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CHAPTER 1

ROUTE-CLEARANCE OPERATIONS

1. GENERAL. Most units today understand that failure to defeat enemy obstacles on roads will result in severed lines of communication. Without clear and open routes, the brigade will be unable to sustain itself. Although route-clearance operations are critical to mission success, there is often little time given to plan, prepare, and execute them. Typically, a unit deploys into the area of operations (AO) and begins aggressive search and attacks looking for signs of the elusive enemy. Too many units spend the entire low-intensity conflict (LIC) phase looking in the woods and ending up engaging only a handful of Cortinian Liberation Front (CLF) soldiers. Meanwhile, the main CLF effort attacks BLUFOR vehicles and personnel on the roads, resulting in the brigade being bled white after only five days of operations. The CLF knows the BLUFOR is highly dependent on the roads and highways, and they routinely exploit that dependence by having their CLF operate near roads. When BLUFOR commanders place route clearance units along the roads, the enemy is either pushed away or killed.

There are very few units that have been able to incorporate a light/heavy technique to accomplish route-clearance missions. This chapter discusses how a unit can integrate its heavy forces to provide overwhelming firepower and place the enemy at a disadvantage.

2. DOCTRINAL BASE.

Current manuals available to infantry and armor company and battalion commanders which do not adequately address route-clearance operations:

• FM 71-1, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company; no discussion on route clearance.

• ARTEP 71-1, MTP; no training and evaluation outline that defines the standards for such an operation.

• FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force; no discussion on route-clearance operations, and only general and cursory information on the integration of light/heavy forces.

• FM 7-10, Mission Training Plans; very limited training and evaluation outline for route clearance.

• FM 20-23, Mine/Countermine Operations; thorough discussion on the capabilities and limitations of mine rollers, mine plows, and other breaching assets, and thorough planning guidance for the organization of elements to conduct breaching operations. The manual does not provide detailed information on light/heavy integration or planning considerations for combined arms route-clearance operations.

Three references that do contain current route-clearance operations information are:

• FM 5-7-30, Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Combat Operations (Airborne, Air Assault, Light). This is the only manual which clearly outlines planning considerations for route-clearance operations at the task-force level. The manual lists facts and assumptions for planning, tasks to be accomplished by the task force, and recommended task organizations. It also gives some planning guidance for employment of the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs).

• CALL 1QFY96 Bulletin No. 96-1, Jan 96, "Route-Clearance Operations," by CPT John Leighow.

• CALL Video Tape No. 14, "Combined Arms Route Clearance," produced at the Joint Readiness Training Center.

As a result of the scarcity of information and lack of detailed planning factors and training outlines, many brigade and battalion staffs do not plan route-clearance operations in sufficient detail, and many company commanders do not have sufficient knowledge to properly train on, or execute, route-clearance operations.

THREE EMERGING METHODS (see also CALL Quarterly Bulletin 96-1):

• Linear Clearance Method
• Combat Clearance Method
• Combined Clearance Method

LINEAR CLEARANCE METHOD: This method is executed by simply moving down a road from start point to a release point. If an obstacle is discovered, security is established while an element reduces the obstacle.

COMBAT CLEARANCE METHOD: This method identifies enemy named areas of interest (NAI) in the area of operation and then sends the combat clearance unit to confirm or deny the position of obstacles. If obstacles are identified, they are cleared and the unit then moves to the next NAI.

COMBINED CLEARANCE METHOD: This method combines the linear and combat clearance methods to clear obstacles and enemy. The unit is given a mission to move and clear an NAI; after clearing the NAI, the unit proceeds down a designated route to ensure that no other obstacles are present.

3. PLANNING.

Issue 1: Commanders routinely task units to clear and secure routes without actually understanding or planning for the extensive operations that the doctrinal definition of "clear and secure" imply.

Discussion: The first question that must be answered when planning for route-clearance operations is the degree of clearance and security desired. To do this properly, leaders must understand the doctrinal meanings of "clear" and "secure."

• Clear - A task which anticipates and requires the destruction of an enemy force, seizure of key terrain, and the reduction of obstacles, all of which would collectively delay or preclude the movement of following forces.

• Secure - To gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to deploy in a manner which prevents its destruction or loss of enemy action.

Looking at these definitions, it becomes evident that to clear or secure an entire route requires a huge investment in time, manpower, and resources, especially in heavily vegetated terrain. Page D-1 of FM 5-7-30 recommends that route clearance be done by an entire task force, with brigade retaining an air-assault or mechanized company in reserve.

