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CHAPTER 2

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

1. GENERAL. Since their reintroduction into the U.S. Army organization in the 1980s, light infantry units have seldom trained with tanks to conduct movement to contact (MTC). Currently, Fort Lewis, WA, is the only major Army installation where active duty armor and light infantry units are stationed together and continually train. The potential enemy that light infantry units usually train to conduct a MTC against is unconventional forces. These forces are generally poorly equipped, poorly organized, and lead such as those forces encountered in Panama and Haiti in the early 90s.

2. DOCTRINAL REVIEW.

The movement to contact (MTC) is an offensive mission designed to establish or regain contact with the enemy and immediately engage him where he is weakest. Upon contact, the unit develops the situation by determining the enemy strengths, the location of his flanks, gaps, and weaknesses, and his intentions. Following this, the unit executes a hasty or deliberate attack, bypass, or, when necessary, a defense. According to FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, light infantry companies conduct movements to contact using two methods:

• The search-and-attack technique.
• The conventional technique (approach march technique).

Both techniques rely on subordinate units fulfilling one or more of the multiple roles of the find, fix, and finish functions. Doctrinally, both techniques have advantages and disadvantages that must be assessed while deciding which to employ. One means of assessment is to compare the technique with the enemy's possible courses of actions (most likely and most dangerous). Selection of the appropriate technique must consider METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available) and be judged by the nine Principles of War.

The search-and-attack technique. Doctrinally, this technique is best when the following conditions apply:

• Enemy forces are unconventional in nature. They typically operate in small teams using "hit-and-run" tactics to gain and maintain the initiative, only making contact when they feel they have the advantage.

• The enemy conducts operations over a very large area and in a very decentralized manner, forcing friendly units to disperse to locate him and then mass to destroy him.

Units conduct search and attack to destroy the enemy, facilitate force protection measures, area denial, and to collect information according to FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion. This technique uses small elements--platoons or squads--to search multiple areas simultaneously. Once the enemy is found, platoons and companies are used to fix and finish the enemy. Although it could definitely be used to establish or regain contact with a conventional enemy force, it would not facilitate immediate engagement of the enemy where he is weakest. For this reason, search and attack has never been regarded as a valid technique for use in a medium-intensity conflict. Also, when judged on how well it achieves the nine Principles of War, the search-and-attack technique is also found to be the least favorable technique in a low-intensity conflict. (See the "Feasibility Matrix" at Figure 2-1.)

The approach march technique. This technique is normally used when a company is conducting a movement to contact as part of a battalion task force (FM 7-10). Doctrinally, it is considered to be most feasible when the following conditions apply:

• Enemy force is more conventional in nature.

• Enemy force follows a more structured order of battle and is more predictable in nature.

• Enemy force is more centrally located.

• Enemy conducts more centralized operations.

As doctrinally described, the basic approach march is a feasible technique in a medium-intensity conflict in an environment against a more conventional enemy. The approach march can also be a highly effective technique against an unconventional force with the following modifications:

• Zone of attack for the approach march must be limited in depth and width to clearly defined terrain features that will enhance the ability of a stay-behind force to accomplish area denial and provide the infantry with quickly achievable terrain-based objectives. Breadth of the zone should be limited, yet great enough to prevent enemy forces from easily avoiding contact (side-stepping through maneuver).

• Sufficient density of maneuver forces must be committed to this zone of attack to ensure complete coverage across the breadth of the zone to prevent enemy forces from slipping between subordinate maneuver units.

• Infantry companies and platoons should select movement formations that achieve more width than depth for the following reasons:
  • This lessens the number of units needed to cover the breadth of the zone.

  • Decreases the time it takes to maneuver fixing and finishing forces forward at the platoon and company levels once contact is made.

• Fixing the enemy can occur rapidly because other elements are already to the flanks of the element in contact, and direct fires to his front and both flanks can initially fix the enemy.

• Bold flanking maneuvers are simplified. Other elements are already to the flanks.

• Deployment in greater breadth facilitates use of the most secure movement technique, bounding overwatch, thus protecting the force.

• Advancing in breadth gives the attacker an automatic geometric advantage in a firefight against a small insurgent force. Since the attacker is dispersed in width, the defender must disperse his fires toward the attacker to suppress him. This allows a massing of combat power at the lowest level.

