Military

Units seldom demonstrate the staff discipline necessary to establish and maintain the battle rhythm
They rarely perform establish routine daily events such as synchronization/targeting meetings and conference calls
Experience great difficulty in generating FRAGOs focusing future
Often unable to assimilate all new available information.
Lack of focus on future operations.
Out of synch with higher HQ battle ryhthm

Hindered battle synchronization.
Unfocused subordinate units.

Techniques:

1. Establish and adhere to a Battle Rhythm and incorporate it into the unit SOP.
2. Strive for the execution of all events at the prescribed time
3. Ensure all tasks that lead to the generation of FRAGOs that focus future operations are accomplished.
4. Set agendas for all events
5. Focus on updating estimates.
6. Provide visibility on significant acts
7. Integrate the Battle Staff and TOC shift

4.3 Determine Actions

* Establish Battalion Command Post (Forward): Forward Support Battalions frequently establish forward command posts (CP) either as part of a forward logistic element (FLE) or when moving a brigade support area (BSA).

Roles and responsibilities between the forward CP and the main CP are frequently undefined.
The forward CPs do not have or use SOPs for organization, assembly, security, and command, control, and communications (C3).
Forward CP personnel are often unaware or unsure of their duties and are unable to control the logistics battle or battle track brigade operations.

Techniques:

1. The FSB should develop an SOP for the forward CP to ensure continuous, responsive combat service support when moving the brigade support area (BSA) or employing a forward logistic element (FLE).

2. Rehearse the newly- developed SOP during Home Station training to gain and maintain proficiency.

3. Doctrinal references:

* Develop Occupation Plan: The Forward Support Battalion often fails to properly plan and execute the occupation/relocation of the BSA.

The military decision making process (MDMP) is usually not used.
Operation is not synchronized with the brigade's current operations.
Rehearsals are seldom conducted. When they are, key personnel often fail to attend.
Normally the unit has an SOP for BSA occupation:
- personnel not familiar with the SOP,
- do not follow the SOP
- never executed the procedure to verify whether it works or not.
FSB S-3s often consolidate the responsibilities of the security and quartering parties.
- OIC of quartering party often inexperienced at placing units in the BSA.
- Lack knowledge and experience of the area needed to properly disperse and defend the BSA.
Tenant elements in the BSA fail to submit sector sketches of their unit area and perimeter IAW unit SOPs.

The FSB S-3 normally plans the move in a vacuum with little or no input from the rest of the FSB staff and the tenant elements of the BSA.
Area improperly quartered when the main body arrives
BSA TOC takes 48-72 hours after closure to establish a good sector sketch of the area.

Techniques:

1. The FSB should ensure compliance with unit SOP for BSA occupation.

2. Rely on the MDMP to:

3. Doctrinal references:

* Military Decision Making Process (MDMP): Battalions generally plan well during the initial planning process at home stations or the ISB. However, as battalion commanders and staffs begin to experience battlefield friction and stress, proficiency in executing the MDMP diminishes.

1. Mission Analysis:

   - Seldom develop comprehensive estimates for the CS and CSS staff elements.
   - Poor time management.

2. Commander's Guidance:

   - Often inconsistent, incomprehensive and lacking detail.

3. Course of Action Analysis and War-Gaming:

   - Bn staffs consistently fail to follow the eight steps of the war-gaming process.
   - Staffs seldom develop force ratios needed to assess the results of the action/reaction/counter-action methodology.

4. Decision Making in a Time Constrained Environment:

   - Bn staffs tend to be less integrated in a time constrained environment.
   - Battle staffs skip steps in the MDMP rather than modifying each step based upon time available.

Staff planning quality generally degrades as battlefield friction increases.
This results in poorly synchronized plans

Techniques:

1. Battalion commanders must see the requirement to conduct Home Station training on TDMP with full staff.

2. Battalion XOs must ensure all members of the battle staff are incorporated into the mission analysis.

3. Consider all time available from the receipt of the initial warning order to mission execution time.

4. Identify critical events that must occur in staff planning and within each battle operating system.

5. Commander's guidance should be given for each battle operating system.

6. Remember: Clear, concise commander's guidance is most important when the tempo of tactical operations increases to minimize the degradation of staff planning quality associated with battlefield friction and stress.

7. The battalion XO must ensure the process remains objective as the S-2 and S-3 fight the enemy and friendly course(s) of action.

8. Doctrinal reference:FM 101-5 (Final Draft, Aug. 96).

* Survey operations - Field Artillery:

Survey support tends to diminishes after the firing batteries and radar are complete.
Units too often fail to consider survey requirements for all assets in the task force i.e., 81 mm mortars, OH-58D, COLTS, targets, routes, and obstacles.

Techniques:

1. Ensure that the survey annex in the Field Artillery Support Plan (FASP) considers all assets in the task force that may require survey.

2. Conduct extensive officer and NCO professional development at Home Station focusing on the importance of effective survey.

3. Doctrinal reference: FM 6-2, especially Chapter 14-2, 14-7 15, and figure 15-1 (FSCOORD checklist).

* Tactical Decision Making Process - Aviation: Aviation staffs do not effectively execute the decision making process.

