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CHAPTER 3

DELIBERATE ATTACK

1. GENERAL. During a rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), typically a unit finds itself asking how it is going to employ their tanks in the deliberate attack. At first, they war-game the possibility of leading with the tanks, but yield to the idea since the noise of the tracks would give the unit away. They then think about linking the heavy forces up at a point just before they attack and infiltrate the light force into sector. Most battalions usually adopt this course of action. What follows is the typical outcome of separating the two forces during the movement to the objective and actions on the objective. The light infantry begins their infiltration into sector reducing simple obstacles, while the tanks wait at the line of departure to move forward. The battalion moves closer to the strong point until it runs into the opposing force's (OPFOR) observation posts. With limited protection against BMP and artillery, the battalion begins to take casualties from enemy direct and indirect fire systems. The light infantry force finds itself running out of an artillery box, only to be engaged by OPFOR direct weapon systems. The battalion begins to take heavy losses, but continues the attack. When the battalion reaches the trigger point to call tanks forward, the battalion is, at best, 70 percent of its original combat power. As the tanks move forward, they follow the route marked by the scouts to the link-up point. The battalion again moves forward to the objective, taking casualties as they advance. The tanks never move to a support by fire position, but follow behind the infantry. Once they arrive at the objective, the light engineers begin to move forward to breach the obstacle; they begin to die at the wire. The tanks move to a position where they can only place limited fires on the objective as the light forces push through the OPFOR's meat grinder. During the attack, the tanks never take up a support-by-fire position that can effectively support the infantry attack. Consequently, the infantry fights their battle while the tanks fight their separate battle. The two forces never meet on the objective to raise the victory flag because the tanks rarely assault onto the objective.

This vignette highlights some of the tactics, techniques, and procedures needed to integrate the light/heavy forces in a deliberate attack. The concept of fighting infantry with tanks is by no means new. The commander and staff must be able to understand the capabilities and limitations inherent in fighting a light/heavy fight against an aggressive enemy. We have learned this lesson through history, not by initially training to standard, but by having to fight an integrated light/heavy force or face annihilation. The light/heavy integration begins with the understanding of differences in applying the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs) and developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures to win on a dynamic battlefield. FM 100-5, Operations, 1940, stated that "no arms wins battles" and that "the combined actions of all arms and services was the key to success." Other field manuals recognized the need of the infantry and armor to work in close coordination by stating, "It is essential that the doctrine, powers and limitations of both be understood by those involved."

• The commander must analyze the enemy's strengths and weaknesses before he can make an informed decision on assaulting with mounted and dismounted forces.

• If momentum is lost during the attack, the commander must assess the capabilities of his tanks in regaining the momentum. Use the shock effect of the tanks.

• Base the direct fire plan on the commander's IPB of the objective.

• Light/heavy should provide mutual support during tactical movements. Bounding of light/heavy units is effective if the commanders understand the time and space differences in bounding forces forward.

2. DOCTRINAL BASE. As in most offensive actions, the commander's deduction of critical facts and the restated mission statement provide the focus for developing an attack. Most commanders begin their development of the operation from the decisive point on the objective and work their way back to the line of departure. A company can conduct attacks that are either separate or independent of a battalion. FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, discusses the forms of attack as either being hasty or deliberate. Because of the difficulties in fire control, navigation, identification of enemy and friendly forces, and limited visibility, attacks are normally deliberate. The company deliberate attack is usually coordinated and planned as part of a battalion attack. The difference between the hasty and deliberate attack is the time given to plan and the intelligence known on the objective; the effects of the attack are the same. Planning the deliberate attack for a light/heavy company team requires coordination at all levels due to the complexity and understanding of the combat arms involved. As we add the speed and firepower of tanks to the equation, we find that other battlefield operating systems are affected. One in particular is the employment of the unit's artillery and the timing of the effects that trigger the battlefield system.

The deliberate attack using light/heavy forces opens new questions commanders and staffs have to take into consideration during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). The coordination between the two elements is critical in addressing what each process brings to the fight. The planning differences in routes, interval, movement speed, formations, orientations, fire control measures, signals to be utilized between platoons, communication, and identification, friend or foe (IFF) procedures are issues that must be resolved and rehearsed before crossing the line of departure.

