TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS
Positive Performance
TREND 1: Military Intelligence company commander's participation in the brigade battle staff. MI company commanders continue to be aggressive participants in the brigade-driven military decision-making process (MDMP). They take an active role in developing intelligence electronic warfare (IEW) task organization in accordance with the brigade scheme of maneuver. Regular and timely communications between company commanders and members of the battalion staff are critical to the successful synchronization of operations. Units regularly use FM communications and established control measures to allow "on-the-fly" coordination between maneuver elements and staff.
(TA
4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)
TREND 2: The use of digital devices within the battery. Battery fire direction centers (FDCs) are consistently maintaining digital communications with the battalion FDC. They are processing and transmitting fire missions to the gun line using lightweight computer equipment (LCU) gun display unit (GDU) link.
(TA
4.1.1 Communicate Information)
TREND 3: FM communications. Recent rotations have demonstrated an increased improvement in maintaining FM communications over long distances. The proper use of retransmission (retrans) has significantly improved the battalion/task force's ability to maintain C2throughout the battlefield. The apparent emphasis on pre-combat inspections and proper planning in the selection of retrans locations have combined to ensure that the commander can communicate with his unit.
(TA
4.1.1 Communicate Information)
TREND 4: Unit communications. MI soldiers are displaying increased proficiency in the use of FM communications and field expedient antennas. Low-level voice intercept (LLVI) and ground surveillance teams are maximizing the range of SINCGARS radios and continue to use the automated net control devices (ANCD) to standard. Company-level communications specialists (31U) routinely maintain consistent communications with organic multiple subscriber radio telephone (MSRT) and have little problems patching into the mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) network with digital network voice telephones (DNVTs).
(TA
4.1.1.2 Receive and Transmit Enemy Information)
TREND 5: SINCGARS operations. Operator skills with the SINCGARS radio seem to improve every quarter. Frequency-hopping radio nets are now the standard; just a few years ago, many units still used the SINCGARS radio in single-channel mode. PLGR time, the doctrinal standard, has begun to see wide use for net timing, and this has had marked benefits. Operator-level troubleshooting skills have also seen dramatic improvement over the past year. However, net control stations (NCSs) must begin to pay better attention to monitoring the time drift on their master radios and over-the-air rekey (OTAR) procedures. A solid operator certification program at Home Station is the key to SINCGARS operation.
(TA
4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND 6: Improved liaison operations. Heavy team liaison officers (LOs) are deploying with adequate personnel and equipment to conduct 24-hour operations. Heavy team LOs are integrated into the brigade staff and performing duty as a subject matter expert/special staff officer during the MDMP.
(TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND 7: Integration of the chemical cell into the tactical operations center (TOC) at the brigade level. A majority of the NBC cells at brigade level are well integrated into TOC operations and tied into the brigade battle staff's designated battle rhythm. FM 100-5, Operations, and CALL Newsletter No. 95-7, May 95, Tactical Operations Center, provide good information on brigade-level TOC operations.
(TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND 8: Firing battery movement order. The use of the movement order by the battery leadership is being briefed IAW the XO's Handbook, addressing specific and implied tasks. Battery leaders brief movement routes utilizing start points, checkpoints, and release points. When higher HQs do not issue start points, checkpoints, and release points, the battery leadership identifies their own, facilitating movement command and control.
(TA
4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND 9: Medical task force interaction. Interaction with civilians on the battlefield continues to improve. Units that teach Rules of Engagement (ROE) to guard force personnel and continue to emphasize changes to the ROE have favorable outcomes during these scenarios. Flexibility is the key.
(TA
4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)
Needs Emphasis
TREND 1: Use of the chemical officer.
PROBLEMS:
1. In an abundance of rotational units at both brigade and battalion levels, the chemical officer is used as a battle captain and the NCO is used as a TOC NCO or RTO (or a combination of other duties above his NBC duties).
2. In the initial phase of operations this is acceptable, but as the NBC threat escalates, a transition must occur. Chemical personnel must be allowed to execute their duties as the brigade or battalion's NBC expert. Calling chemical personnel after an attack is too late.
RESULT: The chemical personnel are not allowed the time that other battle staff members have been allowed to plan, coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the NBC effort.
Technique: FM 100-5, Operations, and FM 3-100, NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, Smoke and Flame Operations, outline the duties that chemical personnel must accomplish and the processes they must be allowed to accomplish.
(TA
4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)
TREND 2: Collection focus.
