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Military

SECTION II

TA. 6 MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY &
NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC) BOS


Positive Performance

6.2.2 Emplace Obstacles

* Complex obstacles: Greater unit employment of non-standard complex obstacles in restrictive and very restrictive terrain.

Technique: A combination of wire, mines, tank ditches and berms has proven most effective.

6.3 Enhance Survivability

* Use of engineer equipment: Aviation elements obtain engineer assets from the infantry brigade for enhancing force protection; brigade commanders understand the necessity to protect the aviation assets.

Technique: Use SEE and bulldozer support to construct survivability positions protecting aviation assets.

* Survivability - Fire Support: Careful management, planning and utilization of engineer resources, class IV planning, and improved threat analysis and awareness have contributed to improved survivability for many units.

Needs Emphasis

6.2.1 Select/Secure Location of Obstacles

* Battalion/Company Obstacle Group Development: Units tend to focus their efforts on individual obstacle sighting and development rather than determining locations for obstacle groups with the specified intent to shape engagement areas.

6.2.2 Emplace Obstacles

* Situational Obstacles:

PROBLEMS:
  1. Units continue to execute based on time rather than event,
  2. Units persist in using a FASCAM sytem when conventional obstacles will work.

6.2.2.1 Emplace Mines

* Air Volcano: Aviation task forces are now deploying to JRTC with Air-Volcano systems.

PROBLEMS:
  1. While aircrews are trained in employing the system.
  2. Battle staffs unfamiliar with planning/integration of the system.

Techniques:

1. Assign responsibility for Air Volcano minefield planning.
2. Develop SOPs to ensure the aircrews have the minimum essential information to conduct crew level planning.

6.2.3 Mark Obstacles

* Minefield Marking and Reporting:

PROBLEMS:
  1. Actual markings emplaced on enemy minefields are not consistent with unit SOPs.

  2. Initial markings are not upgraded with more durable material such as pickets and barbed wire.

  3. Minefields that have lanes reduced are not over watched or subsequently cleared.

  4. Units do not routinely mark friendly emplaced minefields, especially FASCAM minefields.

  5. Failure to follow procedures for filling out and submitting the DA Form 1355 to units responsible for over watching obstacles containing mines.

RESULTS:
  1. Friendly forces continue to experience incidents in enemy minefields believed to have lanes reduced.

  2. Lack of continual observation creates difficulty in determining whether a minefield has been reseeded by enemy forces or merely improperly swept by friendlies.

  3. Leads to an unclear intelligence picture.

  4. Hampers the S-2's attempt to develop enemy patterns.

  5. Incidents of fratricide continue to occur as a result of inadequate documentation and improper marking of friendly minefields.

6.3 Enhance Survivability

* Force protection and site defense of signal sites: Most signal units lack the training and equipment to adequately defend themselves from OPFOR attacks

PROBLEMS. Units are untrained in the following tasks:
  1. Individual and group tactical movement/patrolling
  2. Preparation of individual and crew served fighting positions
  3. Proper emplacement and operation of an LP/OP and construction
  4. Planning and maintenance of tactical and protective obstacles.

Techniques: References:

- FM 5-34, "Engineer Field Data"
-- construction of tactical and protective obstacles.

- GTA 7-6-1, "Fighting Position Construction Infantry Leader's Reference Card"
-- covers the construction of the common types of individual and crew served fighting positions.

* Protect the Force - Aviation: Aviation units fail to effectively defend their assembly areas with organic manpower.

PROBLEMS:
  1. Manpower shortages
  2. Training and command emphasis:
    -- The officers and NCOs lack basic soldiering skills.

Techniques:

1. Aviation leaders must maximize the use of engineer assets to compensate for manpower shortages.
2. Use aviation warrant officers to augment the overall protect the force effort.
3. References: FM 7-8 and FM 5-103 for techniques and standards for defensive measures.

* Force protection: Leaders and soldiers are not taking the proper stops to protect the force.

PROBLEMS:
  1. Improper movement techniques

  2. Inadequate preparation of individual fighting positions, ie. use of sector stakes, preparation of range cards, fighting position construction.

  3. Poor dispersion during halts or in patrol bases.

  4. Poor noise, light and litter discipline.

  5. Inadequate use of observation posts.

  6. Inadequate local security patrolling.

  7. Failure to understand the rules of engagement.

  8. Poor passive/active air defense measures.

  9. Inadequate leader supervision of field hygiene.

RESULT: preventable loss of life and combat power.

Techniques: for Home Station training

1. Construct individual fighting positions to standard, with particular emphasis on sector stakes, clearing fields of fire, range cards and sector sketches

2. Practice squad and platoon movement techniques consistent with desired speed, security, cover and concealment, fields of fire, dispersion, command and control, and the enemy threat.