• Advancing in breadth reduces effects of enemy indirect fire.

• Breadth enables companies to maintain contact with adjacent units to their left and right.

• Breadth simplifies reading the battlefield (battle tracking) and it enhances command and control and speeds clearance of areas for employment of indirect, close air support (CAS), attack aviation, and direct fires.

• Deployment of maneuver forces in greater breadth reduces the need for flank and rear security and an advance guard.

• At the brigade task force and higher levels, allocate forces in a supporting effort to secure zones of attack that have been cleared. Otherwise, insurgency forces will fill the vacuum created by the passage of maneuver forces through these zones. Cleared zones become secured areas.

• Detailed Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) will identify suitable terrain features that facilitate a supporting effort's execution of the area denial mission in and around secured areas with an economy of force. The offensive should be sequenced through zones of attack that allows the supporting effort to execute this mission with minimal forces, yet eventually result in maneuver forces converging on the insurgent forces.

A modified approach march technique, if conducted in accordance with the principles listed, should work well in a low-intensity conflict, and thus enable a conventional force to eventually destroy an insurgency. This is borne out by how well this technique fulfills the nine Principles of War. (See the "Feasibility Matrix" at Figure 2-1.) The approach march technique is suitable for use against both an unconventional force in a low-intensity conflict and a conventional force in a mid-intensity conflict. Now let's examine the employment of tanks with light infantry in a movement to contact mission against both a conventional and an unconventional enemy.

3. PLANNING.

Although no plan remains completely intact following first contact with the enemy, the basis for success or failure of an operation is established during the planning process. The plan must be simple, flexible, and attempt to achieve the nine Principles of War.

Unfortunately, there is a lack of knowledge in the light infantry forces concerning the employment of other combat arms, and this is especially true with respect to armor. In the light infantry community, there has been a tendency to believe that our troops are equal to any task set before them. Light infantry and tanks seldom train together.

The hard combat lessons learned in World War II should govern the combined arms employment of light infantry and tanks. There are two excellent books available on the employment of tanks with infantry that should be required reading for all armor and infantry officers:

• Achtung - Panzer! (English Translation) by Major General Heinz Guderian, published in 1992 by Arms and Armour Press.

• Busting the Bocage: American Combined Arms Operations in France, 6 June - 31 July 1944, by Captain Michael D. Doubler, published in November 1988 by the Combat Studies Institute of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Issue 1: How does the addition of armor affect IPB for the light infantry commander?

Discussion: The approach march technique of a MTC mission can be conducted against a conventional or an unconventional force. When planning to conduct a MTC mission, leaders must consider the capabilities, limitations, and likely courses of action available to the enemy. A conventional force normally has greater anti-tank capabilities, may have its own armor assets, normally fights a more linear battle, and will probably fight along lines of communication (LOCs). An unconventional force has limited anti-tank assets and attempts to conduct a very decentralized fight on a 360-degree battlefield. This force has no significant LOCs to protect, but will probably attempt to interdict friendly forces' use of LOCs with mines, ambushes, and indirect fires. An unconventional enemy may be quite willing to make contact with infantry, but will avoid contact with infantry accompanied by tanks, in many cases. If an unconventional enemy knows the infantry is approaching with tanks, contact with the enemy will be difficult to establish. A conventional enemy with its own armor assets is more likely to make contact with friendly infantry and tanks and can inflict considerable damage on a light infantry unit unaccompanied by tanks.

The addition of tanks impacts development of the MCOO (Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay). Reconnaissance with attention to the terrain, density of vegetation, and soil conditions are important considerations. Tanks are limited in the types of terrain they can traverse, but can cover great distances in a shorter period of time than the infantry.

TTP:

• Recognize the threats posed by the enemy force to the light infantry and to the tanks. Tanks have capabilities that will enhance protection of the infantry and vice versa.

• Identify enemy vulnerabilities to determine exploitable weaknesses to achieve success.

• Consider how the enemy will react to the presence of friendly infantry with armor, infantry alone, and armor alone.

• Suitable Terrain. Identify suitable terrain through the IPB process as practical/available for the maneuver of the tanks and the infantry.

