Military

Troops do not have well-developed planning cells that facilitate concurrent/parallel planning at the troop level.
Air Cavalry Troop (ACT) commanders do not refine IPB products and artillery targets at troop level.
Most products, when provided by the staff in a timely manner, are not utilized to develop the scheme of maneuver of the troop.
Enemy templates, R&S plans, and event templates are usually an after-thought and are not integrated until the troop conducts their rehearsal.
Troop commanders fail to pass target refinement back to the FSO to support their scheme of maneuver.
Many troop planning cells are based on the "chalk number" or position in the flight, as opposed to identifying individual experts within the troop.

Techniques:

1. ACT commanders need to develop sound planning cells at Home Station, focusing on SMEs within the troop.
2. Home Station training should teach how to utilize products during the planning process.
3. The SMEs should have a counter-part on the squadron staff with whom they interact.

* Firing batteries defensive planning: Firing batteries lack coordinated defense plans.

Basic defensive skills in the firing batteries are either disregarded or poorly planned and executed.
Battery commanders fail to conduct IPB of their positions, and with the battalion S2, identify and disseminate the most likely threat to their batteries.
LP/OPs are usually in poor locations to provide early warning and soldiers are not well briefed or equipped to perform the mission to standard.
Often, batteries do not coordinate with adjacent units; when they do coordinate it is often incomplete.
Range cards are either inaccurate or not completed at all.
Maintenance of crew served weapons is often neglected and causes weapons to malfunction at critical times during battles.
Usually, sectors of fire are prescribed by the section chief, not by the platoon leader or platoon sergeant.
Leaders too often fail to explain target reference points (TRPs).
Little thought is put into establishing battery indirect fire targets and the computation of data for self illumination.
Rehearsals of reaction forces and tank killer junior are planned but generally not conducted due to poor time management.

Techniques:

1. Firing batteries need to focus more effort on defensive planning and execution at all levels during Home Station training.

2. A unit defensive checklist is an outstanding base when planning a defense of a position, but METT-T considerations must be used to prioritize and focus the tasks to the situation.

3. The battery commander must work with the S2 and his 1SG to decide how he can best defend his unit's position.

4. Range cards for all of the platoon's weapons systems must be prepared IAW the appropriate FM or ST.

5. Survivability/fighting positions must be constructed where and when METT-T dictates. These positions must be built to standard IAW FM 5-103.

6. The platoon leadership must establish sectors of fire for all weapons and TRPs and disseminate them to the lowest levels.

7. LP/OPs must be placed on the enemy's most likely avenue of approach and where a trigger point can be seen to give the battery time to prepare for a direct fire engagement.

- what they are looking for
- where they look for it
- what they do when they see it

8. FDCs should always be prepared to fire adjacent self defense targets as well as their own.

9. Self illumination data must be computed for each position and sent to the howitzer or howitzers that are designated to fire the illumination.

10. Defensive preparations should be a battle drill as a natural continuation of the occupation battle drill. The emphasis should be to get a basic defense capability as quickly as possible. Preparations begin with the platoon leader and gunnery sergeant establishing a hasty defense plan during advance party operations and continue through occupation and position improvement.

11. Rehearsals should be a part of the SOP for position improvement.

* Infantry team direct fire planning: Infantry teams have difficulty in direct fire planning and execution in both offensive and defensive operations.

Unable to mass fires in engagement areas (EAs).
Unable to focus, distribute and shift fires in manners that are understood by the soldiers that are to execute the plan.
During preparations for defensive operations, teams have difficulty siting obstacles so that they exploit terrain conditions and the effects of direct fire weapons.

Techniques:

1. Obtain and use Infantry School student handout on firect fire planning, SH 7-45.
2. Incorporate SH 7-45 in future editions of FM 71-1, FM 71-2 and FM 71-123.
3. Incorporate training on direct fire planning in Home Station training.

* Engineer battalion integration into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP): Engineer planning and planning products are not in accordance with FM 5-71-3.

Engineer staffs are prepared to conduct horizontal planning to a certain degree. However, the vertical planning process remains unstructured, leading to publication of engineer orders which lack sufficient detail and specificity to conduct successful operations.
The engineer battalion XO too often fails to establish any type of battalion planning timeline.
The Bn S3, S2 and the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) participate together in brigade mission analysis, receive the brigade commander's guidance and participate in the brigade wargaming process. However, critical steps in the development of the engineer estimate, which supports the brigade's MDMP, are usually missing, because the engineer battalion is not planning concurrently.
The brigade engineer (battalion commander) with his staff, seldom develops a detailed Scheme of Engineer Operations (SOEO) to support each maneuver course of action (COA) or then integrates the SOEO for the selected COA into brigade wargaming.
Since the engineer battalion is not following an established timeline and conducting its own wargame to identify critical vertical tasks, these tasks are usually not identified until after the brigade plan is completed and are not integrated or coordinated.

