MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS & NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC)
(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)
TREND 1: Design and integration of obstacles.
1. Obstacle groups typically lack density and integration with direct and indirect fires.
2. During the defense, many assistant task force (TF) engineers (A/TFE) do not develop a complete Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA). The EBA usually focuses on friendly engineer capabilities, often omitting the impact of terrain or the enemy breaching capability.
3. While the TF commander's intent is understood, the A/TFE does not develop an obstacle group design based on the resource planning factors and the width of the avenue of approach (AA).
4. Obstacles are not designed to defeat enemy breaching assets. Designs do not use combinations of "more-visible" and "unseen" obstacles in each group to manipulate the enemy's maneuver in the desired direction.
5. The A/TFE's countermobility timeline does not consider emplacing obstacles during the day versus night based on enemy recon in sector.
6. Many TFs do not array obstacles with sufficient depth.
7. The company/team fire plans do not effectively integrate direct and indirect fires to support the obstacle group design.
1. Obstacles are rapidly bypassed or reduced by enemy engineers.
2. The TF does not achieve the intended obstacle effect of DISRUPT, FIX, TURN, or BLOCK on the enemy formation.
1. Tactical obstacle design should be based on the formation of the attacking enemy and intended obstacle effect.
2. Initial design and array of each obstacle group should incorporate the commander's intent, the resource planning factor (RF), and the total width of the AA.
3. Determine the total quantity of standard minefields required to achieve the intended effect using the obstacle group design calculation shown below. Other anti-vehicular obstacles such as AT ditch or 11-row concertina roadblock can substitute for up to 20% of the standard minefields in a group. Situational obstacles such as VOLCANO, MOPMS, or ADAMS-RAAMS can be planned as part of the groups or used to reinforce an AA based on a new threat. By understanding the task and purpose of fires for each obstacle group design, all units can achieve the intended obstacle effect of DISRUPT, TURN, FIX, or BLOCK on the enemy's formation.
(TA.6.2.2 Emplace Obstacles)
TREND 2: Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) area security.
1. UMCPs routinely do not establish basic security, from initial occupation of the UMCP through construction of individual fighting positions.
2. There is little uniformity in the way UMCPs occupy or establish their area.
3. Individual soldiers are rarely oriented on defensive positions or where each individual goes when directed to defend.
1. BMOs must develop SOPs that provide for security while moving and halted.
2. UMCPs must rehearse occupation of the UMCP area.
3. UMCP NCOs must utilize all available personnel and equipment at the UMCP for security.
4. M1/M2 crews waiting on vehicle repairs should be assigned security duties by the UMCP NCOIC while the mechanics work on their vehicle:
- Dig in UMCP fighting positions.
- Take an active role in the UMCP security plan.
(TA.188.8.131.52 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND 3: Security in the field trains.
PROBLEM: Field trains security plans are inadequate.
a. Field trains security is not planned and integrated within the brigade support area (BSA).
b. Units generally do not address security in the priorities of work when establishing the field trains as part of the BSA.
c. The security plan is not developed, disseminated, or rehearsed.
1. The HHC commander, 1SG, and XO must take a proactive role in establishing field trains security.
2. The security plan must be coordinated with the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) and integrated into the BSA defense plan.
3. Security of the field trains must be addressed in the unit's priorities of work.
4. Troop Leading Procedures (TLPs) must be executed by the field trains leadership.
(TA.184.108.40.206 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND 4: (LTP) Brigade fratricide risks during brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations.
1. Brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) is poorly supervised by the S3.
2. Too many brigades view the R&S effort as a secondary or separate planning effort.
3. Brigades can have 15 to 20 soldiers infiltrating or air inserted throughout the depth of the brigade's area of operations. Task force (TF) scouts can add an additional 20 to 30 soldiers operating in the same general areas.
4. Brigade S3 sections seldom practice battle space management.
1. Poor supervision of the brigade's R&S effort exposes our soldiers to high-risk, friendly fire conditions.
2. Brigades expose their scouts, COLTs, and ETACs to potential fratricide incidents.
3. Every unknown, unsupervised, or poorly-planned insertion of a surveillance asset exponentially increases the potential for disaster.
Techniques: R&S efforts are operational missions and intrinsically high-risk in nature. R&S planning and execution requires the knowledge, experience, and supervision of the primary maneuver BOS representative.
- R&S plans should not be a separate planning effort.
- As with all maneuver operations, develop and issue graphics, adequate control measures, and unit locations to all subordinate units involved in the operation.
- Brigade and subordinate units must exchange their plans and graphics and ensure assigned soldiers are instructed in higher and adjacent unit activities and locations of other units operating in their areas.
- The brigade operations section must review subordinate plans and identify potential BOS problems supporting the operation. Deconflict C2 and maneuver problems and notify BOS representatives of CS and CSS problems. The operations section must follow up on BOS representative solutions to problem areas.
- The brigade operations section must practice battle space management. Current operations section must track current unit movement, activities, and locations and provide FSE accurate information to clear fires.
(TA.220.127.116.11 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND 5: Integration of air and ground operations during security missions.
1. The aviation unit's friendly situational awareness of the ground maneuver elements is usually lacking, particularly the front line ground trace, COLT and scout locations, and artillery firing positions.
2. Ground observation plans and aviation observation plans are not integrated or synchronized to enhance each other's capabilities and provide mutually supporting OP positions. 3. The aviation limit of advance (LOA) is often tied to the ground maneuver LOA, which limits aviation's early warning capability.
4. Although aviation usually makes first contact with enemy forces in security missions, they seldom have priority of fires.
5. The ground commander too often fails to identify the decisive point for his engagement, causing aviation forces to piecemeal their assets to meet the continuous security requirements defined by the ground maneuver commander.
1. Early direct involvement in the planning process along with joint rehearsals will correct the friendly situational awareness issue.
2. Aviation units should have priority of fires in security missions.
3. The LOA for aviation must be forward of the ground LOA.
- Aviation's maneuverability and flexibility allows them to move well forward while still maintaining survivability.
- The forward LOA for aviation along with priority of fires will increase the reaction time and maneuver space for the protected force.
4. In order to support extended security mission requirements, aviation commanders must learn to stagger their crews and integrate dismounted OP positions.
5. Aviation commanders must know the ground maneuver commander's decisive point in his plan in order to surge aviation assets to meet the objective.
(TA.6.3.2 Employ Operations Security)
TREND 6: Security Operations.
1. HMMWV scout platoons do not contribute significantly to security operations.
2. HMMWV scouts have very limited night viewing capability when compared to M1 tanks and Bradleys and no ability to destroy anything that they do observe.
1. Scouts often prevent the TF from being successful in security operations by confusing the "shooters" on identification of enemy vehicles, especially beyond 1200 meters. Enemy recon targets are often observed by scouts for only 3 to 5 minutes, which is not enough time to accurately vector a direct fire killing system onto it.
2. Similar looking vehicles, such as HMMWVs and BRDMs, operating in the same area, create confusion.
3. Scouts behind "shooters" cannot see as far as the "shooter's" systems.
1. Security operations should be given to company/teams alone.
2. Scouts contribute more to the defense by establishing observation posts (OPs) behind the security force that enable the TF to track the enemy through the sector and call accurate and timely indirect fires on him while the TF is in the direct fire fight.
3. Screening involves destruction within capabilities, and scouts are limited to destruction with indirect fire.
(TA.6.3.4 Provide Counter Reconnaissance, Security and Readiness)
Air Defense BOS
Combat Service Support BOS
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