TA.6
MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS &
NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL
(NBC)
Positive Performance
TREND 1: Production of an NBC annex for the brigade orders. This trend has reversed over the last quarter. Brigade chemical cells come through and produce sound NBC annexes where there once were none. NBC annexes to orders are key to ensuring the sound integration of NBC assets and synchronizing the brigade and battalion NBC actions. FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook, is a good reference, and many of the successful units are using it as a basis for their NBC annexes.
(TA
6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND 2: Avenger emplacement. Crews have demonstrated proficiency at operating the Remote Control Unit (RCU) and digging in the Avenger system to increase survivability. FM 44-44, Avenger Platoons, Sections, and Squad Operations, Appendix C, includes an outstanding checklist for Avenger reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position.
(TA
6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND 3: Plotting chemical attacks. Brigade and battalion NBC personnel continually display a firm understanding of the necessary skills required to plot chemical attacks. They possess a keen understanding of manuals such as FM 3-3, Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance, and FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook.
(TA
6.3.2 Employ Operations Security)
TREND 4: Control of lines of communications. Most brigades have recognized that control of ground lines of communication is critical to success in low- to mid-intensity operations. Many are successful in task-organizing for combined arms route clearance and convoy escort operations in accordance with FM 5-7-30, Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Combat Operations.
(TA
6.3.2.1.1 Employ Communications Security)
TREND 5: Smoke operations at the platoon level. The majority of platoons effectively employ large area smoke to cover the target area. Troop-leading procedures are generally utilized, resulting in detailed planning and soldiers being informed on the current mission. References: FM 3-50, Smoke Operations, and FM 3-101-1, Smoke Squad/Platoon Operations.
(TA
6.3.2.2.3 Employ Smoke/Obscurants)
TREND 1: Breaching operations. Heavy teams deploying to JRTC understand breaching fundamentals and tenants.
PROBLEMS:
1. Units continue to poorly execute combined arms breaching of buried minefields in restrictive terrain.
2. Tank crews are not fully trained on the capabilities and proper employment of counter-mine equipment (mine plows and rollers).
Technique: Armor and mechanized units conduct pre-deployment breach training in restrictive terrain using buried minefields detectable only by detonation or with mine-detection equipment.
(TA
6.1.1.1 Breach Obstacles)
TREND 2: Route clearance and mine awareness. Despite some success in predicting minefield locations, units continue to suffer considerable loss due to enemy mines.
PROBLEMS:
1. There is a lack of minefield awareness among leaders and drivers (many vehicles are lost in minefields that have been marked by earlier units).
2. A lack of proficiency in clearing minefields and a general lack of reaction when minefields are reported to the tactical operations center (TOC). Despite an enemy who very predictably caches mines within 300 meters of his minefields and overwatches with infantry, few units see a minefield as an indicator of enemy activity.
RESULTS:
1. Units do not include minefield locations into their targeting process or commit maneuver forces based on the presence of mines.
2. Enemy forces regularly reseed minefields that are detected and cleared by friendly units, then ignored. In some cases, this scenario persists for a period of days and results in multiple mine strikes and casualties.
Technique: Commanders must exercise tactical patience during route clearance operations and allow engineer leaders to analyze the situation to determine the proper method to facilitate route clearance.
(TA
6.1.1.1.1 Breach Minefields)
TREND 3: Combined arms obstacle integration.
PROBLEMS:
1. Brigade and battalion staffs do not understand the fundamental relationship between fires and obstacles outlined in FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration.
2. Infantry leaders are not proficient in siting tactical obstacle groups to influence enemy maneuver.
3. Soldiers are not proficient in emplacing protective obstacles.
4. Obstacle emplacement is not tracked at battalion level, so the commander does not adjust his plan based on actual battlefield conditions.
