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Military

SECTION II

TA. 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS

Positive Performance

4.2 Assess Situation

* Task force commander risk assessments: Task force commanders are conducting more detailed risk assessments with control measures emphasized. Though units still show some weaknesses on implementing these controls, they are beginning to think and discuss options and controls.

Technique: Stress the steps of risk management and force protection issues at all levels.

4.3 Determine Actions

* Brigade combat team (BCT) execution of the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP): BCT staffs are becoming more effective in their execution of the decision making process.

  1. Staffs are becoming more familiar with the battle rhythm of operations. Their ability to accelerate the decision making process is increasing.

  2. Beginning with mission analysis and continuing through the wargaming process, staffs are continually showing the capability to produce an order in a timely manner.

Techniques:

1. Increased commander involvement in the entire process. Commanders involvement, including a directed course of action, allows the staff to streamline the process through less briefing and time spent on developing different courses of action. The time saved is better used in refining the course of action developed by the commander and the wargaming process.

2. Staffs should continue to refine the orders process at Home Station in simulations, ARTEPS, and battle staff training. The focus needs to be on operating in a field environment under the same constraints they will operate under based on their mission. This will enable staffs to focus on other areas which need to be improved such as decision point development, and basic refinements to the plan once it is published.

* Brigade planning, integration, and execution of fires and maneuver:

  1. Integration of fires and maneuver to shape the battlefield has improved.

  2. Development of the desired effects of fires in relationship to unit schemes of maneuver have provided commanders the flexibility required to influence and set conditions for the close fight.

  3. Integration of air and ground forces have proven effective in setting the conditions to reinforce success or separate echelons of the enemy.

  4. Early integration in the planning process and detailing warning orders have provided subordinate units the capability to anticipate requirements and synchronize fires with maneuver.

Techniques:

1. Critical fire support tasks and desired effects are synchronized with maneuver during COA development and wargaming.

a. COA development should result in an in integrated scheme of maneuver and fires, including an observation plan.

b. Synchronization of the scheme of maneuver and fires is essential during wargaming.

c. Refinement must be an ongoing process based on intelligence gathering. The early development of a scheme of fires with maneuver improves the common vision of the fight and allows the staff the flexibility to refine the plan as intelligence is collected before execution.

2. Brigade Home Station should establish a habitual relationship between the Aviation support unit, ALO and fire support element and the S3 operations. This liaison must be reinforced during brigade planning process training, BCTPs and CPXs with the LNOs present during the orders process.

4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations

* Integration of air and ground assets:

  1. Maneuver commanders and staffs improved their ability to plan for and integrate available aviation assets and Close Air Support (CAS) to shape the battlefield.

  2. Command and control, communications and logistic operations continue to show significant improvement with increased usage of available aviation assets.

  3. Airspace usage plans are improving, providing flexible Airspace Coordination Areas (ACAs) throughout the depth of the brigade area. Hasty ACAs have been very effective against targets of opportunity when there is a habitual relationships of brigade staffs and aviation LNOs/ALOs with knowledge of unit SOP to expedite coordination and deconflict fires.

Techniques:

1. Brigade staffs should review and emphasize the principles outlined in FM 100-103 during Home Station training.
2. Brigade staffs must integrate Aviation LNO's, Air Force liaisons in all brigade order processes.
3. COA development should result in an A2C2 plan and ACAS as part of the scheme of fires.

Needs Emphasis

4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status

* Tactical Operations Center (TOC) operations: TOC operation techniques are not serving to assist the commander in making effective, timely, and informed decisions during execution.

PROBLEMS:
  1. The effectiveness of unit TOCs in assisting the commander's decision making process during execution continues to decline.

  2. TOC operations TTPs are not well refined in most unit TOCs, contributing to poor coordination between staff sections and reduced information flow.

RESULT: Unit commanders are getting incomplete and poorly coordinated information from which to base their decisions at critical points in the battle.

Techniques:

1. TOCs must drill their operation procedures routinely during Home Station training sessions. TOC drills should include all the tasks TOCs would be expected to perform at the most critical time in the battle:

- synchronization/execution of indirect fires
- coordinating the movement of friendly units
- reporting/analyzing enemy actions
- providing the commander with complete analysis and recommendations

2. Update the TOC operations manual, which has a pretty fair listing of individual/section duties, to include coordination TTP for specific battlefield events, i.e. when friendly units move the following actions should occur.

3. TOC intercommunications should be eased by the advent of digitized systems which simultaneously share information between staff members. However, we need to continue to develop manual/backup methods which reinforce procedures to share information efficiently and effectively to include multi-form messaging, log books, dedicated runners, etc.

4.1.1 Communicate Information

* Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) signal battalion situation awareness:

PROBLEM: MSE signal battalion planning and control elements and their companies often lack adequate awareness of the tactical situation within their supported unit's area of operations. Divisional signal battalions provide area communications to the maneuver brigades and other divisional elements. Communications assets are distributed throughout the division area and into the brigade sectors. MSE systems planning for future operations and the successful execution of current operations requires that the MSE unit be aware of the supported unit's mission, intent, scheme of maneuver, and possible contingencies.

RESULT: Without constant battle tracking and situational awareness, the signal unit cannot respond effectively to sudden changes in friendly or enemy disposition.

Techniques:

1. Signal units must employ S2 or S3 personnel to maintain close contact with brigade and division intelligence and operations cells in order to receive periodic situational updates.