The commander may actually only want to reduce obstacles and identify enemy traces along the route, as defined on page 2-2 of FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations. To reduce (not "clear") obstacles is to create lanes through or over obstacles to allow an attacking force to pass or to open resupply routes to needing units. The task of reducing obstacles does not imply that the route is secured, nor that the enemy is incapable of reseeding the obstacle area. Reducing obstacles normally will require smaller forces and less time than securing or clearing obstacles. Bypassing obstacles will require even fewer forces and resources. Neither bypassing nor reducing eliminates the threat of further enemy action along the route. The commander must decide which task or endstate he actually wants to accomplish and ensure that the proper task and criteria for success is transmitted to the operational forces.

TTP:

• The commander identifies what method of clearance should be conducted (linear clearance, combat clearance, combined clearance) and then provides the unit with a task and purpose.

• Route-Clearance Planning Consideration Checklist:
  • Warning order issued, to include routes to be cleared, NAIs, and NET move time.

  • Company SITEMP developed with suspected/known obstacles, ambushes, bypasses, danger areas for tanks and light infantry. (An infantry danger area is not the same as a tank danger area.)

  • Indirect fires planned based on SITEMP to achieve suppression and obscuration.

  • Graphic control measures established (phase lines, checkpoints, rally points, restrictive fire lines (RFLs), no-fire areas (NFAs), boundaries, medical evacuation landing zones [MEDEVAC LZs]).

  • Rules of Engagement (ROE) understanding. How does it affect the battle drill or standing operating procedures (SOPs)?

  • Do the tanks have roller or plow attached?

  • Notify adjacent units of operations and start time.

  • Communication considerations: Do engineers have radios? Does everyone in the task organization have the same communication capabilities?

  • Who in the battalion or brigade is responsible for routes? (In whose zone is the route located?)

  • CSS planning considerations: Sufficient demolition on hand? Sufficient marking materials on hand? Vehicle recovery plan established? Refueling/rearming plan in place?

Issue 2: Typically, a battalion commander will conduct active clearance of roads within his sector without any understanding of how his clearance mission ties into the brigade plan.

Issue 3: There is often no control of traffic flow along these roads, and units conducting the road clearance cannot plan for fires along their route without the fear of fratricide.

Discussion: Commanders must establish a route "CINC" for the BDE/BN sector. The CINC will open and close roads according to the level of threat and success of combat units in reducing and clearing obstacles and enemy out of the area. He will control all movement on this route. In establishing a route CINC, the brigade can effectively track the progress of road clearances as well as what roads are red or green for travel by brigade units. A possible road CINC for the brigade is either the brigade XO or the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) commander. The route CINC will have the authority to reposition route-clearance teams in the event of enemy activities or to provide additional security to key assets traveling along a particular route. With centralized control, the brigade can plot the obstacles and enemy contact throughout the brigade sector.

TTP: The individual designated to track the road-clearance elements must consider the following:

• For what purpose will the route be used? Will it be used only once to get attacking forces to an objective or will it serve as a battalion/brigade main supply route (MSR)? Does the route need to be capable of supporting two-way traffic or only one way? What type vehicles will be using the route?

• What is the enemy situation? Do we expect simple or complex obstacles along the route? Typical obstacles:
  • Cortinia Liberation Front (CLF) uses from two to eight mines on the road.

  • Some are buried, while others are surface laid.

  • Mines may be in potholes, MRE boxes, or sand bags.

  • Mines are found on the side of the road and obvious bypasses.

  • Most obstacles are covered by either direct or indirect fires.

  • The CLF usually will not engage well-protected convoys unless it is a high-payoff target.

  • It usually takes the CLF 60-90 minutes to reseed a minefield.

  • Mine caches are located 50-500 meters from the obstacle. If the CLF caches are destroyed, their ability to reseed is reduced.

  • Mines and caches are regularly booby-trapped.

• Time and forces available? How long can we spend on the route-clearance effort? How long do we expect each considered course of action to take? Do we have enough forces and resources (security forces, demolitions, marking materials, proofing equipment, etc.) to conduct a detailed clearance, or do we only have enough to conduct a reduction of obstacles?

• Terrain? Does terrain analysis indicate that bypassing obstacles is a feasible option? Are mine rollers, plows, and detectors likely to be effective based on terrain considerations?

** A force which combines light/heavy is better suited to the task of clearing. **

Issue 4: Commanders have difficulty deciding upon the degree of clearance, security, and reduction to be achieved.

Discussion: A guide to consider is CALL 1QFY96Bulletin No. 96-1, "Route-Clearance Operations," by CPT John Leighow, which recommends four levels of route clearance:

• Level 1: Relies on visual detection and results in a series of in-stride breaches to reduce minefields located along a route. This level does not include securing the minefield areas or searching for enemy forces or caches off the route. The use of mine rollers is very important to enhance force protection during Level 1 operations.