RESULTS:
1. This results in poor execution of defensive operations.
2. Direct and indirect fires are not integrated with the obstacles.
3. Obstacle construction is unnecessarily delayed because infantry units are slow to occupy sectors or battle positions, directed obstacles are not used to support battalion/brigade decisive points, and engineers are routinely tasked to operate battalion Class IV/V points.
4. This lack of adjustment results in minimal delay of assaulting enemy forces.
Techniques:
1. Review FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration.
2. Conduct reconnaissance as early as possible during the defense. Site critical, directed obstacles so that engineer effort is not wasted while the staff completes the operations order.
3. Establish procedures that require the task force S-4 and support platoon leader to operate and supervise the Class IV/V supply point.
4. Task maneuver companies with responsibility for obstacle group construction in order to ensure that engineers receive assistance with mine dump operations and protective wire emplacement.
5. Comply with obstacle reporting requirements outlined in FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations.
(TA
6.2.2 Emplace Obstacles)
TREND 4: Positioning of crew-served weapons.
PROBLEMS:
1. Batteries and platoons routinely do a poor job of identifying enemy capabilities and taking the necessary force protection measures to eliminate or counteract the threats of positioning crew-served weapons.
2. Units do a poor job of positioning crew-served weapons, placing them in positions that restrict movement and operation.
3. Too often the crew-served positions lack interlocking fires.
4. Units fail to clear fields of fire.
5. Units select positions with little or no consideration about dead space, enemy avenues of approach, difficulty in clearing fields of fire, hill masses that block fields of fire, etc.
6. Too many soldiers do not understand how to fill out a range card.
7. Too many soldiers do not know how the traverse and elevation mechanism functions.
8. NCOs do not proactively supervise and train their soldiers on crew-served weapons.
RESULT: Batteries and platoons are often destroyed by a dismounted attack conducted by as few as three to five enemy soldiers.
Techniques:
1. Doctrinal references: FM 6-50, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery, Chapter 3, and STP 6-13B14-SM-TG, pg. 3-6.
2. Ensure all soldiers and leaders are trained on crew-served weapons emplacement, range card construction, clearing fields of fire and, most importantly, positioning crew-served weapons to maximize effectiveness given the constraints of the terrain.
3. Consider identifying crew-served weapon positions prior to the howitzer positions. This technique can greatly facilitate battery defense without affecting the battery's subsequent occupation.
4. Crew-served weapon positions should be inspected/checked by a senior leader battle commander (BC) or 1SG to ensure the weapon is being used effectively. This check should be conducted by actually getting behind the weapon and ensuring it is set up correctly.
(TA
6.3.1 Provide Battlespace Hazard Protection)
TREND 5: Force protection and perimeter defense. Protecting the force is every leader's concern and essential to sustaining the force.
PROBLEMS:
1. Individual and crew-served weapon positions are not completed to standard, often lacking overhead cover.
2. The use of obstacles is non-existent.
3. Camouflage of personnel, tents, vehicles, and equipment are seldom to standard.
RESULT: The improvement of assembly areas fails to occur after initial occupation.
Techniques:
1. All leaders and soldiers should review FM 7-8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, and FM 5-103, Survivability, for techniques and standards for defensive measures.
2. FM 20-3, Camouflage, gives company-level leaders an understanding of camouflage principles.
3. An assembly area plan must be developed and continually improved upon.
4. Constructing survivability positions for all soldiers enhances combat survivability.
5. Leaders must ensure that force protection is a priority and that the aviation task force is included in the brigade task force defensive plan.
(TA
6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND 6: Survivability operations.
PROBLEMS:
1. Individual soldiers do not know the standards for individual and crew-served weapon fighting positions. These positions are almost always substandard and frequently dangerous to the soldiers that occupy them.
2. Leaders are not familiar with collective survivability and force protection requirements outlined in FM 5-103, Survivability, and the force protection planning process described in FM 5-114, Engineer Operations Other Than War, and Joint Publication 3-10.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Base Defense.