PROBLEM: The Military Intelligence company leadership does a poor job in developing IEW specific information requirements (SIR) and special orders and requests (SOR) for dissemination to collection assets.
RESULTS:
1. Teams routinely execute missions with PIR only after limited execution guidance from their chain of command.
2. Soldiers do not understand what their specific collection taskings are.
Technique: MI company leaders must include SIR/SOR backbriefs as part of their standard rehearsal procedure.
(TA
4.1.1.2 Receive and Transmit Enemy Information)
TREND 3: NBC warning and reporting.
PROBLEM: Warning and reporting systems in rotational units are dysfunctional. During chemical attack,s it takes up to one or more hours to receive the initial NBC report with any type of usable information.
RESULT: Chemical personnel often delay taking any type action until this report is received. The key is "don't delay." If the chemical officer has conducted a thorough IPB and a strike has happened in a templated area, he can then start taking some action in response to the attack.
Techniques:
1. A good tool that assists TOCs and chemical personnel in dealing with chemical attacks is the "BATTLE DRILL." This provides focus for everyone in the TOC and causes a pre-selected number of actions to be executed with the chemical officer as the center of focus.
2. One condition of the battle drill is the submission of a NBC 1 report to higher headquarters. The NBC 1 report will provide the chemical officer with the necessary information to identify the hazard that confronts him.
3. FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook, and FM 3-3, Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance, address the required information for a good NBC 1 report.
(TA
4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND 4: Managing communications.
PROBLEM: Command and control rehearsals are often no more than a commander's backbrief, with a poor communication exercise.
RESULT: Neither the communications procedures nor the hardware are properly exercised.
Techniques:
1. A C2rehearsal has key leaders working around a terrain cloth, using either man-pack or remote communications systems. Each key leader should have the correct amount of systems by phase (i.e., the Combat Team 6 might have two SINCGARS RTs and a S/C TACSAT when he assaults, and three SINCGARS RTs and a remote MSRT operating from his C2vehicle). Replicating the C2console and any RETRANS nets are key elements.
2. The remainder of the combat team also participates in the C2rehearsal, but they are away from the terrain cloth. To ensure enough radio assets exist for each net, all nets are established simultaneously.
3. Soldiers who will perform duties at the net control station (NCS) should establish the nets. Soldiers should be prepared to conduct calls for fire and MEDEVAC requests on order at any time during the rehearsal. Critical events, such as passing the battle between the TACs and the TOCs (to include handover of NCS duties and SINCGARS master timing) and changing from the combat aviation net (CAN) to unit command nets should also be rehearsed.
4. The rehearsal exercises the unit's compromise procedures and OTAR. The C2rehearsal should last 24 hours (although the key leaders will only be involved for the first two hours). This allows sufficient time for the SINCGARS NCSs to verify that their RT is not "drifting" excessively.
(TA
4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND 5: Integration of slice elements (communications) at the intermediate staging base.
PROBLEM: Slice element communications are not properly integrated into the combat team at the ISB.
RESULT: Signal planners in the higher headquarters are often unaware of the extensive and unique assets that slice elements bring with them. Slice elements at a typical training center rotation represent a mix of communications configurations and procedures including the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), Air and Naval Gun Fire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), civil affairs and PSYOP teams, the MSE Signal Company, air defense assets, Armor/Mechanized Team, MI Company, and Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE).
Techniques:
1. The higher headquarters should provide a complete set of SOPs to the slice element that includes a one-page "cookbook" highlighting key procedures, drills, and codewords.
2. The signal planner at the higher headquarters should develop a slice integration checklist. The checklist should include an equipment density (by model, i.e., A-model SINCGARS radios), battery requirements, and a communicator PAX density.
3. The signal planner should also coordinate with a slice representative and make an assessment of operator skill level (SINCGARS, MSE, S/C TACSAT, etc.) in the slice, and discuss how doctrinally the slice C2s itself and arrays itself on the battlefield.
4. The final element of successfully integrating slice communications is a solid C2rehearsal. The C2rehearsal de-conflicts frequencies, ensures interoperability of equipment, confirms that slice elements understand the various communications codewords and procedures, and verifies that the combat team's C2architecture is understood. For the signal planner, a successful C2rehearsal indicates that the communications capabilities of the slice elements have been best incorporated into the plan.
(TA
4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND 6: Tactical operations center (TOC) situational awareness.
PROBLEM: Aviation TOCs do not accurately and systematically battle-track their own assets or assets of the brigade.
