Military

While there is no requirement to account for the first shipment of neutral materials with the forms, it will be done as an opportunity for rehearsal.

TFE used the following election neutral material and ballot timeline for election material distribution and pickup.

Ballots materials had to be reproduced at 1AD and delivered to polling stations that were short ballots. After receiving permission from OSCE/Sarajevo, ballots were reproduced on nonstandard paper and delivered in nonstandard envelopes to make up shortages in the ballot count of unexecuted ballots. OSCE miscounts at the place of shipment in Vienna resulted in the wrong amounts of ballots being delivered to polling stations.

While accountability of ballots and materials was maintained throughout, it was not accomplished without difficulty.

• OSCE representatives that were on site to observe the transfer of all materials in some cases did not know which forms were required for proper transfer of materials.

• Shipments of both neutral materials and ballots arrived from the Beluga Group without an inventory or were short/over the required materials.

• The seals used by OSCE for the ballots and boxes could be easily removed.

There appeared to be two techniques used to mark boxes containing ballots. The first was a sheet of identifying information affixed to the sides of the boxes. In many cases, the information separated from the boxes, leaving the handler with no information. The second method was information written on the sides of the boxes. This ensured that information was not separated from the box, but the level of detail differed from box to box. This often left handlers uncertain as to disposition. Unfortunately, many boxes arrived with no information and had to be sorted out by OSCE representatives.

The delivery of ballots was understood to include only boxes of ballots (along with some random neutral materials to make up identified shortages). However, all transload locations received boxes of materials which were both unexpected and unrecognizable. A last-minute effort by regional OSCE supervisors and BDE representatives at the transload locations worked through the issue; however, it was a late effort that never provided individual polling station supervisors the opportunity to make up for, and adjust, shortages.

OSCE Personnel Reception/Departure and Training

The Task Force Eagle G1 coordinated the reception and manifesting support for OSCE supervisors and monitors for the Bosnia-Herzegovina national elections. Coordination was made with ARRC G1 to obtain the necessary waivers/liability forms. OSCE personnel received a welcome ceremony by the 1AD Band and the ADC(M). After the reception, OSCE personnel were registered by OSCE number and regional support area. Immediately following registration, they received training on mine awareness, communication procedures, medical awareness, and criminal activities in Bosnia. After training, OSCE personnel were manifested for their bus rides and departed Eagle Base for their respective assignments. Departure was accomplished in reverse order of reception. K9 bomb dogs were utilized to check baggage for explosives. COMMEAGLE gave the closing remarks and thanked all those involved.

Orders Briefs and Rehearsals

COMEAGLE conducted two orders briefs, complete with backbriefs and rehearsals, to synchronize commanders and staffs on the main effort. He included civilian agencies such as the OSCE, IPTF, and the OHR. These backbriefs and rock drills were essential to the synchronization of the task force effort and ensured unity of effort and continuity throughout the AOR. Brigades conducted in-depth coordination meetings and rehearsals. The rehearsals consisted of subordinate commanders and key players backbriefing the commander on their actions from 12 - 15 September. Following the backbrief, players went through a series of vignettes which included "what ifs" along the full spectrum of violence and also included potential logistical problems. These rehearsals also involved the IPTF and OSCE. The vignettes were used to steer the course of discussion during the critical time around the election, and the rehearsal proved to be very helpful as all sides agreed to solutions to their particular vignettes.

Command and Control

TFE used the DMAIN command post structure and overlaid an elections cell in the center of the DMAIN. This cell, comprised of primary elections planners and principal staff, enabled TFE to better synchronize actions across the task force AOR. The elections cell focused the battle staff on tracking the myriad election tasks, while not distracting or taking manpower from tracking GFAP tasks. The elections cell and current operations cell complimented each other. Staffs stripped headquarters functions to enable staffing with "the first team." Brigades and battalions established command and control nodes on each side of the IEBL. These nodes proved beneficial as brigades and battalions were able to transfer information to and from OSCE, IPTF and the local police almost instantly. This helped the battalion in terms of traffic and ballot pickup. It also helped brigades focus on potential problems in the AOR.

LO use during the election timeframe was extensive. TFE provided LOs to OSCE regional and field offices. The OSCE provided LOsto Major TFE headquarters. Units from FWF 28th DIV, II Corps, and III Corps ABiH provided LOs to TFE headquarters. Other FWF HQs had capable duty officers on duty, such as the VRS LO support in Doboj. Other FWF HQs had capable duty offices available for phone calls, receiving facsimile messages, and documents delivered by courier. LO use facilitated communication between major headquarters and ensured quick resolution of possible incidents.

The G6 staff was responsible for establishing a Task Force Eagle election command net down to each OSCE Regional and Field office. The G6 staff accomplished this by redistributing MTOE equipment to non-standard users and provided operators to LO teams. This caused much turbulence due to the short suspense of the requirement; however, the establishment of this net proved to be a valuable link to the OSCE offices.

