Military

Aviation units in support of a division poorly track friendly and enemy situations in just one brigade sector. Aviation battalions will support operations throughout a divisions' or corps' sector/zone.
Field manuals reflect static flow, not a dynamic battlefield.

Procedure: Include examples in aviation FMs on the art and science of battle tracking. What information is required up-front, prior to launch, and during execution.

* Medical company command post (CP) battle tracking: Medical company commanders do not have the necessary situational awareness, both tactically and technically, to command the brigade's medical resources.

Medical company commanders often do not know what their CP's responsibilities are.
Many medical command posts are nothing more than a soldier on radio watch.

Techniques:

1. The medical company commander should develop a system to capture the critical information that needs to be available to him regularly. The information to track may include:

2. Place the information on boards that are hung along the walls of the CP to facilitate quick visual reference.

3. Tracking the medical company's resources and the tactical situation are essential for situational awareness and accurate decisions on the placement of medical assets in the brigade area.

4.2 Assess Situation

* Rear command post (CP) monitoring and reporting of logistical events: The rear CP normally does not monitor critical logistics events or inform the main CP (or commander) of shortfalls in distribution of supplies.

The rear CP does not monitor and report critical events during preparation for combat. All aspects of support and classes of supply are not reviewed to identify their respective bearing on successful mission accomplishment. Critical events occur during the preparation phase which, if not accomplished, will inhibit mission execution.
EXAMPLE: As a result of the planning process, the staff is aware of the amount of class IV/V obstacle and mine material required to support the concept of engineering and the timelines involved as part of the defensive plan. Failure in shipment, staging, and distribution of required quantities at required times prevents construction of the obstacle.
The commander is not kept informed.
Potential shortfalls in readiness at line of departure (LD) are not addressed.

Techniques:

1. Identify a concept of support specifically for the preparation for combat.

2. Develop an associated timeline which is synchronized with the maneuver timeline to ensure situational awareness and responsiveness on the part of the rear CP.

3. Rear CPs must monitor the preparation for combat, as it is the initial logistics battle, to ensure success in combat operations.

4.2.1 Review Current Situation

* Fire support battle tracking and situation awareness to reduce fratricide risk:

Techniques:

1. Ensure that accurate battle tracking is maintained before and during the battle.

2. Implement an all-station net call prior to execution to exchange information and verify NFAs.

3. During the battle, company/team fire support teams (FISTs) need to come up on the net to update the FSO so everyone else can hear what is going on and track unit locations.

4.2.1.1 Analyze Mission

* Brigade engineer mission analysis: Brigade Engineers routinely allow habitual associations, not engineer battlefield assessment (EBA) and mission analysis, to drive task organization.

Brigade Engineers too often do not recommend organization of engineers with clear task and purpose and delineate clearly command/support relationships to best support the brigade combat team (BCT) mission.
- no detailed analysis of engineer actions throughout the depth of the BCT battlefield using some type of standard methodology.
- no methodology for analysis, for example, reverse breach planning for offensive operations.
- no identication of all engineer tasks required to accomplish the mission.
Engineer battalions do not fully analyze the "why" when deciding upon the command/ support relationship, nor do they clearly specify this relationship in orders once decided upon.
Units often significantly deviate from doctrinal command/support relationships by performing non-standard CSS roles during execution.
Engineer battalions routinely "attach" sapper companies to habitually associated task forces without regard to mission analysis. This appears to provide the "easy" answer by shifting C2 and CSS responsibility to the supported task force.

Engineer battalions typically assume a very detached relationship with task-organized sapper companies for planning and support requirements, displaying a distinct lack of ownership.
Engineer battalion commanders direct the shifting of engineer assets not under their control, without regard for the published command/support relationship.
Task forces, engineer battalions and sapper companies are confused with:
- non-standard combat service support requirements
- degrading CSS responsiveness, logistics reporting and accountability
The engineer battalion is best suited with expertise and resources to provide support in Class III, V, IX and maintenance.
Forces are not adequately allocated.
Command/support relationships are not effectively established.
The main effort is not weighed.
The impact of the engineer force is not maximized at the decisive point on the battlefield.

