Military

There is rarely a medical officer involved in the planning of brigade combat health support operations.
The medical planning and the S-1 are not considering the casualty estimate when developing the CHS plan.
The medical planner is not integrated into the brigade's Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

The CHS plan for placement of medical assets on the battlefield
- does not support the maneuver commander's plan
- fails to take into consideration time/distance factors in the evacuation and treatment of casualties.
Insufficient evacuation platforms are at the right place and right time to support the casualties incurred.
Brigade's medical assets are not able to acquire, treat and evacuate casualties in time to prevent them from dying of wounds.

1. The Forward Support Medical Commander (FSMC) is currently the only technical expert available to the brigade. He must be included into the brigade's MDMP to ensure a technically sound plan that is synchronized with and integrated into the maneuver commander's plan.

2. The medical planner and the brigade S1 must look carefully at the casualty estimate and the S2's situational template (SITEMP) to determine the densities of casualties during the different phases of the operation.

4.3.2 Develop Courses of Action

* Brigade Combat Team (BCT) planning for reserve forces: BCTs continually exercise poor planning in the development/employment of reserve forces in operations.

BCT staffs do not fully consider the criteria involved in planning for and committing the reserve into the current operation.
Decision points for commitment of the force are not fully developed, and therefore, are difficult to track.
Once the reserve is committed, there is usually no thought as to re-designation of another reserve force.

The reserve is not committed at the decisive point and time in order to achieve its task and purpose, which directly impacts on the missions actually given to the reserve force.
The mission is unclear, and as such, does not link into the commander's intent.

Techniques:

1. Develop, designate, and plan for the commitment of the reserve force early in the beginning of course of action development, not as an afterthought in the process of arraying forces. This will avoid the tendency to reinforce failure versus reinforcing success.

2. Once the force is completely integrated in the scheme of maneuver with a clear task, purpose, and commitment criteria, consider the positioning and command and control structure.

3. In the wargaming session, determine the criteria to commit the reserve, synchronize its commitment with the scheme of maneuver, and show the need for reconstituting a reserve force.

* Task force development and refinement of courses of action (COA): Task force S3s and commanders struggle through COA development and refining the COA into a scheme of maneuver.

Most S3's do not know how to start COA development.
Task forces normally develop COA's that only provide an axis, a formation and a simple plan for actions on the objective.
COAs normally do not include branches that provide flexibility to the plan based upon various possible situations.
COAs normally do not address details for actions on contact, actions on the objective nor continuous reconnaissance.
Clear tasks and purposes for subordinate units are not usually provided.
COAs are seldom refined during wargaming.

Procedure: Chapter 2 of FM 7-20 is an excellent reference for developing a COA and scheme of maneuver. This chapter should be incorporated into future additions of FM 71-2 and FM 71-1.

4.3.3 Analyze Courses of Action

* Decision points versus triggers: Decision points often lack specific details and are ineffective in aiding the different command and control nodes from assisting the commander in making the critical decisions at the appropriate time. Because they are poorly developed, they are often confused with triggers.

Techniques:

1. Specific criteria must be developed that includes both friendly and enemy considerations. Once the criteria is established it must be disseminated to subordinate units. This dissemination focuses the reporting process to include the criteria necessary to make the decision.

2. The criteria for decision points is developed during the wargaming process and not after the order has been issued. This will ensure all BOS elements are integrated and the DPs are disseminated to subordinate leaders.

3. As critical points in the battle are determined, thought must be put into whether a decision must be made. If a decision must be made it must pass the yes/no question. If the question is when, then it is a trigger, because it will happen without a decision being made.

4. Decision points must be clearly articulated in the order, the orders brief, and all rehearsals.

5. When considering the commitment of the reserve, shifting of the main effort, repositioning forces, or the location for employing special munitions, decision points and triggers must be thought out as part of the wargaming session.

* Task force Fire Support Officer (FSO) observation plan integration: Task force FSOs fail to integrate their observation plan with the task force scheme of maneuver plan.

Failure of the fire support plan to support the scheme of maneuver as it progresses through the sector.

Lack of forward observers on the battlefield at the critical place to support the destruction of the enemy.

Techniques:

1. During wargaming, the task force FSO and the battle staff must consider OP locations in relation to time and space, and identify who has primary and alternate responsibility for the OPs.

