SECTION IV
Military Support to the National Elections
Task Force Eagle (TFE) performed numerous tasks in support of the Bosnia-Herzegovina National Elections. The OSCE requested support from IFOR with a support matrix published on 28 February 1996. The matrix listed 32 primary functions (tasks) for which the OSCE requested IFOR assistance during the execution of the National Elections. The complete task list is provided at Appendix F, Military Support Tasking Matrix. During its mission anaalysis, TFE identified hundreds of implied tasks associated with supporting the elections. These tasks are too numerous to list.
Of the original 32 tasks, local OSCE representatives eliminated nine tasks which they could handle better. Task Force Eagle decided that 19 of the tasks could be conducted ancillary to on-going military operations, such as ensuring freedom of movement, local area security patrols, and emergency recovery/MEDEVAC services. Task Force Eagle also identified four tasks that required additional IFOR assets.
Support to elections is discussed in three different categories:
- Pre-election tasks (tasks TFE performed prior to 28 August 1996, the day OSCE supervisors began to arrive into TFE AOR).
- Election Support (tasks TFE performed between 28 August -16 September 1996, the day OSCE supervisors began to arrive into TFE AOR and the day observers begin to depart TFE AOR).
- Contingency Operations (Tasks TFE planned, conducted or were prepared to conduct in support of the national elections).
PRE-ELECTION TASKS
Pre-Election Coordination Meetings
Pre-election coordination meetings between all organizations and factions involved in the elections proved to be beneficial for supporting the elections. These meetings took the form of Joint Military Commissions, Pre-election coordination meetings, bilateral coordination meetings, Joint Planning meetings, Elections Working Group meetings and Civil Military Seminars. Regardless of the name, the intent of each of these meetings was to prepare the battlefield and ensure full integration and coordination took place between all parties involved in the elections.
TFE used this forum to outline principal messages that promoted GFAP adherence, exercising the right to vote and to discourage interference with the elections process and freedom of movement. TFE emphasized:
- FWFs must maintain separation.
- FWFs must maintain the cease-fire, and present a nonthreatening, cooperative posture toward civilians, other FWF forces and IFOR.
- FWFs must maintain their weaponry in IFOR-approved sites and comply with IFOR training and movement requirements.
- FWF forces should support a stable political and social environment so that other organizations have the opportunity to fulfill civilian tasks associated with the GFAP.
- FWF soldiers should be encouraged to exercise their individual right to vote for the candidates of their choice, as guaranteed under the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Individual soldiers and FWF units should not interfere with the electoral process or with freedom of movement. Civil police, the IPTF, the OSCE and IFOR will ensure that the elections process is safe and equally available for all voters.
TFE's pre-election coordination meetings were the foundation of the institutional knowledge required for IFOR to execute election support operations smoothly. The meetings established rapport with key election support personnel, NGOs, and local entity leadership. Four major premises laid the foundation for pre-election coordination meetings:
- Place OSCE in the lead.
- Incorporate the appropriate agencies (IPTF, UNHCR, Mayors, Local Police, MUP, FWF), emphasizing their responsibilities for maintaining law and order during the election.
- Determine "Hot" spots, both civil and military.
- Have agencies develop plans to address "Hot" spots.
Essentially, these meetings established the foundation for the strategy of conflict resolution: isolate, contain, and involve the appropriate civil authorities. This strategy paid big dividends and allowed timely problem resolution.
Although weekly pre-election coordination meetings were held, efforts to plan together with OSCE representatives fell far short of the effort needed. At these meetings, TFE representatives provided most of the pertinent information. OSCE representatives were rarely prepared to discuss questions raised the previous week. As a result, opportunities to share information were missed. Future efforts must result in meetings which follow a published agenda, focusing attendees on information changes and unresolved or pending support requirements.
Two problems contributed to the lack of coordination that took place at the pre-election meetings. First, a primary (coordinating) staff element was not specifically identified as the point of contact for the 1AD staff to deal with the OSCE. It is essential that a coordination staff section be identified to coordinate with all civilian agencies and serve as the staff lead for coordination with those agencies. Although not staffed to perform this task, the TFE G5 performed this function by assumption.
