TA.7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Positive Performance
TREND 1: Unit-level maintenance procedures. Units are successful in maintaining operational readiness rates well above 90 percent during their JRTC rotations. This is due to the maintenance focus of the unit commanders, maintenance officers, and platoon sergeants. The maintenance managers do a very good job of balancing their maintenance requirements with their tactical requirements. The positive attitude of the aircraft mechanics and crewchiefs are generally reinforced by the unit leadership and aircrews taking the time to assist in maintenance operations.
(TA
7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)
TREND 2: Preventive medical support. Preventive medicine detachments are improving in their provision of area support. They are actively interacting with the rotational brigade as well as the units within the base cluster.
(TA
7.4.1 Distribute)
TREND 3: Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) operations. The evacuation liaison team (ELT) accompanying the forward support MEDEVAC team (FSMT) continues to be a success in solving the command, control and communications (C3) problems which historically hinder the FSMT. The ELT provides the personnel and communications equipment necessary to establish proper control and liaison for the FSMT. The ELT is capable of coordinating all ground and nonstandard air evacuation casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) for the brigade. The ELT provides the ability to have MEDEVAC representation at key planning and rehearsal meetings. The single, most-important contribution of the ELT has been its ability to establish and maintain a dedicated casualty evacuation control net.
(TA
7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)
TREND 4: Brigade use of a brigade evacuation liaison team (BELT) to coordinate and prioritize aerial evacuation assets. The use of the BELT during medical evacuation operations to coordinate aviation assets gives the medical company tremendous capability. The BELT must be located in a position to allow the CINC medical evacuation to utilize their capabilities and communicate priorities. The BELT must be part of the planning process and have access to a detailed casualty estimate. Reference: FM 8-10-6, Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.
(TA
7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)
TREND 5: Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) operations. CASEVAC operations were a positive trend this quarter due in part to emphasis on certified combat lifesavers at the squad and team levels. In addition, the platoons brought highly skilled medics.
(TA
7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)
TREND 6: Flexibility and willingness to learn. The majority of the Military Police (MP) platoons possessed a terrific attitude and strong desire to learn new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) as well as practice old ones. Most platoons possessed tremendous flexibility and confidence which contributed to outstanding mission success.
(TA
7.4.5 Train Tactical Units and Personnel)
TREND 7: Use of through-put and rotary-wing assets for Class IV and V distribution in the defense. The use of ground and air assets in distribution of defensive barriers material is key in reducing double handling. The utilization of through-put from the division support areas (DSA) via ground and air helps to relieve some of the timing issues, as well as free up some of the brigade's limited transportation assets. The use of through-put must be synchronized with the ground tactical plan and the obstacle plan. The aerial assets are best utilized in conjunction with ground transportation concentrating on delivery of tactical obstacle packages early and transitioning to protective packages as the company and battalion positions become identified. A highly successful technique is to palletize tactical barrier packages on Palletized Load System (PLS) flatracks to be sling-loaded forward to the Class IV/V distribution points. Upon arrival at the distribution points, utilize the PLS prime movers and forklifts to break bulk. Reference: FM 100-10, Combat Service Support, Chapter 2.
(TA
7.5.1.2.2 Move by Air)
TREND 8: Sustainment operations. Historically, sustainment operations are a positive trend at JRTC. This sustainment begins with the initial coordination before deployment and continues through the actual operational sustainment during the rotation. The platoon sergeant shoulders the bulk of the sustainment operation to include all classes of supply and personnel. Unit success can be attributed to the platoon sergeant's knowledge of the supply system and rapport with the supported brigade.
(TA
7.5.2 Supply the Force)
TREND 1: Patient evacuation.
PROBLEM: Units are unable to quickly load and unload ground and air ambulances to standard upon arrival at JRTC.
Techniques:
1. Commanders need to drill personnel in the loading and unloading techniques for all types of air and ground vehicles while at Home Station.
2. All unit personnel should be trained in litter team techniques in the event that rotating rosters have to be established for on-call litter team duty.
3. Reference: FM 8-10-6, Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, provides instruction on litter team techniques and standards for both air and ground evacuation vehicles.
(TA
7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)
TREND 2: Preventive medicine.
PROBLEMS:
1. Units continue to routinely fail to leave proper distances between latrines and food service facilities.
2. They fail to establish handwashing facilities immediately upon site occupation.
Technique: FM 21-10-1, Unit Field Sanitation Team, provides all the standards concerning construction, emplacement, and requirements for latrines and handwashing devices.
(TA
7.4.4.3 Provide Preventive Medicine)
TREND 3: Live-fire use of hand grenades and AT-4s.
PROBLEMS:
1. Limited exposure by soldiers to live hand grenades and AT-4s has a direct and obvious impact on the effectiveness of their use.
