Military

Small arms weapons are not properly maintained and cleaned.
Sleep plans are not enforced; SGMs and NCO are biggest offenders.
Noise and light discipline is not maintained:
- white and chem lights used in tactical operating centers (TOCs)
- hatches slamming
Field sanitation standards not enforced:
- wire left on roads
- trash bags falling out of trucks
- trash being burned or buried in the field
No Pre-combat inspections (PCIs) at Home Station to ensure MOPP gear is packed:
- soldiers without gloves, masks
- soldiers without MOPP uniform
Load plans not enforced.
Unit discipline regarding soldier hygiene, uniforms, vehicles, and equipment not enforced.
Speed limits in the Brigade Support Area (BSA) and along the main supply route (MSR) not enforced.
Proper use of ground guides not enforced.
Use of proper eye protection not enforced.

Techniques:

1. NCOs must ensure 100% accountability of soldiers at all times.
2. During convoy operations, reduce speeds to appropriate for conditions.
3. Maintain unit discipline in the above areas.

4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations

* Integrating aviation planning into the scheme of maneuver: Aviation units properly manage their fighter management programs but fail to integrate aviation planning with supported maneuver units.

Technique: Units must identify critical events in the battle and integrate aviation planning, to ensure aviation is available to augment their scheme of maneuver.

Procedure: Include examples of integrating aviation planning cycles with supported unit's decision making process in FM-101-5 and other applicable FMs.

* Air Cavalry Troop (ACT) synchronization of fire and maneuver during reconnaissance operations: While performing reconnaissance tasks, Air Cavalry Troops (ACTs) do not use fire and maneuver to develop the situation, maintain freedom of action, or maintain the reconnaissance focus.

ACT commanders do not apply the basic fundamentals of reconnaissance and do not delineate the task and purpose of each scout weapons team (SWT) to focus reconnaissance efforts.
Commander's intent fails to outline the critical reconnaissance tasks that must be accomplished.
Upon contact with OPFOR elements, ACTs attempt to maintain contact with long range observation, but generally fail to further develop the situation and continue the reconnaissance effort. They make few attempts to use direct and indirect fires to suppress the enemy and allow the ACT to maneuver to a position of advantage.
Generally, ACTs may attempt to call fires on the target, but do not synchronize this with the maneuver of SWTs. Once the call for fire is initiated, many times, ACTs will break contact, not observe the rounds, and bypass.
When indirect fires are not available, ACTs use poor movement techniques to attempt close reconnaissance of the enemy force and generally become decisively engaged with the OPFOR element, losing reconnaissance focus.
Troop level graphic control measures are seldom added to the squadron graphics to facilitate maneuver, resulting in loss of command and control during decisive portions of the reconnaissance.
FM 1-116 and FM 1-114 are general and do not provide sufficient information on fire and maneuver with reconnaissance focus.

Techniques:

1. Air Cavalry Troops (ACTs) need to define and practice battle drills for fire and maneuver at Home Station.

2. Commander's must give a clear commander's intent and delineate the task and purpose (relative to the required critical reconnaissance tasks) in the operations order (OPORD).

Procedure: FM 1-116 and FM 1-114 should be revised to add examples of how to develop the situation at the Air Cavalry Troop (ACT) and scout weapons team (SWT) level.

* Planning for Tactical Operations Center (TOC) movement: TOCs are either reluctant to move or move too often during the course of a battle.

There is often little or no deliberate planning for when and how the TOC moves to maintain its ability to coordinate and synchronize operations during execution.
Split section TOC operations are not very well understood or executed in most TOCs.

Techniques:

1. TOCs must consistently rehearse split TOC operations to ensure the ability to function fully while displacing on the battlefield.

2. TOC moves should be rehearsed until each person knows his function and can execute in the least amount of time possible.

3. TOCs must thoroughly plan, based on METT-T, when to move during a battle to ensure they can maintain contact and control at all critical junctures.

4. Unit SOPs must include procedures for split TOC operations which ensure all BOS remain covered and synchronization/coordination between sections is maintained.

Procedures: TOC operations manuals, or sections in FMs, must include TTP for moving TOCs, and planning TTP that will assist leaders in developing viable movement plans.