Issue 2: How is the light infantry commander's plan affected by the addition of a tank platoon or tank section?

Discussion: Tanks provide the light infantry commander with a considerable new range of capabilities.

Tank Advantages: The M1 Abrams series tanks possess lethal firepower; a platoon of these tanks has more firepower than a light infantry company. The M1 tanks have five killing systems:

• 120-mm main gun
• 7.62-mm COAX machine gun
• 7.62-mm loader's gun
• 50-caliber machine gun

Because of it size and weight, the tank alone as a vehicle can clear enemy troops in bunkers and trenches.

Tanks can move rapidly under a variety of terrain conditions. They have enhanced target acquisition systems, organic air defense, can provide two types of smoke (limited) for point obscuration, and, when equipped with the mine plow or mine roller, enhance mobility. Tanks can transport infantry and critical supplies. Tanks can provide mobile cover from small arms for light infantry. Because of its height, the M1 series tank provides an excellent observation platform. They can breach obstacles, kill quicker, and mass combat power much faster than a light infantry company.

Tank Disadvantages:

• They are vulnerable to attack in restrictive terrain.
• The M1 cannot traverse certain types of terrain.
• They emit a significant audio and visual signature on the battlefield.
• Tanks require a greater amount of logistical and maintenance support.
• They have limited air defense capability.

Light Infantry Advantages:

• Light infantry can traverse any terrain regardless of slope, density of vegetation, or soil conditions.

• Disciplined light infantry units have a low signature on the battlefield, enabling them to get close to enemy prior to contact (terrain and light conditions depending).

• They can operate with greater dispersion in restrictive terrain, and can pose a significant threat to enemy armor in restrictive terrain.

• Disciplined light infantry units inherently have greater security in restrictive terrain.

• Light infantry requires a small amount of logistical and maintenance support.

Light Infantry Disadvantages:

• Light infantry units are vulnerable to any weapon on the battlefield.

• They have limited anti-armor and air defense capability.

• Light infantry is slow.

Immediately integrate the tank platoon leader into the planning process. He is the subject matter expert on employment of the tanks. It is critical that the tank platoon leader and his tanks arrive at the infantry unit they are supporting before the planning process. The later the tank unit arrives during preparations for combat, the more uncoordinated and desynchronized their actions will be during execution of the movement to contact. Receipt of the supporting tank unit to the light infantry unit as it is crossing the line of departure benefits no one except the enemy.

The tank platoon leader must keep the light infantry commander informed at all times about his unit's mission-capable status, supply status, crew status, weapons status, and any special equipment available (such as mine plows and rollers). These capabilities must be factored into planning.

There is an inherent difference between unconventional and conventional enemy forces. Their differences lie with the type of armor threats they pose, their vulnerabilities, and their likely reaction to the presence of friendly armor. The tactics and techniques utilized in executing an approach march against either of these type forces should differ.

The addition of armor creates other planning considerations for the light infantry commander. He must plan and allow time for:

• Full-force rehearsals (or at least key leaders and special teams' rehearsals).

• Standardizing reporting formats.

• Determining the maintenance and logistical support requirements for the tanks.

• Considering BDAR (battle damage assessment and recovery), resupply, and CASEVAC.

• Resupply of the tanks' ammunition is often left to the tank platoon's parent unit. This often means the tanks must wait for their parent unit to resupply 7.62-mm ammunition when 7.62-mm ammunition could have been delivered with the light infantry unit's LOGPAC (logistical package).

TTP: The plan should protect the force by capitalizing on the tanks and the infantry strengths based on the enemy threats, enemy reactions, and suitability of terrain.

• It must exploit the enemy's weakness.

• It should provide for rapid mutual support.

• The plan should fulfill three requirements for a decisive attack involving light infantry and tanks:
  • Use suitable terrain for maneuver of infantry and tanks.

  • Achieve surprise (if possible). The tactical mobility of armor to rapidly reach points on the battlefield lends itself particularly well to achieving surprise.

  • Mass combat power to exploit a weakness or destroy the enemy once contact is made. The range of tank weapon systems and their speed facilitates massing direct fires if terrain allows.