The staffs do not have a clear understanding of the process and the linkage between the steps.
The few senior officers who understand the process generally focus on other issues.
Often the executive officer focuses on logistical issues, not ST 101-5 staff "leadership" requirements, while the S-3 is fighting the current fight. Units should train as a staff at home station to become proficient in all areas of the decision making process prior to their training rotation.

Techniques:

1. Use executive officers as a chief of staff to coordinate the battle staff and oversee the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP).

2. Use every available Home Station training opportunity to train as a staff in order to enhance proficiency in all areas of the decision making process.

3. Reference: ST 101-5

Procedures:

1. Ensure that the unit TACSOP incorporates the procedures for battle staff drills.

2. References: See ST 101-5, CALL Newsletter 95-12, Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Planning, and CALL Newsletter 95-7, Tactical Operations Center for additional detail about techniques and procedure on how to successfully employ the decision making process.

* Company-level estimate of the situation:

Company/team commanders and platoon leaders make little or no effort to complete their own mission analysis, with resultant products, including a timeline.
Lack of standardized operations order formats and presentation.
Inability to know when to use the deliberate, combat, or quick techniques when applying the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP).
Poor time management
Inadequate preparation to conduct TDMP planning in a field environment.

Techniques:

1. Reference: CALL Newsletter 95-12, Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Planning.

2. Develop pre-printed, acetate sheets for conducting the estimate of the situation in the field:

3. Company commanders can use their platoon leaders as a mini-staff with each responsible for completing a portion of the mission analysis

4. Practice either the combat decision-making process or the quick decision-making process .

Leaders must first understand how the entire formal process works before they can abbreviate the process; otherwise, steps in the process will be skipped and the plan will be poorly synchronized.

* Decontamination Planning:

Brigade and battalion Chemical Staffs conduct minimal decontamination planning.
Chemical Staffs spend little time conducting a map reconnaissance to identify thorough and operational decontamination sites in the brigade area of operation.
No commander's guidance is sought for planning and execution of thorough decontamination operations.
Priorities of decon are not established. Basic patient decon requirements and procedures are not identified at the brigade level.
The segregation of contaminated vs noncontaminated casualties is not addressed.
NBC Annexes do not list decon site locations or link-up points to support current or future operations.
Units fail to verify the availability of CDE to support operational and thorough decon missions or establish decon sites as the chemical threat escalates.

Techniques:

1. Commanders should read and understand TC 3-10, Commander's Tactical NBC Handbook, page 8-4 through 8-7 to understand the commander's guidance needed for the chemical staff to plan effectively.

2. The chemical staffs should read and understand their responsibilities for planning chemical operations as outlined in FM 3-101 (Chemical Staffs and Units) chapters 5 through 9 appendix B and C.

3. Read and understand FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination, chapters 1, 3, 4, and 9.

* Targeting Process/Targeting Meetings:

Staff members do not understand their role in the targeting process.
Battle staffs lack collective experience using the targeting process.
Targeting meetings are random and often unfocused

Techniques:

1. Conducting the targeting meeting (in sequence):

a. The brigade/battalion XO

-opens the meeting
- details its purpose and the agenda
- specifies the time period or event being discussed in the meeting.

b. The S-2 provides an intelligence update.

(1) briefs the current enemy situation.

(2) reviews the current collection plan and reconnaissance and surveillance plan.

(3) provides a battle damage assessment of targets engaged since the last targeting meeting and the impact on the enemy course of action.

(4) presents an analysis of the enemy's most probable courses of actions and locations using the event template and a list of high value targets.

- for the next 24-36 hours for the brigade
- for the next 12-24 hours for battalion)

(5) Finally, the S-2 briefs changes to the PIR for review by the battle staff.

c. S-3 is next:

(1) briefs any particular guidance from the commander and changes to his intent.

(2) briefs any requirements from higher since the last targeting meeting and a review of current operations.

(3) Finally he informs the battle staff of the status of assets available for the targeting process.

d. The third briefer is the battalion FSO:

(1) briefs the status of all delivery assets

- reviews the current target synchronization matrix
- summarizes results of actions taken.

(2) provides the new target synchronization matrix and proposed list of HPTs and locations for the battle staffs' concurrence and refinement.

e. Changes to the HPTL are made. Locations are updated or refined.

f. XO or S-3 facilitates a BOS crosswalk to complete the rest of the matrix:

- identify a detector
- determine an attack means
- assign an asset to assess each HPT.

g. After the targeting meeting, the XO, S-3, S-2 and FSO should brief the commander on the results of the targeting meeting for approval.

h. When the commander approves the results, the following products are updated, prepared and reproduced for timely distribution:

(1) Target Synchronization Matrix

(2) FRAGO to subordinate units

(3) Updated Target List

(4) Updated R&S plan

(5) Any changes to commanders PIR

2. Reference: Targeting Process video script in the JRTC FS DIV TTP red book 1 OCT 96, p.21.

4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance

* Commander's guidance for fire support:

The commander's guidance for fire support is frequently vague.
- does not focus fire support assets
- unsupportable with available fire support assets available.
Commanders are using non-standard terminology.
Improper use of standard terminology

Techniques:

1. Doctrinal references:

2. The FSO must: