TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS (cont)
TREND 16: Medical task force integration.
PROBLEM: Medical task force integration continues to be a problem within the medical task force for all units that deploy to JRTC.
RESULT: At the outset of the operation, task force structure is often not well defined or understood by the C2element or those units subordinate to the task force. However, events such as mobile aeromedical staging facility (MASF) missions, battle damage assessment (BDA), logistical support, and internal tasking requirements, often serve as catalysts in forcing units to act as a single functional element rather than acting as independent units. See FM 8-10, Health Service Support in a Theater of Operations, for a discussion of command and control functions.
(TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND 17: Staff planning.
PROBLEM: Staffs need to be trained in the military decision-making process (MDMP).
RESULT: Staffs rarely use the process for any mission other than the initial occupation.
Techniques:
1. All missions should be analyzed and staffed using the MDMP to ensure that planning continues to be synchronized.
2. References: FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, and FM 8-55, Planning for Health Service Support, Chapter 2, provide detailed information on this process.
3. Reference: CALL Newsletter No. 95-12, May 97, Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning."
(TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND 18: Integration of battalion task force engineers.
PROBLEMS:
1. Attached engineer platoon leaders are not well integrated into the battalion TOC and staff planning process. The relative inexperience of an engineer second lieutenant who also serves as a platoon leader contributes to the difficulty of integration and synchronization.
2. Battalion staff officers do not assist the engineer in performing his duties as a staff member.
RESULTS:
1. The engineer is either not consulted at all during planning or is assigned to the TOC and not allowed to supervise and synchronize execution.
2. The end result is poor synchronization of mobility and survivability operations at battalion level.
Techniques:
1. Task force commanders and staffs must accept that the supporting task force engineer cannot be present in the TOC at all times.
2. The task force executive officer must ensure that the supporting task force engineer is integrated into the MDMP and targeting process. The task force engineer must support task force planning and aggressively supervise his platoon during execution.
(TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND 19: Effective use of time.
PROBLEM: Leaders are not making effective use of time to allow subordinates to conduct necessary troop-leading procedures.
RESULTS:
1. Poor time management often leads to poor supervision of any pre-combat checks or inspections.
2. Teams often get into position without proper equipment or any situational awareness.
Techniques:
1. FM 44-44, Avenger Platoon, Section, and Squad Operations, Appendix D, contains numerous checklists to assist in conducting troop-leading procedures and pre-combat checks.
2. Leaders need to make use of warning orders with timelines to assist subordinates in parallel planning. The use of formatted backbriefs will also facilitate information dissemination and concurrent planning.
(TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND 20: The targeting process and targeting meetings.
PROBLEM: Most brigade and battalion staffs do not understand the basic concept of the targeting process and intermittently conduct targeting meetings with no agenda and focus.
RESULT: Most units fail to focus combat power to find, fix, and finish critical high-payoff targets (HPTs).
Techniques:
1. Read and review FM 6-20-10, The Targeting Process (with emphasis on Chapters 2 and 5), and the Targeting Process video script in the JRTC FS DIV TTP Red Book, 1 Oct 96, page 21, to gain a better understanding of the targeting process and meeting.
2. The battalion XO should open the meeting by detailing its purpose, the agenda, and specifying the time period or event being discussed.
3. The S-2 provides an intelligence update, briefs the current enemy situation, and reviews the current collection, reconnaissance, and surveillance plans. The S-2 then provides a battle damage assessment (BDA) of targets previously engaged since the last targeting meeting and the impact on the enemy courses of action. He follows the BDA with an analysis of the enemy's most probable courses of action and locations for the next 12 to 24 hours using the event template and a list of high-value targets. Finally, the S-2 briefs changes to the priority intelligence report (PIR) for review by the battle staff.
4. The next briefer is the S-3. He briefs any particular guidance from the commander and changes to the commander's intent. He briefs any requirements from higher headquarters since the last targeting meeting and a review of current operations. Finally, he informs the battle staff on the status of assets available for the targeting process.
5. The final briefer is the fire support officer (FSO). He briefs the status of all delivery assets and reviews the current target synchronization matrix, providing a summary of results of actions taken. He provides the new target synchronization matrix with the proposed list of high- payoff targets (HPTs) and locations for the battle staff's concurrence and refinement. Once any changes to the HPT have been made and any locations updated or refined, the maneuver XO or S-3 facilitates a BOS crosswalk to complete the rest of the matrix by identifying a detector, determining an attack means, and assigning an asset to assess each HPT.
6. Upon completion of the targeting meeting, the XO, S-3, S-2, and FSO should brief the commander on the results of the targeting meeting for approval. Once the results are approved, the following products are updated, written, and reproduced for timely distribution:
- Target synchronization matrix
- FRAGO to subordinate units
- Updated target list
- Updated R&S plan
- Any changes to commander's PIR.
(TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND 21: Battle rhythm.
PROBLEMS:
1. The lack of a clear battle rhythm at battalion and brigade levels regularly results in a series of haphazard FRAGOs published at unpredictable times.
2. Battalion staffs plan no more than a few hours into the future, meaning that companies generally have little or no time between receipt of mission and the required execution time.
RESULTS:
1. FRAGOS that direct subordinate units to conduct missions in a hurry come to be seen as emergency operations at the company and platoon levels.
2. The effect of short-term planning is magnified at the platoon level, where a platoon order with more than a vague concept of the company operation is rare.
Technique: To be effective, battalion staffs must be looking at least 24 hours into the future, not planning this afternoon's activities.
(TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND 22: Wargaming.
PROBLEMS:
1. Units continue to experience problems during execution that can be traced back to flawed wargaming during the planning process. Most staffs execute the wargaming procedure, but do not fully understand why the action-reaction-counteraction methodology is used and what result/product is required before proceeding to the next critical event.
2. Usually, the S-2 and S-3 fight it out at the map board while the remainder of the staff observes in silence. Following the wargaming session, the Battle Operating System representatives (BOS reps) scramble to create their own plans that will support what the battalion wants to do.
RESULT: Mission execution consistently breaks down as enemy actions and friction reveal the lack of coordination and flexibility in the plan. Wargaming is the methodology all units employ in an attempt to synchronize the effects of the BOS they have integrated into the plan.
Techniques:
1. Synchronization lies in the ability to accurately reduce battlefield activities and their effects to specific time factors, and then successfully plan, schedule, and coordinate these activities to occur at the desired time and place.
2. The staff must specifically identify all critical battlefield activities across the BOS, estimate the time and distance factors for execution, and understand the mutually supporting relationships among them.
3. To effectively and efficiently execute these processes, each staff officer must be an expert in his branch/operating system and come to the wargaming session with the complete understanding of his BOS capabilities/limitations and the proper tools to determine/calculate task planning factors.
4. The planning staff should again war-game each of their training missions during staff training immediately following completion of the event. Capitalize on hindsight to prompt identification of critical battlefield activities across the BOS and train (or teach) the individual staff responsibility for determination/calculation of task planning factors. Experiment with methods (avenue, belt, box) and recording techniques (narrative, worksheet, synch matrix).
5. The executive officer must facilitate the wargame and also enforce the standard for staff participation/input.
6. References: FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, pp. 2-18 to 2-20; FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, pp. 5-16 to 5-24; Commander's Guide for the Coordination and Employment of Battlefield Operating Systems, pp. 2-38 to 2-41.
(TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND 23: Company-level operations orders.
PROBLEMS:
1. Company commanders struggle with the appropriate level of detail needed in paragraph three of the operations order.
2. They are generally not specific enough in the level of detail in discussing the critical tasks associated with the mission being conducted. Units do a very good job of briefing paragraphs one, two, four, and five. Most units have good to very good orders checklists in their tactical SOPs.
RESULTS:
1. The area of emphasis at company/troop level needs to be more focused on developing a well-defined commander's intent and supporting it with a detailed scheme of maneuver.
2. The units usually brief the commander's intent and then restate the mission task as the scheme of maneuver. For example:
3. The lack of detail by unit commanders frequently leads to a lack of mission focus during the conduct of the mission.
Technique: Company commanders must remember that the mission statement must include a concise and accurate task and purpose and that the scheme of maneuver must include the detailed method on accomplishing that task and purpose.
(TA
4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance)
TREND 24: Use of available planning time.
PROBLEMS:
1. A recent trend during offensive operations has been to purposely sacrifice planning time to initiate an offensive operation earlier than the enemy anticipates.
2. Typically, battalions use 6 to 10 hours to conduct battalion-level troop-leading procedures, then give from 2 to 8 hours for company and platoon-level preparations.
RESULT: Company orders are unclear about the plan below the battalion level and platoon orders that offer almost no resolution on how the platoon will accomplish its own mission.