If the battalion XO does not closely coordinate with the battalion S3, as both work through their respective processes, key engineer tasks are left out of both the brigade SOEO and the engineer battalion plan.
The resulting products from a non-synchronized planning process are very poor. The brigade engineer annex is incomplete. The annex does not include all information critical to the brigade engineer plan or required for subordinate engineer planning.
Since the engineer battalion fails to conduct a structured planning process, the battalion order is merely a plagiarized version of the engineer annex. The order does not provide detailed subunit orders and service support instructions to units remaining under battalion control.

Techniques:

1. Based upon the unique relationship of having an engineer battalion whose assets are usually task organized under maneuver battalion control, the engineer battalion must parallel plan with the supported maneuver brigade. Engineer parallel planning requires a focus on:

2. The engineer battalion, with the ABE, must study the planning process as outlined in FM 5-71-3.

3. The battalion XO should take ownership of how planning is structured within the engineer battalion. He must coordinate, with the S3, critical junctures when the engineer staff is required to supplement S3/ABE efforts in the brigade planning process. This will drive development of the battalion planning timeline.

4. Once the timeline is set, the S3/XO must determine what products will result from each part of the process and whether they come from the battalion staff or the S3/S2/ABE. There should be a continuous exchange of products/information between these two cells to facilitate effective engineer planning for both the maneuver brigade and the engineer battalion.

* Engineer unit planning for use of family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) resources: Engineer units have difficulty planning and executing effective situational obstacles in support of maneuver - particularly the use and synchronization of FASCAM resources.

Engineer staff officers are not incorporating FASCAM planning considerations into their Engineer Battlefield Analysis (EBA).
Basic staff coordination and synchronization of tasks required for FASCAM obstacles have rarely been implemented effectively.

Obstacle emplacement is poorly synchronized with maneuver.
Execution becomes time, rather than event driven.
Ineffective countermobility efforts.

Techniques:

1. Task force staffs must integrate all elements of the BOS during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and identify all specified, implied, and essential tasks regarding FASCAM.

2. The unit must develop an SOP for transmitting SCATMINWARN report and follow-up reports of execution and self-destruct times.

3. The planning process must identify target/obstacle triggers based on enemy events.

4. The plan must clearly:

* (LTP trend) Integration of intelligence in the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) staff planning process:

Within the staff structure of a Forward Support Battalion (FSB), a separate intelligence officer is not authorized.
The staff function is intended to be executed by the S2/S3, supported by a 96B.
a. Generally, the officer assigned to the S2/S3 position identifies with the S3 responsibilities but is not trained in the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process and does not recognize S2 responsibilities.
b. The staff 96B is not normally brought to the Leader Training Program (LTP), consequently the training opportunity for this skill is lost.
Frequently, the FSB borrows an officer from the MI Battalion, but the officer they are provided is an equally inexperienced officer, generally a 2d Lieutenant, loaned to the FSB to be trained.

The IPB process, and its implications in both anticipating the support mission and security for BSA forces, are neglected or glossed over.
The S2/S3 of the FSB is dependent on both the Brigade S2 and the DISCOM S2 to develop the FSB's understanding of the battleifeld. Unforturnately, the DISCOM does not participate in this capacity during either LTP or a unit's NTC rotation, and brigade S2s tend to stay focused forward and neglect the brigade rear area.
Without an intelligence voice in the FSB, the brigade S2's priorities do not alter.

Techniques:

1. During Home Station training, both in the field and in garrison, the FSB S2/S3 should seek opportunities to train in the intelligence officer's staff functions with the DISCOM S2.

2. During Home Station training, the FSB S2/S3 must clearly define the FSB's intelligence requirements to the brigade S2.

3. Train the FSB staff with its authorized 96B, not a borrowed asset from another organization that will not be available when the FSB deploys.

* (CSM trend) NCO integration into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP): The battle staff often conducts the planning process without input from NCOs who are subject matter experts (SMEs).

Technique: NCO subject matter experts must be integrated into the decision-making process. NCOs must assert their expertise during planning.

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Section II: TA. 4, Part 3

Section II: TA. 4, Part 5