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TA. 5 INTELLIGENCE

TA.5 Needs Emphasis Trend 1: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Process and Application

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 1-1: Aviation S-2s are generally not familiar with all the steps of the IPB process and the importance of IPB products to the military decision-making process (MDMP) and subsequent mission execution. S-2s produce the initial products required by defining the battlefield environment and describing the battlefield effects, but do not integrate these products with the rest of the staff during the decision-making process.

1. S-2s too often fail to integrate initial IPB products (MCOO, etc.) into the MDMP.

2. S-2s normally produce only one situational template based on the enemy's most probable course of action.

3. After the unit begins executing a mission, S-2s do not continuously and appropriately update IPB products; instead, they tend to focus solely on the situation map.

RESULT:

1. Too often the enemy's most dangerous course of action is ignored.

2. The battle staff lacks the necessary enemy COAs to viably conduct wargaming.

3. Battlefield information is not sufficiently analyzed and products that should result from such analysis either are not produced, or, if produced, not distributed in time to subordinate element commanders.

4. Doctrinal reference: FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 1-2: S-2s understand threat capabilities, doctrine, and effects of the battlefield, but often do not translate this baseline knowledge into clear and complete depictions of enemy COAs. S-2s are always confronted by limited planning time.

RESULT:

1. Commanders and their planning staffs are not being presented with timely situation templates (SITTEMP), descriptions of enemy COAs based on friendly plans, or listings of HVTs.

2. Some products prepared are incomplete.

Techniques

1. The S-2 must become familiar with the IPB process and its integration into the MDMP.

2. Home-Station training: use the battalion XO to conduct MDMP training with the battle staff. Emphasize the IPB process and integrate IPB products into the entire process.

3. Review Chapter 2 of FM 34-130, July 1994, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

4. Successful S-2s operate under time constraints but focus on presenting the staff and commander with a complete SITTEMP, as a minimum. The S-2 can reduce the other elements of a complete enemy COA to bullet notes or brief them.

TA.5 Needs Emphasis Trend 2: Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Plan Development

4QFY96
1QFY97

PROBLEM 2-1: Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) planning and collection management are two related areas that are consistently weak.

1. S-2s do not identify the critical elements of information.

2. R&S plans are often unfocused.

3. S-2s are often unprepared to serve as the battalion and brigade collection managers.

• Unfamiliar with the collection management process.

• Do not know the capabilities and limitations of the available collection systems.

PROBLEM 2-2:Intelligence fails to identify critical elements in the R&S plan to help fully develop the targeting process. S-2s frequently do not provide focused input to targeting meetings.

Techniques

1. S-2s have responsibilities during all four phases (Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess) of the continuous targeting process.

2. Support the "Decide" phase:

• Identify enemy high-value targets (HVTs) during targeting meetings.

• Recommend high-payoff targets (HPTs).

• Brief the status of available collection systems.

3. Support the "Detect" and "Deliver" phases. Estimate when HPTs will be within range of friendly delivery systems by using an event template.

4. Support the "Assess" phase. Recommend collection assets.

5. Use leaders from supporting MI companies and battalions to provide subject matter experts for training battalion and brigade staffs on the capabilities, limitations, and employment considerations of military intelligence collection systems.

6. References:

• FM 34-130, 8 July 1994, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, Chapters 1 and 2.

  • How the IPB process helps identify specific collection needs.

  • How intelligence collection supports the staff estimate process.

• FM 34-2, 8 March 1994, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning. Provides a review of collection management's basic tenets.

• FM 34-2-1, 19 June 1991, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance, and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance.
  • Basis for R&S planning and execution.

  • A review of basic doctrinal references.

7. Accurate BDA tracking is key to the "Decide" phase of follow-on targeting meetings. The staff must decide to attack targets again or shift assets to other targets.

8. Reference FM 6-20-10, 29 March 1990, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process, Appendix A.

TA.5 Needs Emphasis Trend 3: S-2 Analysis and Reporting

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 3-1: The breakdown of Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) into specific information requirements, serious incident reports (SIRs), and dissemination of indicators; and reporting criteria for specific orders and requests (SORs) to deployed assets are two key weaknesses.

RESULT:

1. Critical reports needed for the decision-making process do not reach the S-2 in a timely manner and are often historical.

2. Critical information regarding enemy timelines, threat situation, and target composition/disposition are not consistently pushed down by the S-2 and the analysis and control team.

3. Predictive analysis is rarely attempted. SALUTE reports are generated and passed to the brigade S-2, but with little analysis.

Techniques

1. The commander should review SIR and SOR as a part of his mission backbriefs from subordinate leaders.

2. The military intelligence (MI) company team commander should require signal intelligence (SIGINT), traffic analysis (TA) team, and human resource intelligence (HUMINT) analysts to produce a summary of activity every 12 hours.

3. Team leaders and above need to review FM 34-3, Intelligence Analyst, to clearly understand their responsibilities concerning the breakdown of priority PIR into SIR/SOR and subsequent indicators.

TA.5 Needs Emphasis Trend 4: Effective Use of Assets

2-3QFY97

PROBLEM 4-1: Analysis Control Team (ACT) asset is poorly managed and utilized.

1. The ACT has difficulty executing all-source analysis in support of the brigade.

2. Soldiers are unsure of their role in the ACT and the function of their section of the TOC.

3. Shift changeovers are not conducted smoothly or with a focus toward the incoming shift.

4. Lack of an ACT "battle rhythm" hinders most sections from producing products the S-2 could use if presented in a timely manner.

RESULT:

1. Predictive analysis is rarely attempted. SALUTE reports are generated and passed to brigade, but with little analysis.

2. Soldiers are completely unfamiliar with the all-source analysis system and its capabilities.

3. Junior analysts work well with the S-2, but do not routinely execute "reverse battlefield operating systems (BOS) IPB" with other members of the battle staff.

4. A 24-hour operation suffers without a proper sleep plan and so does the staff brief associated with shift changeover. These staff changeovers disrupt "battle rhythm" necessary for battle tracking and tempo of operations.

PROBLEM 4-2: Just as it is critical to integrate all task force elements, hospital and clinical staffs must not be left out. Because of location and separation of functions, information flow between hospital elements and the tactical operations center (TOC) is limited.

RESULT:

1. Hospital staff, who often obtain intelligence information from casualties, cannot pass this information to the S-2.

2. Clinical personnel are not usually incorporated into operational planning and, therefore, cannot anticipate or forecast upcoming demands on the hospital system.

Techniques

1. Conduct weekly training with the analysis control element (ACE) to increase soldier knowledge and future use of all-source analysis system (ASAS).

2. The ASAS can be used to assist with radio line-of-sight (RLOS) planning, threat database, upkeep, and graphic intelligence summaries, only a few of its uses.

3. Utilize ACE-generated reports to update the brigade S-2 on developments outside the area of operations (AO) but within the area of interest (AI) to familiarize him with the capabilities.

4. Integrate the ACT into the brigade TOC set-up, preferably between the S-3 and S-2, and update the company SOP, clearly outlining the tasks of the ACT.

5.Commanders need to force-integrate all staff and task force elements prior to deployment in order to develop a task force focus on arrival.

6. S-2s need to develop within the unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) a system that allows for the reporting of information taken from casualties and the processing of that information.

Section P - Positive Performance

Section N - Needs Emphasis, Part II