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Military

CHAPTER 4

MOUT OPERATIONS

by CPT Nicholas Panagakos and 1SG Ralph Kluna
1. GENERAL. Military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) provide units with multiple challenges different from the typical familiar combat operation. However, wherever war breaks out, it is most likely that some of the combat will take place in urban areas as diverse as huge metropolitan cities and remote villages. Regardless of the specific site, the exercise of certain doctrinal fundamentals remains valid if urban combat is to be successful.

The fog had begun to move into the low-lying areas surrounding objective Gloria. "Gloria" was the name of the small village when it became an objective for the infantry company to clear. Intelligence reports had identified the village as a possible safe haven for the enemy to cache supplies and lager their troops. You could feel the anticipation throughout the company as H-hour was growing near. RTOs conducted final communications check on the company net, and squad leaders were continuing to conduct final backbriefs with their soldiers. At H-30, the company would move out.

At H-30 the high-pitched whine of the M1 tanks' turbine engines starting could be heard. This told the company to form for move out. Tank section one, assigned as support by fire, would move first. The infantry could hear the crunching of trees as the tank section maneuvered its way into position. All could hear as the tank section halted, then waited for the radio message of "SBF one in position." When the message came in, it was time to move.

First platoon would be a supporting effort and move first. The lead squad had identified a dry creek bed on an earlier reconnaissance and was using it now to infiltrate the platoon up to the village. Tank section two would be moving with the platoon, positioning one tank on each flank along the high ground. First platoon's task was to breach any obstacles that could delay the tanks from moving into the town. The platoon had been task-organized with an attached tank section and an attached engineer squad. The tank section would provide close support up to any obstacles and then pass the mission on to the second platoon and support the main effort in gaining a foothold. The engineer squad would execute any breaches necessary en route to the objective.

As the platoon moved along the creek, tank section one, at the support by fire position, began to report movement in the village. The enemy had begun moving much earlier than anticipated. If the enemy had detected them, it would become an exercise in reaction and possibly result in numerous casualties. The latest developments were unexpected, but would not hinder the company's mission, so first platoon continued to move, now with a greater sense of urgency.

Tank section two spotted an obstacle, and it was time for first platoon to go into action. Second squad began to move slowly into a support-by-fire position. When the squad leader could see the obstacle, he called the platoon leader with "second in position." The platoon leader moved the first squad forward with the engineer squad to execute the breach. The obstacle appeared well built; it had triple standard concertina with both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines in and around it. It stretched as far as the squad leader could see; there would be no bypass of this obstacle. The engineer squad had prepared the demolition charges while in the assault position. All they needed to do now was place the charges under the wire obstacle to form the breach necessary to move the tanks through and onto the objective. With the assistance of first squad, the engineers moved forward to place the charges. First squad threw smoke forward of the obstacle to obscure it; there was no need for suppressive fire because they had not been engaged yet. This would not be the case for much longer.

With a thunderous roar, machine gun fire erupted, penetrating the smoke barrier at the breach. Two soldiers become casualties instantly from the automatic fire. Tank sections one and two immediately returned fire with their machine guns. First squad leader rushed forward to evacuate his casualties and assist the engineers with placing their demolition charge, but was wounded en-route. Bravo team tried to assist the engineers and continue with the breach, but received a casualty as well. First squad and the engineers had received seven casualties in less than 30 seconds.

Third squad, the platoon reserve, immediately sprang into action. The squad leader fired and maneuvered his squad forward and completed placing the breaching charge, while the first squad evacuated their casualties to the platoon's casualty collection point (CCP). The platoon sergeant was forward now and began requesting for MEDEVAC over the command net. It would be two hours before first platoon could evacuate the casualties.

After third squad had set the charge, the platoon pulled back and blew the breach. The blast was deafening, and debris fell all around the soldiers of first platoon. The smoke and dust caused confusion, but the infantrymen were able to press on. Third squad moved forward to proof and mark the breach, then reported when it was ready.