The preparation of the deliberate attack also is affected by the light/heavy organization. The light infantry commander may be challenged by finding adequate rehearsal sites, conducting resupply operations, or moving to new assembly areas, to name a few. The leaders must have the knowledge to check all elements to ensure they have completed their pre-combat inspections to standard. The checklist may consist of questions concerning fuel status of tanks and slice vehicles, ammunition type and amounts, barometric pressures to be given to tank commanders, maintenance status, and breach equipment. These questions, if put into a standing operating procedure (SOP), allow the commander to refer to a resource instead of his memory.

During the execution phase, the attack is characterized by rapid advancement and assaults, supported by the BOSs. To lose momentum in the attack would give way to vulnerability and open opportunities for the enemy to react. The company must be able to conduct actions on the objective using teams, sections, squads, and platoons. These actions might include breaching, evacuating casualties, providing support, searching enemy prisoners of war (EPW), clearing a trench line, destroying and clearing bunkers, and consolidating and reorganizing, to name a few. These tasks are discussed in detail in FM 7-8, The Infantry Platoon and Squad.

TYPICAL TASK ORGANIZATION FOR
ATTACK OF FORTIFIED POSITION

Figure 3-1

3. PLANNING.

Issue 1: Company commanders do not task-organize Light/Heavy forces to provide continuous mutual supporting fires during tactical movements to the lowest command and control element.

Discussion: When planning movements, the company commander must ensure the unit is moving in a way that supports a rapid transition to maneuver. Most units, when fighting a deliberate attack, do not take into consideration the traveling formations needed to move tanks with the light infantry. In planning the movement of a company team, the commander needs to take into consideration how the tank platoon's seven battle drills (change the formation, contact, action, react to indirect fire, react to air attack, react to nuclear attack, and react to chemical/biological attack) impact the company. The infantry platoon leaders need to rehearse with the tanks on the seven forms of contact (visual, direct fire, indirect fire, close air support (CAS), electronic/jamming, nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC), and obstacles)). Typically, a commander gives little to no thought to the movement to the objective. During this phase, tanks can provide supporting fires and a quick transition from movement to maneuver. Usually, a basic concept of operation looks like this:

(From a company operation order during a deliberate attack at JRTC.)

Figure 3-2

Rarely do you see a company commander give a platoon a section of tanks to maneuver with his platoon. Instead, the commander chooses to control and fight the tank platoon as a separate platoon. When the light infantry is separated from the tanks, it loses a large part of its firepower if engaged en route. The tanks, if separated, lose the close-in security the infantry can provide. This will depend on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) and intelligence (INTEL). The company commander should consider a more integrated task organization as listed below.

COMPANY TASK ORGANIZATION

TTP:

• Mount the infantry on the tanks. Move as fast as the situation will allow. There is security with overwhelming firepower. The commander must assess the biggest threat to his force during the movement and then apply his combat power to neutralize the enemy strength.

• Use the tanks' thermal sights to provide early warning to the light force.

• Integrate the tanks with the infantry so that if the unit comes in contact they can transition from movement to maneuver with minimum delay.

Issue 2: Units have difficulty integrating light/heavy elements into the scheme of maneuver.

Discussion: When a commander is confronted with fighting a light/heavy company team, he needs to determine the most critical facts and their effects for the mission. Some considerations the commander must consider are: potential decisive points determined from integrating the enemy situation and terrain analysis, critical ammunition shortages, and identifcation of potential weaknesses in enemy positioning. If the commander has a good understanding of how the enemy is positioned on the battlefield, he can determine his weapons' effect and array his weapon systems accordingly. The control measures the commander can establish are phase lines (PLs), checkpoints (CPs), and engagement areas (EAs). The commander should use these points on the ground to control his fires as well as his movement. Rarely do commanders use the control measures to transition into other types of battle formations. Usually, phase lines are used to report to higher headquarters the current location and distance from the final objective. A technique is to establish phase lines to synchronize the force's move forward. For example, if chance of enemy contact is not likely before PL RED, the platoon may choose to ride on the tanks; after passing PL RED, the unit can transition into bounding overwatch, clearing the right and left flanks of the tanks as they bound forward.

