Military

Units frequently have difficulty understanding the differences in, and purposes for, pre-combat checks, COMMEXs and signal operation rehearsals.
Communications are not normally integrated into the brigade task force rehearsal.
During deployment COMMEXs are normally ignored.
- if they occur, they exclude all SINCGARS FM and IHRF Radio NCSs controlling their nets.
Task Force briefings and rehearsals do not include a complete review of the signal operations concepts or plans.

Techniques:

1. Revise brigade task force SOPs to include essential pre-operational and pre-combat checks of communications equipment.

2. Familiarize leaders with the purpose, application and conduct of Pre-combat checks, COMMEXs, and signal operation rehearsals.

3. Review the unit's timeline of events to synchronize the signal COMMEXs, rehearsals and execution with the maneuver commander's tactical plan.

4. Doctrinal references:

* Precombat inspections: Aviation company leaders too often do not conduct precombat checks and precombat inspections.

Techniques:

1. Units should review their precombat check and precombat inspection SOPs to ensure they are adequate and used.
2. Doctrinal reference: FM 7-8.

4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders

* Time Management - AD: During the deliberate planning process, there is generally an absence of parallel planning between the battery commander and his platoon leaders.

Platoon leaders often fail to develop and issue effective OPORDs to their teams.
Impedes the platoon leader's ability to integrate and synchronize his planning with that of the supported unit.

Technique: Issuing a warning order after each of the brigade's key planning events (mission analysis brief, COA decision brief, wargaming, etc.) will ensure that subordinate leaders will have adequate time and information to conduct their troop leading procedures.

4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders

* Backbriefs and rehearsals:

Backbriefs and rehearsals are not routinely conducted.

Too many units simply talk through the concept of operations in lieu of a viable rehearsal.

Commanders and S-3 do not:

- deliberately plan for rehearsals and therefore do not prepare for rehearsals
- focus on key events
- address branches and sequels
- involve all key leaders and BOS representatives
- use a synchronization matrix or execution checklist
- adequately note changes to the concept resulting from mission preparation
- publish a FRAGO to update subordinate units.

Techniques:

1. Conduct confirmation briefs immediately after the OPORD `

2. Do not use brief backs as sole means of rehearsal because backbriefs are inadequate in trying to visualize the entire task force plan

3. Rehearsals must be properly planned and prepared.

4. Use a synchronization matrix or execution checklist to guide the rehearsal to insure that all BOS are covered.

5. Concentrate on key events.

6. References: CALL Newsletter 91-1, Rehearsals; FM 7-8, chapter 2; FM 7-10, chapters 2, 4, 5, 6, 7.

When sufficient time is available, there is no substitute for a full-force rehearsal from battalion down to platoon leader level.

* Wargaming: The greatest shortfall in this process is the inability to synchronize the task force because of inadequate wargaming.

Techniques:

1. Array the unit's combat power (two levels down) and array the enemy (event template two levels down).
2. Wargame thoroughly using the action-reaction-counteraction methodology.
3. Conduct detailed analysis of each BOS elements.
4. Conduct a formal wargame brief for the commander (critical if he did not participate in the process).

* Staff battle drills:

Battle Captains and Battle NCOs are not proficient in orchestrating staff battle drills.
Staffs rarely train at Home Station on how to execute staff battle drills.

Unnecessarily large amount of reaction time required for the staff to deal with certain foreseeable situations.
Too many brigades lose their ability to stay within the enemy's decision cycle.

Techniques:

1. Use every possible Home Station training opportunity to develop and refine battlestaff procedures and drills.

2. Train the principal staff on the how to of concurrently planning for future operations while still executing current operations.

* Rehearsals - Fire Support:

Rehearsals are poorly conducted and seldom provide benefit to the operation.
The rehearsals do not practice nor test the plan.
Fire supporters are not integrated into the "maneuver" rehearsal.
Most fire support rehearsals result in only a confirmation of the planned target list.

Techniques:

1. Develop a sound SOP to cover the essential elements of a rehearsal.

2. Ensure that the SOP tests and practices the plan against enemy actions and reactions.

3. Ensure contingencies are addressed and branches and sequels rehearsed

4. Integrate fire support into the "maneuver" rehearsal.

5. A walk-on terrain model is usually worth the required time to construct it.

6. A solid SOP, checklist, or agenda reinforced by home station training would greatly improve rehearsals.

7. Doctrinal references:

4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support

* Staff integration:

Battalion commanders frequently fail to use the XO as the principle agent for integrating coordinating and special staffs into a Battle Staff capable of operating as a team during the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP) and mission execution.
Units that have not developed and trained as a combined staff often ignore several staff officers (such as civil affairs, psychological operations, S-1, S-4, EN, ADO, BALO and SALTO) in staff estimates and orders development.

Procedures:

1. XO must integrate the entire Battle Staff into the TDMP and information management process.

2. Battalion SOPs must establish clear and separate task lists for each TOC member or BOS and be formatted as checklists or battle drills

Technique: Emphasize the Bn XO's role as the focal point in providing clear guidance and supervision for the accomplishment of duties and responsibilities throughout the TOC.

