Military

Techniques:

1. M256 kits detect only vapor, M9 papers detect liquid contamination.
2. Routinely incorporate NBC training into every possible Home Station training event.
3. Proper wearing of gloves must be stressed.
4. "Green tape" cannot be a substitute for M9 chemical paper.

* Medical company's role in defense of the brigade support area (BSA): The medical company is seldom given a clear task and purpose for their defense and the defense of the BSA.

Medical companies often dig a number of hasty fighting positions in a 360 degree circle around the company area, but have no ability to concentrate fires and no understanding of the most likely and most dangerous enemy avenues of approach.
Medical companies deploy without enough Class IV barrier supplies.

Techniques:

1. Develop a standard survivability position for each soldier assigned in the vicinity of their work area. This will ensure each soldier has a protected position in the event of indirect fires.

2. Determine the total Class IV requirement for the company and establish load plans.

3. The medical company commander obtains from the S2/S3 the most likely and most dangerous enemy avenues of approach. Fighting positions are prepared based on this information to enable massing of the fires he has available.

6.3.1.1.2 Prepare Fighting Positions

* (CSM trend) Preparation of vehicle and individual fighting positions: Preparation of vehicle and individual fighting positions is substandard.

Maneuver unit leaders tend to place responsibility for proper preparation of their fighting positions on the engineers.
Dismounts exhibit weakness in basic battlefield survivability/site praparation skills.

Techniques:

1. Leaders are responsible for proper preparation of vehicle and individual fighting positions, not the engineer units.
2. Units must be trained and proficient in site preparation and survivability skills. This should be done at Home Station.

6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment

* Mission-Oriented Protection Posture (MOPP) analysis: Units do not conduct MOPP analysis and do not establish auto-masking criteria.

MOPP analysis, if done at all, is a one-time shot; not tied to the threat or dynamic.
Units are unnecessarily being kept in MOPP which degrades their ability to fight.
Auto-masking criteria is not established, and units not at risk are continuing to mask. Currently, units mask under artillery all the time. It is a trained response regardless of the threat.

Techniques:

1. Ensure that MOPP analysis is a key factor in the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

2. MOPP analysis and the resulting MOPP level for a brigade combat team (BCT) continues with the onset of hostilities and is adjusted as the battle progresses.

3. Auto-masking criteria needs to be dynamic, based upon the enemy's ability to deliver chemical/biological (C/B) weapons as the battle progresses. Tie automatic-masking criteria to the event template. As the window passes for the delivery of C/B weapons, the criteria will be less restrictive.

* (CSM trend) Use of M8A1 chemical alarms: Too many units do not deploy their M8A1s IAW their tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOP) or FM 3-4.

Alarms are often placed inside the unit's perimeter and not IAW correct procedure.
Units are afraid that the alarms may be damaged by vehicles running over them.
Units are afraid someone might steal the alarm if placed outside the perimeter.
The medical company, which has one of three authorized M8A1 alarms, often does not place the alarm IAW the latest down-wind message. When in place,
- power source is not hooked up
- no wire is run to the alarm

Techniques:

1. Refer to chapter 3 of FM 3-3.
2. Train soldiers to properly employ the M8A1 IAW TM 3-6665-12-12.
3. Develop standard operating procedures for marking M8A1s to prevent loss of an alarm.

6.3.1.2.1 Decontaminate Personnel and Systems

* Detailed Troop Decontamination (DTD) operations: Units do not know how to, nor do they have the required equipment to conduct Detailed Troop Decon (DTD).

Common equipment not on hand are:
- drums of STB
- general purpose detergent
- immersion heaters
- protective mask PLL
No one soldier is responsible for the DTD equipment.
The prime mover is not identified.
Soldiers are not trained on how to operate a DTD.
Orders do not address in detail requesting procedures and location on the battlefield of DTD equipment.

Techniques:

1. Have brigade identify the augmentees for DTD in the OPORD.

2. Wherever the augmentees come from, have their NBC NCO teach them how to run the DTD before they are called upon to execute it.

3. Identify in unit SOPs responsibility for maintaining the unit's DTD equipment and what vehicle it will be moved on.

4. Identify in orders where the DTD equipment will be located to best support a thorough decon, and how they will be contacted and moved to the linkup point.

* (CSM trend) Collection points for NBC casualties: Maneuver units consistently evacuate their contaminated killed in action (KIA) casualties to clean collection points instead of the designated collection point for contaminated casualties.

Technique: Ensure unit leaders are briefed on the designated collection point for NBC casualties.

6.3.2.2.3 Employ Smoke/Obscurants

* Weather considerations for smoke missions: Units plan smoke missions without taking into account weather conditions.

Units establish the visibility criteria based upon perfect weather conditions.

Units do not time out their movement to determine what time of day it will be when they want the smoke.

Techniques:

1. Continue to plan smoke missions but also plan according to time of day required.

2. Be realistic on what a smoke platoon can do based upon weather conditions. A smoke platoon cannot make an obscuring blanket on a breach at 1200 hours.

3. Adjust requirements for smoke based on weather. A curtain, given the appropriate number of smoke platforms, is more realistic at 1200 hours than is a blanket.

6.3.4 Provide Counterreconnaissance, Security and Readiness

* Search and destroy enemy reconnaissance forces:

Too often, there is no effort made to search out and destroy enemy recon forces. Security operations at the brigade level tend to be limited to a permeable screen at the FEBA. The usual brigade security effort is one counterrecon company per task force, which lines up along a phase line and does nothing more. The brigade seldom takes other actions to search for and destroy recon forces operating throughout the depth of our AO.
Counterrecon forces are given other missions which detract from their ability to perform the security mission.
As the overall plan is developed, security operations are an afterthought, once the base plan is developed.

Techniques:

1. Commit a force capable of finding and destroying the enemy recon forces throughout the depth of the area of operations (AO). This may need to be a total combined arms force, integrating "lookers" other than just the thermal sights of M1s and M2s.

2. Give the counterrecon force no other mission.

3. Plan security operations early and with the same amount of attention and support given to any other combat operation.

* Military Police in counterreconnaissance operations: Military Police are not effectively employed in the counterreconnaissance role for the brigade rear area.

Military Police have responsibility for security in the brigade rear area and are constantly patrolling in order to detect and neutralize enemy elements. However, this patrolling has not been integrated and synchronized with a brigade counterrecon effort.
MP platoon leaders and S2s are not tying enemy infiltration/exfiltration routes to MP patrol plans.
Rear area named areas of interest (NAIs) receive very little emphasis. RESULT: The platoon leader develops patrol plans without the benefit of expert intelligence analysis.

Techniques:

1. Military Police platoon leaders must make rear area counterreconnaissance functions a critical consideration for brigade reconnaissance planners.

2. Constantly gather data about terrain and road networks which are essential for proper analysis of enemy reconnaissance efforts in the rear area.

3. Tie terrain and road networks information into enemy priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and the location of friendly units on the battlefield to establish an economical patrol plan for the MPs which will put them where the enemy is most likely to be.

Table of Contents

Section II: TA. 6, Part 1 Mobility/Survivability & NBC BOS

Section II: TA. 7 Combat Service Support BOS