Chapter 3
NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER (NTC)
The actions that must occur during RSO& are fundamentally the same actions that a brigade must take during the pause after a battle, i.e., protect the force and generate combat power. The difference is that in combat operations, your starting point is some percentage of full combat power based on the results of the battle. In RSO& your starting point is zero combat power, as all you have are individual items of equipment and individual soldiers, not combat-ready units.--BG William S. Wallace, Commander, NTC
Deploying to the National Training Center (NTC) is an excellent opportunity for units to train deployment procedures, onward movement, and unit integration. The current approach at the NTC is to focus on the unit's execution of building combat power. The specific tasks observed are:
The concept to develop an RSO&I training program at the NTC grew from two directions. First, the NTC observed that a brigade deploying to the NTC was missing a training opportunity because of the administrative nature of the week between arrival at NTC and the brigade's move to the maneuver area. Second, NTC recognized a training void within the Army as it transitions from a forward deployed to a power projection force. Based on the perceived need and missed opportunity, the NTC began in earnest in September 1994 to develop an RSO&I training program.
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The program focuses on the deployment and entry operations stages of force projection, as depicted in FM 100-5. Training begins approximately 120 days prior to unit deployment when the brigade receives a country study and a contingency plan for deployment to the fictitious island of Tierra del Diablo. The country study provides historical, political, social and military background of the region, allowing the brigade to begin preparing soldiers for their mission. The contingency plan, written at the Joint Task Force level, allows either division or brigade staffs to develop their derivative plans.
Ninety days prior to deployment, the brigade receives a JCS alert order and a CNN-style video that portrays current events in the region. Forty-five days prior to deployment, the unit receives the JCS deployment order and another video. Thus, with the country study, the contingency plan, the alert and deployment orders, and the news videos, the brigade has the ability to craft a Home-Station training program that will exercise all of their pre-deployment and deployment requirements. Home -tation training ends when the brigade boards aircraft at the Aerial Port of Embarkation for strategic lift to Tierra del Diablo.
Upon arrival in theater, the brigade mission is to incrementally generate combat power and logistical sustainability. To accomplish that, the brigade initiates its draw of prepositioned equipment that has been downloaded from the Army Prepo Afloat (APA) ship, the USS Cape Irwin. The brigade operates under the direction of the Irwin Theater Logistics Commander, portrayed by the NTC Deputy Commander for Logistics, and with the assistance of the Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Element (AMC LSE), portrayed by NTC's logistical support contractor. The brigade's equipment is configured into company sets, the basic building block for task forces. The issue process allows the brigade to inspect and accept accountability for the equipment, upload weapons, radios and secondary loads, and move to a unit staging area where equipment is positioned in task force organization. Concurrently, the brigade forecasts and draws all other classes of supply from the Theater Logistics Command.
Throughout RSO&I week, the brigade is accomplishing all of the elements required to transform it into a combat-ready unit. This includes, but is not limited to, acclimatization to the theater, training, force protection, weapons screen and zero, and planning for future operations. Shortly after arrival, the brigade is directed to plan for a company/team size operation that will occur before the brigade moves to the Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) at the end of RSO&I week.
The 52d Division Tactical Operations Center, portrayed by the Operations Group, provides higher headquarters support to the brigade. In addition to routine support, the division staff hosts a daily update with the brigade. The brigade receives enemy and friendly situational updates, always escalating toward armed conflict as the week progresses. At the daily update, the brigade is required to brief its status on the incremental generation of combat power and ability to conduct future operations.
RSO&I week culminates with execution of the company/team mission, usually conducted under peacetime rules of engagement, and the brigade movement from the staging area to the Tactical Assembly Area. Each battalion task force is provided an after-action review on their role in RSO&I, followed by a brigade level after-action review.
The RSO&I training program at NTC provides brigade combat teams the opportunity to plan for and execute unopposed entry operations under a theater deployment scenario. The training program is one piece of the Army's efforts to improve its power projection capabilities.
LESSONS:
1. Brigade commanders tend to plan for a company-sized element as their first priority, then fail to develop incrementally beyond that point. The first company-sized unit develops quickly, then all remaining units develop at the same rate. No company or battalion task force-sized element is given priority. Even if the plan identifies a priority task force larger than company, it is not executed. RESULT: The immediate reaction company is combat-capable within 48 to 72 hours, then no other units meet the requirements until 12 hours before brigade movement to the TAA.
2. Many brigades deploying to the NTC express frustration to MCC regarding the lack of rail-loading experience their DTO, MCO, and ITO shops have on such large-scale deployments. Because most units conduct large-scale movements only once every 18 to 24 months, training and experience decline considerably in the interim. A suggested technique is for the NTC MCC to train a three- to five-man team on rail-loading operations and techniques 45-90 days prior to the brigade's deployment, through the LTP or a similar medium.
3. Unit rail teams lack sufficient personnel and/or equipment to drive vehicles to the staging area. Units should augment the rail team with appropriate drivers (heavy equipment drivers) and ensure the rail team deploys with some toolboxs as TAT.
4. Many units do not have deployment or onward movement as part of their METL. Units that do have deployment and onward movement SOPs do not have specific tasks or standards for subordinate units.
5. Units too often do not take advantage of training opportunities during draw week. For example, units link their training day to the contractor's 8-hour workday and do not plan for crew, platoon, and company tasks or training outside the drawyard. Company-level leadership involvement and execution of troop-leading procedures are paramount.



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