencing obstacle and route status, must be disseminated down to all subordinate units.

3. Engineer leaders must develop and implement battle tracking systems to improve the tactical decision-making process.

• Review TACSOPs.

• Engineer leaders must improve knowledge and use of the communications assets normally found within task forces.

4. Doctrinal reference: FM 5-7-30, Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Combat Operations, Chapter 2.

TA.6 Needs Emphasis Trend 6: Positioning of Crew-Served Weapons

4QFY96
1QFY97
2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 6-1: Artillery batteries and platoons are not paying attention to detail in positioning crew-served weapons.

1. Batteries and platoons routinely do a poor job of positioning crew-served weapons.

2. Position restricts movement and operation.

3. Too often the crew-served positions lack interlocking fires.

4. Units fail to clear fields of fire.

5. Units select positions with little or no consideration about dead space, enemy avenues of approach, difficulty in clearing fields of fire, hill masses that block fields of fire, etc.

6. Too many soldiers do not understand how to fill out a range card.

7. Too many soldiers do not know how the traverse and elevation mechanism functions.

8. NCOs do not proactively supervise and train their soldiers on crew-served weapons proficiency.

RESULT: Batteries and platoons are often destroyed by a dismounted attack conducted by as few as three to five enemy soldiers.

Techniques

1. Doctrinal references: FM 6-50, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Battery, Chapter 3, and STP 6-13B14-SM-TG, p. 3-6.

2. Ensure all soldiers and leaders are trained on crew-served weapons emplacement, range card construction, clearing fields of fire, and, most importantly, positioning crew-served weapons to maximize effectiveness given the constraints of the terrain.

3. Consider identifying crew-served weapon positions prior to the howitzer positions. This technique can greatly facilitate battery defense without affecting the battery's subsequent occupation.

4. Crew-served weapon positions should be inspected/checked by a senior leader battle commander (BC) or 1SG to ensure the weapon is being used effectively. This check should be conducted by actually getting behind the weapon and ensuring it is set up correctly.

TA.6 Needs Emphasis Trend 7: Battle Tracking/Reporting

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 7-1: Engineer leaders usually lack an established system to track engineer operations.

1. Reporting is untimely and incomplete or inaccurate.

2. Problems are compounded by the lack of communications hardware between the brigade engineer and the task force engineers.

Techniques

1. Engineer leaders must develop and implement battle tracking systems to improve the tactical decision-making process.

• Review TACSOPs.

• Engineer leaders must improve knowledge and use of the communications assets normally found within task forces.

2. Doctrinal reference: FM 5-7-30, Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Combat Operations, Chapter 2.

TA.6 Needs Emphasis Trend 8: Breaching Operations

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 8-1: Too many units are not conducting a breach to standard.

1. Commanders and staffs too often do not apply all five breaching tenets.

2. Engineers rarely receive enemy obstacle intelligence (OBSINTEL).

3. Task forces neither mass nor synchronize their breach/assault efforts at the objective.

4. Task forces do not conduct effective reverse sequence planning from the objective to local assembly areas.

5. Many elements within the combined arms team do not participate in full-force rehearsals.

Techniques

1. Implement the five breaching tenets:

• Intelligence

• Breaching fundamentals

• Breaching organization

• Mass

• Synchronization

2. Develop and implement a combined arms breach training program in accordance with FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations, Chapter 7.

TA.6 Needs Emphasis Trend 9: Improve BSA Defense

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 9-1: Base defense is a primary mission for combat service support (CSS) units; however, they do not do it very well.

1. Base defense is the painful process by which soldiers can increase their chances of surviving. Even so, it is neglected.

2. CSS commanders need to realize that a good solid base defense is a force multiplier. Initially, base defense is going to require lots of manpower, but after the set has been completed, it will take less soldiers to maintain.

RESULT: Solid base defense will help CSS soldiers survive, thus increasing, if not sustaining, effective and efficient support to the customers.

Techniques

1. Base defense must be factored into the service support equation.

2. CSS units must have a plan and aggressively execute it shortly after occupation and prior to getting totally immersed in providing support.

3. NCOs, as the doers, must ensure maximum use of available time prior to getting involved in mission support.

4. Review the JRTC "Defense of the BSA" video tape. See ordering information at the back of this publication.

5. Forward support battalions (FSBs) and tenant units should conduct combined security sweeps and establish hasty security to receive the main body.

6. Begin to establish the brigade support area (BSA) commander's defense plan IAW the priorities of work.

7. Continue to improve and upgrade the defense based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T).

8. Ensure all units and soldiers within the BSA are familiar with the FSB's TSOP.

9. Maximize use of available weapon systems to enhance the defense of BSA tenants. (For example, integrate tanks and infantry fighting vehicles [IFVs] into the plan. If a tank is waiting for mobility parts but the gun system functions, that tank can be factored into a static defense plan.)

10. The CSS soldier has to provide support while at the same time work on base defense. These actions compete for the same resource--in this instance, the soldier. It requires a careful balance, and normally support gets more attention at the expense of base defense.

Section N - Needs Emphasis, Part III

Section N - Needs Emphasis, Part V