• The plan must delineate finding, fixing, and finishing roles. Some subordinate elements may have dual roles, i.e., finding and fixing. For example, if the terrain allows maneuver by tanks to close with and destroy the enemy, they should be part of the finishing force. On the other hand, if the terrain prevents maneuver by tanks to close with the enemy, employ them as part of a fixing force.

• Any plan should incorporate, but not solely rely on, tanks in breaching operations.

• Plan for BDAR and CASEVAC with respect to tanks and crews. Use tanks for CASEVAC or force protection of CASEVAC assets. Leaders must consider the loss of their combat power to the unit.

• Resupply should be a major consideration in the planning process.

Issue 3: How are fire planning and control measures impacted by the addition of tanks?

Discussion: The addition of tanks significantly affects fire planning with the increased range and lethality of their weapon systems. The tank crew can employ up to four of its weapon systems simultaneously. The tank possesses enhanced target acquisition systems and is an excellent observation platform in certain types of restrictive terrain from which direct and indirect fires might be controlled. The light infantry commander must determine who is going to control the tanks. Does he place them in operational control (OPCON) to a platoon (i.e., his main or supporting effort) or retain control himself? Leaders should establish engagement criteria, based on the situations, for both the tanks and the infantry. In addition, leaders must establish engagement priorities for every weapon system on the tanks and in the infantry company. Control measures should be as follows:

• IFF (Identification, Friend or Foe) measures on the infantry and on the tanks should be visual and thermal for day and night operations to mark friendly positions and avoid fratricide.

• Visual signals using hand-and-arm signals, pyrotechnics; use M203 marking rounds and tracer fire to mark targets and control fires.

• Develop communications plans using the FM radio and field-expedient field telephone. The plan must address the means and method for infantry and tanks to communicate with each other from the squad level on up.

If the tanks are to be collocated with the infantry during the approach march, establish set locations for the tanks and the infantry in the unit's movement formation. This will assist in controlling movement and fires, preventing fratricide, and facilitating communication and mutual support.

TTP: The commander must decide who will control the tanks and must key his infantry leaders' locations in relation to the tanks to facilitate control. If the commander cannot be located with the tanks, such as in a finishing force where tanks are held back in an attack position, place the company's executive officer in command of the finishing force to facilitate control:

• Base engagement priorities on weapons' capabilities versus enemy vulnerabilities to those weapons.

• Establish engagement criteria to assist in identifying decision points, i.e., when to commit the finishing force based on the enemy threat.

• Establish a plan for action on contact that delineates support by fire and assault responsibilities for the tanks and the infantry. Base the plan on the threat and the element that will make the initial contact.

• Establish and resource IFF measures prior to deployment:
  • IR light sources.

  • VS-17 panels.

  • Thermal tape.

  • When practical, IFF markings should be 360 degrees, day and night.

  • Supply infantry and tanks with pyrotechnics, marking rounds, and tracers. All soldiers must understand the meaning of each signal.

• Develop a detailed communications plan. Radio discipline is critical if the communications plan involves having more than five or six stations on the command net.

• Use of field expedient field telephones on tanks enables squad leaders to talk to tanks.

• Incorporate tank commanders as forward observers for controlling indirect fires.

4. PREPARATION.

A unit sets the conditions during its preparations for combat. To establish conditions for success, preparations at every level within a unit must begin with a warning order. Squad and platoon leaders identify what collective tasks need rehearsing. Soldiers should rehearse individual tasks. Platoon sergeants should identify what equipment and classes of supply are required. The conditions are primarily set by:

• Conducting key leader backbriefs following the order.

• Conducting rehearsals.

• Conducting inspections.

• Preparing equipment and supplies.

• Coordinating for support with adjacent units.

• Executing a rest plan.

• Executing additional reconnaissance, beginning movement, and disseminating intelligence updates.

Backbriefs ensure that key leaders understand the commander's intent and scheme of maneuver. They also provide the commander with immediate feedback and update him on subordinate units' status.

The importance of rehearsals involving tanks and light infantry cannot be overemphasized. Because light infantry and armor tank units seldom train together on a frequent and thorough basis, these units, when task-organized, must conduct combined arms training during their preparations for combat.

