PREFACE
Realizing the need to foster a closer sense of cooperation between the light infantry company and a tank force when task-organized, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis Reimer, directed that the Army develop Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for the Infantry/Armor Team.
Because Fort Lewis, WA, is the only installation where heavy forces and light forces share a post, it was chosen as the site to begin working on these TTPs. Specifically, the 1st Corps was given the mission to develop, train, and validate the TTPs needed to help an infantry company commander fully utilize an armored force to his advantage and to exercise the unique capabilities of both maneuver arms under designated conditions.
Knowing that more help was needed, the then Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Caryl G. Marsh, enlisted the aid of the U.S. Army War College to help develop the initial TTPs. Three Lieutenant Colonel students, Dan French, Dave Tindoll, and Craig Stone, developed a draft manual, The Light Infantry Company Employment of Tank Platoons in Restrictive Terrain. This manual served as a starting point by which the Lancers of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (L), and elements of the 1st Battalion, 32 Armor (3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division), could start to develop the critical techniques needed.
This newsletter opens a dialogue and creates an opportunity for units to exercise these light/heavy TTPs. Exercising the TTPs is an essential and necessary step in their proliferation to units that may have to employ tanks in close and restrictive terrain, and to perpetuate the eventual update of pertinent doctrine. Close and restrictive terrain has, in the past, proven favorable to Light Infantry operations, but has always been considered overly restrictive to tanks.
The brigade assigned to execute conducted "How to Fight" seminars to teach company commanders how to use tanks. These seminars focused on various missions that a light infantry company might be tasked to conduct during a typical Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation. The brigade then deployed to the JRTC for a focused rotation with two tank companies (-) (20 tanks total) and a team of nine subject-matter experts (SMEs) to test, validate, and collect those TTPs against an opposing force (OPFOR) known for their expertise and for giving "no quarter."
The TTPs observed and reported in this newsletter are the work of numerous soldiers and civilians and represent the combined efforts of infantrymen and tankers fighting as a combined arms force. In this effort all participants realized a closer cooperation and relationship between these two critical maneuver arms. We were also able to incorporate the knowledge and expertise of many others representing their particular contribution to the combined arms team and involved at various levels in this focused rotation. This cooperation led to a greater sense of accomplishment and to mission success.
Henry
St Pierre
LTC,
AR
Team
Chief
Introduction
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