Military

Planning for task force in-stride or deliberate breaching is not done to the level of detail required for successful execution.
Breach rehearsals at the task force level are generally only wargames.

Procedures: Commanders and staffs need to become familiar with FM 5-71-2 and FM 5-71-3 for developing plans on combined arms breaching to ensure all five tenants of breaching have been planned adequately.

6.2 Provide Countermobility

* Task force integration of obstacles in scheme of maneuver: Obstacles are not being planned nor emplaced to attack enemy maneuver, and frequently do not enhance the effects and capabilities of friendly firepower.

Task forces have weak knowledge of FM 90-7, the doctrinal reference for obstacle integration.
There is a lack of understanding of mobility corridors/avenues of approach and their fundamental relationship to the target, location, and effect of tactical obstacles.
The SITEMP is prepared with little to no engineer involvement.
A Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) is seldom produced, even though it is vital to obstacle planning. The MCOO helps ensure that the obstacles planned will effect the enemy avenues of approach and maneuver corridors.
All leaders do not understand how obstacles and fires are integrated to achieve obstacle effect:
- There is confusion over what a turn, block, fix or disrupt obstacle means in terms of the direct fire plan at the company team level.
- Each of these obstacle intents should assist the commander in planning his direct fires. This enables the commander to maximize the effectiveness of fires, while exploiting the weaknesses that the obstacles have created for the enemy.

Without this information and the scheme of friendly maneuver, the engineer cannot plan what part of the enemy formation to attack and what obstacles can best achieve this intent.
The result of this thought process not happening at task force level is that company team commanders do not know how the obstacles for which they are responsible support the overall scheme of maneuver.

Techniques:

1. Maneuver commanders should become familiar with FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration. This manual is an excellent doctrinal reference as to the purpose of each obstacle, its intended effect, and how obstacles should be integrated into the commander's direct fire plan.

2. Engineer commanders should conduct OPD classes for their habitually associated maneuver units on how to effectively plan and site obstacles they are responsible for and what key information engineers are looking for when they show up to emplace obstacles.

3. Each combined arms exercise (CPX, MAPEX, TEWT, BSS) that is conducted should incorporate a rock drill that focuses on the siting of obstacles with the company team commanders and the engineer platoon leaders being the key players.

6.2.1 Secure/Select Location of Obstacles

*Engineer unit coordination of obstacle sites:

Emplacing engineer and company/team commanders often fail to understand the intent of the obstacle group to achieve synchronization of obstacle effects and fires.
Engineer and company/team commanders seldom plan sufficient time for the siting effort.
Too often, the engineer company commander begins the tentative siting process with no integration of the engineer platoon leaders.
The location of control measures are not made clear to the engineer platoon leader, and the engineers do not understand the company/team commander's intent.
Few, if any, engineer companies have SOPs that outline the steps required and define who is responsible for the obstacle siting and refinement process.
The engineer platoon leader has little understanding of the ranges and limitations of key weapon systems at the task force level.

Techniques:

1. Doctrinal guide for examples of the siting process is FM 90-7, chapter 5.

2. Develop SOPs in synchronization with the maneuver commander on how to develop an engagement area.

3. Place ranges of all key weapons systems as outlined in FM 90-7. This should include both live and training ranges of systems.

6.2.3 Mark Obstacles

* (CSM trend) Engineer unit recording of minefields: Minefield records, DA Form 1355, are incomplete and are not forwarded to higher headquarters as required.

Technique: Increase use of DA Forms 1355 at Home Station training, to include NCOPD and OPD classes on contents, preparation and submittal requirements.

6.3.1 Provide Battlespace Hazard Protection

* Proper utilization of Chemical NCOs: Chemical NCOs are not being utilized correctly from company through brigade level.