• Level 2: Clearing is conducted after a more thorough IPB process has identified likely minefield locations. The clearing force secures the flanks and far side of the minefields prior to clearing and employs visual and electronic mine detection methods.

• Level 3: Clearing includes the detailed clearing of the minefields, ditches, and road shoulders. This type of clearing should result in an updated route reconnaissance report and a map overlay update by all forces. Level 3 operations require more infantry, command and control, and more time than levels one or two.

• Level 4: Clearing is conducted entirely dismounted and includes the securing of the flank and far side of obstacles prior to reduction. It also includes the searching of the flanks for enemy and caches and may include leaving forces at reduced minefields to protect them from reseeding. Level 4 consumes the most time and manpower.

Thorough reconnaissance will help the commander decide what level and method of route clearance is most desirable. Aerial photography, helicopter overflight, dismounted reconnaissance elements, local engineering plans, IEW assets, and information obtained from the local populace should all be employed to develop an intelligence picture of the route to be cleared. Once the commander has decided which level and type of route clearance will meet his desired goals, the staff must develop a synchronized plan that incorporates all of the BOSs. The final course of action should include measures taken to control the route once the desired level and type of clearance have been achieved.

TTP: BOS Planning Factors:

Intelligence:

• S2 provides S3 and commander with template that depicts all known and suspected minefields, to include their size and composition.

• Identify choke points and areas where obstacles may be most easily bypassed.

• Indicate key terrain along the route.

• Obtain plans from the local highway or road officials. They may also be a valuable source of information.

Maneuver:

• Ensure mortar and reconnaissance assets are integrated.

• Develop adequate control measures to control movement along route and aid in clearance of direct and indirect fires.

• Apply engineers, indirect fire, and air support to ensure success in fighting the route-clearance mission.

Fire Support:

• Fire Support Officer (FSO) recommends best shell/fuse combination, sheath configuration, and type of mission to S3 and controlling commander.

• FSO develops clearance of fires procedure and ensures rapid response of fires, especially obscuration fires.

• Pre-clear as much of the route as possible.

• FSO advises commander of assets available, to include smoke and illumination.

Engineers:

• Give the commander a realistic estimate of how much of the route they can clear and reduce, given the available assets and time.

• Ensure all possible assets are utilized: demolition, mine detectors, thermal sights, mine rollers, mine plows, explosive sniffing dogs (if available), bulldozers, small equipment excavators (SEEs), armored combat earthmovers (ACEs), or chainsaws.

• Provide bridge and road classifications to S2. (Brief the commander on bridge and road limitations.)

Air Defense: Advise the commander on the best utilization and task organization of available ADA assets.

Combat Service Support:

• Ensure adequate medical and ambulance coverage is assigned to the clearing force.

• Ensure vehicles being used in the operation are carrying extra water, ammunition, meals, batteries, Class VIII (medical), and stretchers for the infantrymen.

• Develop plan to resupply clearing force with fuel and emergency parts.

Command and Control:

• Ensure the command relationship for all elements involved is clearly stated and understood.

• Ensure a simple, effective frequency plan.

• Plan for retransmit or relay to maintain continuous communication with commander.

Aviation:

• Consider the use of helicopters, such as the OH-58D and the AH-64, in an OPCON relationship to provide forward reconnaissance and immediate direct fire support.

• Plan for aerial resupply of fuel, ammunition, water, and parts.

Civil Affairs:

• If situation warrants, publish warnings to civilians to keep them out of harm's way during clearing operations.

• Coordinate with local officials to ensure their assistance in the route-clearance operation.

Issue 5: The company/team commander who is tasked to conduct a route-clearance operation may find it difficult to find doctrinal references that assist him in planning a task organization.

Discussion: It is important for the task organization to be able to support the clearance mission and fight under one company command headquarters. The task organization should be established as soon as possible to maximize on time available to plan and rehearse. Listed below is a recommended task organization of a light/heavy company team for Route Clearance.

An example key task for each platoon under task to maneuver units:

• 1st platoon provides local security for the convoy when stopped to prevent the enemy from destroying or harassing the armor and vehicular assets on the road.

• 2d platoon will attack to clear the flanks of danger areas or obstacle locations to destroy enemy forces and caches.

• 3d platoon establishes ambush positions near identified obstacles to destroy forces returning to the breached obstacles.

• Tank Platoon provides convoy security and assists 2d platoon in providing overwhelming firepower on enemy forces.

• Engineers will assess and breach obstacles so that the convoy can pass and move out of the danger area.

4. PREPARATION.

The company commander should establish a rehearsal area and rehearse all task-organized units. A rehearsal of breaching and clearing operations is paramount to the success of the operation. At a minimum, the commander should rehearse:

• Dismount drills
• Actions on contact
• Recovery plan
• Breaching an obstacle
• Fire plan
• Remount plan

The company commander can enhance the team's survivability by preparing their vehicles and personnel to conduct route clearance.