2. Together, the FSO and the battle staff must ensure the OPs provide the task force the necessary "eyes" on the critical targets at the required critical time during the battle.

* Task force wargaming: Wargaming at task force level rarely results in a synchronized plan at the conclusion of the wargaming process.

Task force planners habitually arrive at the wargaming table unprepared to use the wargaming process as a synchronization tool. Rather, the wargame usually degenerates into an additional course of action (COA) development session for task force planners.
Planners often do not know what must be accomplished during COA development to facilitate wargaming.
Planners do not understand what the results of a wargaming session should be.

Techniques:

1. Develop adequate teaching tools which describe the expected results of the wargaming process in terms of both products and information. These teaching tools must demonstrate an effective wargaming session.

2. Staffs must understand, up front, what it takes in terms of COA development to be prepared for wargaming.

4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces

* Aviation unit Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TACSOP):

Many Air Cavalry Troops (ACTs) do not have sound tactical SOPs.

Troops that do have sound SOPs do not often utilize them, adhere to them, or understand them.

SOPs generally do not have sufficient detail for combat operations, or when the level of detail is sufficient, crews are not utilizing these procedures.

Observed weaknesses in most aviation unit SOPs:

- standard reporting - actions on contact - target handover - air/ground integration - direct fire planning - engagement area development - fratricide prevention measures

- planning cells - reconnaissance techniques - fire support - Pre-combat checks/inspections - Forward arming and refueling point (FARP) operations - assembly area operations

Techniques:

1. Add SOP development and examples to the Aviation Officers Advance Course.

2. Units should develop, test and refine sound SOPs at Home Station. These SOPs should be developed to reduce the workload during battle planning, preparation and execution.

3. Standardize battle drills or plays, and practice.

* Company commander use of planning time:

Company commanders usually use 90% to 100% of available planning time.
Platoon/Team level briefs are rarely attempted and even more rarely completed to standard.
Most companies/troops start detailed mission planning after receipt of a battalion OPORD.

Techniques:

1. At Home Station, company planning cells should be centered around subject matter experts (intelligence, fire support, maneuver, EW, logistics etc) who routinely coordinate with their counterparts on the battalion staff during battalion level planning. Close coordination of this nature will provide the company early access to battalion staff products and allow concurrent planning on the company's part.

2. Companies should develop rigorous planning time lines that include platoon/team briefs and practice them regularly in garrison and in the field.

3. Crucial products such as the SITEMP, target list, and course of action sketch, narrative and base graphics should be provided to the companies as soon as they are completed by the battalion. Early receipt of these products allows company commanders to plan concurrently, thus ensuring an earlier company OPORD and leaving sufficient time for platoon/team leaders to plan their segment of the mission in detail.

4. Individual crews and small unit leaders must be given the opportunity to analyze their segment of the company mission. This must be trained and practiced at Home Station. Planning at this level must include:

- detailed analysis of the terrain and how to maneuver over it
- potential enemy positions and how to deal with them
- when and how reliefs on station will occur
- how to engage anticipated targets (direct or indirect fires) etc.

* (CSM trend) Use of Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TACSOP): Units are often not familiar with their TACSOPs.

TACSOPs are not getting down to user level.
Too many units have never seen and do not use their TACSOP.

Techniques:

1. Ensure the unit TACSOP is distributed down to user level.
2. Leaders must ensure the units are familiar with and use their TACSOP.

* (CSM trend) Troop leading procedures:

Leaders have difficulty complying with the 1/3 - 2/3 planning rule.
Leaders often do not follow troop leading procedures.
Leaders often wait to be told what to do rather than using time available to conduct necessary checks, rehearsals, etc.
NCOs usually waste valuable training rehearsal time while waiting for OPORD or return of the leader.

Technique: Supervising and inspecting are almost exclusively an NCO function. NCOs must be trained to proficiency in their leadership and time management skills.

* Medical company troop leading procedures: Medical leaders seldom use established troop leading procedures and field orders to ensure timely execution of their plans.

Technique: Use FM 71-1 and FM 7-8 as references to train and implement established procedures at Home Station. This will improve leaders' ability to manage their time and provide subordinates with the information needed prior to start of mission. Use of established procedures will facilitate the early movement of ambulance platoons when the company commanders have not completed their orders.

Table of Contents

Section II: TA. 4, Part 4

Section II: TA. 4, Part 6