RESULT: The lack of constant updating of friendly locations makes air-to-ground integration difficult. TOC battle-tracking charts are also not updated, making them useless to commanders for decisionmaking. Logs are poorly maintained without a method to track ongoing, critical, or incomplete entries. Finally, graphics are not constantly updated to reflect the latest changes.
Techniques:
1. The solution to these battle-tracking problems must focus on good unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) and enforcement of those procedures by the TOC NCOs.
2. Reference: CALL Newsletter No. 95-7, May 95, Tactical Operations Center, provides some examples of standardized tracking methods and techniques to improve battle tracking.
(TA
4.1.3 Issue Planning Guidance)
TREND 7: Staff integration and air defense planning.
PROBLEM: Platoon leaders are experiencing difficulty in TOC integration and staff coordination. Often orders are not produced at the platoon level because platoon leaders are not integrated with the battalion staff and the planning process.
RESULT: Air defense teams are often sent to position with very little information and, subsequently, become casualties.
Techniques:
1. Platoon leaders must become familiar with the military decision-making process (MDMP) as outlined in ST 100-9. Effective use of the checklist outlined in ST 100-9 will help generate the necessary products for staff integration as well as aid in the production of warning orders, platoon orders, and necessary fragmentary orders.
2. Effective use of radio telephone operators (RTOs) and platoon sergeants will help the platoon leader plan future operations and execute current operations.
3. Reference: CALL Newsletter No. 95-12, May 97, Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning."
(TA
4.1.3 Issue Planning Guidance)
TREND 8: Communications Security (COMSEC) procedures.
PROBLEMS:
1. When a real or suspected compromise occurs, unit personnel do not have procedures for assessing the impact of the compromise or developing recommendations for the commander.
2. Once a suspected or known compromise occurs, the unit cannot assess the impact.
RESULTS:
1. Units cannot make an informed decision because they do not know what COMSEC was involved.
2. Once a suspected or known compromise occurs, the unit must have a council that is prepared to assess the impact on unit operations.
Techniques:
1. Signal officers need to develop a battle tracking system for COMSEC and net IDs in each radio. This system cannot be static, as elements will tend to change/increase net IDs in their radios as operations expand.
2. At a minimum, the signal officer should be aware of every ANCD on his battlefield and the contents of each ANCD.
3. Once a suspected or known compromise occurs, the unit must have a council that is prepared to assess the impact. This council should include representatives from tactical intelligence and C2. The council determines what was compromised, how the compromise might be exploited by friendly/enemy forces, and the impact of an over-the-air rekey (OTAR) on current/future operations. The council prepares both an assessment of the compromise and a recommendation for the commander. The recommendation may include continued normal operations, continued operations with enemy monitoring, changing net identification (IDs), and a delayed or an immediate OTAR. An ill-advised quick fix for compromises is to change the Julian Date on SINCGARS nets. This should not be an option. This action runs the risk of isolating the unit from assets across boundaries (particularly general support (GS) elements or aviation). Any unit entering the area of operations (AO) or theater after a Julian Date change may be electronically isolated for a period of time.
(TA
4.1.3 Issue Planning Guidance)
TREND 9: Battle tracking and reporting.
PROBLEMS:
1. Commanders habitually have difficulty in making sound, timely decisions due to a lack of available information.
2. Units in contact often delay reporting their situation until well past the point where a decision by the higher echelon could have influenced the battle.
RESULTS:
1. Often the vital piece of information is in possession of the unit, but is not part of the commander's decision process because it was not reported or was lost somewhere in the battle-tracking system.
2. The hesitation to report is compounded by the all-too-frequent disappearance of information within the TOC or TAC.
Technique: A clear, universal understanding of the commander's critical intelligence requirements (CCIRs) and effective information management techniques within TOCs/TACs can greatly reduce the danger of making decisions without the benefit of all the available critical information.
(TA
4.1.3 Issue Planning Guidance)
TREND 10: Initial-entry operations medical care.
PROBLEMS:
1. The brigade S-1, in conjunction with the medical planners, are doing a poor job of making a detailed casualty estimate.
2. This estimate is not in reference to the ground tactical plan and the enemy threat.
Techniques:
1. The brigade S-1, in conjunction with the medical planners, must do a detailed casualty estimate.
2. Once the estimate is complete, the medical planners need to echelon medical support and evacuation assets to meet requirements generated by the estimate.
3. The key to execution of the plan is to utilize the combat health service officer (CHSO) or the Charlie company commander to command and control evacuation and treatment assets. If the CHSO is utilized for the C2role, ensure he/she has the experience to execute and control the plan.