Figure 3-3

TTP:

• The company team needs to establish near and far recognition signals to help the armor unit identify friendly infantry as they bound forward: VS-17 (vehicle identification) panels, flashlights, and infrared (ir) chemical lights. Ensure you develop a realistic communication plan to facilitate reliable command and control during the movement.

• The commander should use graphic control measures to assist him in transitioning his formations and movement techniques during unit movement to the objective.

• Armor units should understand the direct fire support an infantry unit can provide without overextending his distance to the light infantry.

• The light infantry needs to be aware of the tank's main gun and 50-caliber machine gun ranges so they do not mask the tank fire by maneuvering in front of their positions.

• Use your tank platoon to eliminate the most serious direct fire threat to the company.

• Commanders must ensure that the platoon leaders identify and plot:
  • Known and suspected enemy positions.

  • Direct and indirect fire range fans of enemy weapons systems.

  • Enemy overlay for IVIS (Inter-Vehicle Information Systems) should be updated (M1A2 only).

• Commanders must determine:
  • Routes

  • Movement techniques for the company

  • Company formations based on:
    • company battle space

    • battalion scheme of maneuver

    • the likelihood of contact and where

    • the disparity between the tank platoon and infantry platoon movement rates

4. PREPARATION.

Issue 3: Commanders conduct pre-combat inspections (PCIs) with their soldiers and equipment. Leaders focus on the readiness of mission-essential equipment and ammunition and on the mission understanding of subordinate elements, leaders, and individual soldiers. Infantry commanders do not display the knowledge to conduct effective PCIs with the armor unit. The commanders usually leave the inspections up to the armor leadership. This results in a misunderstanding of what equipment and ammunition can be used during the operation.

Discussion: The inspection of the unit should consist, at a minimum, of each crew or squad's ability to move, shoot, and communicate. The infantry leadership needs to ensure that the equipment the armor is using will not hinder the commander's scheme of maneuver. For example, if a tank is firing SABOT rounds and the commander's scheme of maneuver plans on moving infantrymen next to the tanks, the discard of the rounds may cause injuries to the infantrymen. This information causes the commander to either change his scheme of maneuver or restrict the armor from using those rounds during certain phases. When conducting PCIs for the deliberate attack, leaders should, at a minimum, inspect the following:

Issue 4: Commanders understand the importance of rehearsals, especially actions on the objective. The leaders fail to rehearse coordinated movements with the light/heavy elements. The more the unit focuses on squad and platoon-level movement with the armor, the more confident and aggressive the unit is fighting as a combined company team.

Discussion: Rehearsals should focus on mission-specific tasks, allowing leaders to maximize the limited time available. Leaders should look for rehearsal sites where they can maneuver the armor elements. Since light infantry and armor do not regularly work with each other, they are apprehensive about maneuvering within close proximity. The light infantry worry about being run down while the tanks worry that the infantry will restrict their movement. A technique to bring light/heavy units' confidence level up is by working basic battle drills in an open area and then move to more restrictive terrain. Tanks should rehearse moving through all types of terrain with the infantry to their flanks and rear. Tanks should test fire near infantry to get them confident about being in close proximity while tanks are firing.

Rehearsals of actions on objectives should be detailed enough so that the infantry units understand fire commands. An example of a fire command rehearsal between the squad leader and the tank commander as they assault an objective:

Infantry squad leader: "Team Bravo, move forward and clear bunker two."

Leaders can rehearse these commands by using FM radio, hand-and-arm signals, or modified field telephones on the tank (see Appendix C). An additional technique that can be rehearsed is using M203 rounds to mark targets on the objective for the tanks.

TTP:

• Conduct rehearsals of fire command techniques down to squad level. Rehearsing control measures will prevent overkill when multiple units are able to observe and engage enemy targets.

• The priority of rehearsals should be in line with course-of-action (COA) development and flow from the decisive point of the operation to the LD.