• Good pre-combat inspections (PCIs) will allow for greater flexibility if the situation changes.

• The commander should take the opportunity to ensure his soldiers have adequate protection while conducting route clearances. This may include sandbagging vehicles, opening hatches to lesson the effect of mine blasts, and having troops wear protective vests and Kevlar helmets with eye protection. All of these safety precautions increase the survivability of the clearance team.

Suggested PCI Checklist for Route-Clearance Operations

5. EXECUTION.

For a route-clearance operation to be successful, a company team must employ all of its combat multipliers at one decisive point along the road. This point is usually an obstacle, NAI, or danger area.

The synchronization of combat multipliers is controlled by the company commander. The commander ensures that the light/heavy team works together in one clearance technique. The technique discussed below is just that--a technique that can be modified to fit the unit's particular task organization. This technique incorporates fire support, engineers, tanks, and infantry to overwhelm the enemy if they become engaged.

Figure 1-1

NOTE: Separation between vehicles should be in accordance with the maximum blast radius of the suspect enemy mines. The lead vehicle is 75-100 meters in front of convoy. This provides standoff in the event lead tank runs over a mine.

Figure 1-2

TTP:

• Lead tank closes with obstacle, danger area, or NAI. The lead tank fires to his left and right, clearing the area through fire. At a minimum, the tank should engage with its COAX. The main gun can be used as a direct lay weapon system against enemy positions. (Suppress)

• The commander should call for smoke to his flanks as well as forward of his position. The tanks can fire their smoke grenades forward to assist in obscuration. (Obscure)

• The second and third tanks will have infantry squads mounted on them during movement. As the lead tank is firing, the second and third tanks will close the distance on the lead vehicle and dismount. The rest of the company will dismount from the trucks quickly. Two squads are mounted on the tanks to provide for faster dismounting from a vehicle. Dismounting from trucks is a long process, and two lead squads can assist by providing security.

• After the infantry squads dismount, they conduct bold flanks to the left and right of the obstacle. (Secure)

• Artillery is used to fix the enemy while squads maneuver to the flanks of the enemy.

• The commander moves forward so he can see the fight and establish control of the lead tanks.

• The commander uses mortars and artillery to smoke the obstacles. Fire should be continuous through this maneuver. The commander is either firing smoke or high explosives, fixing the enemy as they withdraw.

• A security platoon establishes a 360-degree perimeter around the convoy. This close-in security protects the tanks from enemy attacking them from the rear or throwing satchel charges on the tanks.

• Tanks should be used to provide a base of fire as the maneuver platoon advances forward. The platoon in contact should control the tank fire by either communication or visual recognition signals as the squads advance.

• Tanks should be used off roads if possible. Ensure five meters is cleared of mines from the road before moving tanks. (VS-17 panels or guides will help tanks identify front-line traces of the maneuver unit.)

• Commander calls the engineers forward to assess the obstacle. (A good idea is to have a light infantry NCO with the engineers for control of the company plan.) (Reduce)

Figure 1-3

TTP:

• Unit moves to secure far side of the obstacle, destroying any enemy personnel. The use of tanks, artillery, and smoke should all be in play when the unit is conducting its bold flanks.

• Unit should apply suppress, obscure, secure, reduce (SOSR) techniques when conducting their breach. (Note: Smoke is not an option at the breach.)

• Mortars should set up to provide fires on the obstacle or flanks for the maneuvering unit. The maneuvering unit can assist the engineers by putting smoke at the obstacle as they pass it.

• If possible, the flanking unit provides far-side security for the breach; tanks can be used for near-side security.

• Tanks scan with thermals, providing security to the maneuver unit.

• The company commander establishes limit of advance (LOA) for the maneuvering unit.

• Security platoons provide near security for the convoy and should direct tank fire into enemy positions, if possible.

Figure 1-4

TTP:

• The company leap-frogs platoons forward on the lead tanks. The security element now becomes the flanking platoon during the next engagement.

• Convoy moves out of the breach area a few hundred meters down the road. The convoy should no longer be under direct fire when the flanking unit loads up on the truck. If the convoy is being sniped, the company should employ smoke to cover withdraw.

• Stay-behind forces or ambush positions should be considered if caches have not been found.

• Casualties should move to a landing zone (LZ) or ground evacuated to the nearest medical treatment facility.

• Use a floating CCP to ensure proper security of casualties and medical assets.

Figure 1-5

This technique fulfills two purposes. First, it provides excellent security for the route-clearance team. Second, it allows the route-clearance team the opportunity to look for, and destroy, enemy and caches while engineers are breaching a lane.

Introduction

Chapter 2: Movement to Contact