Techniques:

1. Engineer commanders, who also support maneuver commanders and have special staff responsibility, should heed doctrinal guidance of Chapter 2, FM 5-100, Engineer Operations, with regard to organizing engineer forces and recommending command and support relationships.

2. Engineer leaders should check themselves by asking:

4.2.3 Decide on Need for Action or Change

* Rear command post (CP) updates to logistic estimates: During the execution phase, the rear CP monitors changes in combat power, but does not update the logistic and personnel estimates.

The brigade operations planners normally develop COAs and make future plan considering logistics and personnel estimates that are created prior to current combat operations.
Logistic estimates on the capability to conduct or support the chosen COA are changing based on current operations without adjustments to the future plan.
The staff does not emplace limiting factors (indicators of culmination) to ensure the brigade's status does not drop below the minimum estimated requirements.

Techniques:

1. Identify during the staff estimate process not only the required, current, and projected status, but also update status as current operations progress. This will ensure the ability to accomplish future operations.

2. Rear CPs must monitor current operations and anticipate needs for adjustment in conjunction with estimations used during the planning process. Whether the change is due to enemy contact or other non battle consumption, or whether the information is from actual unit spot reports or assumptions based on maneuver reports, the information serves to present an updated status of the brigade combat team.

* Brigade planning for multiple enemy courses of action (COAs): Brigade plans are normally based on a single anticipated enemy COA.

Brigade staffs often plan their scheme of maneuver against a single anticipated enemy rather than branch planning to develop a flexible scheme that would be effective against a range of enemy options.
Brigades that do some branch planning often do not include the same staff as for the base plan.

Inflexible execution when the enemy reacts differently than anticipated.
Does not provide the maneuver commander the necessary flexibility to adjust the brigade's plan; we often fight the plan, not the enemy.
Synchronization of the force is often unhinged when required to react to unplanned "push-to-talk" operations.
Uncoordinated effort.

Techniques:

1. Address multiple enemy COAs early in the planning process to allow each BOS to synchronize and plan to support the development of decision points and triggers to defeat an uncooperative enemy.

2. Although the result of branch planning is not often a written product (CONPLAN), it should result in graphic control measures to facilitate its rapid execution based on the commander's decision.

3. Brigade plans must be flexible and address multiple enemy COAs.

4. Develop standard "plays" at Home Station that are well rehearsed by subordinate units to provide a foundation for execution of base plans. Time during the planning process can then be spent on development of branches and sequels of the base plan.

5. Develop decision points, including friendly and enemy criteria, for execution that support against multiple enemy options, and refine them during Home Station training. Use the analogy of a quarterback looking over the defense. Either he (the commander) executes the called play (base plan) or he calls an audible (branch plan) against a varied defense.

4.3 Determine Actions

* Development of brigade scheme of fires: Current fire support annexes are inadequate as planning, prep, and execution tools.

Techniques:

1. The initial brigade scheme of fires must be developed and published with the brigade OPORD. The scheme of fires can either be written in paragraph format or outlined on a worksheet.

2. The scheme of fires should be initiated during the course of action development. A list of critical fire support tasks (CFST) must be identified.

3. Initially the fire support events determined during course of action development will be very general.

EXAMPLE: When the combined arms reserve (CAR) is committed, the brigade will employ close air support (CAS) in engagement area (EA) RED to destroy one MRP consisting of 1XT80 and 2XBMPs to allow task force 3/75 30 additional minutes to defeat the MRC on OBJ COWBOYS to establish attack by fire positions north of Granite Pass (an additional CFST for employing CAS will be suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).

4. The bulk of the scheme of fires should be developed during the wargaming session.

5. Immediately upon receipt of the brigade's OPORD, the DS battalion will conduct a technical rehearsal to determine gunnery solutions for each target in the scheme of fires and determine what type of munitions and quantity to achieve the desired effects. The ES battalion S3 will brief the brigade FSO on the result of the technical rehearsal.

6. After the combined arms rehearsal, the FM rehearsal should be conducted. The end result is a rehearsed and refined scheme of fires with technical gunnery solutions to support the brigade's scheme of maneuver.

7. At a minimum, each event must list the following: