Military

Task force FSOs usually do not adequately define what the task and purpose is for each task force target.
During the wargame, the FSO does not require the S3 to clearly state the intent for each target.

Techniques:

1. Task force FSOs must emphasize the importance of assigning each target a defined task and purpose. If the maneuver commander/S3 cannot provide this, the target is probably not valid and usually not executable.

2. Consider other factors during the planning process, to include:

- observers
- artillery we expect available to service a target
- what maneuver event will trigger the firing of this target

* (CSM trend incorporated) Combat Service Support (CSS) rehearsals: CSS rehearsals are inadequate.

S1 and S4 seldom conduct CSS rehearsals.
1SGs and specialty platoon sergeants:
- rarely get involved in CSS rehearsals
- seldom come to CSS rehearsals well versed on the task force and company/team maneuver plan.
- seldom have graphics
Rehearsals lack detail and direction.
Rehearsal aids are inadequate.

Techniques:

Develop a rehearsal SOP that outlines rehearsal responsibilities, attendees, times, and locations.
Ensure all participants fully understand the maneuver plan prior to the rehearsal.

* Company/team planning for direct fires: Inadequate fire control within the company/team direct fire plan results in ineffective placement and synchronization of fires on the enemy.

Company/team direct fire planning continues to be in a state of disarray.
Company/teams are not achieving effective, overwhelming fires on enemy formations in either defensive or offensive operations.

Techniques:

1. Develop, as a priority of work, rehearsing the direct fire plan during the preparation phase to help ensure the validity of the plan.

2. Immediately start engagement area (EA) development on receipt of the task force warning order (WARNO).

3. Company level intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) must clearly identify where the enemy will come as result of the terrain and friendly action, and the best places to place effective fires on his formations.

4. Commanders must become more responsible in siting and supervising the integration of combat multipliers into the direct fire plan.

5. Units must better manage their time in order to accomplish all the work required prior to mission execution.

4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support

* Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) management: A2C2 is often neither practiced nor fully understood.

Too often, the brigade combat team (BCT) staff relies on the aviation LNO for airspace management. Airspace management in the BCT sector is the responsibility of the brigade commander. The S3 air manages A2C2 at the brigade level; the G3 air manages A2C2 at the division level. Airspace management applies to all uses of airspace in the BCT sector, to include Air Force fixed wing, Army rotary wing, UAV, indirect fires, and air defense assets.
A2C2 plans are often not disseminated to maneuver task forces, FA, ADA, and Air Force elements to synchronize the brigade's efforts.

Techniques:

1. Read and review FM 100-103.

2. A2C2 planning must be disseminated. Develop Home Station training to enhance techniques for unit airspace management and incorporate A2C2 procedures in unit TACSOPs.

3. Ground maneuver units must assume responsibility for and take ownership of their airspace. Fixed wing, rotary wing, UAV, artillery, and air defense are merely temporary users of airspace.

4.4.2 Issue Orders

* Timely issue of OPORDs at platoon level: Platoon Leaders are not issuing OPORDS or disseminating critical information in a timely manner.

Techniques:

1. Platoon leaders can provide maximum time to their subordinates if they use WARNOs, OPORDs, and FRAGOs to transmit critical information. The key is to use backwards planning and then sticking to the timeline.

2. Transmit changes and updates by FRAGOs or supplementary combat battle instructions.

3. Delegate to subordinate mission leaders the authority to coordinate with the different task forces. Most missions at the NTC are physically led by squad leaders, and they, therefore, must be empowered to make the decisions needed to get the mission accomplished.

4. Platoon leaders can maintain C2 by getting back briefs and confirmation briefs by their squad leaders as coordination develops.

4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline

* Battalion Fire Direction Center (FDC) crew drills for tactical fire control:

Battalion Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TACSOP) do not establish a specified crew drill for the battalion Fire DirectionCenter (FDC). RESULT: Their tactical fire control is inefficient, leading to excessive mission processing time.
FDCs do not issue doctrinal fire commands.
FDCs do not effectively battle track and therefore lose situational awareness during the battle.
FDCs develop and assign responsibilities to crew members during the rotation, but not to all crew members.

Technique: The battalion FDC must develop a crew drill that clearly fixes responsibility to each member for critical tasks during the conduct of operations. The end result will yield standardized mission processing in a lock-step fashion with minimum processing times. This crew drill must be clearly established in the TACSOP. Sample crew drill for a voice call for fire executed digitally:

When time available is limited, it is critical at the battery level to issue an OPORD to section chiefs and above that focuses on the accomplishment of the unit's critical field artillery tasks (CFATs.) Battery commanders and platoon leaders fail to focus their unit's efforts on the tasks required to accomplish the mission.
Battery commenders offten issue unclear orders and make poor use of available time.
In most cases, battery commanders use battalion-directed pre-combat checks (PCCs), but often fail to identify their own pre-combat inspections (PCIs) and rehearsals.
When the commander does specify PCCs/PCIs, leaders often do not adequately check to see if they have been accomplished.

Techniques: Leaders must focus on accomplishment of their CFATs by executing troop leading procedures (TLPs) to standard. FM 71-123 provides TTPs, in detail, to address this issue. The TLPs provide a mental framework to ensure complete preparation, dissemination and execution of both the battery and platoon mission. The steps are not sequential and can occur either out of order or simultaneously after the receipt of the mission.

1. Receive the mission.

- The commander must analyze the mission to define his battery's restated mission and CFATs.

- He must define the task, purpose method and endstate for each critical task to determine logistics and Class V requirements.

- He must also identify PCCs for the sections.

2. Issue a warning order.

- The commander issues as much information and detail as he can based upon METT-T. He may do this by FM, or if time is available, issue a WARNO in written form.

- There is no doctrinal format for the WARNO. However, a five paragraph field order works best.

3. Make a tentative plan.

- The commander must focus on battery/platoon IPB and METT-T.

- He must be concerned with positioning, movement, logistics, rehearsals and defense as he develops his plan.

4. Initiate movement. If the mission requires and the time is available, initiate movement or repositioning as soon as possible.

5. Conduct reconnaissance.

- This recon can be a map recon or ground as time available allows.

- The commander should coordinate with adjacent units, survey, engineer support, and route security as needed.

6. Complete the plan.

- The commander must now take all the information and produce a coherent order.

- The plan must be executable by the unit based on METT-T and satisfy all CFATs.

7. Issue the order.

- The audience for the order is METT-T driven; however, down to section chief level is best since there is less room for individual interpretation of the plan and intent. The key players must be present.

- A terrain board or cartoon sketch of the battery's area of operations is a technique that is clear and easily understood by the audience.

- Clear delivery of the order is critical to the TLP process.

- Once complete, use a backbrief to ensure complete understanding of the OPORD and commander's intent.

8. Supervise.

- This is the most important, yet most neglected step of the TLP.

- Leaders must conduct the PCCs/PCIs that the commander established. The requirements for effective PCCs/PCIs are outlined in FM 71-123, pages 2-33 through 2-35.

* Pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections (PCC/PCI): Company fire support teams (FISTs) generally conduct inadequate PCCs/PCIs.

Ground/Vehicle Laser Locator Designators (G/VLLD) batteries fail when dismounted.
Protective masks do not seal during a chemical attack.
Machine guns do not fire because they are dirty.
Radios will not hold a crypto fill.

Techniques:

1. Develop detailed PCC/PCI checklists prior to execution.

2. Make checklists mission specific, e.g.:

- dismounted operations
- copperhead shoots
- offensive operations, etc.

Table of Contents

Section II: TA. 4, Part 6

Section II: TA. 4, Part 8