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INTRODUCTION

by LTC Henry St Pierre

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As professional soldiers with more than a passing interest in history, many of us equate World War II with fast-moving tank action characterized by the Blitzkrieg campaigns in Poland and France, the seesaw battles of North Africa, and Patton's Third Army race across Europe. In reality, with a few exceptions, World War II was a light infantry war where tanks provided support to the infantrymen slugging their way up the Italian boot or across Western Europe. Nowhere was this more evident than the tough fights of the First Army had in breaking through the Normandy hedgerows in the summer of 1944. Initially, infantry units moved from hedgerow to hedgerow meeting a determined, well-entrenched enemy and suffering numerous casualties in an effort to regain the offensive. It was only through very close cooperation between tanks, engineers, and the infantry that units began to have success in breaking through these well-defended hedgerows and, subsequently, set the conditions for the breakout that preceded Patton's celebrated dash across Europe.

The post-World War II realization of the Soviet Union as our number one threat dictated the need to build a faster, better armed, and more maneuverable army. In the decades since, the United States has come to depend on mechanized forces, and the tank became the prime ground maneuver weapon. This gravitation away from the World War II model of tank and infantry cooperation reached another stage with the adoption of the AirLand Battle Doctrine and the M1/M2 series of vehicles. In this doctrine, the infantryman assumed a secondary role in warfare. The results, while leading to the successful conclusion of the Cold War and Operation DESERT STORM, left the U.S. Army overly dependent on mechanization.

At the same time that we were building the force that would win Operation DESERT STORM, Army Chief of Staff General Wickham realized the need to have a more flexible, easily deployable force. This force would be better suited to handle military missions where the use of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles might not be appropriate. Thus was born the concept of light fighters and the 6th, 7th, 10th, and 25th Infantry Divisions (Light). These forces were lightly equipped and ideally suited to conduct rapid deployment in an emergency and Operations Other Than War (OOTW) types of missions. These deployment missions included peacekeeping and fighting in highly-restrictive terrain such as jungles, mountains, and Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). Since their inception, these forces have been the first units deployed to hot spots such as Somalia, Panama, and Haiti. Light forces proved invaluable because of their ability to deploy quickly and to put large numbers of infantry soldiers on the ground in a relatively short period of time.

In all the deployments and subsequent combat operations involving these units, one truth has become self-evident: their greatest advantage, that is, their relative lightness, is also their greatest disadvantage. It is their inability to bring heavy direct-fire weapons to bear once combat is joined that makes these units so vulnerable to even Third World countries equipped with the most rudimentary of heavy weapons. The resulting lessons learned in Somalia and Panama demonstrated a need to have tanks attached to these units when deployed for combat.

This dilemma presents itself at a time when we are faced with numerous low-intensity threats. At issue is the lack of expertise to utilize light forces with armor in certain combat situations. We forgot most of the lessons learned the hard way in World War II on how tanks and infantry cooperate. When these units are put together for the first time, there is a tendency, born out of a lack of understanding, to misuse the tanks. Instead of integrating them as part of companies and battalions, light fighters will tend to place them away from the light infantry units. The usual reason given is safety and, specifically, concern for the infantrymen on the ground. We tend to place the tanks in support-by-fire positions or convoy escort missions instead of closely integrating them with infantry to assault an objective as part of a company on battle positions or as a part of the counter-reconnaissance force. By putting tanks in such secondary roles, we fail to maximize their mobility and inherent combat potential. Light fighters lack understanding of what light forces are capable of when tanks are integrated directly into their combat formations.

This newsletter serves as the basis for developing Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) that are necessary for light infantry battalion, company, and platoon commanders to work with tanks. This document also provides the armor component of any such combined arms element with an understanding of the light infantry concerns when working with tanks. This effort is designed to provide all forces involved with initial TTPs to begin the process of cooperation and gives everyone a start point for dialogue in developing procedures necessary for the specific environments encountered on deployment and under the conditions in which their operations are to be conducted.

Leaders using these TTPs must understand they were developed under a specific set of circumstances. They were developed at Fort Lewis, WA, by the 1st Brigade 25th ID (L) and 1st Battalion 32d Armor--units which habitually work together. This does not mean that a light infantry unit meeting its armor component for the first time cannot enjoy the same close spirit of cooperation and understanding that exists between these two units. Indeed, that is a major reason for developing this TTP. They can - but it takes practice and understanding of each other's capabilities and limitations.

Although these TTPs were developed under controlled circumstances, they are valid techniques for any light infantry unit that finds itself in combat with tanks in support. These TTPs should be modified to meet specific terrain, circumstances, and ROE.

In developing these TTPs, six major points of consideration for successful integration of tanks became evident in all situations:

• Absolute situational awareness must exist between the tanker and the infantry on the ground. The tanker must be aware of the location of the light fighters around him. The light fighters must be on constant guard against potential dangers associated with working closely with tanks.

• Cross-talk between the tankers and the infantry is essential to foster a good working team. We offer various techniques to accomplish this, to include field expedient installation of field phones on the right rear fender of the tank.

• Both the infantry and the tankers must exercise tactical patience. The tanks, indoctrinated in moving quickly from one position to another, must remember they are in a support role to the infantry. Their mission is to protect the light fighter on the ground. They also depend on infantrymen for support and protection against close ambush. Separating themselves from the infantry will not only result in needless loss of life and equipment destruction but also mission failure. Also, terrain easily trafficable to an infantryman may be impassable to a tank. Be aware that mobility consideration for tanks and light fighters is different when planning your moves.

• Use of tanks does not negate the need to use smoke, obscurants, and indirect fire when moving up to obstacles and support-by fire-positions.

• It is essential that tankers attached to the infantry unit be involved in every step of the troop-leading procedures--especially rehearsals.

• To be effective, organize the unit as a combined arms team.

The paradigm that has driven the use of tanks as the primary fire and maneuver force on the armor heavy battlefield has not changed. What has changed is the role the main battle tank plays in the light infantry scenario. In that environment, the tank clearly is in a support role. Even as such, if properly integrated in the scheme of maneuver, the tank is a great combat multiplier and can provide a tremendous advantage to the light force commander and substantially increase his unit's capabilities.

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Preface
Chapter 1: Route-Clearance Operations