Military

Company leadership does not clearly understand their role and responsibilities in a field environment.
Leaders duplicate work and critical leader tasks do not get accomplished effectively, if at all.
Critical tasks are done differently each time, and take longer, since no one knows the standards for completion.

- write to the job, not to the personality of the person in the job.
- identify each critical task the company must accomplish to be combat ready.
- describe how the task is done, and include an established time standard for completion.

4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders

* Level of detail in enemy forces paragraph of company/team OPORDs: Co/tm commanders do not refine the enemy situation or conduct sufficient terrain analysis to give platoon leaders and vehicle commanders the level of detail required to adequately see the enemy and see the terrain.

Frequently, because of inadequate time management at higher levels or at company level, co/tm commanders are pressed for time in the preparation of their OPORDs.
In order to get a decent order out in a reasonable amount of time, commanders "gloss" over portions of the order, primarily Paragraph 1A (Enemy Forces), by simply presenting this paragraph word for word out of the Task force order.
The lack of a clear and detailed Paragraph 1A can be attributed directly to co/tm commanders not conducting a detailed IPB at their level during the development of the co/tm OPORD.

- unrealistic in terms of the scope of assigned responsibilities, as compared with the destruction of the enemy, and
- unexecutable when attempted on terrain which has not been properly analyzed for the military aspects of terrain.

Techniques: The amount of work a co/tm commander has to perform in preparation for a fight can be staggering and must be delegated, properly resourced, and accomplished in a timely manner.

1. Get the most detailed terrain products available for the assigned AOs (this is usually not a 1:50,000 map), maps of 1:24,000 scale or larger.

2. Satellite or recon photos may be available through the S2 and should be requested.

3. A completed MCOO done at Home Station or the night prior to the prep day of a battle will save much time during the orders preparation.

4. Have enemy doctrinal manuals and orders of battle on hand, tabbed and broken down to what a doctrinal enemy would do given the anticipated mission.

5. Place responsibility on company XO or platoon leaders to assist in developing blown up sketches of enemy positions and key terrain in the AO.

6. Do not wait unit the Task force order has been issued to begin the IPB process. All things mentioned above can be done the evening/night prior to the preparation for the anticipated mission if the information is aggressively sought out and used to refine pre-existing products brought from Home Station.

7. Drill subordinates during Home Station training on what their responsibilities are in the IPB process.

* Planning for repositioning of Paladin units to support maneuver operations: Paladin units do not adequately plan for and conduct movement to support the brigade's operations.

Battalion staffs of Paladin equipped-units seldom plan movements in sufficient detail to synchronize with the critical field artillery tasks and maneuver.
When the battalion staff does not plan the movements, battery commanders are forced to do this themselves.
Current software in the AFCS for the Paladin limits the firing area to 500 meters. Anytime a Paladin has occupied all four quadrants inside the firing area, the POC must generate a tactical move order to move the platoon to another firing area. These capabilities and limitations present numerous terrain management and coordination challenges for the DS battalion staff.

Techniques:

1. The battalion staff must plan for movement, in detail, as part of the brigade planning process so that it is synchronized with the brigade scheme of maneuver. The staff should refine this plan as part of the FA battalion planning process. Some factors that the staff must consider as part of this process are:

2. The staff must give the firing batteries clear guidance and triggers to conduct survivability and tactical moves.

- a Paladin battery position area (PA) is 2000 x 2000 meters
- a platoon position area is 1000 x 1000 meters
- howitzers occupy firing areas within 500 meter radii.

* Inadequate fragmentary orders (FRAGOs):

Fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) at both task force and company/team level do not address changes in the current situation (friendly and enemy).
Most FRAGOs only address one unit and are not synchronized across the task force.

Procedure: Future versions of FM 71-1/2 should better address the format for fragmentary orders.

4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders

* Graphic control measures in brigade schemes of maneuver: Brigade schemes of maneuver lack sufficient graphic control measures to provide flexibility during execution.

The brigade planning process often fails to provide required graphic control measures for specified tasks (e.g., passage of lines, movement routes/axes, air corridors).
Control measures for the shift from the deep fight to the close fight are often not well defined.
Reserves, when designated, are often provided the brigade base plan graphics with unclear control measures for commitment. Reserves almost always do not have consolidated graphics.
Graphic control measures beyond the objective are often omitted, prohibiting forces to quickly transition.
Control measures to protect the force and coordinate the flow of forces from the front to rear are often omitted or done "push-to-talk" during execution.
Units designate checkpoints throughout the area of operation, but rarely use them to assist in controlling the force.

Techniques:

1. Brigade staffs must address all specified tasks and develop the graphic control measures for each task.

2. Staffs should look at implied tasks and plan the control measures necessary to commit follow-on forces.

3. Control measures should be in sufficient detail to meet the commander's intent. They must provide subordinate commanders the tools necessary to protect the force and transition to the close fight.