Second platoon, the company main effort, started moving through the breach toward the first building. Their task was to gain a foothold for the company and clear buildings one and two. With squads using tanks from section two as shields, first and second squads moved toward their objective. When the two squads moved within 25 meters of the building, second squad started throwing smoke. The smoke was going to obscure the enemy from seeing them enter building one.

First squad of second platoon would enter the building through the back door. The Alpha team leader aggressively maneuvered his team into position. They were stacked on the left side of the door, when the team leader turned to kick the door in. In a flash of fire and vaporous smoke, the team leader had disappeared. The door had been booby-trapped. Immediately the squad leader pushed first squad through the door and continued with their mission to secure building one. Once the building was secured, the platoon passed second squad through the building and on to building two, second squad's objective.

The infantry company would be able to accomplish their mission and secure objective Gloria. Their ability to move into the village and gain a foothold ultimately ensured their success. The company paid a heavy price in accomplishing their goal and would not be combat ready for another 72 hours.

Issue 1: How could we have prevented some of those casualties?

EXAMPLE: In the vignette above -

TTP:

Techniques:

  • By executing the breaching fundamentals of SOSR (Suppress, Obscure, Secure, and Reduce), while placing the attached tank section between the enemy and the dismounted infantry to form a shield, some of the casualties from small arms could have been prevented.

  • Do not use the door of an enemy-occupied building as the entry point. The doors most likely will be booby-trapped. Create an entry point while simultaneously clearing enemy from that room. Otherwise, use a window as an entry point (less dangerous than doors).

2. DOCTRINAL BASE. For such risky and potentially complicated operations, what does our doctrine tell us about planning, preparing, and executing MOUT operations? What these manuals do not provide are techniques for employing tanks with infantry during MOUT in a role other than support by fire.

"The increased population and accelerated growth of cities have made the problems of combat in built-up areas an urgent requirement for the U.S. Army; this type of combat cannot be avoided...." --FM 90-10-1 w/ch 1, An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas

The concept of using tanks and infantry as a combined arms force in built-up areas is not new. However, the organization of the heavy infantry division places mechanized infantry and armor together. This does not give light infantry the opportunity to train with tanks habitually. The addition of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle further reinforces the armor relationship with mechanized infantry.

Throughout history, planners combined tanks with infantry to accomplish specific tasks. The last time tanks and infantry were combined and used extensively in an urban environment was 30 years ago during the battle of Hue. In 1968, U.S. forces had the mission to clear the city of Hue. The enemy resistance was so strong that the infantry could not do it alone. The Marine Corps combined the efforts of infantry and tanks to accomplish their goal and clear the city.

In 1993, while conducting operations in Somalia, U.S. forces operated in an urban environment (Mogadishu) without the support of armor. When the enemy had decisively engaged the infantry, U.S. ground forces were unable to move into the area and extract them. This resulted in 18 hours of intense combat, leaving 18 American soldiers dead and countless others wounded. The addition of armor might have allowed for quicker reaction and possibly less casualties. Because we did not have armor forces in country, we will never know.

A more recent incident, not involving U.S. forces, occurred during the Russian invasion of Chechnya in late 1994. The Russian attack on Grozny consisted of a motorized rifle regiment (roughly 2,000 troops), with the goal of reaching the train station. The infantry and tanks had not been prepared for the resistance they would encounter. Russian infantry rode on top of the tanks during the movement into the city. This made them easy targets for the Chechen rebels. The rebels simply used machine gun fire to engage the infantry and RPG-7s to engage the tanks. The covering infantry either was separated from the tanks or dismounted too late. At the end of the battle, the attacking Russian brigade lost 20 of its 26 tanks, 100 of its 120 Armor Personnel Carriers (APC), and half of their 1,000 men were either killed, wounded, or missing in action. The lack of combined arms training and a poor plan combined for devastating results during the assault on Grozny.

3. PLANNING. Planning provides the cornerstone to success. Military plans must be simple yet provide enough detail to allow subordinates to execute with minimal guidance. Plans should identify main and supporting efforts as well as the decisive point. These help the commander shape a plan maximizing the effectiveness of his combined arms force. What follows are some experiences based on MOUT planning considerations for combined arms employment.

Issue 2: Improper task organization for MOUT operations and unclear chain of command and control.

Discussion: The result was confusion and lack of control during mission execution.

TTP:

Techniques: The task organization should reflect where elements will be assigned for a given mission; more importantly, the senior maneuver element leader should be in control of each element.

EXAMPLE: There are three traditional ways to task-organize a tank platoon into an infantry company.

  • Put the tank platoon under company control (see Figure 4-1). The tank platoon leader should be responsible for maneuvering the tanks in accordance with the commander's intent. With this task organization, tanks would most likely be used in support by fire and overwatch missions. This task organization is the most difficult to maneuver tanks with the infantry. However, the tank platoon leader can choose to maneuver the platoon by sections to execute the mission. This would provide greater flexibility in supporting the infantry during the close fight.


    Figure 4-1

  • Break the tank platoon into two sections, each under control of one infantry platoon (see Figure 4-2). The commander relinquishes direct control of the tank maneuver to the infantry platoon leaders. This technique is very effective in keeping the tanks at the same rate of progress as the infantry. However, infantry platoon leaders burdened with the additional command and control responsibilities often have a difficult time maneuvering the tank platoons because of a lack of experience with tanks and overall battlefield focus. Typically the infantry platoon leader is focused on clearing a building and on his maneuver squads. This results in his forgetting the tanks and failing to maneuver them forward.


    Figure 4-2

  • Break the tank platoon into two sections: one under company control and one under platoon control (see Figure 4-3). The maneuver infantry platoon has a tank section available to support the close fight. As stated in the previous option, the infantry platoon leader would still face the difficulties associated with this additional element to command and control. However, the commander has a tank section to deploy at the critical place and time, as he determines. This task organization technique still allows support to the infantry close fight while keeping additional support options in reserve for the commander to employ. There are drawbacks here as well. The tank platoon leader is not maneuvering his tanks--an infantry platoon leader is. Also, the tanks directly available to the company commander are cut in half.


Figure 4-3

None of these techniques are inherently better than the other. The task organization has to be tailored to best suit the given mission. Regardless of the technique selected, what follows are some rules of thumb to remember during planning, preparation, and execution:

  • If using tanks to shield squads and teams from building to building as part of the maneuver, the leader of the forward element needs to control the tanks.

  • If the commander is controlling the tanks, he needs to move forward to a position where he can effectively maneuver the tanks in support of the infantry.

  • The task organization should support the span of control. If the commander is going to control the tanks, then there is no reason to task-organize the tanks by section under infantry platoons.

  • Tanks and infantry must be mutually supporting. Tanks need infantry support when the two elements are working together. Do not leave tanks alone because they are not prepared to pull local security during the operation. Tanks are extremely vulnerable to dismounted attack when operating in restricted terrain.

Issue 3: Too many infantry commanders fail to use Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) products during the development of their plan.

Issue 4: Too many commanders fail to consider mounted avenues of approach portrayed in Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) produced.

Discussion:

  • Commanders too often devise plans without adequate consideration of how the enemy fights. An enemy will react differently to an armor threat than to an infantry threat. However, when such reactions are not considered, tanks are often left vulnerable to enemy anti-tank weapons and obstacles because of planning oversights.

  • The failure to effectively use the MCOO gives specific examples of planning oversights. For example, mounted avenues of approach encompass far more than the road network. Road networks will be the first place that the enemy will emplace mobility obstacles.

TTP:

Techniques:

  • In many cases, the integration of IPB products into the planning process would have eliminated the oversights that do not often show up until mission execution.

  • In planning, pay close attention to available terrain that will support tank cross-country movement. The pace may be slower, but by using terrain for concealment, far greater security is possible.

  • Infantry commanders must fully understand the capabilities and limitations of the tanks attached to their company.

  • Involve tank platoon leaders and platoon sergeants in the infantry company-level IPB process; their tank expertise will hasten the understanding of what tanks can and cannot do and aid the infantry commander in making the best employment decisions.

  • At every level of IPB, always address enemy capabilities and limitations.