4. Reference: FM 8-10-6, Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.
(TA
4.2.2 Project Future Requirements)
TREND 11: Forecasting requirements in planning.
PROBLEM: The Class VIII system is not well integrated across the battlefield.
Techniques:
1. At the outset of the exercise, medical task force commanders need to ensure integration of the MEDLOB battalion forward distribution team (FDT), the Level III hospital medical supply, and the rotational brigade's Charlie company of the forward support battalion (FSB).
2. The goal should be to ensure that all real-world Class VIII needs are identified and reported in a timely manner.
3. Logistical personnel also need to educate both clinical and administrative personnel regarding the limitations of the Class VIII system during holidays, weekends, and at exercise closure.
4. Forecasting is imperative! FM 8-10, Health Services Support in a Theater of Operations, Annex A, discusses the C2relationship concerning Class VIII in a theater of operations.
(TA
4.2.2 Project Future Requirements)
TREND 12: Brigade battle rhythm.
PROBLEM: Brigade-level organizations have been ineffective in establishing a battle rhythm that maximizes planning time at the subordinate unit level.
RESULT: Commanders and subordinate leaders at all levels have not had the ideal planning time necessary for the planning and execution of orders.
Techniques:
1. Brigades must strive to conduct targeting meetings to direct operations for execution at company level 36 to 48 hours from the time orders and FRAGOS are issued.
2. Brigades must develop a battle rhythm using targeting meetings as the basis to develop the rhythm consistent with the time standards listed above.
(TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND 13: Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).
PROBLEMS:
1. Aviation staffs continue to struggle with the decision-making process.
2. The recent trend depicts staffs that have a very general knowledge of the planning process.
RESULTS:
1. In the JRTC environment, the staffs usually attempt to execute an abbreviated process.
2. However, without a sound understanding of the military decision-making process and continuous updating of products, the staff squanders its most precious resource -- time.
3. When time is short, the first things to be omitted are rehearsals and clear guidance to subordinate commanders.
Techniques:
1. Executive officers, who normally focus on logistical issues, must become the acting chief of staff and fulfill his leadership duties in accordance with (IAW) FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operation.
2. The staff must train the MDMP at Home Station to the point of it being a battle drill. Finally, SOPs must contain procedures for assembling the staff and detailed instructions on conducting an abbreviated planning process.
(TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND 14: Air assault planning and execution.
PROBLEM: Air assault planning and execution are not being performed to standard in accordance with (IAW) FM 1-113, Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations, and FM 90-4, Airmobile Operations.
RESULT: Often one or more phases of the air assault process are neglected during the preparation and planning phases, resulting in poor execution of the air assault.
Techniques:
1. For a successful air assault, the planning process must be centralized with decentralized execution. The initial planning conference (IPC), air mission brief (AMB), and the air crew brief (AB) must be completed to standard and a checklist utilized to achieve maximum success.
2. Leaders at all levels should be reminded that the battalion is the lowest level that possesses the necessary staff and planning assets to execute a successful air assault.
3. Units should review the air assault planning process to ensure they have an adequate understanding of the complete process.
4. Commanders must ensure all leaders are familiar with the air assault process, both current and emerging doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
5. All leaders need to enforce the use of checklists during preparation, planning, and execution and hold all soldiers accountable to the standard heavy LO packages.
(TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND 15: Heavy team integration during low-intensity conflict (LIC) operations.
PROBLEM: During low-intensity combat operations in restrictive terrain, heavy teams are assigned a task/purpose, task organization, and command relationship that fails to maximize their capabilities of mobility, protection, and firepower or provide adequate support for the brigade's movement to contact/search-and-attack operations.
Techniques:
1. Effective armor operations in restrictive terrain require combined arms task organization. Attach light infantry or OPCON aviation assets to heavy teams for operations in restrictive terrain.
2. Task and purpose for armor units should maximize use of available counter-mine equipment (mine plows and rollers, mechanized engineer platoon). FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, lists the following doctrinal missions or operations for heavy teams.
- Open and secure routes
- Conduct Convoy Escort
- Establish Checkpoints
- Deliberate and Instride Breach v Task-organize Bradley or cavalry fighting vehicle platoons or sections to light infantry companies for use as a fixing or finishing force during search and attack operations to maximize the potential of the 25-mm chain gun as a light infantry support weapon.
(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS Narrative
TA.4
Command and Control BOS Narrative, Part II
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