The second problem centered around the OSCE structure and organization. The OSCE and its chain of command, as established through Regional and Field offices, did not function as a unified organization, but was fragmented with control at the field office level. As a result, many members of the TFE staff and other coordinating agencies did not understand the structure. This made communication and issue resolution more complicated. The problem was compounded further by OSCE personnel from different field offices providing conflicting guidance to requests for information. This was a direct result of having two separate field offices, one for the Federation and one for the Republic of Srpska. The OSCE should have provided an organizational structure or bureaucracy chart describing its organization, delineating who is in charge and responsible for the various OSCE functions.
The OSCE encountered difficulties identifying TFE election support requirements in a timely fashion. Specifically, tentage, light sets, power generation and copier support were always pending in the eyes of OSCE personnel. Quantities, locations and times for delivery were never worked out for many of the requirements. TFE personnel planned many support requirements because limited input from the OSCE was available. Support to OSCE must be within identified mission requirements and use funds authorized by Congress for this purpose. All of the logistical requirements, such as tents, tent floors, generators, light sets, heaters, fuel, maintenance on the provided materials and equipment, and other support requirements must be identified, requested, approved, and funded with monies authorized by Congress for this purpose. IFOR must not be placed in the position as automatically being the alternative source of all unfunded or unanticipated requirements. Also, a fund citation needs to be generated to account for unplanned requirements. TFE developed a cost-capture worksheet to document support requirements.
MEMORANDUM FOR Task Force Eagle DMAIN G3
SUBJECT: OSCE Election Support
1. NOTE: The following format must be completed by the organization tasked for election support. Election support forms are for discrete activities/missions and not to compile multiple activities/missions.
2. Unit reporting: ____________________________________________
3. Date:______________________ Location:______________________
4. Description of support:
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
5. Vehicles, Equipment, and Supplies Used:
| ITEM | QUANTITY | TOTAL MILES USED | PASSENGERS TRANSPORTED | HOURS OF USE |
| HMMWV | ||||
| M925 FOV | ||||
| HEMTT | ||||
| PLS | ||||
| M1 | ||||
| M2/M3 | ||||
| TENT, GP MED | ||||
| LIGHTSET | ||||
| GENERATOR | ||||
| FUEL | ||||
| AIRCRAFT | ||||
| UH-60 | ||||
| KW-58D |
6. Point of contact for this report is: (Name, Rank, MSE No.).
\\SIGNATURE BLOCK OF S3\\
TTP:
|
Parallel Planning
TFE conducted parallel planning to the extent possible. TFE issued FRAGOs to brigades to allow planning and preparation to progress in spite of many key elements of information which were not available early in the planning effort. The ARRC published three drafts of its order, and TFE published three major FRAGOs, each building on the last, and several minor FRAGOs to allow units the maximum time possible to react to new developments and changes. The trend was that political leadership and IOs generally lag behind the military in their planning effort; ARRC and TFE need to continue to press these agencies to plan farther in advance and make decisions early.
Election Information Dissemination
At numerous meetings, the OSCE representatives requested that IFOR use its PSYOP elements to disseminate OSCE information. OSCE only provided a few posters, however, and never any audio products. On several occasions, PSYOP had coordinated with both Serb and Muslim radio stations which agreed to use their products. RS officials apparently "got the word out" on election procedures much more efficiently than Federation officials. RS officials used radio spots in short, clear, and concise announcements to ensure RS citizens were aware of election procedures. Federation radio spots were not aired as often and have been described as too sophisticated for many of the uneducated DPs in the Federation. TFE themes which communicated IFOR support to fair, free, and democratic elections without showing bias to either entity or parties that were broadcast are listed below:
- Strategic
Themes:
- Peaceful elections will yield venture capital.
- Continued support of OSCE.
- Elections are the responsibility of the entities.
- Elections are a beginning, not an endpoint.
- Abide by the election results.
- IFOR's role in the elections.
- September 14th is the day to vote, not to visit.