Time is often short. Realistically, for most operational deployments, if units in a brigade task force were to be deployed into combat, they would normally spend time in an Intermediate Staging Base (ISB). The ISB is where some quality rehearsals could occur that would set the conditions for success. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)'s ISB is where the light infantry forces stage, but the armor units attached to the light brigades stage out of North Fort Polk. Integrated rehearsals seldom take place due to space limitations at the ISB and limited funds allocated to transport the tanks back and forth from North Fort Polk to the ISB.

Units also fail to conduct integrated rehearsals because they are not made a priority. Commanders must prioritize rehearsals. The timing of sub-unit and special teams' rehearsals must allow for a maximum amount of time for integrated, combined arms, full-force rehearsals. For a movement to contact using the approach march technique, actions on contact (seven forms of contact) rehearsals and actions on the objective (march and intermediate objectives) rehearsals are usually the most important.

Full-force rehearsals are important because every plan contains flaws, many of which are not discovered until someone attempts to execute the plan. If the person responsible for executing a critical task is not involved in the rehearsal, the flaw will probably go undiscovered until it is being executed under fire. Full-force rehearsals allow leaders to see where everyone will be in relation to each other during critical portions of the mission, which will confirm or result in refinement of fire plans and control measures. If possible, conduct these full-force rehearsals on terrain similar to that of the actual operation.

Integrated combined arms rehearsals are key for several reasons. This is probably the only opportunity that the tanks, infantry, engineers, mortars, and fire supporters have to learn something about each other, develop confidence in each other, "becoming sure of their reliability and consequently of their mutual aid." Combined arms rehearsals are the only way to confirm that the plan is synchronized. The communications plan will also receive a good shake-out in a combined arms rehearsal.

Time management of sub-unit and special teams' rehearsals allows more time for integrated rehearsals. Rehearsals of squad, fire team, and special teams' collective tasks can be conducted during or even prior to issuance of the unit's operation order. Train individual tasks during this period.

Delegate responsibility for these rehearsals down to the senior team leader if squad leaders must attend the operation order. This is a prime example of empowering junior NCOs, good time management, and developing leaders. Tank crews should rehearse crew drills and conduct maintenance before integrated rehearsals.

If the tactical situation is not conducive to conducting full-force rehearsals, then an integrated, combined arms, key leader rehearsal must suffice. Leaders must try to involve as many special team personnel as possible.

Inspections are a leader responsibility. Senior leaders should spot-check soldiers. Conduct spot-check inspections at all levels. Spot checks gauge the status of equipment, the dissemination of information, and evaluates the morale of the troops. If the commander wishes to inspect the equipment of a tank unit, the senior leader from that tank unit should assist the commander. There should be initial and final inspections, since initial inspections will inevitably discover deficiencies that must be corrected before crossing the line of departure. Involve the company command section (commander, first sergeant, and executive officer) in these spot checks. The commander cannot be everywhere at once, and the executive officer and first sergeant may have to assume command of the company at some point during the mission.

Coordinating for equipment, supplies, and maintenance are responsibilities of the commander's left and right arms--the XO and the 1SG. With tanks attached or operationally controlled to the company, the XO or 1SG should be passing maintenance and supply issues concerning the tanks to their higher headquarters. The tank unit leader should provide the XO and 1SG with a list of every requirement he has, regardless of whether the light infantry unit will be able to fill the bill. They must be made aware of the need. The XO and 1SG should assist in resupplying the tanks with items they can obtain. For example, tanks supporting a light infantry unit will have a higher consumption rate of 7.62-mm ammunition. If the light infantry unit's LOGPAC is more responsive and frequent than the LOGPAC from the tanks' parent unit, coordination should be made to provide the tanks with this ammunition via the light infantry unit's LOGPAC. Both the XO and 1SG ensure the necessary coordination is conducted for needed equipment and supplies, but neither of them should be involved in physically procuring or delivering these supplies, if at all possible. The XO and 1SG conduct coordination with adjacent units if the commander is unavailable.

The unit should conduct additional reconnaissance if there are nagging questions concerning the enemy or the terrain. For example, in the zone of attack there are several streams, all the roads are unimproved, and there has been recent heavy rainfall. Reconnaissance may be necessary to confirm whether ground conditions will support movement of the tanks through low ground and across streams.

