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Military

SECTION II

TA. 5 INTELLIGENCE BOS


Positive Performance

5.1 Collect Information

* Integration of Staff Assets: S-2s. increasingly solicit input from staff experts when analyzing enemy capabilities and intentions. AD Officers and Fire Support Officers contribute likely emplacement of enemy Air Defense and Fire Support assets.

Technique: To focus the input from other staff officers, provide them with the enemy commander's likely intent for the various BOS. Given the enemy commander's intent, these staff sections can better advise the S-2 on how and where the enemy commander will employ his assets.

* Cross-Talk Between Military Intelligence Company (MICO) SIGINT and HUMINT Assets: SIGINT and HUMINT teams within the MICO are passing information between them.

RESULTS:
  1. Cues other assets for further collection

  2. Confirm with another intelligence source information they have already collected.

  3. Productive cross-talk is most likely to occur when all elements within the MICO clearly understand

    - the supported commander's PIR
    - the current friendly and enemy situation
    - the current collection emphasis for all MICO elements.

* Enemy Battle Tracking (R&S): Aviation task force S-2s continue to show tremendous improvement in their ability to battle track the enemy as rotations progress. This allows the S-2s to give aircrews an accurate picture of the current battlefield.

5.2.1 Evaluate Threat Information

* Crater Analysis: Commanders at all levels are becoming more aware of the importance of conducting crater analysis after the receipt of OPFOR indirect fires.

  1. Enables the S-2 to conduct predictive counter-mortar analysis of the enemy situation
  2. Increases probability of the successful capture of several OPFOR mortars during the LIC phase.

5.2.2 Evaluate Physical Environment Information

* Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO): S-2 sections prepare detailed MCOOs at home station and arrive at the JRTC with these products. Successful S-2 sections task supporting topographic engineer teams to assist in developing these products. Most sections also take advantage of available unclassified multi-spectral imagery when conducting terrain analysis.

* Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) - AD: AD Units are developing adequate terrain analysis products and preparing MCOOs for initial combat operations planning. Terrain analysis is significantly enhanced with satellite imagery products from the division terrain analysis detachment.

5.3 Prepare Intelligence Reports

* Reporting: Aviation task force S-2 sections habitually provide accurate and timely reporting to higher.

* Initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) - AD: Air defense battery commanders are conducting a thorough initial IPB with the brigade S-2.

  1. They identify the threat air order of battle, their mission, suspected air avenues of approach and HLZs.

  2. They are becoming more adept at templating the locations of enemy air defense assets.

  3. Battery commanders conduct thorough analyses of how the enemy air supports the ground effort.

  4. Greater understanding in correlating the distance factors of HLZs to BSPs and CSPs has led to more effective templating of enemy HLZs.

Needs Emphasis

5.0 Intelligence BOS

* Intel Section Operations:

PROBLEMS:
  1. Some sections arrive without SOPs, or with unclear SOPs
  2. Unit deploying with SOPs are often unfamiliar with them; hence do not use them.

RESULTS:
  1. Non compliance with SOPs
  2. Internal confusion within the section about how tasks should be accomplished,
  3. Section collective tasks not conducted to standard,
  4. Increased workload on key leaders within S-2 sections

Techniques:

1. Develop detailed section SOPs that break down collective tasks into individual tasks.
2. Identify which section member is responsible for accomplishing each of these individual tasks.

5.1 Collect Information

* Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Planning and Collection Management: These two related areas are consistently weak.

PROBLEMS:
  1. S-2s do not identify the critical elements of information
  2. R&S plans are often unfocused.
  3. S-2s are often unprepared to serve as the Battalion and Brigade Collection Managers.

    - unfamiliar with the collection management process
    - do not know the capabilities and limitations of the available collection systems.

Techniques:

1. Use leaders from supporting MI Companies and Battalions to provide subject matter experts for training Battalion and Brigade Staffs on the capabilities, limitations, and employment considerations of Military Intelligence collection systems.

2. References:

- FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (8 July 1994) Chapters One and Two

-- how the IPB process helps identify specific collection needs
-- how intelligence collection supports the Staff Estimate process.

- FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning (8 March 1994)

-- provides a review of collection management's basic tenets.

- FM 34-2-1, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance, and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance (19 June 1991)

-- basis for R&S planning and execution.
-- a review of basic doctrinal references,

5.1.2 Collect Target Information

* Intelligence Support to the Targeting Process: S-2s frequently do not provide focused input to targeting meetings.

Techniques: S-2s have responsibilities during all four phases--Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess--of the continuous targeting process:

1. Support the "Decide" phase:

- Identify enemy High Value Targets (HVTs) during targeting meetings
- Recommend High Payoff Targets (HPTs).
- Brief the status of available collection systems

2. Support the "Detect" and "Deliver" phases:

- Estimate when HPTs will be within range of friendly delivery systems by using an Event Template

3. Support the "Assess" phase:

- Recommend collection assets for the "Assess" phase.

4. Accurate BDA tracking is key to the "Decide" phase of follow on targeting meetings:

- The staff must decide to attack targets again -- or shift delivery assets to other targets.

5. Reference FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process (29 March 1990)
Appendix A.

* Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield - Aviation: Aviation S-2s are generally not familiar with all the steps of the IPB process, and the importance of IPB products to the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP) and subsequent mission execution. S-2s produce the initial products required by defining the battlefield environment and describing the battlefield effects, but do not integrate these products with the rest of the staff during the decision making process.

PROBLEMS:
  1. S-2s too often fail to integrate initial IPB products (MCOO etc.) into the TDMP.

  2. S-2 normally produces only one situational template based on the enemy's most probable course of action

  3. After the unit begins executing a mission, the S-2 does not continuously and appropriately update IPB products; instead they tend to focus solely on the situation map.

RESULTS:
  1. Too often the enemy's most dangerous course of action is ignored.

  2. The Battle Staff lacks the necessary enemy COAs to viably conduct wargaming.

  3. Battlefield information is not sufficiently analyzed and products that should result from such analysis either are not produced, or if produced not distributed in time to subordinate element commanders.

  4. Doctrinal references: FM 34-130 and ST 101-5.

Techniques: for aviation S-2s

1. S-2 must become familiar with IPB process and its integration into TDMP.

2. Home Station Training: use the battalion XO to conduct TDMP training with the Battle Staff. Emphasize the IPB process and integrate IPB products into the entire process.


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