Issue 5: Light infantry commanders and staffs too often fail to consider using tanks to support the overall CSS effort. This usually means they fail to consider tanks as a readily available mobile platform.

Issue 6: Too many light infantry units are unfamiliar with the Class III, IV, and overall maintenance requirements associated with attached tanks.

TTP:

Techniques:

  • Light infantry elements can use attached tanks to carry water and ammunition as well as other supplies. This obvious benefit to the dismounted infantryman is too often overlooked, especially when operations are extended or require the expenditure of large amounts of ammunition.

  • To keep attached tanks mission capable requires planning for refueling and rearming of the tanks. Additionally, there may be a requirement for recovery of one or more tanks because of maintenance problems or the tank being disabled during contact. Light infantry logisticians need to ensure they understand the planning factors for fuel and ammunition consumption, and then make the necessary arrangements for adequate resupply, maintenance support, and recovery capability. Failure to do so can result in unnecessary loss of attached tanks. Push the necessary support packages well forward on the battlefield. Put them under the control of the company XO to provide the most immediate support reaction. This will shorten the recovery period.

4. PREPARATION. The preparation phase of any operation is critical to the success of the operation. Steps taken prior to mission execution can greatly impact the ultimate success or failure of the mission during the execution phase. MOUT operations are no exception. The addition of tanks to the battle mix of Light Infantry gives even greater necessity to thoroughly prepare for operations.

Issue 7: Too many Pre-combat Inspections (PCIs) and Pre-combat Checks (PCCs) lack the necessary thoroughness to be useful.

Issue 8: Too many units fail to sufficiently rehearse operations; backbriefs take the place of full-force rehearsals. While back riefs have their place, they pale in comparison to the value of rehearsals conducted in greater detail, particularly with tasks related to actions on the objective.

Issue 9: Too many soldiers are not aware of the contingencies involved when operating with tanks in close combat. The addition of tanks to a light infantry task organization inherently implies the necessity for a thorough and detailed preparation. For example, Rules of Engagement (ROE) may be very specific about collateral damage in an urban area, and failure to understand the destructive power of tanks can make ROE compliance difficult.

Issue 10: The presence of civilians during MOUT operations provides very unpredictable challenges for elements executing close combat in urban areas, challenges which too often are glossed over during mission preparation and prove detrimental to successful mission completion.

TTP:

PCIs:

  • The addition of tanks to the Light Infantry task organization does not change the basic requirement for PCIs-- tanks simply increase the amount and type of inspections necessary. The PCIs are still geared to ensuring the unit can move, shoot, and communicate. However, it is advisable that the commander initially use infantry personnel to inspect infantry equipment, and that tankers inspect the tanks. THEN, the two elements can help inspect each other, particularly with equipment directly involved with support. EXAMPLE: Use infantrymen to inspect the external phone box on each tank, since the infantry relies on these phones as a means of communication during close combat supported by tanks. This helps ensure the equipment is serviceable AND that the infantry knows how to use the phones.

  • Commanders must specifically set aside time for PCIs and sub-divide the time to include cross-over inspections, for example, Joint PCIs with tanks and infantry, as described above.

  • Commanders must ensure PCI standards are briefed and then enforced.

  • Commanders should develop PCI checklists as a tool to assist leaders at all levels to effectively inspect their equipment and the equipment of attached elements.

Rehearsals:

  • Conduct a combined arms rehearsal, time permitting, at the level tanks are task-organized. The following aspects of the combined arms operation need to be rehearsed:

    • Graphic and fire control measures

    • Communications

    • Direct fire plans

    • Breach drills

    • Procedures for infantry riding on tanks

    • Techniques for using tanks as infantry shields

  • Try to replicate conditions for mission execution during rehearsals, i.e., day, night, civilians on the battlefield, and host-nation personnel, as well as ROE.