TTP: Task-organize and receive all attachments early. This gives subordinate leaders a focus, enabling them to identify collective and individual tasks to rehearse and spot-check equipment and supplies needed for the mission. Rehearsals should begin at the lowest level following receipt of a warning order.

• Prioritize rehearsals.

• Time management of sub-unit rehearsals allows more time for full-force, combined arms rehearsals.

• Rehearsals should be with full equipment on terrain similar to that of the actual area of operations.

• Delegate responsibilities for sub-unit rehearsals to lowest level possible.

• Inspect the entire unit. Have tank commanders assist as subject matter experts.

• Use backbriefs and rock drills following the operation order and before company rehearsals to enhance leaders' retention of knowledge during rehearsals.

• Load limited special equipment and supplies on the tanks. This will lighten soldier load, and because special equipment and supplies are on the tanks, these items will become more readily available for the soldiers. Use common sense when determining what equipment to place on the tank. For example, placing some SKEDCO litters on tanks might be a good idea, but the infantry platoons should still have some being carried by soldiers.

• If the plan includes soldiers riding on the tanks at some point during the operation, rehearse this before full-force combined arms rehearsal.

5. EXECUTION.

Once planning and preparations are complete, the outcome of the battle is already half decided. It is now time to execute. The modified approach march technique at the company level should be executed with infantry companies and platoons moving in formations that achieve more breadth than depth for the following reasons:

• It lessens the number of units needed to cover the breadth of the zone.

• It decreases the time it takes to maneuver fixing and finishing forces forward once contact is made.

• Fixing the enemy and directing fires to his front and both flanks can fix an enemy.

• Bold flanking maneuvers are simplified. Other elements are already to the flanks of the unit in contact.

• Deployment in greater breadth facilitates the use of the most secure movement techniques.

Advancing in breadth gives the attacker an automatic geometric advantage in a firefight against a small insurgent force. Since the attacker is dispersed in width, the defender must disperse his fires toward the attacker to suppress him. This technique also reduces effects of enemy indirect fire which, if accurate, is more destructive on a company deployed in depth attempting to advance. Breadth helps companies maintain contact with adjacent units to their left and right. Breadth simplifies reading the battlefield, battle tracking, and, therefore, enhances command and control. It will speed clearance of areas for employment of indirect fires, CAS, attack aviation, and direct fires. This will occur as long as ground reconnaissance forces are not employed in close proximity to the maneuver forces conducting the approach march; i.e., in the current zone of attack. Deployment of maneuver forces in greater breadth than depth also reduces the need for flank and rear security and an advance guard.

The Company Team Modified Approach March Against an Unconventional Enemy. One basic requirement exists to effectively task-organize tanks with a light infantry company conducting a movement to contact--suitable terrain. Some factors in the proposed terrain will dictate where tanks can and cannot go. The terrain must facilitate armored maneuver. The following is a suggested task organization for such a force tasked to conduct a movement to contact against an unconventional enemy in restrictive terrain. Primary location in scheme of maneuver and tasks are listed under the units in italics.

Suggested Task Organization:

Note: This suggested task organization is based on a light infantry company at full strength in personnel, of which there are very few currently in the Army. Most light infantry companies today have no personnel in their anti-tank sections and many have only two platoons with three squads or three platoons with two squads. Losses are inevitable in combat, but accomplishing any mission becomes increasingly difficult with personnel shortages before the mission even begins. If you were to subtract the AT Section and three rifle squads or one platoon from this suggested task organization, it immediately becomes apparent the maneuver options have become more limited. Additionally, security will become leaner, firepower is less, and the breadth of area this company team can effectively cover is decreased by one third.

The modified approach march technique uses infantry platoons to find the enemy, not tanks, squads, or fire teams. Infantry platoons possess sufficient organic firepower and numbers of personnel dispersed over a large enough area to survive chance contact and maintain contact with the enemy. Squads and fire teams by themselves are too vulnerable when separated by distance and difficult terrain. This separation and terrain will decrease their chance to survive contact initiated by the enemy.

