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TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 1: Indirect Fires During Close Contact

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 1-1: Infantry platoon leaders and forward observers are reluctant to use indirect fires during small unit contacts.

1. There is a tendency to be overly cautious for fear of fratricide, since the enemy is often only 200-300 meters away.

2. Most fire support teams do not have an established battle drill for this situation. They are not well-trained in the adjustment of fires onto rapidly moving mounted and dismounted enemy forces.

3. Decentralized "fast" fire missions are rarely seen, particularly during the search and attack phase of operations.

RESULT:

1. Reduced opportunity to kill the enemy.

2. Most units do not fire the required volume of ammunition in effect to achieve the desired effects on the target.

Techniques

1. Plan for and use artillery and mortar fires to rapidly isolate, block, or defeat enemy forces upon contact.

2. Use priority targets for both the mortars and artillery. Selectively use quick-fire channels to assist the observer in obtaining "fast, accurate" fire missions.

3. Establish battle drills that immediately get a round on the ground upon contact. Once the round is on the ground, observers should be trained to make one bold, accurate shift and fire for effect.

4. Always give accurate target descriptions and make sure that the attack guidance is fully understood.

5. Fire support team (FIST) training: include engaging close-in targets with fire support while the observer is moving.

6. Train forward observers (FOs) on rapidly determining a target location and initiating a complete call for fire while on the move and under attack.

7. Train FOs on the use of the Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver (PLGR) to rapidly determine a target location in restrictive terrain. See "The PLGR: Techniques and Procedures Forward Observers Can Use to Bring Rapid, Accurate, Indirect Fires to the Close Fight" in CALL Newsletter No. 96-10, Oct 96, CTC Quarterly Bulletin.

8. Use every available Home-Station training opportunity to conduct battle drills on contact, using one round adjustments, bold shifts, and the appropriate shifting and firing of priority targets.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 1-2: Few units are using mortars when contact with the enemy is established.

1. Maneuver unit leaders (platoon and company) are allowing their observers and FSOs to fight with fires prior to maneuvering on the enemy.

2. Company fire support officers (FSOs) and platoon FOs are not establishing priority targets with 60-mm and 81-mm mortars along the unit's route.

Techniques

1. FOs and FSOs should establish targets along the unit's route as they template enemy positions and likely ambush sites.

2. As the unit moves along the route, the FO should cancel one target and establish the next target. Use the minimum safe distance of the weapon system designated to signal the shift to a new target.

3. When the unit comes in contact with the enemy, the FO can initiate his priority target or shift from his priority target, placing his fires on or behind the enemy.

4. See "Fast, Accurate Fires in the Close Fight" by LTC David L. Anderson in CALL Newsletter No. 96-4, 2d Qtr, Mar 96, CTC Quarterly Bulletin.

TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 2: Targeting Process

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 1-1: The brigade-level targeting process often lacks focus. It fails to orient collection and supporting fires.

1. Targeting meetings routinely fail to focus combat power to find, fix, and finish critical high-payoff targets (HPTs).

2. Most units do not use the results of targeting meetings to refocus their collection plans or task specific units to confirm or deny named areas of interest.

3. There is often little follow-up on taskings to subordinate units as part of the targeting process.

4. The decide element is being performed adequately, but the execution of detect, deliver, and assess needs great improvement.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 1-2: The battle staff targeting process needs improvement.

1. Intelligence, operations, and fire support personnel do not focus on the targeting process.

2. High-value target (HVT) lists are rarely disseminated to subordinate units.

3. Subordinate units who received the HVT lists did not use them to produce high-payoff target (HPT) lists during the target planning process.

4. Meetings did not occur on a regular basis; S-2s did not present the current enemy situation.

5. S-2s conduct insufficient enemy analysis during the "decide" phase of the process. RESULTS: The detect phase of the targeting process is not clearly focused; therefore, the delivery phase is inadequate due to prior flaws in the targeting process.

Techniques

1. The targeting process must become a routine action managed by the brigade XO or S-3.

• Use the commander's intent to focus on finding, fixing, and finishing the enemy.

• "Decide, Detect Deliver, Assess" is a continuous process that must be understood and integrated by all brigade task force BOS members.

