Military

Task forces have difficulty controlling the flow of vehicles in and out of unit maintenance collection points (UMCPs).
Task forces often have fully mission-capable vehicles remaining in the UMCP for long periods of time.
Once vehicles are released from the UMCP, task forces often have problems successfully linking up the vehicles with their units prior to execution.

Techniques:

1. The UMCP should be given enough class IV material to create a "fence" with one exit/entrance.

2. UMCP leaders should designate a "gate guard" to control traffic in and out of the UMCP.

3. The task force leadership should take an active interest in controlling the link-up of repaired vehicles with their units. Too often, the only parties involved in the linkup are the battalion maintenance officer (BMO) and the individual vehicle commanders.

* (CSM trend incorporated) Maintenance procedures and reporting: Generally, operator maintenance procedures are substandard.

DA Forms 2404:
- lack signatures
- have incomplete administrative data
- are often illegible
- are not forwarded IAW standard procedure
Identified faults have no recorded corrective action.
Units do not use appropriate diagnostic procedures/equipment.
Parts often not routed or delivered until end of campaign.

Technique: Units should better train maintenance reporting procedures and operator/unit level troubleshooting procedures.

7.4.3.4 Perform Chaplaincy Activities

* Brigade chaplain assistant responsibilities:

Brigade level chaplain assistants do not understand the breadth and depth of their position as manager of the unit ministry team. Most have a current operations mentality when it comes to assisting the chaplain.
Brigade level chaplain assistants are not skilled in battle tracking, safety/risk assessment and implementation of the religious support plan.

Techniques:

1. Chaplain assistants, at all levels, must

2. While doctrinal lists may be helpful in broadening a chaplain assistant's perspective, it would be better to utilize monthly training opportunities at Home Station to develop programs whereby chaplain assistants can learn to better assist the chaplain.

* Unit Ministry Team (UMT) communications skills: Unit ministry teams are frequently unable to communicate with subordinate unit ministry teams on the battlefield.

Unit ministry teams are often unskilled in the area of radio communications.
Their methods for communicating in the field are often untested prior to deployments.
They lack depth in "battle drills" for alternative types of communication.
Most unit ministry teams know the basics of radio communication, but lack any fall back plans if their "plan A" does not work.

Technique: Chaplains and assistants should develop "battle drills" for the employment of basic communication techniques in the field. These drills must include fall-back plans and be practiced to perfection at Home Station.

7.4.4 Provide Health Services

* Deployment of the medical company in the Brigade Support Area (BSA):

Techniques:

1. Develop a standard template to assist in the layout of the company area.

2. Establish and enforce one route through the company area; adjust based on terrain, but do not change the one-route concept. Place along the established traffic route:

* Medical company management of maintenance and supplies: Medical company commanders do not have systems in place to manage and track the brigade's medical assets.

Medical evacuation platforms go into a non-mission capable (NMC) status and are not identified as such for up to 72 hours.
The medical company has ambulances available but does not react since they are unaware that evacuation platforms are NMC.
Task force medical platoons, company medics and unit combat lifesavers run out of medical supplies and are unable to care for casualties.
The medical company has additional Class VIII on hand but does not push it forward.

Technique: Work out a system between the medical platoons within the brigade combat team (BCT) and the medical company in the form of a brief standard report that gives their current status on maintenance and Class VIII.

- Design a simple report form that can be passed either by FM or ambulance messenger.
- The form must be easy and fast to promote its use by the platoon leaders.

7.5.2 Supply the Force

* Forecasting Class III/V requirements for aviation missions: S1s and S4s need to improve on forecasting Class III and V usage and resupply requirements during missions.

Techniques:

1. Battalion executive officers (XOs) must ensure the S1 and S4 forecast all requirements, regardless how seemingly minute.

2. Training at Home Station should always emphasize future operations as well as current so that the impact of supply forecasting can be realized.

3. Participate in COA development and wargaming to gain the necessary information to forecast future requirements.

* Field Artillery (FA) battalion ammunition resupply system: The FA battalion staff does not adequately plan, prepare and execute ammunition resupply using the "double loop" system.

Field artillery battalions try to execute the double loop resupply system; however, ammunition resupply consistently hampers their operations.
Staffs do not adequately identify anticipated ammunition requirements or resupply triggers based upon critical fire support tasks (CFSTs).
Ammunition platoons are forced to deliver ammunition during the night due to late or conflicting guidance.
Inaccurate or slow reporting of ammunition counts to the TOC/ALOC by the batteries hampers resupply planning.
Routinely, emergency Class V resupply is not present in the combat trains.
Palletized Load System (PLS) flat racks are not configured to allow commanders to empty a flat rack when conducting resupply to the FAASV. Without an empty flat rack, the ammunition platoon cannot reconfigure for follow-on missions.

Techniques:

1. In the planning phase, the battalion S3 and Fire Direction Officer (FDO) must determine anticipated ammunition requirements and resupply triggers based upon critical fire support tasks (CFSTs) and enemy courses of action.

2. During the preparation phase, the ammunition platoon configures the flat racks for delivery to the batteries, either directly or through a rapid refuel rearm point (R3P) site.

3. When using the double loop system, it creates two loops of travel for ammunition platoon vehicles: one between the combat trains and the firing batteries, and one between the combat and field trains.

4. Ammunition resupply and the double-loop system are complex operations. They require constant staff supervision by the S3, S4, and XO. The staff must develop and monitor checkpoints, timed status reporting, and triggers before, during and after the battle to ensure positive command and control of the battalion's ammunition assets. These must be rehearsed and well understood by everyone involved in their execution.

* Field artillery (FA) battalion ammunition requirements: FA Battalions do not determine and track ammunition requirements properly.

Battalions experience extreme difficulties in identifying ammunition requirements and tracking expenditures.
The staff does not consider ammunition requirements, based on critical field artillery tasks (CFATs) during the mission analysis and wargaming processes.
The staff does not direct resupply triggers to adequately support the mission.
Staffs do not have systems in place to track ammunition consumption at the section, platoon, battery, nor battalion levels, making it extremely difficult to project ammunition requirements.

Techniques:

1. Staffs must carefully consider ammunition capabilities and requirements during mission analysis and wargaming and throughout the planning process.

- compute ammunition quantities for expected task requirements
- wargame the "what if" (i.e., what if we shoot 60 minutes of smoke as opposed to 30 minutes)
- derive ammunition requirements for that task
- do this for each expected task

2. The staff must determine resupply triggers to allow an uninterrupted flow of ammunition for the duration of the mission.

3. The FA battalion must have a standard system to track ammunition.

* Engineer force management of Class IV and V supplies:

Techniques:

1. Use the already adequate SOP in order to effectively manage class IV/V supplies.

2. Per FM 20-32, mines are received by a "centralized through-put operation by Corps and Division that stops at the Battalion level...at some point the maneuver battalion turns over the control of the mines to engineers". The flow of obstacle material within the task force sector is a maneuver responsibility, but is effectively a shared responsibility between maneuver and engineer forces in order to ensure the effective planning and execution.

Table of Contents

Section II: TA. 6 Mobility/Survivability & NBC BOS

Acknowledgements