Military

While the brigade assigns COLTs R&S responsibilities, the brigade planning does not address in detail their mission, infiltration, and extraction.
Instead of a staff effort, the planning for COLT operations to plan these critical areas are left to the COLT platoon leader and the R&S planner to plan, prepare, and execute.

NOTE: Individual skills of Combat Observation Lasing Teams (COLTs) have improved during this quarter. Teams continue to improve their survival skills (fieldcraft) and tactical knowledge in movement techniques, camouflage, reporting, and knowledge of the enemy.

Techniques:

1. Brigade staff planning must include:

2. The COLTs exist to support the brigade's fight and their employment requires the integrated and synchronized planning efforts of the entire brigade staff.

3. Planning for COLT operations begins as early as high value targets are identified and refined as course of action is developed and finalized during the wargaming. Suggested areas for staff planning:

* Brigade chaplain integration into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP):

Limited situational awareness.
Unable to impact the overall brigade plan.
Unable to develop a religious support plan that is both comprehensive and flexible.

Procedure: FM 16-1 is very clear that the chaplain is to be part of the orders process and submit an annex. What is missing is a more complete discussion and possible timeline for mission analysis and product development. Recommend a vignette in FM 16-1 that walks a chaplain through the orders process.

* Military Police (MP) integration into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP): Military Police (MP) Platoon Leaders are not integrated well into the brigade staff planning process.

Military Police are frequently given vague missions which do not make full use of the platoon's capabilities in supporting offensive and defensive operations.
Platoon leaders are sometimes not aware of their staff responsibility in the planning process and have a tendency to present themselves primarily at the orders issue.
Key staff members, such as the S2 or S3, are often not aware of what MPs do on the battlefield; many associate MPs exclusively with Enemy Prisoner of War and traffic control operations.
Many commanders see rear area combat operations as the primary domain of MPs and further limit their flexibility by assigning MPs to static defense duties within the Brigade Support Area.

Techniques:

1. Conduct training events, such as CPXs and STAFFEXs, which allow the MP platoon leader to interact with the brigade staff during MDMP and assert his capabilities and recommendations in a systemic manner. This interaction will cause brigade planners to analyze MP employment as a response to a specific threat or a solution to a particular mission need instead of an after-thought tasking.

2. MPs should conduct training at Home Station with engineers, chemical units, scouts, etc., so that commanders may see the way MPs can be integrated into the full spectrum of brigade operations.

* Brigade Signal Officer (BSO) planning for communications:

- distance between elements
- terrain obstacles
- enemy electronic warfare activity
- loss of communications assets

Techniques:

1. BSOs must be fully integrated into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) in order to discern the variables and contingencies which could affect command, control, and communication (C3).

2. Plan and coordinate to use all available means of tactical communications; FM radio, Improved High Frequency Radio (IHFR), tactical satellite (TACSAT), and Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE).

3. Back-up systems should be pre-positioned forward so that they are available for instant use if required. Back up retrans or Radio Access Units (RAU's) are of little use if they are held in the rear during fast-paced combat operations.

4. Assets should be moved forward behind combat forces or with security escort to minimize the danger of destruction by enemy forces.

5. Communications plans should be published and briefed in a clear, concise format to ensure that all elements understand the plan and how contingency communications will support the maneuver.

* Brigade XO roles and responsibilities in the brigade battle staff: The Brigade XO is a dysfunctional participant of the brigade battle staff.