2. Incorporate the targeting process into battle staff training.

3. Ensure that the appropriate personnel prepare for and attend targeting meetings. Staff should be prepared as follows:

• S-2 should present:

  • Analysis of current enemy situation.

  • The current high-value targets (HVTs).

  • A recommended list of high-payoff targets (HPTs).

• S-3 should:

  • Present the current friendly situation.

  • Describe future operations.

• At the conclusion: S-3 cuts a FRAGO.

4. FSO/targeting officer coordination:

• Work closely with the S-2 to develop HPTs.

• Continually coordinate with all brigade elements for the most accurate, up-to-date information for proposed targets.

5. Doctrinal reference: FM 6-20-10, The Targeting Process.

TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 3: Automated Fire Planning

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 3-1: Although units consistently maintain digital communications, they rarely fully exploit the capabilities of the LTACFIRE/IFSAS system.

1. Few units use the LTACFIRE/IFSAS to manage targets, conduct fire planning, and conduct tactical fire direction.

2. Too many units have inexperienced operators.

3. Too often the unit chain of command fails to enforce use of the system.

4. Even units with excellent TACFIRE SOPs too often fail to follow the SOP.

RESULT:

1. Fire plans are not disseminated or fired.

2. Inefficient use of resources.

3. Failure to meet the commander's attack criteria.

Techniques

1. Exploit the system. Ensure that both operators and leaders fully understand the capabilities of the system.

2. Establish effective LTACFIRE/IFSAS sustainment training at Home Station, using realistic and demanding operational scenarios.

TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 4: Failure to Adjust Fires

4QFY96
1QFY97
2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 4-1: Too many forward observers (FOs) initiate calls for fire using non-doctrinal, incomplete formats. EXAMPLE: calling in a grid location and nothing more.

RESULT: Critical loss of time as the firing unit must then request target size, description, and direction.

Techniques

1. Fire support NCOs and officers must train FO teams IAW FM 6-30, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire, Chapter 4.

2. All members of the battalion FSE must know the proper call for fire format and the six elements required to properly initiate a voice fire mission.

3. FIST training should include radio rehearsals and use of the TSFO; emphasize proper call-for-fire formats.

4. Ensure soldiers understand the necessity of providing the fire direction center with accurate and proper information the first time to increase mission processing times and ensure faster rounds on target.

TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 5: Call for Fires

4QFY96
1QFY97
2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 5-1: (Repeat of Problem 4-1).

TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 6: Use of (GPS) Receiver (PLGR)

4QFY96
1QFY97
2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 6-1: During the LIC and deliberate attack, most FOs turn their PLGRs off or leave them in the continuous mode while moving.

RESULT: When the lead element of the platoon makes contact, the FO is unable to utilize the PLGR to immediately and accurately determine the target location.

Techniques

1. Ensure that the PLGR is turned on and in the continuous mode.

2. Use it upon contact to send the FO's present location and initiate a fire mission utilizing the polar plot call for fire.

3. Implement the Techniques described in "The PLGR: Techniques and Procedures Forward Observers Can Use To Bring Rapid, Accurate Indirect Fires to the Close Fight," CALL Newsletter No. 96-10, 4th Qtr, Oct 96, CTC Quarterly Bulletin.

4. Reference: TM 11-5825-29-13.

TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 7: Use of Fire Control Teams

4QFY96
1QFY97
2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 7-1: Many units come to JRTC with little or no knowledge of how to employ fire control teams (FCTs).

1. Most units do not train with the FCTs at Home Station. They train with them for the first time when they arrive at the ISB.

2. Most maneuver commanders do not adequately understand the employment capabilities of FCTs.

Techniques

1. Attach the FCT to a rifle company or a scout platoon to provide responsive naval gun fires as well as a terminal close air support (CAS) control capability at the company or platoon level. This technique works well when there are limited fire support assets available (for example, during initial insertion or when operating forward of field artillery and/or mortar ranges).

2. Treat the FCTs independently during reconnaissance operations. Assign the FCT a named area of interest (NAI) or some other area in which to operate. This gives the maneuver commander more sets of eyes forward to cover more area. This forward employment requires detailed planning for communications, resupply, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), and potential extraction/exfiltration of the FCTs when they operate independently and far and/or forward.

TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 8: Q36 Operation

4QFY96
1QFY97
2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 8-1: Field artillery planners too often do not have an adequate understanding of the firefinder radar system to successfully plan and then execute using the system. Too often the targeting technician, the firefinder subject matter expert, is not consulted about employment considerations beyond site selection until after the battle has begun. Many field artillery tactical operations centers (TOCs) tend to expect more from the radar than the system can actually deliver.

RESULT:

1. Units lose critical time and miss key opportunities trying to execute unrealistic plans.

2. The lack of planning and execution knowledge hampers unit planning for future operations.

Techniques

1. Conduct extensive Home-Station training with the system so that both operators and planners understand and accept the system's capabilities and limitations.

2. At Home Station, conduct tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) terrain walks to highlight the unique requirements of the system, i.e., optimum mask angles, positioning considerations, and the effects of vegetation and terrain.

3. Make the targeting technician an integral member of the field artillery battalion staff. Bring the targeting technician into the planning process early.

4. Conduct professional development classes for both officers and NCOs at Home Station. Gauge the level of detail to the target audience.

TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 9: Howitzer Range Cards

4QFY96
1QFY97
2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 9-1: Too many firing batteries either have no howitzer range card or only a partially completed one. Frequently, howitzer range cards do not contain direct fire targets or data for antipersonnel (APERS) ammunition or Killer Junior.

Techniques

1. Battery leadership should inspect howitzer range cards during precombat checks and inspections to ensure the range card is done to standard.

2. Reinforce the value of the direct fire range card for howitzer engagements.

3. Doctrinal references: FM 6-50, 23 December 1996, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Cannon Battery, Chapter 3, p. 3-12.

TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 10: Out-of-Traverse/6,400-mil missions

4QFY96
1QFY97
2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 10-1: Firing units often experience difficulty executing out-of-traverse missions.

1. Executive officers (XOs) too often fail to derive the minimum quadrant elevation (QE) for each octant.

2. Fire direction centers (FDCs) often fail to compute terrain gun position corrections (TGPCs) for each octant.

3. Often howitzer section equipment, such as the prime mover and/or camouflage netting, prohibits true 6,400-mil capability.

4. Howitzer sections routinely do not emplace their aiming posts correctly.

5. Lack of aiming reference points and pick-up displacement for all possible azimuths further inhibits crews from executing out-of-traverse/6,400-mil missions.

6. Gunners and section chiefs are not comfortable using aiming posts to pick up displacement.

7. Units are not using distant aiming points (DAPs) despite their availability.

RESULT: Slow fire mission response times, particularly when responding to counter fire missions.

Techniques

1. Doctrinal references: FM 6-40, 23 April 1996, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery; FM 6-50, 23 December 1996, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery; and the appropriate howitzer -10.

2. Ensure the XO and FDC understand the requirements necessary for the conduct of out-of-traverse missions, especially setting up the chart in the FDC to facilitate 6,400 mils.

3. Ensure howitzer sections are trained on how to position their alternate aiming reference points and are completely proficient at picking up displacement.

4. Frequently rehearse out-of-traverse dry fire missions in each octant to ensure the firing unit is capable of providing fast, accurate fires.

5. Ensure all unit equipment is positioned to facilitate 6,400-mil operations.

TA.2 Needs Emphasis Trend 11: Accuracy of Mortars

4QFY96
1QFY97
2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 11-1: Fire support officers (FSOs) are not providing timely meteorological (MET) data or coordinating for survey (declination) support for the task force's organic mortars. The mortar platoons and sections are not aggressively conducting registrations as a means to improve their accuracy.

Techniques

1. The battalion FSO should coordinate with the FA battalion S-3 to get meteorological (MET) messages (computer MET if the unit is using the mortar ballistic computer) and survey support. Include the maneuver task force in the FA battalion's priorities of survey support (with the priority going to the main effort task force).

2. The FSO, with the maneuver task force S-3, should establish which units register the mortars and should ensure that this tasking is included in the operations order.

Section N - Needs Emphasis, Part II

Section N - Needs Emphasis, Part IV