4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations

* Air/ground coordination and integration: Aviation and ground commanders fail to coordinate and integrate their assets to maximize the effectiveness of the combined arms team.

Frequently aviation units operate over ground commanders' sectors without understanding of the ground commander's intent or scheme of maneuver.
Ground commanders do not have a clear understanding of how to employ aviation assets.
Aviation commanders fail to give ground commanders an accurate depiction of aviation capabilities and limitations and suggest the best method to utilize their assets.

Techniques:

1. Initiate commander/S-3 interface early in the planning cycle.

2. Commanders or S-3s should conduct direct coordination with aviation companies placed under the operational control of an infantry battalion.

* Integration between assault and attack aviation assets:

Rarely exists during operations.
Minimal interface occurs between aircrews of different companies.

Techniques:

1. Train at Home Station with attached units.
2. Conduct rehearsals to identify problems and ensure synchronization.
3. Doctrinal reference: FM 90-4.

* A2C2: The aviation liaison officer often does not understand his role within the brigade A2C2 element.

Often fails to provide the information needed to ensure airspace deconfliction.
Frequently neglect to provide information which promotes the development of situational awareness, especially within the AD arena (both ground to air and air to ground engagements).

Technique: References:

* CSS Integration - Fire Support: The FA battalion combat service support decision making process is not integrated into the battalion operational decision making process.

The ALOC staff and TOC staff develop isolated, disjointed support
Wargaming seldom incorporates the concept of support.
CSS not rehearsed at the battalion level.

Desynchronization between the execution of the operational and CSS plans.
Crisis management.

Technique: Include CSS planners in mission analysis, course of action development, analysis of courses of action, wargaming, plans preparation, and rehearsals.

* Ineffective Task Organization - AD: Ineffective task organization of air defense assets continue to adversely affect the ADOs' ability to focus combat power at the critical time and place on the battlefield.

AD task organization not synchronized with the brigade's concept of the operation .
During air assault and deliberate attack operations, AD in direct support of the air assaulting or attacking battalion task force are often providing air defense of the assembly areas while simultaneously conducting troop leading procedures with their supported unit.

Techniques:

1. Ensure that air defense assets remain focused on the brigade priorities.

2. Analyze the brigade's concept of operation to synchronization the air defense task organization with the specific phases of the brigade's plan,

* Breach fundamentals synchronization:

Insufficient coordination and integration between task organized units.
Combined arms rock drill rehearsals at brigade and battalion level often exclude key BOS representation.
Failure to achieve full scale rehearsals at company team and below.

Extended amount of time on target.
Unsynchronized execution.
Execution shortcomings such as timid and untimely deployment of forces, exposed flanks, no obscuration, and no attempt to secure the far side of unopposed point obstacles are common.

Techniques:

1. Use simple, well rehearsed, standard breach drills.
2. Apply the doctrinal techniques found in FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations.

* Combat Health Support (CHS) Planning and Staff Integration:

Techniques:

1. Integrate the Medical Company Commander and Brigade Surgeon into the brigade staff planning process for CHS operations.

2. Ensure that the Combat Health Support Officer (CHSO), the brigade signal officer and representative from the forward MEDEVAC support team become involved the CHS planning process.

3. The Brigade S-1 should schedule CHS wargaming, coordination meetings and rehearsals as critical events on the brigade timeline.

4. The CHS planner must provide the command with a CHS estimate to be used as a basis for the CHS plan which is developed by the Brigade S-1 and the other CHS planners in the brigade.

5. The CHS planners should develop a single CHS graphic (cartoon) showing the position of the Brigade's medical assets, all air and ground evacuation routes and planning and alternate methods for requesting MEDEVAC.

6. The brigade should include the CHS graphic with the brigade operations order to ensure maximum distribution and dissemination of the CHS plan.

7. Doctrinal reference: FM 8-55,

4.5 Employ tactical C3CM

* Compromise procedures and COMSEC management: Brigade task force compromise plans are generally not well thought out, comprehensive enough, or rehearsed.

Most units plan to jump their Julian dates up or down on the FH FM nets because alternate net IDs have not been established and/or published.
A SINCGARS time change from Julian date GPS Zulu/ or alternate net ID is only a temporary fix (long enough to correct the reason for change) to deny enemy access to compromised nets. Once all nets are on the adjusted time, a COMSEC and/or SOI changeover must be initiated.

Techniques:

1. Although manually distributing COMSEC/SOI changes is an acceptable method, a more preferred method is to implement all COMSEC/SOI management and compromise procedures using electronic key transfer, i.e., FM over-the-air-rekey (OTAR) and/or MSE bulk/individual variable transfer. Incorporate the OTAR method of distribution into the brigade's SINCGARS CNR sustainment training program..

2. To further protect during periods of suspected compromise

3. Initiate a COMSEC and/or SOI changeover after all nets are on an alternate Net ID or adjusted time.

4. Doctrinal reference: See FM 11-32 Combat Net Radio (CNR) Operations for building SINCGARS SOPs.

Table of Contents

Section II: TA. 4, Part 2

Section II: TA. 5 Intelligence BOS