• Security must be maintained during rehearsals.

• Rehearsals of resupplying and evacuating vehicles and personnel should be executed at platoon level and controlled at company level.

Issue 5: The company commander must understand that the tank platoon has no organic combat service support assets. Normally, the platoon sergeant will coordinate directly with both his organic company and the infantry company.

Discussion: The most forward combat service support (CSS) element of the tank platoon's parent company/team will be the company team's combat trains. The trains should provide necessary vehicle recovery and maintenance service for the platoon. The light infantry company should provide immediate medical aid. It will be necessary for the company commander and tank platoon leader to determine the best route for the platoon to use in moving to the trains location. During the preparation for the attack, the commander must have a good understanding on how his tanks will be recovered and resupplied. Preparations for resupply may include being topped off four hours before an attack.

TTP:

• The commander must recognize that proper maintenance is the key to keeping the tank platoon operational.

• As a general guideline, tank platoons will conduct repair and recovery as far forward as the situation allows.

• The M1A1 has a basic load capacity of 40 main gun rounds; 900 50-caliber; 11,400 7.62-mm; 24 smoke grenades. (M1A2 has a basic load of 42 main gun rounds, with the remaining amounts the same as the M1A1.)

• Tanks need time to conduct maintenance.

• When a commander loses one tank, he has lost a platoon of firepower in his company.

5. EXECUTION.

The attack must be violent and rapid to shock the enemy and prevent his recovery until the defense has been destroyed. The attacker must minimize his exposure to enemy fires by using maneuver and counterfire, avoiding obstacles, maintaining security, ensuring command and control, and remaining organized for the fight on the objective. --FM 100-5, Operations, 1986

Issue 6: A successful deliberate attack is usually a result of an integrated task organization and effective direct and indirect fire control plan. Rarely does the commander place a detailed fire control plan to integrate the heavy unit. The results are a free-for-all on the objective, either with tanks and infantry missing target opportunities or overkill of a particular sector. The inadequate analysis of an enemy situation results in the task organization being insufficient to support the company movement or attack.

Discussion: A unit must task-organize so they have a breach element, support element, and an assault element. With decentralized elements, there must be control measures established to synchronize all elements to produce the desired effect--kill the enemy. The direct and indirect control plan is the method the commander uses to ensure that sufficient firepower is used in accordance with the threat. The control plan starts when the unit crosses the line of departure and ends with the consolidation and reorganization near the objective. The commander's fire control plan is affected by the enemy disposition, movement formations of the tanks and infantry, and speed of attack.

Figure 3-4

SUPPORT ELEMENT: The support element is usually the lead element in movement to the objective. The task of the support element is to assist in fixing, isolating, and suppressing enemy forces on the objective. The support element is also the most likely to come into contact en route to the objective; its given orientation is the direction of attack. The support force maneuvers to the objective with the light infantry providing close-in support and tanks providing overwhelming firepower against enemy dismounts. If the commander is unable to isolate the objective with maneuver, he can initially isolate the objective with fires and then with direct weapons from the tanks and the crew-served weapons. The support element should have an engineer attached to assist the platoon in conducting in-stride breaches to the objective.

BREACH ELEMENT: The breach element is the second in the order of movement to the objective. The task of the breach element is to open a gap to pass the assault element onto the enemy objective. The breach element does not have heavy units attached to them, but should receive close-in support with the assault element tanks. These tanks can move up with the breach element and provide direct fire on the objective while they breach, or breach the obstacle themselves. This close-in support does not negate or stop the support element's fires on the objective. The breach element applies all principles of suppress, obscure, secure, and reduce (SOSR) as they accomplish their mission. The breach element also has the smoke grenades on the tanks to assist with obstruction.

ASSAULT ELEMENT: The assault element is the main effort. It is third in order of movement to the objective. It is tasked with crossing the gap created by the breach element. What type of enemy unit intelligence has detected on the objective will determine whether the light force or heavy force goes through the breach first. If mines and obstacles have been cleared, the tanks should drop the mine plow on the lead assault tank and begin to proof the lane while destroying enemy targets. The infantry in the assault element will fall behind the tank as it clears the objective. The commander's control plan on the objective allows him to continue fires past the objective while tanks engage targets using main gun and 50-caliber machine guns. Clear bunkers or trenches that the tanks have fired on with infantry.