5. EXECUTION. As with any other combat operation, the ultimate success or failure of the mission is determined by how well the units execute the mission. Obviously the planning and preparation for any given mission are key to any subsequent success or failure. However, regardless of the plan or the level of pre-mission preparation, soldiers' and officers' ability to execute the individual and collective tasks inherent in the mission clearly determine the likelihood of mission success. This task ability is a direct result of disciplined training and repetition. If soldiers can execute their tasks to standard, then it is up to leaders to position their soldiers for success in battle.

Issue 11: Too often light infantry fails to properly employ tanks to reinforce the infantry's attempts to gain a foothold during MOUT operations, a critical step in achieving mission success.

Discussion: To gain a foothold to access a village or a town, use tanks to reinforce light infantry. Gaining a foothold is executed under one of two basic conditions: (1) detected or (2) undetected. Obviously, being undetected by the enemy is preferred. Additionally, the following task-organization conditions exist: supporting the infantry will be armor, engineer, and field artillery elements. Each element will combine their efforts to gain the foothold.

TTP:

Techniques:

  • Use of tanks in a support by fire for the infantry.

    • Employ tanks as a support-by-fire element.

    • Employ stand-off to maximize the effectiveness of the tanks' weapon systems.

    • Stand-off allows for greater coverage of the objective.

    • Use clearly understood control measures (graphic, visual and direct/indirect fire) to mark the progress of the infantry.

    • Maintain enough maneuver flexibility that tanks can reposition their support-by-fire positions based on, and relative to, the infantry advance.

    • All the tanks in the combined arms force should not be dedicated to support by fire.


    Figure 4-4

  • Use tanks to maneuver infantry squads into the village.

    • With some tanks in the support by fire role, the remaining tanks can move infantry soldiers into a position to gain the foothold.

    • Tanks can provide a mobile shield for dismounted infantry, protecting them from small-arms fire and shell fragments. This allows an infantry squad to move behind a tank all the way forward to the targeted building. The tank also provides immediate direct fire support for any threat to the infantry squad. Tanks can move a maximum of nine personnel.

    • After gaining the foothold, continue to use tanks to move infantry.

    • Maintain communication between tanks and infantry throughout mission execution.

    • Establish identification, friend or foe (IFF) to prevent fratricide.


    Figure 4-5

  • Use smoke to screen movement from those areas that tanks cannot block. Use the smoke to obscure the vision from other buildings, not between the infantry and the building they wish to enter.


Figure 4-6

Issue 12: The majority of MOUT casualties occur as units move outside of buildings or move between buildings. A lack of situational awareness is the primary cause of these casualties.

TTP:

Technique: To minimize casualties when moving outside or between buildings:

  • Cover all possible threat locations with either observation or fire.

  • For those areas it is not possible to cover with observation or fire, use smoke to set a screen to block enemy observation of friendly movement.

  • Move tanks forward to support infantry moves. Properly position the tanks before the infantry begins moving, whether the tanks are supporting by fire or being used as shields, or both.

  • Pre-plan the positions if possible, but devise a marking system and communication signals to designate situationally dependent positions to help maintain momentum.

  • When using tanks as a shield for the infantry, move the tanks as close as possible to the start point to allow the infantry the freedom of movement when exiting the building.

  • Tanks need to move at the infantry's rate of movement.

  • When the distance between buildings is short, tanks can just position themselves to block the open area from enemy fire.

Issue 13: Too many company commanders do not position themselves where they can best command and control all of their elements. They are either too far back and unable to see the fight, or they get too far forward and get decisively engaged in squad- or platoon-level fights.

Discussion: The commander is unable to effectively maneuver forces he is responsible to synchronize, unable to mass direct and indirect fires at critical points, or position key elements under his control. This results in a failure to ensure the main effort is at the decisive point with the overwhelming combat power necessary to be successful.

TTP:

Technique: Use graphic and other type control measures, widely disseminated and clearly understood by all elements in the task organization, to assist the company/team commander's command and control. The following control measures are particularly useful in MOUT operations:

  • Phase lines

  • Number and lettering systems for buildings

  • Tentative support by fire positions

  • No fire areas

These control measures can assist the commander to visualize the battle, which is critical for those portions of the battle he may not be in a position to actually see (see Figure 4-7).


Figure 4-7
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