- Tactical
Themes:
- Peaceful elections will yield jobs.
- Election process and content.
- Peaceful elections will yield a future.
- Elections are a beginning, not an endpoint.
- Abide by the elections.
- IFOR's role in the elections. Elections are the responsibility of civil authorities.
- Violence is not the answer.
- September 14th is the day to vote, not to visit.
Areas that need to be emphasized for future operations include: OSCE should provide the necessary voter education materials so that units can conduct a more effective information campaign to promote fair and free elections; the OSCE, in conjunction with TFE, should develop a plan to more efficiently use radio air time to educated citizens; special emphasis should be placed on educating displaced persons.
The parties, the OSCE, IPTF, and IFOR agreed to establish voters' routes. This decision was not made in time to adequately publicize the routes. Therefore, local police, voters, and international organizations responsibile for various aspects of the elections, especially the transportation of voters, were generally unaware of the routes and to the agreed procedures for use of these routes. The Military-Civil Relations teams did distribute maps and intructions on the voters' routes to the Bosnia population up to election day.
TTP:
|
Election Common Terms of Reference/Opstina and Polling Station Numbering
Early in the election support process, it became apparent that different terms and procedures meant something different to other units and organizations. One example is "polling station" versus polling place/site/location. A polling station is the smallest unit of measurement, so to speak, consisting of one set of screens, ballot boxes, and equipment. Polling site or place or location means a group of polling stations close to one another. While this sounds insignificant, it has a great impact on projecting the capacity of polling stations on voter routes, built-up areas, and absentee polling stations. This is why a common glossary needs to be established. During the early stages of the election support mission, one organization needs to be given the responsibility for defining terms and descriptions for the elections process. The glossary of terms needs to be published in an order, and units should conduct standardized leader seminars to ensure compliance.
The ARRC and OSCE disagreed in some cases on how opstinas would be named and numbered. The ARRC published a 1:500,000 map sheet (Edition 2) that was used by TFE. Confusion arose when the OSCE and some subordinate units lumped split opstinas together in the same phrase or used the locally accepted name for the opstina instead of the definitive names from the map. The result was shipment of neutral materials and ballots to the wrong locations. The same was true for polling station numerical designations. The OSCE was unable to provide locations and assessments of identified polling stations in time for the elections.
IFOR accepted the mission to develop a polling station data base, identifying and making an assessment of each polling station. As polling stations were identified, OSCE offices and IFOR established different numbering systems for polling stations which made it difficult to track and to report to higher headquarters. Polling station data was constantly being changed up to the last day and there was confusion on who had the authority to change polling station locations or add new polling station locations to the database. Again, the major problem observed was no one organization was given the responsibility for consolidating and standardizing the polling station database. The polling station data base needs to be locked in early with a GPS grid and sketches or pictures provided to assist units in locating the actual polling station.
TTP:
|
Communication Support
The OSCE used commercial radio receiver/transmitter (Motorola) and repeater system for communications between OSCE elements and IFOR. Each OSCE office also had PTT and INMARSAT, which was the primary means of communication with other OSCE offices. TFE installed and operated eight base stations in the TF Eagle AOR. The base stations and hand-held radios were used to monitor an emergency channel used by the OSCE and ECMM and also to provide a means to coordinate with the OSCE and ECMM personnel in the AOR monitoring the elections process in BiH. The base stations and hand-held radios were located at the five maneuver brigades, the 18th MP Brigade, the TFMAIN Headquarters and 141st Signal Battalion SYSCON.
A signal brigade was the proponent for Motorola Equipment installation and training for TFE. The equipment was not available in sufficient time to do a good battle handoff regarding training on the equipment and its use. Consequently, efforts to install, train, and troubleshoot the systems were rushed and training could not be done to the desirable level. Some of the systems were not programmed to be compatible with the OSCE and IPTF radios. Additionally, the five-channel system was overcrowded with ECMM, IPTF, OSCE and IFOR.
TTP:
|
Section
III: The National Elections
Section
IV: Military Support to the National Elections, Part 2
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
