Military

The exact size and composition of the logistical force is dependent on several factors:

Reception - Off-loading personnel and material from inter or intratheater transport at a point of debarkation for relocation to designated areas. It is the process of receiving unit resources, i.e., personnel, equipment and supplies, into the theater of operation. Reception begins with the arrival of the first personnel or equipment in the theater and ends when personnel and equipment are staged.

Staging - Organizing and preparing for movement of personnel and material at designated areas to incrementally build forces capable of meeting the operational and tactical commanders' requirements. Similar to reception, staging applies to resources, not units. Staging begins when the first equipment or personnel arrive (from reception) at the staging areas and ends when personnel and equipment are rejoined for onward movement. Throughout the RSO&I process, but more specifically in the staging area, the Task Force is accomplishing all of the elements required to transform it into a combat-ready unit. This includes, but is not limited to, units reassembled and united with their equipment, acclimatization to the theater, training, force protection, weapons screen and zero, class V and supplies uploaded, and planning for future operations.

Onward Movement - Relocating forces that are capable of meeting the commander's operational requirements to the initial point of their mission execution. This movement is accomplished by rail, road, or air. The mode of transportation depends on the tactical and logistical situation.

Integration - The synchronized and systemic process of establishing force projection into a tactical commander's force prior to mission execution. The force structure can be a joint task force or a combined force. Integration is the final step in the RSO&I process of force projection and is only achieved after successful completion of reception, staging, and onward movement. Integration planning and coordination, however, must begin early and be continuous throughout the force projection process.

INTEGRATION PROCESS

INTEGRATION: The seamless flow between phases and the transition of units ot the tactical commander.

Unlike the first three parts of RSO&I, integration is not logistics intensive, but rather necessitates a unit-to-unit interface. Integration has two parts:

As a result of the RSO&I process, units are normally operational prior to arrival at the TAA. The arriving unit is absorbed by a higher headquarters or receives a mission handoff from a departing unit. The arriving unit becomes operational to its authorized level and then integrates with the receiving higher headquarters. A new command and control structure and communication network must be established with the new headquarters. Simultaneously, the arriving unit must establish security within the higher headquarter's TAA. Command and control, communications, and security are the priority of effort during the integration phase of RSO&I. Any logistics-intensive tasks (supply, transportation, maintenance, and services) that were not completed during reception and staging are conducted concurrently with integration.

Integration applies to units melding into a ready, operational force. The unit's personnel and equipment are combined (staged) and moved from the staging area (onward movement) to the tactical assembly area. Integration may take hours or days. The complexity and time required for integration depends on the size, contingency conditions, and predeployment/ongoing coordination and planning.

Continuous coordination, which includes in-transit total visibility (ITV) of equipment and personnel and force tracking, helps predict when in-country integration can begin and how long it will take to complete.

RSO&I effectiveness depends largely on several functions:

Command & Control:	RSO&I requires an effective combat power-tracking system with responsive leaders and managers.
Communications:	Reliable communication is pertinent throughout the RSO&I process at all echelons of command. This will aid the responsiveness to problems and assist in major decisions at higher levels of command.
Security:	RSO&I operations must be protected from the full range of threats (espionage, local unrest, terrorist activities and weapons of mass destruction).
Transportation:	RSO&I calls upon the full range of Army transportation support from discharging ships and hauling cargo to providing information for force tracking.
Host-Nation Support:	RSO&I is facilitated by use of host-nation resources (ports, airfields, railways, land for staging, traffic convoy and convoy escorts, etc.) This calls for liaison and contracting capabilities.
Field Services:	RSO&I calls for a variety of soldier support services (food, water, sanitation, billeting, etc.) Service requirements increase in correlation with the number of days the unit spends in the marshalling area.

Reception, Staging and a portion of Onward movement occur in the marshalling area. The marshalling area is defined as an area of sufficient size and facilities (airfields, ports, beaches, staging and assembly areas) to perform the complex tasks of arrival, off-load, equipment and personnel linkup and staging, supply distribution, assembly, and preparation of forces for employment.

TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES (TTPS):

1. PLANNING FACTORS IN THE MARSHALLING AREA:

• Holding area square footage required = (Ship cargo square footage x 4) x no. of ships in a week's flow.
• Staging area holding requirement = Holding area required vicinity port.
• Tentage requirement = Arriving PAX x Average stay at staging area + 50%.
• Sign requirement = no. of arriving units (CO level) x 3.
• Strip maps required = no. of units (CO level) x 15
• Hot meals per day = (no. of arriving + no. of staging - no. departing) x2
• Travel time to key areas within Marshalling Area. (APOD to SPOD to Class V. . .etc.)
• Latrine requirement = no. of soldiers/30.

2. RULES FOR SUPPORTING UNITS:

• Do everything by unit -- coordinate for unit movements and operations, not individuals
• Greet and brief commander at airport
• Give units SP from staging area to TAA
• Signs, signs, and more signs
• Maps, maps, and more maps
• Unit HQ at Unit Staging Base must be on net (Bde/Bn level)
• Containers restricted to areas with handlers
• Daily meeting with all affected units (updates to schedule and situation)

3. RULES FOR DEPLOYING UNITS:

• Meet time schedule (meet SPs)
• Attend daily meeting
• Maintain radio net (24hrs)
• Track and report incremental build of combat power
• Maintain a TOC
• Manifest some tool boxes as TAT (To Accompany Troops)
• Ensure one set of keys travels with vehicles and that the location of a second set is known and available throughout the RSO&I process.
• Identify critical people as initial deployers and have backup personnel identified and trained if needed.
• Vehicle Markings: In addition to stenciled vehicle markings and bar-code labels, clearly mark vehicles in a conspicuous location so that they can be identified from a distance (i.e., signs in front windows, affixed to trailers, on track vehicle turrets).

