Military

S2 sections often operate on a 12 on, 12 off shift schedule. Based on the time available and the work required to be done, this is a waste of precious personnel resources.
The shift schedule reinforces an "I'm not on shift" attitude, and tends to inhibit teamwork, setting up a "we/they" relationship between the two shifts.
Most S2 sections set up an internal plans section (which is a good idea), but fail to fully brief the plan to the rest of the section working current operations.

Procedures:

Phase soldiers into work schedules, rather than have massive turnover twice a day.
Rigorously enfore quality shift change briefings.
Hold regular "huddles", in which the entire section, together with the ACT, is brought together to share the current enemy situation, and the status of recon operations.
Avoid the 12 on, 12 off shift schedule. Soldiers should get at least six hours of sleep and time for personal hygiene and meals; they do not need (and we cannot afford) 12 hours out of the fight.
At the completion of each step of the planning process, and at a minimum when the OPORD is complete, the S2 planners should brief the entire section on the next mission.

5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements

* Reconnaissance & Surveillance (R&S) operations: R&S operations routinely fail. It has become an afterthought, and "S2 business", rather than the brigade's initial main effort.

No one is put in charge of the R&S effort, to track it, adjust it when necessary and ensure that it answers the commander's PIR.
R&S efforts are usually reduced to a matrix in the intel annex (which only the S2s read). The matrix addresses NAIs covering all known or templated enemy locations, but does not adequately address task and purpose for each mission or recon element.
R&S operations are often not rehearsed.

The brigade often does not know whether or not task forces are able to execute their assigned missions under the plan.
If adjustments are necessary, the S2 does not have the tasking authority to redirect recon assets, and S2s usually have to request that subordinate elements change their plans.

Technique: Appoint a chief of R&S at brigade level. Give the chief of R&S a small, part-time planning staff, and the equipment and authority to task and receive reports from all elements of the brigade for R&S missions.

* Planning, synchronizing, and supervising the reconnaissance effort:

Reconnaissance effort fails.
Staff is unable to determine threat weaknesses and strengths
No synchronized plan to avoid those strengths and exploit threat weaknesses.
The commander, who is ultimately responsible for the supervision of the entire process, usually has as little grasp of the requirements for successful R&S planning as the S3.

Techniques:

1. Task force commanders and S3s must recognize their role in recon planning and supervision and become actively involved in this phase of the battle.

- S2 recon responsibilities:

-- identifies collection requirements derived from the IPB process and focused during the task force planning process

-- identifies recon and surveillance assets available and the integration of the two into a collection plan balancing collection requirements against collector capabilities.

- S3 recon responsibilities:

-- tasks assets

-- synchronizes the plan with other systems (e.g. fire support, CSS)

-- ensures the recon plan is as well integrated, synchronized and supported as the operations plan.

2. Proper division of responsibilities will allow the S2s time to analyze recon results and recommend redirection of collection assets.

5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation

* Task force intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB): Task force level intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) efforts are not producing usable information for task force staffs and company/team commanders.

The results of task force level IPB are not properly focused on information that subordinate commanders need and will use in fighting the enemy.
The IPB is overly process-oriented rather than being geared to providing information that will help in the destruction of the enemy force.

Techniques:

1. Develop usable guidelines for task force S2s that focus them on obtaining and refining information which will have a direct impact on fighting the enemy.

2. Refine IPB manuals to concentrate less on the process and more on the information required to fight combined arms teams.

* (LTP trend) Air Defense staff officer (ADO) input to intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB): Air defense staff officers (ADOs) have a tendency to wait until the brigade receives the formal order from Division before their staff estimate process begins. They rarely begin the process with the receipt of the first Warning Order.

The brigade ADO rarely develops the aerial portion to the IPB prior to mission analysis.
The ADO rarely coordinates with the S2 to add the third dimension analysis to the maneuver IPB prior to COA development.

Technique: The ADO's development of the aerial portion of the IPB must begin immediately following receipt of the Division's Warning Order. The aerial IPB results in a predictive analysis of when and where the Brigade will most likely see enemy air.

5.3 Process Information

* Task force S2 understanding of IPB process, products and integration: Task force and squadron S2s frequently do not understand the application of the IPB process, resultant products, and their integration into the planning process

The specific application of the IPB process (i.e. what products result from the process) is not clearly articulated in MIOBC/OAC and 96B MOS instruction.
Instructional exercises tend to focus on brigade and higher echelons.
The staff planning process and specific IPB product integration at task force level is
- generally not understood
- not articulated to the S2 by the commander, executive officer (XO) or S3.
The IPB process and example applications in current field manuals (FMs 34-130, 34-3, 71-123, 34-2-1) are generally vague, nonspecific and representative of concept process rather than technique.
The appendices in FM 34-130 are adequate to illustrate these concepts, but currently there is no good example of a well-integrated (i.e. inclusive of all battlefield operating systems) SITEMP product with the degree of resolution required to focus the task force planning process.
Currently, S2s and S2 section personnel are first exposed to process application and integration at the CTCs.

Procedures:

Implement a program that sends serving observer/controllers (O/Cs) to Ft Huachuca to observe training and, if possible, give an overview of what we are seeing at the CTCs.
The CTCs should conduct VTCs between Ft Huachuca and task force S2 trainers.

Technique: Use every Home Station training opportunity to integrate S2s into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). IPB and its resultant products are integral to successful planning and preparation.

5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information

* Engineer company input to task force S2's situation template (SITEMP):

Techniques:

1. Engineer company commanders must better train their XOs. Provide them with appropriate doctrinal manuals on engineer equipment, capabilities and organizations.

2. XOs must seek out the task force S2's guidance on their input to the task force SITEMP.

5.4.4. Prepare Reports on Enemy Situation

* Use of SITEMPs to confirm or deny enemy courses of action (COAs): S2 sections too often fail to use their own SITEMPs as analytical products. They routinely produce SITEMPs of varying quality and utility, but often throw them in a corner and fail to use them once the planning has stopped and execution has begun.

Techniques:

1. S2 sections should post and use their SITEMPs for reporting enemy COAs.

2. S2 sections should ensure that the SITEMP or other analytic product is not confused with "hard" intel received by using two maps: one analytical map, and one for posting only "hard data".

Table of Contents

Section II: TA. 4 Command and Control BOS

Section II: TA. 6 Mobility/Survivability & NBC BOS