4.5 Employ Tactical C2W

* Electronic Warfare (EW) protection for reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance forces:

Techniques:

1. The ACT must plan detailed force protection missions in their EW execution matrix during the recon/counterrecon phases of the battle.

2. The ACT should work closely with the Fire Support Officer (FSO) to coordinate force protection missions during the insertion of the scouts/COLTs.

3. The FSO must provide specifics of where and when these scout/COLTs are being inserted. This information can then be given to the ES/EA teams listening to the targeted nets to see if the teams were compromised while being inserted. If so, the FSO can warn these teams and take appropriate action. Concurrently, per the EW execution matrix, the recon net(s) would be exploited to protect the rest of the force by reporting any compromised OPs, assembly areas, TOC sites, etc.

* Traffic analysis (TA) cell employment of jump nodes: Traffic analysis cells are often not planning for, nor adequately employing, jump nodes to ensure mission continuity.

Techniques:

1. When the TA cell is forced to jump, either to maintain communications with deployed EW teams or prevent itself from being overrun, it should dispatch a jump vehicle with adequate files, maps, secure communications etc., to maintain control of the battle.

2. Once the jump vehicle is in position, with good comms to all outlying sites and the ACT, it should then assume control of the tasking and reporting net.

3. The main TA cell body then tears down and redeploys to the jump vehicle's location. Once reunited, and operational, the main TA cell body will resume control of the net and the jump vehicle will be absorbed back into the TA cell.

4. If the TA cell does not possess a jump vehicle or it gets destroyed, an EW team should be designated as the net control until the TA cell relocates or gets reconstituted. However, this is the least favorite option, because mission continuity is lost, and it deters from the EW team's mission.

* Electronic surveillance (ES) jamming effectiveness reports (JERs):

Techniques:

1. The electronic support (ES) system tasked with monitoring the enemy frequency to determine the effectiveness of the jamming mission against it must be sitting on that frequency during the conduct of the EA mission, and must provide timely and accurate jamming effectiveness reports (JERs) to the TA cell. Provide JERs frequently to the TA cell, especially if:

(1) increase the jammer's power output,

(2) reorient its antenna, or

(3) switch this particular EA mission over to another EA system, if available.

2. Place an EW system with hearability to the target area, not colocated with the EA system or between it and the target area. Task it to monitor the target net to determine the effectiveness of the mission. The monitoring system should assign an approximate effectiveness rating to provide timely and well understood input to the TA cell. One method follows:

3. Standardize the issuing of JERs. A two to three minutes interval during a jamming mission would help enforce the timeliness and importance of these reports, and ultimately lead to a more effective EA mission.

* Traffic Analysis (TA) cell functions: Traffic analysis (TA) cells generally do not set the proper tone for the rest of the deployed ES/EA assets under their purview.

Frequently, the TA cells will put out taskings and then passively wait for the ES/EA teams to report, rather than being pro-active by providing feedback to the teams, showing an interest in the mission, and reminding the teams, periodically, of the current tasking.
TA cells are displaying a "check the block" mindset and are not following-up to ensure taskings are understood or being followed.

Techniques:

1. The EW platoon leader and sergeant must take a more active role and interest in what the traffic analysis cell is or is not accomplishing

2. Hold the cell accountable for what it does or does not accomplish, ensuring that at least the basic standards expected of an electronic warfare signals intelligence cell are being executed.

NOTE: A motivated TA cell that shows an active interest in the mission will be reflected by the ES/EA teams. Likewise, an apathetic TA cell will be reflected in kind by the ES/EA teams.

* TRQ-32A(V)2 team operation of the Recorder, Reproducer Set, Sound (RRSS):

Procedures:

Develop a TTP pamphlet for the RRSS and distribute it to all TRQ-32A(V)2 teams.
Evaluate the RRSS for a possible upgrade to make it more "user friendly."

* TRQ-32A(V)2 team radio operation:

Procedures:

Develop an addendum to the technical manual for the TRQ-32A(V)2 to warn operators against the practice of transmitting on their guard radios.
Explore the possibility of adding a VHF bandpass filter to the guard radio circuit to make it into a receiver/transmitter.

Table of Contents

Section II: TA. 4, Part 7

Section II: TA. 5 Intelligence BOS