4. Review of doctrinal terms and graphics control measures by staffs during Home Station training will provide a clear understanding of their meaning and how they affect each BOS.

* Company/team and platoon rehearsals: Company/teams and platoons often fail to adequately use the time available after receiving the warning order (WARNO) to identify critical tasks to rehearse and to conduct those rehearsals.

Company/teams plan for rehearsals, but fail to execute them due to poor or undisciplined time management.
WARNOs and company/team OPORDs lack sufficient guidance on type of rehearsals that must be conducted by each platoon during troop leading procedures.
Units do not appreciate the value of rehearsing both routine and critical tasks when the time is available prior to execution.
Units tend to 'hand wave' the task or rely on the standard 'its SOP' reply without reinforcing unit performance through a rehearsal.

Commanders fail to fully visualize how the enemy will use his combat multipliers to shape the battlefield or predict when the enemy will use his combat multipliers against platoon, company/team positions.
Once engaged with the enemy, units find out they are not as well prepared to execute routine and critical tasks and therefore experience considerable command and control difficulties.

Techniques:

1. Company/team commanders must direct the type of rehearsal to be conducted at platoon level to ensure complete understanding of the mission.

2. Reinforce and aggressively train at Home Station in all training events leading to deployment.

3. Train junior leaders how to conduct a rehearsal and practice as often as possible during any training event.

4. Review CALL publication 91-1, Rehearsals, Apr 91, and incorporate rehearsal techniques in all leader training programs and publications.

5. Establish platoon and company rehearsal kits to assist units when full-up rehearsals are impractical.

6. Develop a small unit rehearsal checklist which assists junior leaders in developing rehearsal skills.

* Level of detail in company/team operation orders (OPORDs): Company/teams do not produce OPORDs in sufficient detail to allow them to accomplish their mission.

Situation Template (SITEMP) refinement, terrain analysis, and threat analysis are not conducted in sufficient detail to portray how the enemy will fight and shape the battlefield.
Commanders are weak in articulating to subordinates how they envision the battle will flow.
OPORD Para II: Poor understanding of task force or brigade scheme of maneuver.
OPORD Para III: Often scheme of movement and not a scheme of fire and maneuver to kill the enemy.
Task forces gives unclear task and purpose to company/teams which results in confusion on how the company/team fits into the task force's scheme of maneuver.
OPORD Para IV: Not synchronized with the scheme of maneuver for company/teams.
Commanders often do not consider the capabilities and limitations of their attachments.

Techniques:

1. Commanders must read and understand the OPORD example as outlined in FM 71-1, Appendix A.
2. Commanders must practice writing and issuing orders.
3. Incorporate OPORD writing and issuing training in all facets of garrison operations.

* Maneuver unit rehearsals: Units often fail to effectively rehearse missions.

Units spend too much time and energy building rock drills or sand tables for rehearsals instead of using the terrain.
Units spend too much time discussing every BOS for every phase during rehearsals.
Units usually run out of time prior to getting to the objective, thereby, never rehearsing actions on the objective.
Units rarely rehearse direct fire plan and its synchronization with indirect fires and the breach force in depth.

Techniques:

1. Units concentrate on the critical plans of the mission (i.e., during an attack, action, on contact from direct fire or indirect fire range through the assault, SOSR, actions on the objective).

2. Emphasize the shifting of fires and setting the conditions for the breach.

3. Discuss the use of dismounts.

4. Have the S3 and S2 drive through the engagement area (EA) while company/team commanders give their fire commands on FM.

5. S2 discusses what the enemy looks like at certain positions on the ground.

* Engineer unit rehearsals: Engineer rehearsals with company/team commanders at task force level and below are poorly conducted, if conducted at all.

Too often engineers do not plan for or properly allocate time for well defined and specific rehearsals with the maneuver compant/teams. Poor time management is to blame.
Units consistently fail to have clearly defined pre-combat check/pre-combat inspection (PCC/PCI) SOPs or checklists for the type of mission at hand. Engineer platoon leaders and commanders spend too much time ensuring these common tasks are completed properly at the expense of allocating time for rehearsals.

Techniques:

1. Doctrinal references for rehearsals and how PCC/PCIs fit into planning are FM 5-10 and FM 90-13-1.

2. Engineer commanders need to develop better SOPs defining minimum events to allow for maximum time management and best supervision techniques. For example:

- situation
- attachments and detachments
- earliest time of movement
- nature and time of operation
- time and place of OPORD issuance
- administrative and logistics information
- solid timeline

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Section II: TA. 5, Part 5

Section II: TA. 4, Part 7