3. Treat every halt as a hasty defense. Begin preparing hasty fighting positions when halts last more then 15 minutes.

4. Practice a disciplined response to hostile air, both fixed and rotary wing.

5. Use vignettes to train soldiers on situational application of the rules of engagement. Refer to CALL Newsletter 95-2, Peace Operations Training Vignettes.

6. Proactive patrolling techniques designed to find the enemy, determine his strength and dispositions and to provide early warning and security.

7. Enforce, at all levels, strict adherence to noise, light, and litter discipline.

8. Enforce field hygiene; note: in heavily forested and vegetated areas, soldiers are susceptible to poison ivy and poison oak, particularly in the summer and fall.

6.3.1 Provide Battlefield Hazard Protection

* React to Chemical Attack:

PROBLEMS:
  1. The main causes for chemical casualties are the lack of early warning, non-compliance with directed force protection measures, and not following established battle drills.

  2. Units within affected chemical attack areas fail to properly employ their M8A1 Chemical Agent Alarms.

  3. Alarms are normally emplaced, but not checked to ensure proper operation.

  4. The improper emplacement of the M8A1s also results in no early warning for units and the loss of soldiers.

  5. The brigade directed MOPP level is frequently ignored or misunderstood.

  6. During chemical attacks, some units don't have masks and MOPP gear readily available.

  7. When units react to a chemical hazard, they normally mask and give the alarm, but stop short of increasing the level of MOPP.

  8. The unit sustains a high amount of casualties due to lack of protection and reaction throughout the area

RESULT: Units sustain significant casualties from chemical attacks.

Techniques:

1. Conduct individual training to standard using the tasks outlined in STP 21-1, SCMT, using a collective or STX format (see TC 3-8, Chemical Training for guidance).

2. Generate battle drills for the TOC and leader's actions that coincide with ARTEP 7-8/7-10 MTP, and make them part of the TACSOP.

3. Integrate NBC battle drills into TOCEXs, STAFFEXs, TEWTs, and other training vehicles.

4. Leaders must supervise and become effective in the units response to a chemical attack, and not just wait for it to go away, or be told what to do.

* Chemical casualty management:

PROBLEMS:
  1. Too many units have no procedures developed specific to handing chemical casualties.

  2. Bn/TFs are not adequately trained, organized or equipped to perform patient chemical decontamination.

  3. Company/Teams routinely fail to segregate and decontaminate chemical casualties.

  4. BSA located medical companies are not equipped to handle mass chemical casualties.

  5. Bn/TFs fail to use the existing CASEVAC system for chemical casualties; they rely on brigade to develop a separate chemical casualty evacuation plan, which often does not happen.

  6. Brigade and battalion level chemical staff members do not sufficiently coordinate with their medical counterparts about casualty estimates, logistical considerations based on casualty estimates, evacuation capabilities, treatment facilities, or other management concerns.

RESULT: Unacceptable soldier deaths caused by evacuation delays.

Technique: Use non-standard evacuation methods and ambulance exchange points to transport uncontaminated casualties to the medical support units.

Procedure: develop specific procedures to handle chemical casualties; these procedures will be different than the procedures for normal battle or non-battle casualties.

* Positioning of crew served weapons: Artillery batteries and platoons

PROBLEMS:
  1. Batteries and platoon routinely do a poor job of positioning crew served weapons.

  2. Position restricts movement and operation

  3. Too often the crew served positions lack interlocking fires.

  4. Units fail to clear fields of fire.

  5. Units select positions with little or no consideration about dead space, enemy avenues of approach, difficulty in clearing fields of fire, hill masses that block fields of fire, etc.

  6. Too many soldiers do not understand how to fill out a range card.

  7. Too many soldiers do not know how the T&E mechanism functions.

  8. NCOs do not proactively supervise and train their soldiers on crew served weapons proficiency.

RESULT: Batteries and platoons are often destroyed by a dismounted attack conducted by as few as three to five enemy soldiers.

Techniques:

1. Doctrinal references: FM 6-50 chap. 3, and STP 6-13B14-SM-TG pg. 3-6.

2. Ensure all soldiers and leaders are trained on crew served weapons emplacement, range card construction, clearing fields of fire and, most importantly, on positioning crew served weapons to maximize effectiveness given the constraints of the terrain.

3. Consider identifying crew served weapons positions prior to the howitzer positions. This technique can greatly facilitate battery defense without affecting the battery's subsequent occupation.

4. Crew served weapon positions should be inspected/checked by a senior leader (BC or 1SG) to ensure the weapon is being used effectively. This check should be conducted by actually getting behind the weapon and ensuring it is set up correctly.


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