Infantry squads do not have direct communications with indirect fire support. They must relay their request through their platoon headquarters to receive indirect fire support. Incorporating tank sections into or adjacent to platoon movement formations reduces the element of surprise. The guerrilla forces will hear their turbine engines long before they see the infantry with tanks and will probably avoid contact. If the insurgents choose to make contact, it will be on ground of their choosing that will not facilitate teamwork between the infantry and the tanks. Placing tanks with the finding force is an option if the goal is to drive the enemy into a fixing force that is already in position or can rapidly reach a desired point on the ground. However, the element of surprise is reduced, and in the midst of densely vegetated, restrictive terrain, movement and reaction to danger are reduced.

Complete actions on contact with consolidation, reorganization, and casualty evacuation. Units must execute consolidation and reorganization rapidly. There may still be enemy in the area capable of requesting and directing indirect fire. If casualties are few and the enemy can be quickly searched, the company team should move away from the scene of the engagement to consolidate and reorganize. If casualties are heavy, the platoons with greater combat power should expand the security perimeter.

Resupply of ammunition or other supplies may be needed following the contact. Cross-leveling ammunition and other critical assets can alleviate shortages. Remove ammunition from KIAs and casualties requiring evacuation.

Extract the finishing force from the scene of the contact as soon as possible to prevent the enemy from discovering its composition and strength and developing an effective counterattack. Indirect smoke and smoke pots can assist in obscuring possible enemy observation of consolidation and reorganization. Leaders must focus on security during this phase of the operation. There is always a tendency for victorious soldiers to let down their guard.

Using the tanks with the finding elements will probably result in no contact, but the enemy will be forced to abandon that area of operations and could be driven into another company's or battalion's zone of attack. Employ other assets to support its execution.

If indirect fires are not available, attack helicopters could be used to fix a suspected enemy force while ground maneuver forces maneuver to find, fix, or finish the enemy. In addition, employ attack helicopters over suspected enemy mortar positions to deter the enemy from firing. Employ the tank/infantry force as a fixing force if the enemy is able to break contact.

The task organization and roles can be adjusted to fit the situation, for every operation is impacted by METT-T and OAKOC (observation and field of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles and movement, key terrain, and avenues of approach). If executed by well-trained, disciplined troops, it promises success against an unconventional force. It achieves mass and surprise, and capitalizes upon the strengths of infantry and tanks working as a team.

The Company Team Modified Approach March Against a Conventional Enemy. Again, the basic requirement of suitable terrain is in effect. If the terrain does not support the employment of tanks, the enemy will not have armor there either. If the terrain supports armored maneuver, then task-organize the tanks with the infantry. However, against a conventional enemy force, the severity of the enemy threats posed against friendly armor and light infantry must be weighed. If the likelihood of encountering enemy armor is high, some or all of the tanks attached to an infantry company may need to advance with the infantry. Otherwise, the infantry advancing alone runs a high risk of making contact with enemy armor in-strength. Most light infantry companies are too understrengthed to man their anti-tank sections. Since the anti-tank sections go unmanned, seldom is anti-tank gunnery trained, and, therefore, there is little proficiency in the skills needed to execute that task. The armored element could possibly increase with the addition of the tank company commander's and/or XO's tanks. IPB at the battalion and brigade level is responsible for identifying a need to increase the amount of armor attached to a light infantry company. The task organization from higher headquarters should provide the light infantry company with sufficient armor to maneuver against any enemy armor threat and protect the infantry. The commander should task-organize the tanks within the company team to provide flexibility.

Below is a suggested task organization to conduct a movement to contact against a conventional enemy in restrictive terrain, with two mobility corridors, in the company team's zone of attack. The commander has decided to show weakness on his right flank and strength in the center. His left flank is in extremely restrictive terrain--no armor or anti-tank assets are employed on this flank. Primary location in scheme of maneuver and tasks are listed under the units in italics.

Suggested Task Organization:

Again, the infantry platoons are the finders and fixers. Leaders should augment those platoons advancing along mobility corridors that facilitate armor movement with tanks or anti-tank weapons.

• Infantry platoons should have a healthy supplement of AT-4s.

• They should have plenty of HC smoke if contact must be broken or obstacles must be breached instead of by-passed.

• Carrying a few anti-tank mines might be advisable.

• Employ hand grenade simulators. They can create false anti-armor weapons signatures.