Before deployment to NTC: During train-up at Home Station, brigade commanders fail to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of the brigade XO and how he is to work with the brigade S3.
- Brigade XOs tend not to be involved in the training of the orders process until a major training event occurs (FCX, JANIS).
- The orders process train-up does not stress synchronization and execution of all BOS elements.
- No Chief of Staff is required to track brigade execution from the initiation of mission analysis to mission completion.
- Although the S3 assumes some of this function, he is never required to truly synchronize logistics with fire and maneuver during most JANIS and FCX training events.
RESULT: The unit deploys without a clear picture of the roles and requirements of the brigade XO.
After deployment to NTC: The XO begins to execute his responsibility as Chief of Staff for the commander without a clear working relationship with the S3 and no clear areas of responsibility other than "the XO keeps the time clock and worries about CSS".
- As the orders process progresses, the S3 and commander get involved with the maneuver and wargaming and do not sufficiently integrate the BOS elements into a cohesive and functional plan.
- The XO is caught up with:
-- moving and sustaining a real force in a hostile environment
-- working with TOC personnel who mostly work for the S3
-- trying to observe and integrate what he can of the BOS into an order that the S3 and commander are doing, on their own, in the plans tent.
- Any attempt by the XO to maintain a time clock is seen as abrasive and resisted by both S3 and commander.
RESULT: The order fails to synchronize the BOS, fails to consider any sort of TLP timeline for the task forces, and is executed from the brigade main CP by an XO that knows very little about the plan.
3. Around the time of the third orders process: The commander finally understands that somebody has to be the Chief of Staff for the orders process.
- The commander is too busy and the S3 is only focused on maneuver and cannot step back to see the big picture.
- The XO begins to find his niche. With all the staff reporting to him as the center of the brigade operations, he can begin to integrate all BOS elements into the plan.
- The S3 is now free to concentrate on his parts of the operation and the commander can get out of the TOC and see his troops.
RESULT: This is a slow learning process for the XO, but with practice, the brigade's orders process gets on the right track.
4. Response to lower operational readiness (OR) rate: Unfortunately, as the learning curve for the brigade XO and the battle staff begins a steady climb, the brigade OR rate heads in the other direction.
- Right at the time when the orders process has a chance to jell, the brigade XO is pulled out and sent to the BSA to become an over-grown BMO.
- The battle staff, now under control of the S3, drops all concepts of integration and logistical synchronization.
- The commander, feeling the pressure of maintenance, increased tempo of the rotation, and the lack of a Chief of Staff, turns off any growth in the orders process and conducts self preservation. The commander says, "No new ideas on how to do orders. We do just what we trained at home station - S3 get me an order out as fast as possible - we will work the details at the rehearsal".
- The XO is now living in the BSA. Whatever growth the maintenance management system has been through over the last few days is terminated. The XO says, "No new ideas on how we do maintenance. We do just what we trained at home station - task force XOs give me your deadline report; we are going to start cross leveling, circle-xing, and scrounging parts".

Any systems established, developed, or grown during the rotation do not get a chance to mature.
The unit leaves at the end of the rotation with a lot of knowledge and ideas of how to do things better, but no ideas or experience on how to make it work.
The orders process and maintenance system are broken and stay broken.
The brigade returns home to pass on to the next rotational unit "how to win at the NTC", and nothing to do with:
- learning the orders process
- developing and training a maintenance system that works
- using the XO as the executive officer to the commander and performing his Chief of Staff function.
The XO is depicted as the commander's personal troubleshooter. He is in the way as a player in the orders process, and best kept at the BSA.

Techniques:

1. The brigade XO must be the right hand man to the commander with all the authority and responsibilities that position requires to execute. The brigade commander must clearly make the brigade XO the Chief of Staff for the brigade.

2. The S3 must work for the XO in garrison as well as the field.

3. During train-up, all elements of BOS must be stressed and integrated into every level of training.

- FCXs designed to stress and exercise logistical consideration must be trained.

- Logistics exercises must be executed by the full battle staff, to include S3.

4. The XO needs to be drilled by the brigade commander in the role of Chief of Staff to include heading up the orders process.

5. The FSB commander, task force XOs, and task force BMOs need to be held responsible for their jobs and should not have the brigade XO as their safety valve. (Part of the task force BMO's responsibility is developing and drilling a system of keeping the task force Chief of Staff informed of maintenance issues.)

6. Task force XO needs to maintain a system that keeps the brigade XO informed.

7. The BMOs needs to be trained not to make every meeting with the XO a decision meeting.

8. When maintenance becomes an issue at the NTC, do not strip the Chief of Staff out of the task force and brigade to try and put a bandage on the problem.

-- The FSB and additional maintenance assets can surge on a task force to get OR up.

-- Do not strip the front lines to fix the support elements.

* Aviation Liaison Officer (ALO) integration into the Military Decision-Making Process:

Brigades fail to realize the capabilities and limitations of limited aviation assets.
Either no plan for aviation support, or hasty and ill conceived plans for the employment of aviation.

Technique: The ALO is a critical staff member who can have a decisive impact on the ground maneuver unit's success or failure. Commanders and staffs must involve the ALO during the decision making process to ensure the planned employment is within aviation capabilities with the assets available.

Table of Contents

Section II: TA. 4, Part 2

Section II: TA. 4, Part 4