3. Frequently units do not construct viable survivability positions for critical systems such as artillery batteries, counterfire radars, TOCs, signal nodes, aviation assembly areas, and ammunition transfer points, leaving them vulnerable to ground and air attack.
RESULTS:
1. Cursory berming, rather than digging, is the norm.
2. Camouflage measures are rarely used outside immediate tactical operations center (TOC) areas.
Technique: Train leaders and soldiers on survivability standards in accordance with FM 5-103, Survivability.
(TA
6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND 7: Reaction to NBC threats.
PROBLEMS:
1. Most units lack a well-thought-out NBC plan.
2. A common problem is the lack of basic NBC knowledge and a plan that delineates actions to take upon and after the attack (to include unmasking procedures).
RESULT: When presented with an NBC threat, the chain of command falls apart and chaos reigns supreme.
Technique: FM 3-4, NBC Protection, provides information on NBC protection. Although the FM provides a wealth of information on NBC, chapters 2 and 3 provide outstanding basic information to help thought and planning processes.
(TA
6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND 8: Force protection. Military Intelligence (MI) soldiers' deaths due to fratricide and poor force protection measures are on the increase.
PROBLEMS:
1. Teams moving throughout the brigade area of operations (AO) are not coordinating properly for no fire areas (NFAs) nor are they relaying final location grids to their controlling headquarters in a timely manner.
2. Leaders are not enforcing force protection measures such as fighting positions, overhead cover, and security patrols.
RESULT: Four out of five MI teams engaged by the JRTC OPFOR are being destroyed by enemy artillery without ever firing a shot in defense.
Techniques:
1. The tactical operations center (TOC) must be apprised of unit location and situation on a continuous basis.
2. The leadership at all levels must impose discipline in force protection methods and procedures. The unit SOP should describe the standard for a position defense, and this standard should be enforced.
(TA
6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND 9: Sensor employment and operations.
PROBLEMS:
1. Units do not make effective use of forward area air defense (FAAD) command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) sensors, simplified handheld terminal units (SHTUs), or handheld terminal units (HTUs).
2. Often sensors are placed in positions that do not allow for line-of-sight conductivity with SHTUs/HTUs.
RESULT: Teams and the units they support do not receive early warning data.
Techniques:
1. FM 44-48, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Sensor Platoon, outlines sensor employment guidelines as well as technical capabilities and limitations that must be considered in early warning planning.
2. Units should make use of the 14J operator in the planning process to help maximize the use of the sensor.
3. Effective use of the FAAD C3I system allows for situational awareness of all team locations to aid in battle tracking. Units must also ensure all communications exercises include FAAD C3I nets to ensure communications equipment is operational and conductivity is achieved down to the gunner level.
(TA
6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment)
TREND 10: Checkpoint operations.
PROBLEM: Units have a poor understanding of checkpoint purpose, procedures, construction, and the required force protection measures needed by armor/cavalry units.
RESULT: Checkpoints are not set up to a standard, and checkpoint operations result in weak security across the brigade's area of operations and contribute to the alienation of the civil population and host nation government.
Technique: FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP, and ARTEP 17-57-10 MTP provide adequate standards for pre-deployment training.
(TA
6.3.2 Employ Operations Security)
TREND 11: Base and base cluster operations.
PROBLEM: Corps support group commanders and battalion commanders are not, for the most part, familiar with base and base cluster operations.
RESULT: Most commanders have trouble assimilating their units to base cluster operations and defining responsibilities. The common problem is the lack of knowledge on base and base cluster operations.
Technique: FM 54-30, Corps Support Groups, pages 11-6 through 11-15, provide detailed information on rear operations to include sample worksheets for base defense plans. FM 100-15, Corps Operations, pages 2-7, 2-8, and 5-15, and Appendix C provide more information on rear operations.
(TA 6.3.4 Provide Counterreconnaissance, Security, and Readiness)
TA.3
Air Defense BOS Narrative
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS Narrative
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