Technique: Although the early initiation of operations offers some benefits to the commander, he must recognize and be willing to accept a significant reduction in planning and preparation at the subordinate unit levels.
(TA
4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance)
TREND 25: Fire support rehearsals.
PROBLEMS:
1. Once units depart the intermediate staging base, rehearsals are poorly conducted and seldom provide benefit to the operation.
2. Fire supporters are not integrated into the "maneuver" rehearsal as recommended in FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, and most fire support rehearsals result in only a confirmation of the planned target list.
RESULT: Rehearsal techniques listed in FM 6-20-1, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Cannon Battalion, are not being used.
Techniques:
1. Develop a sound SOP to cover the essential elements of a rehearsal.
2. Integrate fire support into the "maneuver" rehearsal. Each commander and FSO should succinctly describe the actions as each unit fights with maneuver and fires.
3. The FSO must be able to describe what enemy or maneuver action will trigger a specific fire support task/event. A walk-on terrain model is usually worth the required time to construct it.
4. Review FM 6-20-1, pages 3-12 through 3-15. This source provides an excellent overview of key rehearsal elements. A solid SOP, checklist, or agenda, reinforced by Home Station training, would greatly improve rehearsals.
(TA
4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans)
TREND 26: Command and Control (C2) Rehearsal/Communication Exercise (COMMEX) in the Initial Staging Base (ISB).
PROBLEM: C2rehearsals in the ISB are often no more than a commander's backbrief, and the COMMEX regularly deteriorates into signal soldiers passing radio traffic on a single net to confirm COMSEC and radio net timing.
RESULT: The C2rehearsal (whose sole proponent is all too often the signal officer) does not receive the proper attention, and combat operations suffer.
Techniques: A successful C2rehearsal has four components.
1. The most important component of a C2rehearsal is participation of the commander and his staff. Without this support, the rehearsal is a failure.
2. The next major component is that the C2rehearsal has a clear purpose. The purpose of the C2rehearsal is to expose flaws or disconnected activities in the plan, focus on actions and decision points critical to the mission, ensure that subordinate commanders explicitly understand their mission, and instill confidence in the participants.
3. The communication exercise is a major component. At the completion of a proper C2rehearsal, the signal planner can turn to the commander and give him a green light on all communications systems and procedures within the combat team.
4. The last component of a successful C2rehearsal is the plan. Current signal doctrine does not include information on planning or executing a C2rehearsal.
(TA
4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)
TREND 27: Rehearsals.
PROBLEM: Units frequently rehearse prior to operations, but often never move beyond generic or leader-only rehearsals. Surveys over the past two quarters reveal that at the company level, rehearsals cover all mission-essential tasks to be performed only 8 percent of the time, while companies conduct no rehearsals 39 percent of the time. At the platoon level, leaders rehearse all mission-essential actions 19 percent of the time and neglect rehearsals completely 27 percent of the time.
RESULT: The lack of rehearsals specifically tailored to the tasks to be performed often results in reduced proficiency during the mission.
Technique: Reference CALL Newsletter No. 98-5, Mar 98, Rehearsals.
(TA
4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)
TREND 28: Control of the brigade rear battle.
PROBLEM: Command and control (C2) of the brigade rear battle is being passed to the forward support battalion (FSB) tactical operations center (TOC). If the FSB TOC controls the brigade rear battle, the brigade must provide augmentation to the FSB TOC.
RESULT: The brigade rear battle must be synchronized and integrated with the brigade plan. The brigade has to resource the FSB with a dedicated cell that consists of the appropriate level of assets to battle track.
Technique: This cell must include dedicated communications, intelligence and fire support equipment, and personnel. Reference: FM 7-20, The Infantry Brigade.
(TA
4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)
TREND 29: Chemical asset integration.
PROBLEM: Many brigades are not using NBC assets with the best possible task and purpose.
RESULTS:
1. Decontamination, smoke, and reconnaissance assets are repeatedly left performing missions such as convoy escort, ROWPU security, manning TCPs, and troop transportation missions. These are viable missions when no NBC threat is present, but as the situation changes and the threat warrants, NBC assets must be employed in their doctrinal roles enhancing force protection.
2. There are many instances where smoke assets could be combat multipliers but are often omitted.
3. Additionally, instances of units being slow in relinquishing control of chemical assets (platoon is a part of the FSB perimeter and the commander not wanting to give up the asset) when directed, therefore hindering the NBC fight. By the time a persistent chemical strike happens, decontamination response is slow because the decontamination plan never matured. This is basically a result of the brigade not executing proactive decontamination site reconnaissance.