LESSONS:

1. Cross-load ADVON personnel for deployment if possible. The unit ADVON, to include the Port Support Activity (PSA) and Air Mobility Command (AMC) when possible, should deploy on two or more aircraft. Deploying on two or more aircraft enables port and rail operations to begin in the event one aircraft experiences mechanical problems.

2. Using Host-Nation (HN) support/equipment can propose incompatibility dangers. HN heavy equipment transporter vehicles (depending on Nation) often have access ramps for wider vehicle wheelbases than that of U.S. vehicles. Verify HN equipment for compatibility and make necessary modifications or arrangements.

3. Arriving equipment generally requires refueling immediately after offload.

4. Units should plan for a 15+ soldier detail (per planeload of soldiers) at the APOD to download A&B bags from the plane and onto the trucks, and to monitor any sensitive items pallets. The detail should be positioned on the plane to be the first soldiers off to begin the offload process. To prevent loss of personnel accountability, the detail should be identified in advanced and a roster maintained.

5. Upon arrival at the APOD, deplaning soldiers should be uploaded directly onto transportation assets (buses, trucks) to prevent wandering soldiers on the airfield and to ensure that they are moved to a secure and safe area as rapidly as possible. To effectively maintain personnel and equipment accountability, a reliable person must visually inspect soldiers as they deplane.

6. Deploy communications assets early in the deployment process to maintain responsive and reliable communications with RSO&I providers and higher-level commands.

7. Units track equipment well, but do not track the incremental building of combat power as people and equipment come together. Recommend using the chart shown in Appendix B. All reporting requirements, including report formats and times, should be established prior to deployment. (This is particularly important when reporting to a JTF.)

8. Identify a "Class A Agent" and submit Memorandum of Request for Appointment of Class A Agent.

9. Submit Map request and obtain required maps through local supply channels prior to deployment. (S2/G2).

10. Commanders must be informed on what services are realistically available and what tasks, conditions, and standards are required during the RSO&I process.

LESSONS FROM BOSNIA "OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR":

1. Early deployment of Task Force Eagle leadership ensured positive immediate effect and set the conditions for the arrival of combat forces. This, coupled with early employment of the Civil Affairs and PSYOP elements, contributed to our combat forces operating in a relatively nonhostile environment.

2. RSO&I forces and capability must be staged to the ISB early. These units, with required equipment, need time to reconnoiter and prepare areas to support the operational units as they pass through. Also, as with any operation, having the time to rehearse all the actions required will make the RSO&I process go much smoother for the initial units deploying to theater.

3. LOGCAP is not an entry capability. Contractors can relieve Army units of many support and construction requirements; however, they cannot match military mobility and entry capability. It takes 60 - 90 days to build up LOGCAP operations; military assets (engineers, logistics units) must be scheduled to perform the mission until then.

4. The RSO&I process is not logistics; it is operations with heavy logistical implications.

5. A viable checklist (what needs to be accomplished, and individual unit status) is essential for the management and control of forces passing through the ISB.

NOTE: For more detailed Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR-specific lessons, see the BHCAAT 10 Initial Impressions Report (August 1996) pulished by CALL.

LESSONS FROM KUWAIT "EXERCISE INTRINSIC ACTION":

1. Plan to position appropriate unit C2personnel (with decisionmaking authority and communications) at the key nodes during the RSO&I process. While unit C2personnel change as each deploying unit moves out, the ARCENT-K C2 person should remain the same.

2. Plan to deploy sufficient communications equipment to establish a "hasty net" as necessary. Coordinate the nets and frequencies prior to deployment.

3. Units should ensure (for their own sake) that the Home Station APOE sends ARCENT-K a "wheels-up" report which provides detailed unit movement data. These data should be forwarded to the destination APOD through the ITO.

4. Units should deploy with an aggressive, robust training plan which can be implemented if the unit is not committed to the line immediately. The training plan must be flexible enough so that it can be expanded or contracted as time and resources are realized.

5. While the support operations officer does not directly participate in the RSO&I process, he should be planning for the brigade's follow-on mission in the TAA. If the support operations officer is on the first flight, he can begin coordination and planning with key logistical personnel at Camp Doha. This greatly facilitates turning on the flow of logistics at the TAA when RSO&I is complete.

6. Manifest a small percentage of the support battalion (15 percent to 20 percent) into the first third of available aircraft. These soldiers draw equipment and supplies to support elements in the TAA as they complete RSO&I. This technique provides a seamless flow of logistics support as the support provided during the RSO&I process is reduced.

7. Have approximately 15 to 30 soldiers designated as the TAT/baggage detail so they can be pulled out as soon as the plane lands. Ensure someone is placed in charge of them. The TAT/baggage detail should then break down the TAT/baggage into unit sets. Once the download is complete, unit leaders can send personnel to pick up their A&B bags and specific unit TAT/NAP equipment so that it can be uploaded.

8. Utilize a bus to move unit drivers instead of riding shotgun with host-nation contract HET drivers. Contracted HETs are not the quality of CONUS contractors and can be dangerous for U.S. soldiers to ride in.

NOTE: For more detailed Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION-specific lessons, see the Initial Impressions Report to be published by CALL tentatively in March 1997.

Chapter 1: Introduction and Purpose

Chapter 3: National Training Center (NTC)