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TA.1 Needs Emphasis Trend 1: Direct Fire Planning

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 1-1: Improper terrain analysis and inadequate understanding of how the enemy plans to fight leads to poor direct fire planning. There is little synchronization of direct, indirect, and obstacle plans in the defense, and fire control discipline needs improvement.

RESULT: Units are not positioning weapons to effectively engage and destroy targets.

Techniques

1. Leaders at the platoon and company level must conduct their own IPB to determine where to kill the enemy before they position their weapons.

2. Leaders must understand the terrain and anticipate the enemy's most probable course of action.

3. Develop and sustain the basic skills essential to direct fire planning (aiming stakes, range cards, sector sketches, and basic fire control measures, TRPs, maximum engagement lines, trigger lines and fire commands).

4. Rehearsals are key to synchronizing fires with the obstacle plan.

5. CALFEXs build soldier confidence in his weapon and provide real-time feedback on the integration of direct and indirect fires on a target.

6. References: FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, and FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion.

TA.1 Needs Emphasis Trend 2: Actions on Contact

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 1-2: Units continue to perform poorly in the first moments of contact with enemy units. General problems include an initial hesitation to react, failure to establish a base of fire sufficient to prevent the enemy from maneuvering to a flank, and failure to include indirect fire assets in the response.

RESULT:

1. Many contacts result in several friendly casualties and an enemy who escapes unscathed.

2. Soldiers' execution of individual movement and marksmanship wins the day in the close fight.

Technique

Review CALL Newsletter No. 97-17, Sep 97, NTC Trends Compendium; refer to "Actions on Contact."

TA.1 Needs Emphasis Trend 3: Force Protection

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 1-4: Aviation units commit fratricides on an average of three incidents per rotation.

1. Lack of an effective friendly recognition signal.

2. Lack of a clear understanding of the rules of engagement.

3. Failure to properly identify friendly vehicles.

Techniques

1. Units must take every precaution and develop effective plans to reduce the risk of fratricide.

2. References:

• CALL Newsletter No. 92-4, Apr 92, Fratricide: Reducing Self-Inflicted Losses.

• CALL Newsletter No. 95-9, Jun 95, Risk Management for Brigades and Battalions. (Both publications are good references for developing fratricide prevention SOPs.)

• JRTC video: Air/Ground Coordination.

TA.1 Needs Emphasis Trend 4: Engage Enemy

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 1-5: Units do not prepare range cards to standard. Most range cards are missing critical information: FPL, dead space, TRP, direction and elevation information, etc.

RESULT: Poor interlocking fires between positions and gaps in defensive sectors.

Techniques

1. Leaders must enforce use of range cards in all defensive and security positions.

2. Use a standardized acetate-covered range card format for every weapon in the platoon.

3. References: STP 7-11BCHM Task No. 071-312-3307, p. 3-260; FM 7-8, The Infantry Platoon and Squad (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger), Chapter 2, pp. 2-76 to 2-78.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 1-6: Units are unable to execute the find, fix, and finish methodology against a quick-hitting and elusive enemy. Although most company commanders can provide a correct doctrinal definition of mutual support, few are able to translate the concept into the appropriate time/distance relationship between elements on the ground. The platoons continually make contact with their nearest supporting element a kilometer or more away.

RESULTS:

1. Engagements tend to last seconds/minutes whereas the movements of supporting elements require minutes/hours to execute.

2. Most commanders employ either a linear scheme of maneuver with two or three platoons abreast or a decentralized independent platoon/squad search technique.

3. Once contact is made, both of these Techniques rely on the rapid movement of supporting elements to converge on and fix the enemy.

4. Units find it difficult, if not impossible, to overcome the mobility factor: the enemy moves as fast or faster than you do.

Techniques

1. The decisive point technique executed at the company level (outlined in CALL Newsletter No. 97-8, Feb 97, Search and Attack! Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) applies the "hammer and anvil" approach. One platoon forms the fix (anvil) element by establishing ambushes along likely lines of drift into and out of the search zone. The remaining two platoons (hammer) search the zone, sweeping enemy forces toward the ambushes.

2. References: CALL Newsletter No. 97-8, Feb 97, Search and Attack! Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, pp. II-9 to II-10; FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, pp. 4-14 to 4-19; FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion (Infantry, Airborne, and Air Assault), pp. 3-18 to 3-23.

Section N - Needs Emphasis, Part I

Section N - Needs Emphasis, Part III