Techniques:
1. Chemical officers must stress the proper utilization of NBC assets during the planning of operations and then check to ensure that assets are being utilized as intended. Situational awareness is paramount, and a thorough understanding of upcoming operations are the keys to integration of NBC assets.
2. Reference: FM 3-100, NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare and Flame Operations, gives a good basis for the doctrinal employment of NBC assets.
(TA
4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)
TREND 30: Platoon battle drills.
PROBLEM: Some platoons have difficulty aggressively executing battle drills.
RESULT: The soldiers react to the contact and leader's direct action, but many times the reaction is slow and unrehearsed.
Techniques: Reacting to contact should be instinctive, immediate, and rehearsed. Units should train on battle drills outlined in ARTEP 19-100-10, DRILL, and those developed for internal TACSOPs.
(TA
4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinates)
TREND 31: Commander's guidance for fire support.
PROBLEM: Most commanders are using the format in FM 6-71, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander, while writing their guidance for fire support using Purpose, Priority, Allocation and Restriction (PPAR). Recently, some commanders have started using Task, Purpose, Method and Endstate.
RESULTS:
1. Although FSOs are using the correct formats, many FSOs are poorly conveying the commander's guidance for fire support.
2. The terms destroy, neutralize, suppress, and harass are not being used properly. The commander's guidance for fire support is usually vague, does not focus fire support assets, and is not supportable with the fire support assets available.
Techniques:
1. FM 6-71, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander, pg. 3-5, lists the information commanders should provide their FSOs. FSOs must clearly understand the commander's intentions and guidance for the use of fires.
2. FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process, states that the effects of fire can be to harass, suppress, neutralize, or destroy the target. The subjective nature of these terms means the FSO must ensure his commander's interpretations of this terminology are realistic and equally understood, and that the commander has the fire support assets available to achieve his attack guidance.
3. FSOs must fully understand the concept of operations and the commander's intentions for the use of fires. FSOs must translate this into clear, concise and understandable terms.
(TA
4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TREND 32: Staff integration and synchronization.
PROBLEMS:
1. At Home Station, the platoon leader, company commander, and division provost marshal should conduct informal NCOPD/OPD at brigade on MP capabilities and employment. They must also ensure that the platoon leadership understands how the brigade uses the tactical decision-making process to plan operations.
2. Platoon leadership must understand where and how they provide input in the planning process to integrate and synchronize MP support into the operation. Then leaders must be able to take that information given to the brigade and produce combat orders for the platoon so junior leaders can begin their troop-leading procedures and parallel planning. The platoon leader must ensure that MP assets are included in the brigade's TACSOP. He must also ensure that his recommendations on the appropriate doctrinal MP missions, command relationship, and task organization are used by the staff in developing the plan for the brigade operation. Combined arms operations and working with host-nation police will improve operations as well as information sharing and intelligence collection.
3. Proper integration and synchronization of MP assets will prevent many of the 911 missions which are uncoordinated, unplanned, and unrehearsed.
RESULTS:
1. Many unnecessary casualties and lost critical assets are the result of 911 missions. At Home Station, the provost marshal, commander, and platoon leader should conduct continuous leader/staff training at brigade on MP capabilities and employment.
2. The MP annex to the TACSOP should describe capabilities, employment considerations, doctrinal missions, prioritization, and specific collective tasks that support the brigade mission-essential task list (METL) tasks.
Technique: The platoon leader must also ensure that his recommendations on the appropriate doctrinal MP missions, command relationship, and task organization are used by the staff in developing the plan for the brigade operation. Combined arms operations and working with the host-nation police will improve operations as well as information sharing and intelligence collection.
(TA
4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TREND 33: Synchronization of indirect fires.
PROBLEM: The almost universally poor results obtained by indirect fires are largely attributable to the lack of a workable observer plan tied to clearly defined trigger points.
RESULT: Most U.S. fires during the past two quarters have landed harmlessly behind (in terms of space or time) enemy forces. When viable enemy targets are identified, the lack of pre-planned targets that are tied to triggers is compounded by the lack of clear maneuver graphics to identify clearance responsibilities. The two shortfalls combine to produce indirect fires that are far too slow and cumbersome to be effective.
(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TA.4
Command and Control BOS Narrative, Part I
Acknowledgements
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