2. Maneuver force's Command or O/I nets should be monitored.

3. A current operations map should be maintained at the signal battalion and company command posts which depicts the

- maneuver plan
- disposition of friendly and enemy forces
- projected communications asset movements

4.1.1.1 Receive and Transmit Mission

* Task force fire plans brief during operations order (OPORD):

PROBLEM: Task force fire plans (concept and scheme of fires) are not well briefed during task force OPORDs and are therefore not well understood by subordinate commanders.

RESULTS:
  1. Confusion on the part of fire supporters and frustration on the part of maneuver commanders.

  2. Lack of understanding by company/team commanders of the concept of fires, critical fire support tasks (CFSTs), and their execution responsibilities.

  3. Ineffective fires due to complications in executing the task force observations plan and synchronizing fires with maneuver.

Techniques:

1. The final opportunity the task force fire support element (FSE) has to communicate its top- down fire support plan is at the OPORD brief. It is the only time that the task force commander, company/team commanders, and subordinate FSOs will hear the plan together prior to the rehearsal. The briefing must be clear, concise, and understandable to facilitate subordinate planning and minimize subsequent changes or misunderstandings.

2. Use sketches and/or cartoons to facilitate understanding.

3. Alternate the S3 and fire support officer (FSO) for each phase of the operation to better associate fires with maneuver.

4. Develop a standard format for briefing the plan and ensure it covers vital information such as:

- commander's guidance for fires
- critical fire support tasks
- concept of fires, to include responsibility for observation and execution {primary and alternate}
- tasks to subordinate units, and force protection measures

4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information

* Parallel planning between task force and brigade:

PROBLEMS:
  1. Task force and brigade S3s have no formal system that dictates what and when products will be available throughout the brigade orders process.

  2. Most units have established WARNO systems; however, they often lack critical information that will assist the task force planning process.

  3. Parallel planning is a must for the entire staff; but, is especially critical for the S2 because 80% of his products are needed for COA development.

  4. Task force LNOs are usually newly assigned 2LTs or 1LTs waiting to attend the advanced course and lack the experience/training required to make significant contributions to the unit by way of LNO responsibilities. This shortfall is not due to lack of effort; rather a lack of training and understanding of task and purpose.

Techniques:

1. Liaison Officers (LNOs) can be especially effective in producing a timely conduit for information. Information that can assist the battle staff throughout the planning process may include a list of facts and assumptions made by the HHQ staff during their planning. This information, provided by the LNO, might assist the task force in understanding why a certain COA was chosen by the HHQ.

2. The task force LNO should be an integrated staff officer who aggressively pursues needed information for all BOS elements within the task force to facilitate parallel planning.

3. Task force commanders must ensure the LNO clearly understands his duties and responsibilities and has a clear understanding of the planning and orders process.

4. Task force and brigade S3s should establish a formal planning process.

5. Establish a commo network that allows quick dissemination of information to the task force as the brigade executes its orders process. These products, coupled with detailed WARNOs, will greatly assist the task force in their effort to parallel plan.

4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status

* Dissemination of current CSS planning estimates:

PROBLEMS:
  1. Mission analysis often does not include accurate planning estimates.

    - Brigade staffs do not include current on-hand/assigned data when conducting mission analysis.

    - The rear CP normally has the information posted, however, the planners at the main CP are unaware of limitations based on current status.

  2. Planning estimates used during COA development (such as casualty estimate) are not provided by the planners to the executors (such as the forward medical company commander).

RESULT: The lack of information reconciliation results in shortfalls in mission attainability as well as shortened troop leading procedure time for the support structure.

Techniques:

1. The receipt of a division order by brigade staffs should trigger transmission of status updates to the main CP.
2. Estimates used during COA development must be reviewed by support LNOs early to assure attainability.

* Brigade command post (CP) battle tracking: Battle tracking in brigade CP fails to provide the commander the required information before, during, and after the battle to make timely, efficient, and effective decisions.

PROBLEM: Brigades are weak in battle tracking of combat power two levels down. The brigade believes that by tracking the task force combat power (one level down) they can stay abreast of the situation enough to monitor the battle. In order for the main CP to become a proactive participant in the fight it must know what is happening at the co/tm level (two levels down). Additionally, the fighting of the deep fight, not in terms of distance, but time, requires the co/tm details.

Techniques:

1. The brigade main CP must know the situation at the front

- who is in contact
- how much combat power remains
- status of ammunition
- who needs to come out of the fight to refuel, etc.

to be able to make decision and recommendations to the commander on

- who gets priority of fires
- where to commit the reserve
- where to put CAS
- what critical CSS assets need to be moving and where

2. FM 71-3 identifies 11 task for the brigade main CP to perform. Seven of these require detailed level of information.

- Assist the brigade and task force commanders
- Plan future operations
- Coordinate operations throughout the depth of the AO
- Synchronize CS and CSS assets
- Monitor the close fight
- Maintain continuous operations for extended periods
- Assume command and control if the TAC is destroyed.

3. The building and tracking of combat power must be a units SOP for training as well as for deployment.

4. JANIS exercises must stress brigade main CP to track this level of detail and demand that they become an active player in employment of CAS, artillery, reserve forces, to include tracking and informing the commander of impending decision points, critical friendly and enemy events and the movement and priority of CS and CSS support throughout the brigade sector.

5. Brigade mains need standard tracking charts and SOP reports that include subordinate leaders using proper spot reports, commander SITREPs, BDA, and current combat power. With an established SOP for use of the Command and O/I frequencies, this level of information can be passed quickly without tying up the nets during the fight.

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