• Carry bangalore torpedo sections and C-4 Pop-and-Drop charges for breaching wire and destroying mines.

• Use light engineer teams to mark or clear mines in the mobility corridors.

• The tanks operate as sections; never use a tank by itself without another tank. The tank section with the platoon in the center fulfills multiple roles:
  • They can find the enemy with their enhanced target acquisition systems and increased observation due to their height.

  • They can fix with four of their weapon systems.

  • They can finish with any of their five weapon systems.

  • They are mobile support-by-fire platforms that can suppress enemy targets while advancing with the infantry or remain static while fulfilling the same role. The tank section, with the center platoon, could be flexed to support the right platoon if the situation warrants and if it can be accomplished in a timely manner.

Movement formation for the center platoon with tanks might be as follows in Figure 2-2.

Figure 2-2

The tank section with the center platoon should have either the mine roller or mine plow or both. A conventional enemy that has broken contact with friendly forces will have the resources to place numerous tactical obstacles along narrow mobility corridors in restrictive terrain. The following scenario depicts one method for breaching operations involving light infantry with tanks. The light engineers in this scenario are occupied marking and destroying mines to the rear of the center platoon.

Achieve surprise and mass by the retention of a reserve. This reserve contains tanks, heavy engineers, and infantry. The heavy engineers should have a MICLIC (Mine-Clearing Line Charge, M58A3) to facilitate rapid breaching. Otherwise, maneuver of this element might be delayed. Incorporate infantry and anti-tank teams into the reserve because this force may have to advance beyond the three light platoons that are forward. The infantry provides protection against dismounted threats. The anti-tank teams could be of great use to the armor if the enemy counterattacks with armor and mechanized forces because they can destroy lightly armored vehicles of an enemy. This allows the tanks to focus on destroying enemy tanks. Since the enemy will hear the tank section with the center platoon, it is not necessary to keep the reserve in an attack position. The reserve can follow the company team's advance by one terrain feature or out of line of sight. Employment of the reserve is, as always, situational dependent.

TTP:

• Use every leader in the company. The commander cannot be everywhere at once. Place the XO and 1SG in command of the company during training exercises. The commander mentors them through command of the company, so they will learn how he wants them to fight. The advantage of training these individuals is that both of them could be placed in charge of subordinate units if the need arises. The 1SG in this technique is normally near the commander, but not necessarily located with him. When the need arises, the 1SG moves to the commander's side to advise and assist him in controlling the company fight. If something happens to the commander, the 1SG can automatically assume command and control of the company because he is near or with the company command section.

• Task organization, equipment and special weapons, movement formations, movement techniques, and arraying of forces on the battlefield must account for terrain and the enemy. Fight the enemy, not the plan.

• Incorporate the attachment leaders into the chain of command. Doing this can prevent serious disruption of command and control during the execution of a mission. Do this at all levels.

• Maintain a reserve. The reserve should have a large percentage of the unit's combat power. Combat power does not equal numbers of personnel. Combat power is the destructive effects of fire. The goal is to wear the enemy down with forces deployed forward until the enemy is weak enough to overcome him with the reserve or finishing force.

• Have a plan for actions on the objective for every NAI, intermediate, and march objective in the zone of attack. Plan should be flexible. A reserve provides that flexibility.

• Plan unobserved fires against templated enemy mortar positions.

The modified approach march is a technique that follows basic principles and can be used against a conventional or unconventional enemy force. When practical, tanks should always operate with light infantry. There are certain light infantry soldiers in the Army that have had the distinctly distasteful experience of combat without U.S. armor support, and they never want to go back into combat without tanks.

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
(Breach of a Mine/Wire Obstacle in Restrictive Terrain)

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
(Breach of a Mine/Wire Obstacle in Restrictive Terrain)

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
(Breach of a Mine/Wire Obstacle in Restrictive Terrain)

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1. Peter Tsouras, Warrior's Words: A Quotation Book, Arms and Armour; distributed in the USA by Sterling Publications Co., New York, N.Y., 1992, p. 19.

2. Ibid, p. 337.

3. Ibid, p. 323.

4. Ibid., p. 428.

Chapter 1: Route-Clearance Operations

Chapter 3: Deliberate Attack