At company level, NBC NCOs are not put in positions to accomplish their job.
- they end up being the 1SG's driver running LOGPAC, casualty evacuation, etc.
- they are not in positions on the battlefield to advise their commander on NBC matters.
- they are rarely located with or have a radio to talk to the commander.
Rarely do NBC NCOs get the NBC annex to the battalion OPORD.
Accounting for Chemical Defense Equipment (CDE) is nonexistent. This also holds true for battalion and brigade chemical NCOs.
At battalion and brigade level, the chemical NCOs get caught up solely in operations duties, with little time to conduct NBC duties.

Increased burden on the chemical officer.
Likelihood that coordinating efforts for the NBC slice will fall through.

Techniques:

1. At company level, commanders must ensure that NBC NCOs are positioned such that they can always talk to them. They are a great source of manpower in a company, but their job is to keep commanders informed and to advise them on how to prepare and react to a chemical attack.

2. Battalion and brigade chemical NCOs must be made available to track CDE, communicate with subordinate chemical NCOs, and to track preparations for combat as they relate to chemical warfare.

* (CSM trend) Reaction to indirect friendly fires: Maneuver units seldom react appropriately to fire support rounds coming in.

Soldiers often stand and watch rounds coming in.
They do not put masks on or take approprate protective measures.

Technique: Units must develop SOP and train for reaction to incoming friendly fires on the battlefield.

6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems

* Defense measures for Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) unit sites:

Signal company site defense plans/measures are often inadequate to defend against a Level II ground threat.
MSE units deploy in various sized elements ranging from 2 man retrans teams to 30 man node centers. These elements are frequently not trained or proficient in basic site defense measures. This leaves them vulnerable to destruction by hostile elements.
Commanders tend to place emphasis upon the installation, operation and maintenance of signal systems and tend to disregard the requirement to establish and improve site defense measures.

Techniques:

1. Command emphasis must be applied to site defense training within signal units. Specific areas usually found to be weak include:

2. Leaders at all levels must understand that the destruction of signal assets due to inadequate defensive measures degrades area communications for an unacceptable reason.

* Force protection of aviation assembly areas:

Assembly area security is the first "fight" to be concerned with. However, force protection for aviation assembly areas continually needs improvement, specifically:
- passive air defense measures
- R & S planning/execution
- fire support planning/execution
- obstacle emplacement
- actions on contact
- individual soldier skills
Aviation units either anticipate attached units to aid in security (i.e. Avenger Team or MP Squad) or consider themselves positioned too far in the division's rear sector to plan threat contingencies.

Techniques:

1. Aviation units need to train at Home Station to be self-sufficient within their own area. Continue to emphasize the importance of assembly area operations and focus more Home Station training to perfect skills.

2. Develop and rehearse detailed battalion SOPs for assembly area operations.

* Protection for the aviation unit assembly area (AA): Aviation units seldom develop a good assembly area security plan capable of successfully repelling a level I threat.

Aviation assembly areas (AAs) are usually widespread with no pre-planned occupation plan to ensure aviation personnel and equipment are protected from the enemy.
Fighting positions built to standard, overlapping fields of fire, correct emplacement of crew served weapons, etc., are not planned for or emplaced before occupation of the assembly area.
Seldom is one person made responsible for the AA security; it is usually a collection of individual efforts in hopes of securing the AA.

Techniques:

1. At Home Station, aviation units should develop and practice their SOP for occupation and security of the AA.

2. Realistic expectations for defending against the enemy should be planned for and developed to standard.

3. Common soldier tasks must be taught at Home Station and practiced until all soldiers know and can achieve them to standard. Units must identify the person responsible for developing and executing the AA security plan and hold him responsible for AA security.

* Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) squad preparation of fighting positions: BSFV squads often construct inadequate fighting positions.

Technique: BSFV squads should use interlocking layers of sandbags at least 18" deep. The sandbags increase the density and the stability of overhead cover.

Table of Contents

Section II: TA. 5 Intelligence BOS

Section II: TA. 6, Part 2