2. The Expert Infantryman's Badge (EIB) standard of putting an AT-4 into operation is almost always done well. It is the aiming and actual firing of the missle with which soldiers struggle.
3. Soldiers almost never adjust the sights on the AT-4 from the factory settings.
RESULTS:
1. Soldiers are very hesitant to throw the live grenades in anything but a very structured, range-type situation. Soldiers will consistently throw one in ten hand grenades short because of a lack of training.
2. The same is true with the use of the AT-4.
3. This leads to the missile being fired high on almost every instance. The situation becomes even worse when conducting night operations with AT-4s.
Technique: A review of FM 23-25, Light Anti-Armor Weapons, Chapter 6, talks about how to effectively employ anti-armor weapon systems at night.
(TA
7.4.5 Train Tactical Units and Personnel)
TREND 4: Limited visibility operations.
PROBLEMS:
1. Units are not enforcing the use of night-vision devices (NVDs). The number of night-vision devices that the typical platoon or company has is usually adequate, but soldiers are hesitant to put them into operation.
2. Units, such as those stationed in Alaska, have a unique training challenge in to how to conduct limited visibility training while incorporating night-vision devices, but they are the exception.
RESULTS:
1. In addition to the normal night-vision goggles, soldiers are not aware that they can use flashlights in specific situations.
2. Across-the-board limited visibility training is deficient and it shows.
Technique: Units should take every opportunity, including Home Station training, to use NVDs. Procedures for use of flashlights and other illumination should be specifically addressed in the unit SOP.
(TA
7.4.5 Train Tactical Units and Personnel)
TREND 5: Setup of the dismount point.
PROBLEM: Units fail to provide shelter near the dismount point for use by civilians on the battlefield (COB). This shelter should provide protection from weather and comfort items such as coffee and water. It also provides an area for noncombatants to go to while gate guards get guidance or escort personnel.
Technique: FM 8-10, Health Services Support in a Theater of Operations, Chapter 3, Section IV, and FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, Chapter 4, Section II, provide guidance on the laws of land warfare concerning health service support.
(TA
7.6.1 Perform Rear Area Restoration)
TREND 6: Enemy prisoner-of-war operations.
PROBLEMS:
1. Doctrinally, Military Police (MP) are responsible for the proper handling, processing, safeguarding, and reporting of all enemy prisoner of war/civilian internees. Due to limited MP assets, the brigades, at times, do not require the MP platoon to conduct enemy prisoner-of-war/civilian internee (EPW/CI) operations.
2. The brigades do not maintain and forward the required forms (DD Form 629, Receipt of Prisoner or Detained Person; DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document; and DA Form 5976, Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag or local equivalent) for EPW/CI accountability.
RESULTS:
1. The MI company performs the mission assisted by the forward support battalion (FSB), and the brigade fails to provide the division with the required information, logs, and status reports on EPW/CI.
2. Proper controls and accountability for EPW/CI are not followed.
Techniques:
1. Military Police must be involved in EPW/CI operations. If there are other operational requirements for the MP platoon, it is advisable to require at least MP supervision/advisement over the processing and reporting.
2. The platoon should enforce the guidelines for processing EPW/CI IAW the company and division TACSOP. References: FM 19-4, Military Police Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, Enemy Prisoner of War, and STP 19-95B1-SM (Task No. 191-376-4101).
(TA
7.7.1 Perform PW Operations)
TREND 7: Civilians on the Battlefield (COB).
PROBLEMS:
1. Most units are unfamiliar/untrained in dealing with civilians on the battlefield. This ranges from the unnecessary use/display of force to permitting civilians free access to the position area and allowing them to disrupt unit activities.
2. Another common occurrence is for the unit to call battalion for guidance whenever civilians show up at the perimeter. Frequently, the battalion takes an inordinate amount of time to decide what it wants the unit to do with civilians.
RESULTS:
1. These actions unnecessarily anger friendly/neutral civilians and allow neutral/anti-U.S. civilians a significant opportunity to collect valuable intelligence (where the C2nodes are, possible targets for terrorist activities, etc.).
2. Frequently, terrorists will gain unobstructed access to a battery and will destroy the BOC/FDC or howitzer section through the detonation of a ruck sack or car bomb.
Techniques:
1. Develop and disseminate to the lowest level a "white/gray/black" list of all pro/neutral/anti-civilians and clear, concise guidance of what actions are to be taken with each type of civilian as well as civilians not on any list.
2. Establish clear procedures on what soldiers are to do upon contact with civilians; train and rehearse soldiers on how to deal with COB at Home Station.
(TA 7.9 Evacuate Noncombatants from Area)
TA.6
Mobility/Survivability BOS Narrative & NBC
TA.4
Command and Control BOS Narrative
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