U.S. units do not normally use Motorola-based, non-secure radios as part of normal, day-to-day operations and do not own such equipment. The requirement to establish monitoring stations using Motorola equipment required the purchase of the necessary equipment by NATO.

Motorola equipment requires special expertise to install and program which is not found in a division signal battalion. The NATO-provided Motorola equipment used for the mission required self-taught installation and programming training of electronic maintenance technicians.

TFE did not receive repeater locations. They were provided generic coverage maps which gave an estimate of coverage. In some cases, this estimate was inaccurate. TFE had no control of repeater locations or coverage provided. They were able to use mobile repeaters that were included in the initial communications package to cover some dead zones.

TFE monitored five separate primary frequencies for both OSCE and IPTF. There was a great deal of net use by the IPTF which distracted from the original mission of monitoring for emergency calls. Besides S/C TACSAT, there were four other methods of communications available to the Task Force Eagle Headquarters. The systems used were PTT, Teledata, VSAT and the MSE-PTT interface. Each provided redundancy which helped facilitate communications between each Headquarters element and the OSCE Regional and Field offices. Although most of the systems remained reliable through the elections period, redundant communication systems were needed to provide a safety net in the event of one or two systems failing.

Reporting and Battle Tracking

TFE focused the battle staff to track movements of ballots, buses, IEBL crossings, polling station and counting house actions, and potential hot spots. This took an inordinate amount of effort on brigade's parts to provide timely, accurate, and complete information. Brigades provided timely information, yet much of the spot reports received were inaccurate or lacked sufficient detail to be used for decisionmaking. The majority of reports received were subsequently refuted using secondary sources.

TFE had to maintain a viable fighting force to monitor and respond to any possible threats generated either deliberately or hastily from the FWF major military establishments. This required troops to monitor and observe military establishments and have reserves available to deal with any possible threat. These elements of the IFOR force were dispersed in areas that did not allow them to add much effort to the tasks outlined in the categories below.

Task Organization

Elections operations ranged from area security, tracking Beluga Group movements, transporting ballots and neutral materials from transload points to LECs, guarding key LOCs, QRF reactions to hot spots, and force protection. To maximize maneuver forces for these tasks, combat support and combat service support units fulfilled the more routine tasks, such as convoy escort or guard posts, freeing up maneuver forces. For example, the band guarded the DMAIN, enabling the MP CO to conduct traffic circulation and polling area security.

TFE task-organized UH-60 and attack helicopter assets to brigade command posts to facilitate response aviation support, particularly for C2and reconnaissance of hot spots. TFE requested and received additional UH-60 and CH-47 assets from USAREUR FWD and UH-1s from C-SPT. TFE aircraft flew over 270 hours in support of elections and were postured to support QRF responses to hot spots throughout the AOR.

Quick Reaction Force

TFE retained five platoons as task force QRF - two light infantry, one BSFV, and two military police platoons. TFE also retained sufficient lift and attack helicopter assets to move the light infantry platoons. TFE positioned one MP platoon with Shark (communications van) forward in NORDPOL BDE AOR to facilitate responses to hot spots in Doboj, Modrica, Teslic/Tesanj. TFE also positioned the BSFV platoon at SWEDEBAT Hqs to reduce transit time to SKODA and improve responsiveness across the TFE AOR.

The task organization for a brigade QRF was a dismounted air-mobile platoon and a section of three M3A2 CFVs. The brigade also maintained two MP Squads and a Scout Weapons team as the brigade reserve. Additionally, one battalion formed a QRF of a PLT (+) with six BFVs and two full dismounted squads; another battalion formed a QRF of a Scout Section; and a third battalion formed a QRF of two MP Squads. QRFs provided flexibility in dealing with contingencies from securing a fixed site to providing a blocking position.

Engineer pure quick reaction forces were pre-positioned to react to different situations. Scenarios included OSCE vehicle minestrikes, demonstrators blocking access to a polling station, and FWF vehicle movement toward a polling station. One brigade Route Proofing Team (Panther, CEV, M113A3, and an ambulance) was prepared to react to an OSCE vehicle striking a mine. A mobility/countermobility team (three M113A3s, M9 ACE, and a HMMWV) was prepared to react to movement of large groups of demonstrators. The ACE would be used to move obstacles, such as cars and trees, and would carry pre-packaged wire obstacles that could be quickly strung across roads to block additional movement.

One brigade established a transportation reserve to transport ballots in the event units in sector did not have the assets available to transport the ballots themselves. On one occasion within a battalion, the transportation reserve was committed to assist a company. This allowed the brigade to continue its mission without disruption to the election process.

Evacuation of Non-Government and International Organizations

One task that TFE was specifically concerned about was the safety of civil agencies during the election timeframe. TFE developed a CONPLAN for the evacuation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Organizations (IOs) if the situation deteriorated. CONPLAN 96-002 outlined the operation. This evacuation plan can be found at Appendix I, NGO and IO Evacuation (CONPLAN 96-002, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and International Organization (IO) Evacuation).

Section IV: Military Support to the National Elections, Part 1

Appendix A: Glossary and Acronyms