The sequence of the attack is illustrated in the diagram shown below:

Figure 3-5

TTP:

• Company Action/Options:
  • Elect to bypass.

  • Light platoon provides overwatch to the tank section as they move forward to provide suppressive fire.

  • Forward Observer (FO) calls for artillery on the far side of the obstacle.

  • Lead tank should have a mine plow to assist engineers of proofing lane.

  • Platoon leader designates sectors of fire for the light/heavy team.

  • Commander determines whether to plow through the breach or use the engineers. (Anti-personnel (AP) mines have little to no effect on tanks. Ensure soldiers are away from tanks if tanks proof a lane. A tank can go over one strand of wire without difficulty.)

  • Commanders must employ smoke before the lead element breaches or the tanks move through.

  • Use the application of SOSR. The company can use the smoke grenades on the tanks to cover and obscure friendly movement.

  • Use overwhelming firepower as the engineers move forward. Tanks provide close-in support as the engineers reduce the obstacle. The infantry provides local security for the tanks as they suppress enemy positions.

  • Trail elements should prepare to assault through the breach and continue the mission.

  • Artillery and mortars should continue to fire as the infantry and armor pass through the obstacle.

  • The commander must ensure the unit has obstruction, artillery, or mortar fire on the far side and direct fire on any known or suspected enemy positions before breaching.

• During the deliberate attack a company team can expect to:
  • Destroy an inferior force.

  • Attack by fire.

  • Overwatch/support by fire.

  • Assault.

  • Bypass.

  • Reconnaissance by fire.

  • Hasty/in-stride breach.

  • Clear a danger area.

Figure 3-6

TTP:

• A commander can plan on conducting three types of breaches:
  • Mechanical breaching, usually with mines or mine rakes.

  • Explosive breaching, employing means such as the Mine-Clearing Line Charge

    (MICLIC), M173 line charge, bangalores, blocks of C4.

  • Manual breaching, with soldiers probing by hand or using grappling hooks, shovels, chain saws.

• Commander must ensure he keeps the enemy on its heels by keeping up the momentum.

• The engineers need to mark the breach large enough for a tank to pass through safely. Unit SOPs will dictate marking methods and materials. Commonly, these include:
  • Cleared Lane Mechanical Marking Systems (CLAMMS)

  • Pathfinder system

  • Engineer stakes with tape

  • Guides

  • Chemical lights and/or infrared lights

  • Expended shell casings

• Commander orders the assault through the breach. The tanks should lead the assault with the infantry following behind. (Allow tanks to move through the breach before the infantry allows for more suppressive fire if needed.)

• Commander should re-establish the company formation and continue forward to the objective.

Figure 3-7

Figure 3-8

TTP:

• Tanks and infantry should not be separated on the objective. A squad should follow a tank as it destroys bunkers or vehicles. The infantry should clear the bunkers once they have been engaged.

• The unit moves across an objective as slow or fast as needed to maintain communication and control.

  Breaches and reduction of obstacles need to occur as soon as possible to allow the tanks the freedom of movement if there is a counterattack.

• The commander should number or mark all known enemy positions on the objective and assign sectors of fire when the platoon assaults through the objective.

• The best direct lay weapon system the commander has is the tank's main gun.

• The commander should consider bringing forward his 60-mm to have additional direct lay capabilities.

• Once the assault element is on the objective, the commander should consider repositioning his support element if they cannot fire, or isolate the objective.

• Develop a marking system for destroyed bunkers and vehicles.

• Tanks should have tracers to mark bunkers at night.

• The infantry can cross-level PAC-4B to guide in infantry fires at night.

• The commander needs to use the range finders of the tank when calling for artillery or preparing or counterattacks.

• The commander must create an exit breach near the expected counterattack. This allows the tanks freedom to maneuver if counterattacked by an armor force.

---

Chapter 2: Movement to Contact
Chapter 4: MOUT Operations

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